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The language scene in Egypt has witnessed important developments since the 
turn of the 21st century. Defying the Fergusonian distribution of diglossic 
functions, the use of Egyptian Arabic (ʿāmmiyya) has spread to domains where 
Standard Arabic (fuṣḥā) is expected. There is also increasing evidence of the 
rising prestige and commercial value of English. In addition, Arabic written in 
Latin script has become a common sight in offline mediums. This study, which 
began in 2010 and was concluded in 2014, is an attempt to understand the 
dynamics of this developing situation in the backdrop of substantial political 
change in Egypt. I investigate what has motivated the recent language 
developments as well as how they are viewed by the self-appointed protectors 
of fuṣḥā and by a sample of language users, with particular focus on the role 
that ideology plays. This involved conducting interviews with ‘agents of change’ 
(an Egyptian nationalist political party, a leftist publisher, and a mobile service 
provider), and a focus group interview with ‘resisters of change’ (representing 
three Arabic language conservation societies). I also carried out a web survey of 
the language behaviour and attitudes of Cairo-based Internet users. 
Incorporating the qualitative and quantitative findings from the interviews and 
the survey, I contend that ideology plays a significant part in the motivation and 
perception of language change. However, the relationship between language 
ideologies and language practices is not straightforward. Other factors such as 
education and age were also salient. These findings contribute to a reframing of 
diglossia and an attempt to theorise the relationships between language, 
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S IDEAS ARE CENTRAL TO THE NOTION OF REVOLUTION, FIRST BECAUSE 
ALL POLITICAL LIFE IS STRUCTURED IN TERMS OF IDEAS, SECOND 
BECAUSE REVOLUTION, AN ESSENTIALLY-CONTESTED CONCEPT, IS A 
LABEL ATTACHED TO EVENTS OR SEQUENCES OF EVENTS WHICH MEAN 
DIFFERENT THINGS TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE, AND THIRD BECAUSE THE 
VERY CONCEPT OF CHANGE, THE YARDSTICK WHICH PEOPLE USE TO 
DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT A REVOLUTION HAS OCCURRED, IS 







Peter Calvert (1990: 77), Revolution and Counter-revolution 
The language situation in Egypt has long been considered a classic case of diglossia, 
which is described by Ferguson (1959b: 336) as a “relatively stable language 
situation”. This description suggests that diglossia is a situation which is not easily 
amenable to change. However, a close look at the present language scene in Egypt 
demonstrates that it is anything but stable. I explain why this is so as I provide a 
background to the present research in Section ‎1.1. I then address why Egypt is 
considered ‘special’ in sociolinguistic terms and how this relates to the present 
research in Section ‎1.2. Finally, I list the research questions that this thesis aims to 
answer and outline the structure of the remainder of this thesis in Section ‎1.3.  
1.1 Background: So much change 
When I embarked on my research in 2010, Egypt’s official language policy had 
remained unchanged for the past sixty years but several developments since the turn 
of the century were shaping the language scene. Internet had become more widely 
available with a free Internet scheme launched in 2002 (Abdel-Hafez & Wahba, 2004) 
and the number of Egyptian Internet users continued to grow rapidly, reaching  23.02 
million users at the end of 2010. Egypt’s Internet penetration rose from an 
insignificant 1% in 2000 to 29.5% ten years later with an average annual growth rate 
of 64% (MCIT, 2011). With the largest community of Internet users in the Arab World 
(MCIT, 2010), Egypt like many other countries was experiencing the linguistic side-
effects of becoming more connected in today’s global world. While the Internet was 
2 
 
rapidly becoming more accessible, support for Arabic script was slow to follow. This 
prompted Arabic speakers to develop their own version of ‘Netspeak’ (cf. Crystal, 
2006) which involved using Latin script to write (often colloquial) Arabic (Warschauer 
et al., 2002). Even as software support became more readily available, the use of 
Latinised Arabic (henceforth, LA) online did not seem to be decreasing; in fact, it was 
spreading to offline use. It was clear that this new linguistic form had become an icon 
of youth identity (Aboelezz, 2012).  
Moreover, as Egypt entered a new global age, no one could “miss the growing 
importance of English as the language of development, education, business and 
technology” (Atia, 1999). This was demonstrated by the pervasive use of English in 
computer mediated communication (Warschauer et al. 2002), its significant spread in 
publishing (Aboelezz, 2012) and its rise as the language of choice in educated circles 
(Schaub, 2000). Many new International schools boasted education in English 
(Peterson, 2011), and several new private universities emerged lucratively offering 
education in foreign languages, which often translates into the absence of Arabic 
from curriculums. 
Although the spread of Global English may be described as a universal phenomenon, 
and certainly one which has been reported in other Arabic speaking countries (see 
for example:  Badry, 2011; Daoudi, 2011; Palfreyman & Al Khalil, 2003; Said, 2011), 
some of the linguistic developments Egypt was witnessing appeared unmatched 
anywhere else in the Arabic speaking world. Since the turn of the century, Egypt has 
been experiencing a boom in the publishing industry aided by a relaxation of 
publishing regulations (Atia, 1999). Tens of new periodicals appeared on the market, 
including many magazines in English, and others in a mixture of English and LA 
(Aboelezz, 2012). Egyptian Arabic (henceforth, EA), once frowned upon in print 
(Cachia, 1967), was rising in acceptability and popularity, particularly in publications 
aimed at young people. The surge in using EA in publishing is perhaps no better 
exemplified than by the launch in 2005 of a groundbreaking magazine, Iḥnā 
(henceforth, Ihna) which is written predominantly in EA in Arabic script (Borg, 2007; 
Dahle, 2012). Soon after, a publishing house called Malāmiḥ (henceforth, Malamih) 
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was established in 2007, and within three years had published tens of works for 
young Egyptian writers in English, EA, and English mixed with LA. 
However, it was not only in print that EA was gaining a greater footing. In 2007, 
Vodafone Egypt, one of the biggest mobile service providers in Egypt, replaced its 
recorded service messages in Standard Arabic (henceforth, SA) with new messages in 
EA. With this move Vodafone Egypt became the first mobile provider in an Arabic-
speaking country to use colloquial Arabic in its service messages. Another 
development was the emergence of the Liberal Egyptian Party in May 2008. The 
party emphasised the Egyptian ethnic identity, and called for the standardisation of 
the Egyptian vernacular as the national language of Egypt. In the same year, 
Wikipedia approved a proposal for the first (and to date only) version of the online 
encyclopaedia in an Arabic vernacular and Wikipedia Masry was officially launched at 
the end of 2008 (Panovi , 2010).  
How is this language change? 
These developments at once question the diglossic distribution of functions in 
classical diglossia as well as challenge the ‘stable’ nature of diglossia. That is, changes 
in domains of use can be perceived as part and parcel of the natural process of 
language change. As Ferguson (1977: 9) himself notes, “all languages change in the 
course of time, and all speech communities change through time in respect to the 
functional allocations of the varieties of language used in them”. It may therefore be 
said that language can change on two levels: the first level is the structure of the 
language (lexicon, grammar, etc.), and the second is the use of the language. Even if 
we argue that the structure of the Arabic language has remained unchanged since 
pre-Islamic times, changes in the domains of use of Arabic demonstrate that, despite 
popular belief (cf. Elgibali, 1996), Arabic is in fact not immune to language change. 
Ferguson also notes that this latter type of change is usually fuelled by changes in 
users’ evaluations of language (cf. section ‎3.3).  
Indeed, Boussofara-Omar (2008: 635) echoes Ferguson when she notes that “the 
ways in which members of a community use language as well as their beliefs about 
language varieties and their ways of speaking shift and change”. She calls for “a shift 
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from studying diglossia as a ‘relatively stable situation’ (Ferguson, 1959: 336) to 
diglossia as sets of practice” (2008: 635). While the present work is not a study of 
changes in the structure of the Arabic language, it is still a study in language change 
in that it investigates how the changes in language use outlined above relate to 
changes in users’ evaluations of language – that is, their language ideologies. 
Language ideologies can be “illuminated through a micro-analysis of linguistic 
structures in discourse and macro-analysis of the factors that lead to asymmetries in 
how languages are perceived” (Stadlbauer, 2010: 1). While it is difficult to conceive 
of doing the former without engaging at least in some small degree with the latter, it 
is possible to divide research on language ideologies in Arabic sociolinguistics along 
rough lines of micro and macro analyses. The present work is firmly positioned in the 
latter. 
More change 
However, this is not the limit of this work’s interaction with change. Despite the 
linguistic, technological and social changes which were clearly taking place in Egypt 
when I began my research in 2010, the political situation appeared quite stable – 
some might say stagnant. Egypt had been under the rule of Muhammad Hosni 
Mubarak for almost thirty years and the main political player (in effect, sole political 
player) was his National Democratic Party (henceforth, NDP). There were no 
prospects of political change on the horizon. Indeed, as I was collecting data in Egypt 
in the summer of 2010, the only real contenders for the presidential elections which 
were scheduled to take place the following year were Mubarak (already over 80) and 
his son, Gamal Mubarak. 
However, one year into my research, a revolution1 in 2011 signalled the onset of a 
period of drastic political change. The period spanning this research (2010-2014) 
witnessed multiple regime changes with a number of governments and interim 
                                                             
1 As pointed out in the quote at the beginning of this chapter, ‘revolution’ is an ‘essentially-contested 
concept’, and even more so the act of labelling it. Mehrez (2012: 1) states: “From ṯawra (revolution) 
to fawra (uprising) to inqilāb (coup) … the very naming and framing of Egypt’s revolution attest to the 
complexity of its meanings and significations”. Since this work is a study in ideology, my primary 
concern is not what things are, but how they are perceived. Hence, while acknowledging the 
semantics of this label, I have opted to use the term ‘revolution’ because it translates from the term 
now ubiquitously used in Egyptian society: ṯawret xamsa w-ʿišrīn yānāyir (the January 25 revolution).  
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governments, one parliamentary election, two presidential elections, and three 
constitutional referenda. These significant political changes inevitably influenced the 
research I carried out and for this reason, this thesis is not only about language 
ideology in Egypt, but about language ideology and change in revolutionary Egypt. 
One of the main contributions of this work is that it chronicles the interaction of 
political and language ideologies in Egypt at a time of significant political change. 
1.2 What’s Special about Egypt? 
The language developments described in Section  1.1 suggest that there is something 
unique to EA and to the Egyptian context which is providing impetus to these rapid 
linguistic changes. To evaluate this, it is useful to turn to literature on Arabic for 
some clues. Egypt has always had a special place in Arabic sociolinguistics: there is an 
abundance of research on EA and on the language situation in Egypt. Indeed, one of 
the earliest Arabic sources entirely dedicated to studying a variety of colloquial 
Arabic was Yūsuf al-Maġribī's early 17th century manuscript Dafʿ al-Iṣr ʿan Kalām Ahl 
Miṣr [Lifting the Burden from the Speech of the People of Egypt] (cf. Zack, 2009). EA 
also attracted the attention of European Orientalists from the 18th century onwards 
(cf. Section  3.3.2.1). Indeed, the main examples of Arabic diglossia that Ferguson 
(1959b) gave when he introduced the concept of diglossia were from Egypt.  
This scholarly attention that Egypt and EA received suggests the historical and 
cultural importance of Egypt. This importance has in turn conferred a kind of supra-
local prestige on EA. For example, Mitchell (1982: 125) notes that “in the important 
case of Egypt, the colloquial usage of the cultured classes of the capital city provides 
spoken norms for the whole country”, “not to mention the frequent incorporation of 
Egyptian forms in the speech of non-Egyptians”. Elsewhere he alludes to “the degree 
of acquiescence to the widely known linguistic practices of Egypt” (p.137), stating 
that “Egypt has developed a standard colloquial language to whose norms educated 
… speakers of other dialects conform” (p.134). He also notes that when 
misunderstandings occur between Arabic speakers of different origins, they “typically 
appeal either to more widely known regional forms, especially those of Egypt, or to 
those of M[odern] S[tandard] A[rabic]” (Mitchell, 1986: 27). 
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In the same vein, Maamouri (1998) notes how school children in the Maghreb 
sometimes use EA forms in their writing under the impression that these forms 
actually belong to SA, and links this to Egypt’s media influence. Versteegh (2001: 
139) cites a similar example from Yemen, where “foreigners who speak Arabic are 
automatically classed as Egyptians, and in communicating with them Yemenis will 
tend to use Egyptian words and even take over Egyptian morphology”. Versteegh 
(2001: 197) explains: 
[EA] is universally known in the Arabphone world on account of the numerous Egyptian 
movies and soap-operas that are exported to all Arab countries. This has led to a 
situation where most people can understand the Egyptian dialect at least partly, but not 
the other way round. A second reason is the large number of Egyptian teachers working 
abroad: thousands of Egyptian teachers were invited to come to the North African 
countries after independence because of the shortage of people who could teach in 
Arabic. In recent times, many Egyptians have been working temporarily in the Gulf 
states and in Saudi Arabia. 
The supra-local prestige of EA, together with its evident local prestige, go some way 
to explain language phenomena which have only been observed in Egypt. For 
example, Holes (2004: 380) notes that “written dialect in newspapers and magazines 
is limited to nonserious topics such as sport and fashion, and even here it is only in 
Egypt that this is at all common”. He also refers to the practice of mixing SA and EA in 
some published material and observes that this ‘mixed written style’ “appears to be 
confined to Egypt and points up once more the different attitude that Egyptians have 
to their native speech compared with that of other Arab nations” (Holes, 2004: 382). 
Versteegh makes a similar observation, noting that the favourable attitude towards 
EA is visible in a range of contexts. For instance, “speeches in the Egyptian 
parliament are often given in something approaching the colloquial language, which 
would be unheard of in other Arab countries” (2001: 196). Another example he 
provides is that in pan-Arabic conferences, “Egyptian delegates unhesitatingly use 
colloquialisms in their speech while delegates from other Arab countries do their 
best to avoid such colloquialisms at all costs” (2001: 197). Significantly, Versteegh 
(2001: 196) observes that it is not surprising that “of all Arab countries, Egypt is the 
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one with the most marked tendency towards the use of the dialect. Egypt has always 
been characterised by a large degree of regional nationalism aiming at the 
establishment of an Egyptian identity, and the Egyptian dialect is certainly an 
important component of this identity”. This important link between language and 
identity is a central theme in this work and one which I will seek to explore in my 
discussions. 
1.3 Research questions and thesis structure 
In light of the foregoing discussions, the main purpose of this thesis is to understand 
the developing language situation in Egypt by investigating the motives behind some 
of the changes described in Section ‎1.1 and exploring how they are received by 
language users and protectors of SA. The role that ideology plays in the motives and 
evaluations of these changes is central to the investigation. The aim is to then use 
the findings to present a contemporary understanding of the relationship between 
language and ideology, reassess the applicability of the diglossic model in Egypt, and 
engage with other important concepts such as identity and power on a theoretical 
level. Table 1 outlines the main research questions that this thesis aims to answer 
and the chapter where each question will be addressed. 
Research Question Where it is answered 
RQ1: What motivates pro-ʿāmmiyya agents of change? What role 
does ideology play? 
CHAPTER 4 
RQ2: How are the recent changes perceived by pro-fuṣḥā resisters 
of change? How is this linked to their ideologies? 
CHAPTER 4 
RQ3: What are the attitudes of language users towards the recent 
changes and how are these attitudes related to the users’ 
identities and language practices? 
CHAPTER 5 
RQ4: How can the findings further our understanding of the 
language situation in Egypt? 
CHAPTER 6 
Table 1. The research questions and where they will be answered 
I have attempted to maintain a kind of chronology in the thesis, so that the reader is 
brought up to speed as they proceed through the thesis, with the latter chapters 
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painting the most recent picture of events and language developments in Egypt. The 
remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: 
CHAPTER 2 focuses on diglossia. In the first part, I provide a historical overview of the 
Arabic language and the Arabicisation of Egypt with particular attention to the 
origins and development of diglossia. In the second part, I elucidate what is meant by 
diglossia as a linguistic concept. Here, I outline Ferguson’s diglossic model and 
provide a review of expansions and criticisms of the model. I address the relationship 
between diglossia and language shift, and discuss the different conceptualisations 
that Arabic linguists have offered of the Arabic language situation, the frequent 
problematisation of the situation, and native speakers’ awareness of this situation. 
In CHAPTER 3, I focus on language policy, ideology and practices. I demonstrate that 
the three terms are closely intertwined and must therefore be discussed together. 
Under language policy, I discuss the post World War II Arabicisation policies in newly 
independent Arab countries and issues of language planning and standardisation. I 
then address language ideology – to which the bulk of the chapter is dedicated. I 
cover language myths about Arabic and discuss the issue of identity – particularly 
national identity – at length. Finally, I discuss language practices in Egypt and point to 
the evident discrepancy between language ideologies and practices. 
The first two RQs are addressed in CHAPTER 4. To answer RQ1, I conducted three 
interviews with (representatives of) pro-ʿāmmiyya agents of change: the Liberal 
Egyptian Party, Malamih publishing house and Vodafone Egypt. To answer RQ2 I 
conducted a focus group interview with three pro-fuṣḥā resisters of change: 
representatives of three prominent Arabic language conservation societies in Egypt. I 
subject the interviews to discourse analysis to investigate how ideology is configured 
into the interviewees’ arguments – if at all. These interviews were conducted in the 
summer of 2010. 
In CHAPTER 5, I explain how a web-based survey of language attitudes and practices of 
Cairo-based Internet users was designed to address RQ3. I provide a review of the 
methodology, outlining the advantages and drawbacks of this research method. I 
then define the population and outline the process of designing, testing and piloting 
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the survey. Finally, I present the survey analysis and results and acknowledge the 
limitations of the findings. The survey was carried out in 2012-2013. 
CHAPTER 6 addresses RQ4. I paint a more up to date picture of the language situation 
in Egypt in 2014 and use the findings from the interviews and the survey – along with 
the relevant literature – to make sense of the language changes in Egypt. I begin by 
addressing the question of identity and emphasise the prominence of this question 
at the time of writing. I then adapt existing theories to offer a theoretical framing of 
the relationship between language and power in Egypt. Finally, I revisit Ferguson’s 
diglossic model and offer an alternative way of framing diglossia in Egypt by 
expanding a recently proposed model by Bassiouney (2014). 
I conclude the thesis in CHAPTER 7 where I summarise the main contributions of this 





2 Diglossia in Arabic: History and Theory 
S LATER ON, CORRUPTION AFFECTED THE LANGUAGE OF THE MUDAR, WHOSE 
FORMS, AND WHOSE RULES GOVERNING THE VOWEL ENDINGS, HAD BEEN 
SYSTEMATISED (AS THE PURE ARABIC LANGUAGE). THE VARIOUS LATER 
DIALECTS DIFFERED ACCORDING TO THE (MORE OR LESS CLOSE) CONTACT 
WITH (NON-ARABS) AND THE (LARGER OR SMALLER) ADMIXTURE OF NON-
ARAB (ELEMENTS). AS A RESULT, THE BEDOUIN ARABS THEMSELVES CAME 
TO SPEAK A LANGUAGE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THEIR 
MUDAR ANCESTORS WITH REGARD TO VOWEL ENDINGS, AND DIFFERENT IN 
MANY RESPECTS WITH REGARD TO THE (CONVENTIONAL) MEANINGS AND 
FORMS OF WORDS. AMONG THE URBAN POPULATION, TOO, ANOTHER 
LANGUAGE ORIGINATED, WHICH WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE MUDAR 
WITH REGARD TO VOWEL ENDINGS, AS WELL AS MOST MEANINGS AND 
GRAMMATICAL INFLECTIONS. IT DIFFERS ALSO FROM THE LANGUAGE OF 
PRESENT-DAY ARAB BEDOUINS. AGAIN, IT DIFFERS WITHIN ITSELF 
ACCORDING TO THE (DIFFERENT) TERMINOLOGIES OF THE INHABITANTS OF 
THE VARIOUS REGIONS. THUS, THE URBAN POPULATION OF THE EAST SPEAKS 
A DIALECT DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE MAGHRIBIS. AND THE LANGUAGE 













Ibn Khaldun (1967 [1377]: 456), Muqaddima 
2.1 Introduction 
Notwithstanding the special relationship that Egyptians have with their colloquial 
(Section ‎1.2), Egypt tends to be indiscriminately regarded as part and parcel of the 
Arabic linguistic community. Although discrepancies are occasionally acknowledged, 
the Arabic speaking world is, more often than not, crudely treated as one 
homogenous entity with comparable characteristics. As a result, some of the 
generalisations made about the Arabic speaking world (as a linguistic community) 
can be very misleading when applied to individual cases (speech communities) such 
as Egypt (cf. Ferguson, 1991). Throughout the present work, I seek to highlight how 
the language situation in Egypt diverges from generalisations that have been made 
about the Arabic speaking world. 
However, in spite of any such divergences, Egypt irrefutably shares with the rest of 
the Arabic-speaking world a historical chapter which saw the arrival of the Arabic 
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language in Egypt. It is therefore necessary to trace the roots of this language, once 
restricted to the Arabian Peninsula, and to examine how it has come to be the 
adopted language of a much wider geographical space today. Such an examination is 
instrumental to an understanding of the origin of Arabic diglossia and the emergence 
of different regional varieties of Arabic. It is then important to grapple with the very 
concept of diglossia; to understand what exactly it means as a linguistic term. 
Hence, this chapter begins with two sections on the history of diglossia, while the 
remainder of the chapter is dedicated to discussing the theory of diglossia. I begin in 
Section ‎2.2 by providing an overview of the history of the Arabic language, outlining 
its fortunes and misfortunes under the Islamic empire. This is a mostly chronological 
account, with intermittent discussions of how various events influenced the 
language. I then focus on the history of Arabic in Egypt in Section ‎2.3, describing the 
linguistic situation in Egypt before and after Islam, discussing the substratal influence 
of Coptic, and examining linguistic developments during the modern era as a link to 
the contemporary language situation. Together, these two sections serve as a 
necessary prologue to the following sections where diglossia is addressed from a 
theoretical point of view. 
In Section ‎2.4, I explain diglossia as a linguistic concept – as defined by Charles 
Ferguson (1959b) – and review the expansions and criticisms of other linguists. In 
Section ‎2.5, I discuss the relationship between diglossia and language shift, which has 
an important bearing on the present research. I then explain some of the key 
terminology pertaining to diglossia in Arabic in Section ‎2.6. In Section ‎2.7, I discuss 
different perspectives about the distance between the two diglossic poles and 
different approaches to studying the intermediate varieties. In Section ‎2.8‎2.8, I 
discuss how and why diglossia has been problematised in the literature, with a 
particular focus on its effect on education. Finally, I discuss speakers’ awareness of 
diglossia in Section ‎2.9 before concluding with a summary of the key points from this 
chapter in Section ‎2.10. 
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2.2 A history of Arabic and the origins of diglossia 
Arabic is a Semitic language; this refers to a group of languages which belong to the 
Afro-Asiatic family of languages (cf. Ryding, 2005; Versteegh, 2001). All the other 
groups in the Afro-Asiatic family comprise languages indigenous to North Africa. It is 
therefore the Semitic group which accounts for the ‘Asiatic’ in the Afro-Asiatic family, 
as it was originally the most Easterly based of its sister languages: covering the 
Levant, the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian Peninsula. The languages of the Semitic 
subfamily, which are thought to descend from a single “Proto-Semitic” language 
(Versteegh, 2001), include extinct members such as Phoenician, endangered 
languages such Aramaic, and survivors such as Hebrew and Arabic. Of these, Arabic is 
the language in widest use today serving as “the native language of over 200 million 
people in twenty different countries as well as the liturgical language for over a 
billion Muslims throughout the world” (Ryding, 2005: 1). 
The development of the Arabic language may be divided into five stages: Old Arabic 
(or Proto-Arabic), Early Arabic, Classical Arabic, Middle Arabic and Modern Arabic 
(Ryding, 2005). The evidence which survives from the first period (approximately 7th 
Century BC to 3rd Century AD) is very scarce, and carries little information about the 
structure of the language. Speculations have been made about the presence of an 
early form of Arabic in inscriptions which were found in Central Arabia and date as 
far back as the 6th century BC (Versteegh, 2001), but the earliest evidence of the 
existence of Arabic as a distinct language seems to lie in an inscription which has 
been dated back to the first century AD (Holes, 2004). The second stage spans a 
period of about three centuries, during which Arabic underwent some transitional 
changes through contact with the surrounding cultures (with Aramaic having a 
notable influence in the arrangement of the Arabic alphabet) and evolved into a 
closer semblance of Classical Arabic (Ryding, 2005; Versteegh, 2001). 
It is perhaps the Classical period which was the most crucial to the development of 
Arabic. The earliest evidence from this period survives in pre-Islamic poetry from the 
6th century AD which was preserved through an active tradition of oral transmission 
until it was finally recorded in writing in the 8th century AD (Holes, 2004). During this 
period, reciting poetry was a highly refined and much admired formal art and tribal 
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custom. Even at this early stage, there is general agreement among Arab and 
Western linguists that some regional variation had precipitated in dialectal varieties 
of Arabic, although it is maintained that such variation would have consisted mostly 
of minor lexical and phonetic differences which did not interfere with mutual 
intelligibility (Altoma, 1969; Badawi, 1973; Holes, 2004; Versteegh, 1996; Zakariyya, 
1964). It is speculated that the literary koine of poetic production, though not far 
removed from the native varieties, would have been used alongside them (Ferguson, 
1959a).  
Badawi (1973) subscribes to this theory. He acknowledges the claim made by 
medieval Muslim grammarians to linguistic purity during the pre-Islamic period, 
stating that the Bedouins of the time spoke ‘perfect’ or ‘sound’ Arabic innately2 (this 
is commonly referred to as the theory of linguistic purity). However, Badawi tells us 
that linguistic evidence and accounts presented by some of the very same 
grammarians suggests a contradicting reality. The grammarians had set up a dialectal 
hierarchy in which the Arabic of the tribe of Quraysh constituted the most perfect 
variety (Holes, 2004; Versteegh, 1996), inevitably implying some degree of linguistic 
variation among the tribes and regions of Arabia (Versteegh, 2001). Strictly speaking, 
such a situation corresponds to what Ferguson (1991) would call a case of “standard-
with-dialects” where the standard variety is the mother tongue for a group of people 
who use it for everyday conversation. However, Badawi goes even further to 
speculate that the Bedouin tribes had two levels of speech: the varying native 
vernaculars which were used for everyday communication within the tribes, and a 
somewhat uniform literary variety for poetic production and formal cross-tribal 
communication (Badawi, 1973: 19-22). It is the latter, Badawi states “which was the 
seed of a common language, or ‘Arabic’ [al-ʿarabiyya] as it later came to be known” 
(p. 20). Badawi describes this situation as ‘linguistic duality’ (izdiwājiyyat al-luġa), 
which corresponds to what is known in Western linguistics as diglossia.  
The view that the origins of diglossia stem from pre-Islamic Arabia is supported by 
Elgibali (1996) and Anis (2003 [1973]). According to Elgibali (1996: 8-9), “to presume 
that Classical Arabic was the native language of any speaker either immediately 
                                                             
2 The Arabic expression they used was bi-l-salīqa, literally meaning innately or by nature. 
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before or at the time of the inception of Islam is, a gross misrepresentation. The texts 
transmitted to us belong to a literary genre, which was not identifiable with any one 
native tongue”. Anis argues that this literary language, which drew many of its 
features from the dialect of Quraysh, was in fact an amalgamation of other Arabic 
dialects as well: it was a sophisticated poetic koine recognised by the Arab tribes of 
the region and used in oratory competitions, but not itself the native tongue of any 
one tribe. Eglibali (1996: 9) posits that “it is more reasonable to believe that the 
literary language emerged as a selective composite and an eclectic blend, marking its 
manifestations unfit to be considered a valid representation of a homogeneous 
linguistic competence of a given speech community”. This elevated variety was 
hence a learned variety, one which was manipulated by tribal elites who would 
compete in the mastery of intricacies. As Elgibali (1996: 10) observes, “one can easily 
imagine the importance of such mastery in a society dominated by oral tradition”. He 
adds that the “history of Arabic abounds with anecdotal evidence of how learning 
the Classical language has always been a noble yet unattainable goal” (Elgibali, 1996: 
12). 
The central event which would shape the fate of Arabic did not occur until the 7th 
Century AD with the emergence of Islam. Muhammad, the prophet of Islam, was born 
in the year 570 AD in Mecca. From 610 AD and until he died in 632 (22 years), 
Muhammad preached Islam. At the core of his message was a divine revelation, the 
Qurʾān (henceforth, Quran), a text which was not only considered the literal word of 
God, but is considered by multitudes today to constitute Arabic in its purest form; 
Arabic was “permanently sacralised” (Ryding, 2005: 3). Though differing in stylistic 
and general textual structure, the Quran is thought to be formulated in the poetic 
variety of pre-Islamic Arabia (Badawi, 1973; Holes, 2004; Versteegh, 1996). 
Muhammad was himself from Quraysh, an important tribe in Ḥijāz, the eastern part 
of the peninsula. It is therefore little wonder that later Muslim grammarians would 
rank the dialect of Ḥijāz highest among the pre-Islamic dialects of the Arabian 
Peninsula (Holes, 2004; Versteegh, 1996). 
Soon after Muhammad’s death, his followers recognised the need to preserve the 
Quran as many of the reciters of the Quran were dying in battle and the increasing 
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number of followers from outside the Peninsula was resulting in deviant readings of 
the Quran (Versteegh, 2001). The codification process was a long and thorough 
process overseen by an appointed committee of text editors who had to make many 
decisions at the linguistic-level. The first unified text of the Quran, al-muṣḥaf, was 
completed during the time of the third Caliph, ʿuṯmān bin ʿaffān (r. 644-656) and was 
sent to the corners of the fast-growing Islamic empire to displace all deviant texts. Al-
muṣḥaf is believed to be the product of the first effort to standardise the Arabic 
orthography which included the adoption of diacritic dots to distinguish between 
similar letters, a convention which was already in use by some Arabic scribes and 
which is thought to have been borrowed from Syriac (ibid.). Other innovations in the 
orthography included the introduction of red dots to denote short vowels by Abū al-
Aswad al-Duʾalī, who is traditionally credited with the invention of Arabic grammar 
and who also invented the šadda (gemination sign) and the hamza (glottal stop). The 
development of the system for denoting short vowels into a closer semblance of the 
short vowel diacritics of modern Arabic is attributed to the first Arabic lexicographer, 
al-Khalīl bin Aḥmad al-Farāhīdī in the eighth century (ibid.). 
Within a century of Muhammad’s death, his followers had formed an empire that 
stretched from Persia to Spain, and wherever Islam went, Arabic did too.  In fact, it is 
indicated that “the first main cultural transformation that occurred after the 
establishment of the Islamic empire had more to do with language than with 
religion” (Dallal, 1999: 158). While Muslims remained a minority for several centuries 
in many parts of the empire (including Egypt), Arabic, the official language of the 
empire, was gaining rapidly. In the eighth century, Arabic began to replace Greek to 
the West and Persian to the East as the language of administration (Versteegh 2001), 
but recognising the prominence of the Greek and Persian cultures, translations from 
these languages would later abound, introducing many Greek and Persian loanwords 
which survive in Arabic to this day (Holes, 2004). In these early centuries following 
Islam, Classical Arabic was not only used as a written language, but also served as 
“the spoken language of the élite in formal situations” (Versteegh, 1996: 17). 
Between the eighth and the twelfth centuries, Arabic became the language of a great 
body of cultural and scientific production which thrived under the Islamic empire. 
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Indeed, it is argued that what is often dubbed “Islamic sciences” should be more 
accurately designated “Arabic sciences” because of the central role that the Arabic 
language played in the development of these sciences (Dallal, 1999). Many of the 
scholars who wrote in Arabic were not Arab, and some were not even Muslim. 
One particular science was quick to flourish; that of Quranic exegesis. The close 
analysis of the Quran often entailed a linguistic analysis of the text, and soon enough, 
some scholars began to focus primarily on the language of the text itself rather than 
its contents (Versteegh, 1997). This was coupled with a growing concern for the 
Arabic language; medieval grammarians believed that the rapid acquisition of the 
Arabic language by non-native speakers of Arabic in the wake of the Islamic 
conquests had resulted in the ‘corruption of speech’ (fasād al-kalām) (Badawi, 1973; 
Versteegh, 1996, 1997). Grammatical mistakes in assigning the wrong case endings 
to words were often reported and bitterly criticised by grammarians who took 
measures to preserve the unity of the language. In the eighth century, the first text 
to comprehensively compile and describe the rules of Arabic grammar was written 
by Sībawayh (c.a. 752- c.a. 796), a Persian scholar who studied Arabic in Iraq and was 
one of al-Farāhīdī’s students (Carter, 2004).  Kitāb Sībawayh (Sībawayh’s book), so 
called because its author died without giving it a name, is still considered by many 
today as the ultimate reference on Arabic grammar.  
Notwithstanding contemporary views concerning the pre-Islamic origins of diglossia, 
it is worth noting that, to the Arabic Grammarians, there was only one Arabic 
language; it was used in everyday communication by the tribes of pre-Islamic Arabia, 
and it is the same language in which the Quran was revealed (Versteegh, 1996). 
While the Grammarians acknowledged regional linguistic variation among the tribes 
of Arabia, this was regarded as “equivalent expressions with approximately the same 
status” (Versteegh, 1996: 16). For centuries after Islam, noblemen would send their 
children to live with Bedouin tribes so that they may learn to fight and speak ‘proper 
Arabic’. It was also common for the Arab grammarians of the time to consult 
Bedouins in arbitrating linguistic questions, suggesting that Classical Arabic (as 
defined by the grammarians) survived for some time as a living language which was 
natively spoken by at least some tribal groups. However, over time, the forms put 
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forth by grammarians as supposedly spoken by a group of people – through 
expressions like “the Arabs say” – “lost [their] connotation of actual intercourse with 
living speakers of the Classical language who could be consulted in case of doubt, 
and it came to denote a methodological fiction” (Versteegh, 1996: 18). The work of 
the early grammarians was essentially prescriptive; indicating how people should 
speak (Versteegh, 1996). That the grammarians had to go to such lengths to 
prescribe how Arabic ought to be spoken is itself proof that whatever core of native 
speakers the Arabic language had, this was rapidly diminishing. 
By the 13th century the Arabic Islamic empire was past its prime. Already weakened 
by the emergence of independent dynasties and the Crusaders’ inroads, it suffered 
additional blows from the Mongol invasions in the 13th century (Smith, 1999). This 
weakened state culminated in the fall of Granada, the last Muslim stronghold in 
Spain in 1491 and the subsequent expulsion of Muslims from the Iberian Peninsula. 
What happened to Arabic under the disintegrating empire was perhaps the early 
Arabic grammarians’ worst nightmare. For one thing, this disintegration symbolised 
the declining prestige of Arabic. With the loss of Andalucía in Spain, the Islamic world 
had lost an important centre of cultural exchange (peaking in the 10th century) for 
which Arabic was the main vehicle of expression (ibid.). Under the independent 
dynasties in the East, Farsi (a new form of Persian heavily influenced by Arabic) was 
already replacing Arabic as the language of the court from the 9th century and 
became the main language of culture in the 10th century. The fall of Baghdad, 
another Islamic cultural centre, to the Mongols in 1258 undermined the status of 
Arabic and contributed indirectly to the newfound prestige of Farsi in the entire 
Islamic East (Lapidus, 1999; Versteegh, 2001). Arabic continued to be revered as the 
language of Islam, but even as Islam spread further into central and South East Asia, 
it did so through Farsi (Lapidus, 1999).  
Simultaneously, a new force began to emerge from the 14th century onwards: that of 
the Ottomans. The Ottomans expanded in every direction, annexing to the Islamic 
empire new territories in Eastern Europe. In its geographical scope; the Ottoman 
Empire was the greatest of Islamic Empires, reaching the height of its expansion in 
the 17th century (Lapidus, 1999). The Ottomans were Turkish-speakers and enforced 
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Turkish as the language of government and administration throughout the empire. 
As in Persia and further to the East, Arabic continued to function as the language of 
religion. It was also the language of most cultural production, and crucially, it 
continued to be the language of the populace in the Arab provinces where less than 
one percent of the population spoke Turkish (Versteegh, 2001). Turkish became a 
language which influenced Arabic in the long term, but was also permanently 
influenced by it. 
The above changes fall in the timeframe of what is sometimes known as the stage of 
Middle Arabic. However, definitions of the time span of ‘Middle Arabic’ vary widely; 
it extends from (as early as) the 8th century to the end of the 18th century according 
to some linguists (cf. Versteegh, 2001), while other linguists delimit it to the period 
from the 13th to the 18th centuries (Ryding, 2005). Holes (2004: 37) does not rule out 
the possibility of tracing “the developments in Middle Arabic through time”, while 
Versteegh (2001: 114) argues that “it would ... be a mistake to assign any 
chronological connotation to the term ‘Middle Arabic’”, and uses it as a “collective 
name for all texts with deviations from Classical grammar”. In light of this ambiguity, 
Middle Arabic is perhaps more usefully treated as a developmental phase rather than 
a time period. However, it is useful to draw parallels between Middle Arabic and 
what Chejne (1969) terms “the period of decline” of Arabic: from 1258 to 18003. 
Studies of Middle Arabic usually focus on examining the influence of colloquial Arabic 
in written texts, though this is not always easy since many texts will have possibly 
undergone various degrees of editing and ‘correction’ over time, and because the 
written texts available for study are not proportionately available from all regions of 
the empire (Holes, 2004; Versteegh, 2001). The general assumption about this stage, 
however, is that while the literary standard codified by the Classical grammarians 
remained morphologically and lexically intact, save for borrowings from the 
substrate languages, the vernaculars experienced morphological simplifications most 
visible in the loss of inflections and grammatical distinctions.  
                                                             
3 Chejne (1969) divides the history of Arabic under the Islamic empire into three periods: development 
(661-750), growth (750-1258) and decline (1258-1800). 
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The 14th century Tunisian scholar, Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406) – who is quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter – testifies to this in his Muqadimma (1377), observing that 
the language of his time is different from that which was codified by the early 
grammarians (Ibn Khaldun, 1967 [1377]). Ibn Khaldūn is clearly a proponent of the 
theory of the pre-Islamic purity of Arabic, and attributes any deviation from Classical 
Arabic to contact with the non-Arabs. He believed that the Arabs had lost their 
innate ability to speak their language properly when they left Arabia and settled 
among the non-Arabs; the more contact they had with the non-Arabs the more 
‘corrupt’ their language became. Crucially, Ibn Khaldūn notes that the Arabic spoken 
in his time has lost many of its grammatical inflections and that it has been 
phonologically influenced by contact with non-Arabs. He also notes regional variation 
in Arabic, observing that the Arabic spoken by the people of the East (who have been 
influenced by Persian and Turkish) is different from that which is spoken by the 
people of the West (who have been influenced by Berber). All the same, Ibn Khaldūn 
remarks that the Arabic language is just as eloquent in his time as when it was 
codified by the Classical grammarians (in a clear reference to the literary variety 
which had retained its Classical features). We may infer from this that Middle Arabic 
reflects a stage during which the Arabic vernaculars shifted further from the literary 
standard and grew further apart from one another; a period where distinct regional 
varieties began to emerge and diglossia became more pronounced. 
Although the traditional theory of the purity of pre-Islamic Arabic was “dogmatic in 
its view of Arabic as a static language”, “not surprisingly, the language itself – 
unheeded by theoretical prescriptiveness or squabbles – has ceaselessly continued 
its own journey of change into a multitude of often interrelated and overlapping 
regional, ethnic, religious, and social varieties” (Elgibali, 1996: 4). What the well-
meaning classical grammarians had effectively done, according to Badawi (1973: 38-
41), was “freeze” Arabic in its 7th century form, isolating it from successive waves of 
change. For a language to remain accessible to the ears and tongues of its people the 
parallelism between the language and society must be maintained so that the 
language continues to reflect the civilisation of its speakers; but the grammarians 
could not possibly freeze the Arab civilisation even if they had tried. By defining 
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sound Arabic so precisely and distinctively, the early grammarians had 
unintentionally defined two languages instead of one: one which falls within the 
prescribed boundaries of the language, and one which falls outside them; i.e. 
eloquent Arabic (fuṣḥā), and the Arabic of the populace (ʿāmmiyya). The 
grammarians had chained the first with linguistic rules, but left the other to roam 
freely; an image which is romanticised by Badawi (1973: 40): 
Fuṣḥā remained in her abode waiting for someone to knock on her door; to seek her 
where she is, yielding to her demands. If she ever does answer a bold call to come out, 
she does so hesitantly, in her codified boundaries, and after close inspection of what is 
permissible and what is not. She does that, if at all, with her eyes forever gazing 
backwards while the society and those around her are continually moving in the 
opposite direction. On the other hand, ʿāmmiyya – or that which is not fuṣḥā – kept up 
with society and fulfilled its every need. She lived in people’s homes, shared their beds, 
mixed with them in their affairs, closed their deals, rejoiced with them, condoled with 
them, expressed their innermost emotions and pulsated to their heartbeats. 
(translated) 
However, literary Arabic has not remained completely unchanged since its 
codification as the above analogy might suggest. The Arabic of the modern period 
(Modern Standard Arabic; henceforth MSA), which begins approximately from the 
end of the 18th century, differs markedly from Classical Arabic (henceforth CA). 
Though MSA is a continuation of the same literary tradition and is morphologically 
very similar to CA, there is a discernable difference in style and vocabulary reflecting 
different historical and cultural traditions (Ryding, 2005), (cf. Section ‎2.6). The 
cultural changes to which the difference between CA and MSA can be attributed 
were largely a by-product of the European colonisation which swept through the 
Islamic world in the 19th century bringing the waning Ottoman Empire to an end and 
thereby concluding this chapter in the common history of the Arabic-speaking world.  
Colonial forces in the Near East were mainly Italian, French or British, though the 
purpose, manner and length of colonisation differed widely between colonisers and 
colonies. It was not until the end of World War II that the region became completely 
independent of European colonisation, although the colonisers maintained a cultural 
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hold on their former colonies (Nasr, 1999). The extent and nature of the cultural 
influence of colonisation across the Arabic speaking world was not uniform, though a 
shared feature is the plethora of foreign borrowings into the Arabic vernaculars from 
the respective languages of the colonisers (examples include the influence of Italian 
on Libyan, French on Syrian and Lebanese, and English on Gulf Arabic) (cf. Holes, 
2004). However, the most lasting legacy of the colonial era has perhaps been the 
division of the Islamic and Arab World into territorial nation-states. As the newly 
found states walked down separate paths of history, they continued to diverge 
politically and culturally as well as linguistically. I will return to this point in history in 
the next chapter when I discuss Arabicisation policies in the newly found Arab states 
(Section ‎3.2.2), but I shall now rewind and zoom in on the country which is the focus 
of the present study: Egypt. 
2.3 The Arabisation of Egypt 
Pre-Islamic Egypt was inhabited by a polyglot society, mostly concentrated in the Nile 
Valley and Delta, but also populating some of the desert and less arable land to the 
East (Holes, 2004). The ancient city of Alexandria was the capital of Egypt as well as a 
major trade port in the Mediterranean. Before the arrival of Islam, the majority of 
Egyptians were Monophysite Christians who spoke Coptic, a descendent of Ancient 
Egyptian and a language which, like Arabic, belongs to the Afro-Asiatic family. 
However, Coptic is not a Semitic language; in other words, if Arabic and Hebrew were 
sisters, Coptic would be their ‘cousin’ (cf. Holes, 2004; Versteegh, 2001). In Pre-
Islamic Egypt, written Coptic, which was heavily influenced by the Greek alphabet, 
was used in liturgy and in some limited administrative functions. As was the case in 
Syria, Egypt had been under the political control of the Byzantine emperors for 
several centuries and Greek was the main language of administration. Arabic had 
also been on the scene for some time through the migration of Arab Bedouins to the 
eastern and north-eastern parts of Egypt over a number of centuries. Greek 
historians record that parts of this region had undergone some degree of 
Arabicisation by as early as 66 BC (Holes, 2004). 
Islam arrived in Egypt in 639 AD within less than a decade of Muhammad’s death. 
Upon their arrival in Egypt, Arabs set up their garrisontown in Fusṭāṭ (literally 
22 
 
meaning ‘camp’, now situated in Old Cairo) which subsequently became the new 
Egyptian capital and developed into an important commercial and cultural centre for 
the Islamic empire (Donner, 1999). Initially, the ‘province’ of Egypt also included 
Spain and North Africa (present day Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco), though 
these became separate provinces in 705. Around this time, Arabic became the 
language of administration in Egypt (Holes, 2004; Versteegh, 2001). Although the 
population of Egypt remained predominantly Christian for several centuries, this 
administrative change sped up the Arabicisation of Egypt as it meant that Coptic 
administrators had to learn Arabic if they were to retain their jobs (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 
2007). Other developments which took place between the 9th and 12th centuries also 
favoured the spread of Arabic. These included the large scale conversion into Islam 
by Egyptian Copts, influxes of Arab migrants into Egypt and the disbanding of the 
Arab army which allowed Arab garrisons to mix with and marry from the local 
population (Holes, 2004).  
From the beginning, Egypt occupied an important position in the Islamic empire, but 
its importance was increased dramatically under the rule of the Fatimid caliphs (969-
1171) who came from North Africa and made Egypt the seat of their caliphate. The 
Fatimids formed their capital next to Fusṭāṭ in al-Qāhira (literally meaning ‘the 
victorious’), giving Cairo its modern name (Donner, 1999). The new capital soon 
became home to al-Azhar, a great mosque and educational centre which would 
attract scholars from around the Islamic world and play a substantial role in 
advancing Arabic and Islamic studies for centuries to come. During this period, Egypt 
continued to enjoy a reasonable degree of autonomy having already developed a 
distinct provincial identity under earlier Abbassid rulers: “While an inhabitant of 
Egypt identified himself as an inhabitant of a village or town, as a member of a 
religious community, and as being of a specific ethnicity – native Egyptian or 
Egyptianised Arab – he also recognised the existence of a fixed territory called Egypt 
to which he belonged” (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007: 8). 
While Arabic was gaining quickly in towns and urban centres, the Arabicisation of the 
countryside was much slower. Coptic continued to be used as a liturgical language by 
Coptic Christians, but in general as the number of Arabic-speakers increased, that of 
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Coptic speakers decreased. This triggered the concern of members of the Coptic 
clergy such as Sāwīris ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (d. 987)4, who complained in his history of the 
patriarchs that most Copts could no longer understand Coptic and could only 
communicate in Arabic (Gamal El-Din, 2006). Recognising the endangered status of 
Coptic, dictionaries and grammars of the language began to emerge during the 13th 
century in an effort to preserve and revitalise the language, but by the 16th century 
the language was all but extinct (Holes 2004). It was ultimately reduced to a liturgical 
language, though one which is still used today by Egypt’s Christian Copts who make 
up approximately ten percent of the population (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007). Versteegh 
(2001) notes that the period of Coptic/Arabic bilingualism in Lower Egypt lasted for 
about two centuries, which was shorter than the period of bilingualism in Syria and 
thinks that this may explain the surprisingly limited influence of Coptic on EA. 
2.3.1 The substratal influence of Coptic 
In the 1960’s, Wilson Bishai wrote a series of articles on the substratal influence of 
Coptic on EA (Bishai, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1964). In terms of phonology, Bishai (1961) 
demonstrates that the influence of Coptic was very limited, and where plausible is 
restricted to dialects of Upper Egypt (a region of Egypt in which Islam and Arabic 
were later and slower to penetrate). For instance, he notes that the /p/ sound which 
occurred in Coptic but not in Classical Arabic, had been replaced by /b/ in EA and has 
re-emerged only recently as a result of contact with European languages. Similarly, 
the /g/ sound, which is iconic of EA and occurs in the same distribution as the 
Classical Arabic /ʤ/, cannot be traced back to Coptic where this sound was not 
common. Other phonological features of EA which set it apart from the phonology of 
Classical Arabic are often found in similar distribution in other, sometimes distant, 
Arabic vernaculars suggesting internal developments in the language or a more 
general process of second language acquisition rather than a substratal influence of 
Coptic (Versteegh, 2001). For instance, Versteegh notes that the interdentals of 
Classical Arabic have shifted to dentals in Egyptian Arabic, a feature which is 
sometimes attributed to Coptic influence. However, because the disappearance of 
interdentals is part of a widespread phenomenon where marked phonemes were 
                                                             
4 Better known in the West as Severus of Eshmunein. 
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replaced by unmarked phonemes in the sedentary Arabic vernaculars (including 
areas well beyond the influence of Coptic), Versteegh deems it unlikely that this 
development took place in consequence to Coptic influence. 
In terms of grammar, the only two clear influences of Coptic appear to be in the 
morphological pattern of using ʾa plus a personal pronoun prefixing a verb in order to 
indicate a special kind of past tense in EA and in the use of the particle ma plus the 
imperfect form of a verb to indicate a special kind of imperative (Bishai, 1962). In 
both cases, these features occur regularly in Coptic and are not paralleled in any of 
the other Arabic vernaculars. Bishai also makes a compelling case for Coptic 
influence on the word order of interrogative sentences in EA. In EA, like Coptic, the 
interrogative pronoun is delayed to the end of the interrogative phrase whereas it is 
fronted in Classical Arabic – delaying the interrogative pronoun in Classical Arabic 
and fronting it in Coptic or EA present marked constructions. Bishai acknowledges 
the refutations of earlier linguists who believed that inconsistency in the occurrence 
of this phenomenon and its occurrence in other Arabic vernaculars make Coptic 
influence an unlikely explanation. However, Bishai demonstrates that the occurrence 
of the interrogative pronoun in the final position after the verb as a governed 
element agrees fully with Coptic against Classical Arabic and other Arabic 
vernaculars. Versteegh (2001: 106) too points out that this feature sets EA apart 
from other spoken varieties of Arabic and is likely attributed to Coptic, but he posits 
that this is an instance of language interference which “may have consisted not in 
the emergence of new phenomena but in the tipping of the balance towards one of 
two existing alternatives”. The other grammatical features discussed by Bishai (1962) 
are either more characteristic of Upper Egyptian dialects, or their relation to Coptic is 
at best probable. For instance, Bishai attributes the use of ʿan (of) instead of min 
(from) in expressing comparative relationships in Egyptian Arabic to a similar usage in 
Coptic. However, he concedes that both constructions are used in Egyptian Arabic 
with min being more common in Lower Egypt, and that the use of ʿan for 
comparisons in Classical Arabic is not entirely uncommon. He also acknowledges that 
Turkish also uses the equivalent of ʿan for the same function, making it a possible 
source for this feature. 
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The number of words in the lexicon of Egyptian Arabic which may be attributed to 
Coptic ancestry is again very limited though easier to substantiate (Bishai, 1964). 
Bishai provides a list of words which are of Coptic origin, but the majority of these 
would probably appear alien to most speakers of EA today. This is because many of 
these words are restricted to dialects of Upper Egypt, while others are of specialised 
use in the Coptic Church.  This, as Bishai (1964: 47) notes, “leaves the number of 
Coptic loanwords used commonly in Egyptian Arabic smaller still; they mainly include 
names of various kinds of fish, vulgarisms, and names of cooking utensils and foods 
not used in Arabia”. He even observes that a language such as Turkish, which was 
never a vernacular of Egypt, has left a more profound impression on the Egyptian 
Arabic lexicon, echoing Versteegh’s (2001) marvel at the surprisingly small number of 
Coptic loanwords in Egyptian Arabic.  
It therefore appears to be in grammar where the influence of Coptic may be most 
felt, and even here it is restricted and in some cases hypothetical. Hence, with 
limited grammatical influence, minimal lexical influence and negligible phonetic 
influence, the role that Coptic played in the development of EA was very low overall. 
Bishai (1960: 229) arrives at his own explanation for this: 
The limited influence of Coptic on Egyptian Arabic can only be explained as lack of 
widespread bilingualism in Egypt during the transition from Coptic to Arabic. This leads 
to the conclusion that the Copts who were converted to Islam at any one time must 
have been a minor segment of the population. To judge from linguistic criteria alone, 
the Muslim Egyptians of today are perhaps right in claiming predominantly Arab 
ancestry. 
2.3.2 The decline, revival and reform of Arabic in Egypt 
The history of the Arabicisation of Egypt under the Islamic empire did not always 
proceed at the same pace, and it encountered a few setbacks along the way. Even 
when the language of administration was Arabic, Egypt was not always ruled by 
Arabs; the Ayyubids (1171-1250) were Kurdish, while the Mamluks (1250-1516) were 
of Turkic, Turco-Circassian or Greek origins (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007). While Chejne 
(1969: 101) reports that the Mamluks “took little or no interest in Arabic studies”, 
Versteegh (2001: 72) notes that there were “many Mamluk scholars who occupied 
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themselves with the religious and grammatical literature in Arabic”. Whichever the 
case, Arabic continued to occupy an important position in Egypt during the reign of 
the Mamluks, as it remained the main literary language (Versteegh, 2001). Indeed, 
when the Mongols sacked Baghdad in 1258 and after the Mamluks’ success in 
fending them off, the cultural scene of the Arab World shifted to Cairo (Brugman, 
1984). However, even though Cairo was to become the abode of many prominent 
figures in literature and arts in the course of the 14th century, Brugman notes that 
these were merely the late buds of a culture which had already passed its zenith, and 
for that reason Cairo would never compare with 9th century Baghdad. 
The trend of non-Arab rulers continued when the Ottomans (1516-1805) seized 
control of Egypt. Once again, Egypt became a mere ‘province’ in a larger empire, and 
would remain vassal to the Ottomans until 1914 (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007). The 
Ottomans replaced Arabic with Turkish for administrative functions, although 
Versteegh (2001) notes that the use of Turkish was restricted to the governing elite 
who formed a small minority and had to recourse to translators in order to 
communicate with the people. Most of the documents produced locally were written 
either in Arabic or in both Turkish and Arabic. Crucially however, Arabic lost its 
position as a literary language and became chiefly the language of theologians 
(Brugman, 1984). Chejne (1969) writes that the deteriorating state of Arabic was 
accelerated by the Arabic speakers who found learning Turkish more functional and 
speaking it more fashionable. During the four centuries of Ottoman rule, literary 
production in Arabic became “scarce and sterile”, and by the 19th century Classical 
Arabic had fallen into disuse (Chejne, 1969: 84). 
For all that Arabic may have suffered at the hands of the Ottomans it experienced a 
brief revival under Ottoman rule in the 19th century. In 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte 
led a French expedition against Egypt. The expedition itself was very short-lived and 
proved too adventurous to sustain; the French were driven out of Egypt in 1801 but 
the legacy they left would impact the position of Arabic for the rest of the century 
(Chejne, 1969; Holes, 2004; Versteegh, 2001). In many ways, the expedition marked 
the beginning of a period of cultural influence from Europe – initially from France but 
later also from England (Versteegh, 2001). For one thing, it resulted in the 
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establishment of Egyptology which would ensure continued contact between Egypt 
and the West for a long time to come. Napoleon also introduced an Arabic printing 
press and his French entourage founded the Institut d’Egypte which provided some 
instruction in Arabic (Chejne, 1969).  
Europe had already gone through the Renaissance, the Reformation and the 
Industrial Revolution which had given birth to many technologies and intellectual 
ideals. These were eagerly taken up by Muhammad Ali, a Turkic-Albanian Ottoman 
whose lineage ruled Egypt from 1805 to 1952, and who had a great zeal for European 
learning and culture (Brugman, 1984). Muhammad Ali, though paying homage to the 
Ottomans in Istanbul, was virtually independent of them and ruled Egypt with almost 
complete autonomy. His reign saw the beginning of the Arabic nahḍa or Renaissance 
(Chejne, 1969). Of this, Mejdell (2006: 8) writes: 
In several respects, the Egyptian (Arab) 19th century cultural renaissance al-nahḍa, 
which incited the renewal of Arabic as an intellectual medium, was a ‘modern’ 
phenomena [sic], too. The major impetus and motivation behind it was practical and 
secular-oriented—the need for technical and scientific development to withstand 
foreign domination. Ideologically it was inspired by the European enlightenment, with 
educational reforms and, gradually, nationalist claims on the agenda. 
Muhammad Ali’s most significant tribute to Arabic was perhaps in replacing Turkish 
with Arabic as the official language of administration in Egypt and reinstating it as the 
vehicle of cultural production (Chejne, 1969). Muhammad Ali sponsored educational 
missions to Europe to gain specialised knowledge in various educational fields. One 
of the earliest missions was sent to Italy in 1813 to train type-founders and printers 
who later worked in the Government Printing Office (Brugman, 1984). Muhammad 
Ali also founded several schools in Egypt including the school of languages which 
would produce numerous translations into Arabic under the leadership of al-Ṭahṭāwī 
(1801-73). Secular studies were also later introduced in al-Azhar University.  
This intellectual revival made the Arabic scholars and writers aware that Arabic was 
at a disadvantage in expressing technological terms and modern social and cultural 
ideas, a problem which was usually resolved by reviving equivalent concepts from 
the Classical literature, coining new Arabic terms (sometimes under the influence of 
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Turkish usage), or less commonly by borrowing the European terms into Arabic 
directly (Versteegh, 2001). Ferguson calls this revival that Arabic experienced nothing 
short of a ‘miracle’ which is often underestimated or forgotten about. He states that 
“in the sense of having a literary language that is part and parcel of the life 
involvement of people; there really was a renaissance, a revival of the language, a 
renewal of a language that was in a sense not fully alive” (Ferguson, 1997 [1990]: 
264). 
While printing and publishing flourished in Egypt, elsewhere in the Arabic-speaking 
world publishing and freedom of speech were more restricted, making Egypt an 
attractive destination for Arab writers and thinkers particularly from Syria and 
Lebanon. The 1870s saw the establishment of several significant Arabic periodicals, 
including the founding of al-Ahrām daily by the brothers Taqlā of Lebanon in 1875 
(Chejne, 1969), a newspaper which became the official Egyptian gazette and still 
boasts very wide circulation today. One clear influence of Western ideas during the 
Arabic nahḍa was in the rise of intellectual nationalism. This took different forms in 
the Arab World: While many thinkers wrote of an Islamic community (umma) with 
Islam as the unifying factor, in Syria and Lebanon the discourse was of pan-Arab 
nationalism, while in Egypt there was “an emphasis on the special character of 
Egyptian society, history and culture” and intellectuals sometimes wrote of an 
Egyptian nation (waṭan) which transcends the Muslim umma (Versteegh, 2001: 176), 
(cf. Section ‎3.3.2). Versteegh notes however that “although the Arabic thinkers often 
disagreed among themselves about the future form which their nation should take, 
they all agreed on its being an Arabic-speaking nation” (2001: 177). 
The regained position of Arabic was short-lived; it was cut short by the British 
occupation of Egypt in 1882. Arabic suffered a number of blows under British rule: 
English was declared the official language in 1898, the school of languages was 
closed down and education became only accessible to the privileged elite in either 
English or French (Chejne, 1969). This was only compensated for by the flourishing 
career of Arabic in the publishing industry which played a significant role in the 
dissemination of nationalist ideas (Brugman, 1984). Over the next few decades, 
Egyptians continued to call for reinstating Arabic as the official language of the 
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country, a case which was taken up by Egyptian intellectuals and institutions such as 
al-Azhar. In 1908, Cairo University5 was established by a group of citizens with the 
aim of making education in Arabic available to all Egyptians (Chejne, 1969). The 
status of Arabic greatly improved with the abolishment of the British protectorate in 
Egypt in 1922 (Brugman, 1984).  
The call for Arabic gained momentum in the 1930s and by 1940 Arabic came to be a 
recognised language which was widely used in government, taught in schools and 
universities, and even used in foreign institutions (Chejne, 1969). Coinciding with and 
contributing to these gains were fervent moves to reform and modernise the Arabic 
Language, mobilised by the establishment of the Arabic Language Academy (majmaʿ 
al-luġa al-ʿarabiyya) (henceforth, ALA) in 1932 and the Arab League (officially, League 
of Arab States; henceforth, LAS) in 1945 (cf. Section ‎3.2.3). LAS also played an 
important part in spreading pan-Arab sentiments across the Arabic speaking world 
(cf. Section ‎3.3.2.2). 
The culmination of nationalist activity in Egypt is often seen in the 1952 revolution 
where the monarchy was overthrown through a military coup. By then, Arabic and 
pan-Arab feelings were so deeply entrenched in the Egyptian collective that when 
Egypt issued its first constitution as a republic in 1956 this was vividly captured in the 
first and second articles which declared Egypt an Arab state, the Egyptian people an 
integral part of the Arab community, Islam the religion of the state, and Arabic its 
official language (cf. Section ‎6.2.1). I will return to this period in history when I 
discuss the relationship between language and national identity in Section 
‎3.3.2‎3.3.2.3. Having outlined the origins of diglossia in Arabic, I will now explain what 
exactly diglossia means in theoretical terms. 
2.4 Diglossia Defined 
Based on an account by Sotiropoulos (1977), the term diglossia was first introduced 
in 1902 by a German linguist called Karl Krumbacher in his book Das Problem der 
                                                             
5 Originally named the “Egyptian University” then renamed “King Fuad I University” in 1940, before it 
was finally named “Cairo University” in 1952.  
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Neugriechischen Schriftsprache6 (The Problem of the Modern Greek Written 
Language). In this book, Krumbacher dealt with the nature and origin of diglossia in 
Greek. Zughoul (1980) points out however that there is a common view in the 
literature that the term was coined by French linguist William Marçais with specific 
reference to the Arabic language. He defined it as “competition between a learned, 
written language and a sometimes exclusively spoken vernacular” (1930: 401 quoted 
in French in Zughoul, 1980). 
However, it is Charles Ferguson (1959b) who is credited with setting out the general 
principles of the concept of diglossia as we understand it in sociolinguistics today. 
Arabic was one of the four examples of diglossia that Ferguson presented in his 
article, with particular reference to EA. He defines diglossia as follows: 
Diglossia is a relatively stable language situation in which, in addition to the primary 
dialects of the language (which may include a standard or regional standards), there is a 
very divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed variety, 
the vehicle of a large and respected body of written literature, either of an earlier 
period or in another speech community, which is learned largely by formal education 
and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes but is not used by any sector 
of the community for ordinary conversation. (Ferguson, 1959b: 336) 
Ferguson (1959b: 328) uses the terms high [H] and low [L] to refer to these two 
varieties which have specialised functions in society: “In one set of situations only H 
is appropriate and in another only L, with the two sets overlapping only slightly”. 
Moreover, prestige is usually ascribed to the H variety but not the L variety: “there is 
usually a belief that H is somehow more beautiful, more logical, better able to 
express important thoughts” (p. 330). Crucially, H is not acquired natively, but must 
be learned through the medium of formal education, and the speaker is therefore “at 
home in L to a degree he almost never achieves in H” (p. 331).  
Ferguson’s conceptualisation of diglossia has since been extensively discussed, 
criticised and extended. Versteegh (2001: 190) remarks: 
                                                             
6 The name of the book in Sotiropoulos (1977) is Das Problem der Modernen Griechischen 
Schriftsprache but the only record I could find was of Das Problem der Neugriechischen Schriftsprache. 
The translation is the same. 
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Ferguson’s model restricted the notion of ‘diglossia’ to situations where the low variety 
was genetically related to the high variety, of which it was a simplified version. In later 
publications this restriction was lifted and the notion of ‘diglossia’ was expanded to 
include any functional distribution of linguistic varieties, whether these were languages 
or dialects or registers. The functional distribution in Arabic-speaking countries is 
nothing but a special case of a general phenomenon of sociolinguistic variation in all 
speech communities. 
Some of the most notable expansions of Ferguson’s definition of diglossia came in 
the work of John Gumperz (1962, 1964, 1966) and Joshua Fishman (1967, 1972) who 
distinguished between a sociolinguistic and a psycholinguistic approach. Gumperz 
extended the concept to include communities with separate dialect registers or some 
kind of ‘functionally differentiated language varieties’. Fishman took this a step 
further by attempting to apply diglossia to cases of compound or coordinate 
bilingualism, effectively extending the definition of diglossia to bilingual communities 
where the H and L varieties may be completely unrelated (such as in former 
European colonies in Africa). Fishman is also credited with introducing the idea of 
‘domains’ of use, which are broader than Ferguson’s ‘functions’. Versteegh (2001: 
190) notes that in the terminology used by Gumperz and Fishman, ‘diglossia’ “is 
reserved for the sociolinguistic notion of a functional distribution of linguistic 
varieties”, while the term ‘bilingualism’ is used to refer to “the psycholinguistic 
notion of the speakers’ command of these varieties”. Fishman (1967: 34) states that 
“bilingualism is essentially a characterisation of individual linguistic behaviour 
whereas diglossia is a characterisation of linguistic organisation at the socio-cultural 
level”. 
Not all sociolinguists accept these expansions of the classical diglossic model. Among 
these is Ferguson (1991: 218) himself who states that he had aimed to describe a 
situation “in which the ordinary formal language of the community is one that no 
one speaks without special effort and no one uses in ordinary conversation: it is 
acquisitionally and functionally superposed to the primary variety of the language”. 
He adds that his “intention was that the users would always view the two [varieties] 
as the same language”; in the case of two different languages the linguistic correlates 
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and the linguistic nature of the possible outcomes would be different (Ferguson, 
1991: 223). Similarly, De Silva (1982: 95) notes that the meaning of the term 
‘diglossia’ has been enlarged so much that it could be said to apply to any ‘complex 
speech community’ “simply by virtue of an interdependency between, on the one 
hand, differentiations of social roles and, on the other, conventional variations in 
linguistic behaviour”. In other words, “wherever there is role-bound linguistic 
variation there would be diglossia; and almost every language seems to fit the bill” 
(ibid.).  
With respect to Arabic, Furguson’s diglossic model has been criticised for three main 
reasons (Mahmoud, 1986). The main criticism of Ferguson’s model was that it was 
too categorical and impressionistic, overlooking the alternation found in the speech 
of particularly educated speakers (cf. Section ‎2.7). Critics have also contended that 
the exclusive domains or functions of use he outlined in his article were too 
hermetically separated. Finally, critics challenged Ferguson’s description of diglossia 
as a stable phenomenon, citing the existence of intermediate forms of Arabic as 
evidence that the situation is undergoing dramatic change (cf. Section ‎2.5). 
Mejdell (2006: 43) notes that Ferguson’s table of functions “was hardly realistic at 
the time, overstating the spoken use of H in education, in parliament, in other public 
performances—where attested usage rather represents an elevated form of L”. 
Similarly, El-Hassan (1977: 113) states that Ferguson’s specialisation of functions for 
H and L cannot be validated by empirical linguistic evidence, “partly because 
language is a fuzzy phenomenon which defies rigidity”. Ferguson states for instance 
that religious sermons are conducted in the H variety, but El-Hassan challenges this 
with an extract from a sermon delivered in a mosque in Upper Egypt, where the 
preacher clearly alternates between H and L. In addition, El-Hassan states that 
political speeches are not consistently in H as Ferguson claims, citing the speeches of 
late Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956-1970) as a case in point. The 
same, he says, applies to university lectures and to personal letters which can in fact 
be written in L. 
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Moreover, Bassiouney (2009: 12) notes that Ferguson’s model does not account for 
the social factors which “may have a part to play in the negotiation of choice of 
variety in a diglossic community in specific sets of circumstances”. One such factor, 
the effect that speakers have on each other, is discussed by Versteegh (2001: 194) 
who notes that it has received very little attention in the literature. Versteegh refers 
to radio dialogue transcripts taken from Diem (1974) where a clear shift towards H in 
one case and L in another takes place in the speech of two speakers who 
accommodate to the speech of their collocutors. This example highlights why it can 
be illusive to classify varieties discretely by function alone. Other relevant social 
factors include class differences, power differentials and social conflict. In his 
defence, Ferguson (1991: 227) later explains that it was not fashionable to study 
social factors of this kind at the time he wrote his article in 1959 because it was not 
considered ‘true science’. 
Despite the dichotomous nature of Ferguson’s classical diglossic model, it is worth 
noting that he did acknowledge the presence of “relatively uncodified, unstable, 
intermediate forms” which are used to resolve communicative tensions in certain 
situations (Ferguson, 1959b: 332). In particular, he alludes to: 
… a kind of spoken Arabic much used in certain semiformal or cross-dialectal situations 
[which] has a highly classical vocabulary with few or no inflectional endings, with certain 
features of classical syntax, but with a fundamentally colloquial base in morphology and 
syntax, and a generous admixture of colloquial vocabulary. (ibid.) 
Ferguson may not have provided a detailed theoretical model or a principled way to 
analyse the nature of these intermediate forms, but his acknowledgment clearly 
paved the way for future research (Boussofara-Omar, 2008) – and he later states that 
this was his intention all along (Ferguson, 1991). In fact, the above definition is very 
much in line with what later Arabic linguists have termed Educated [Spoken] Arabic7 
(cf. Section ‎2.7).  
                                                             
7 It has been speculated that Ferguson’s allusion to a ‘semi-formal’ or ‘cross-dialectal’ variety was in 
fact in reference to Blanc’s (1960) continuum study (cf. Section ‎2.7) which was published the following 
year under Ferguson’s auspices (Mejdell, 2006). 
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Another aspect of Ferguson’s diglossic model which has received scholarly critique is 
its ‘stability’. Given the importance of this feature to the work at hand, it is reviewed 
separately in the following section. 
2.5 Diglossia and Language Shift 
The stability of diglossia is challenged by Schiffman (1993: 115) who states that 
“diglossic situations tend to be unstable”, their instability owing “to an imbalance of 
power between the two (or more) varieties of a language that constitute the diglossic 
complex” (cf. sections ‎3.2.5 and ‎6.3). He adds that “this instability and imbalance of 
power often lead to language shift, that is, displacement of one variety by another, 
or even by a third (unrelated) variety”, where the shift takes place “domain by 
domain (rather than speaker by speaker, or community by community), until the 
abandoned language controls no domains at all” (Schiffman, 1993: 115). Similarly, 
Kaye (1970, 1972) considers diglossia in Arabic to be a fluid and flexible situation 
which is susceptible to change. He states that because colloquial forms of Arabic are 
learned natively, they must by definition be ‘well-defined’. However, Kaye attempts 
to discredit the common belief that Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) has a well-
defined form. For his purposes, he defines MSA as any type of non-colloquial form of 
Arabic which is acquired non-natively, for example in schools (a definition which 
incorporates some intermediate forms of Arabic)8. Kaye argues that, because it is not 
natively learned, MSA is an ‘ill-defined’ system. He then states that Arabic diglossia 
cannot be stable because it involves interaction between two systems, one well-
defined and the other ill-defined, and no ill-defined system is stable9. 
Schiffman (1993) presents a useful taxonomy of conditions which may affect the 
susceptibility of a diglossic situation to language shift. The first being whether the 
diglossic situation is classical or extended. In cases of extended diglossia where the H 
and L varieties are not genetically related, H typically “has greater international 
prestige or is the language of the local power elite or the dominant religious 
community” (Schiffman, 1993: 116), and is therefore the more powerful variety. This 
                                                             
8 Compare this to the definition given in Section ‎2.6. 
9 That is not to say that Kaye’s conceptualisation of well-defined versus ill-defined systems is not 




contributes to the fact that extended diglossic situations are generally less stable 
than cases of classical diglossia where “it remains to be seen whether the same kind 
of imbalance of power exhibited in nongenetic diglossia can be said to exist” (ibid.)10.  
Secondly, Schiffman distinguishes between cases of total and partial diglossia: in 
totally diglossic linguistic cultures (under which Arabic falls) all speakers exhibit 
diglossic behaviour and there are no speakers who only speak the H variety (entailing 
complementary distribution of H and L use), while in cases of partial diglossia, 
diglossic behaviour is only exhibited by some members of the community (entailing 
overlap in the functions of H and L). He also notes that the more hermetically 
separate the domains that the H and L varieties occupy, the more stable the diglossic 
situation, since their existence in complimentary distribution means less competition 
between them. In other words, total diglossia is more stable than partial diglossia, 
although Schiffman stresses that strong differentiation of functions must be 
maintained for the situation to remain stable. Hence, while Egypt would be classed 
as a totally diglossic culture in as far as there are no speakers who only speak the H 
variety, the fact that there is overlap between some of the functions of H and L 
implies that the situation does not necessarily lend itself to stability with respect to 
this condition. 
A third distinction that Schiffman makes is between homogeneous and 
heterogeneous diglossia; the first referring to cases where there is a single L variety 
which “can be used for communication throughout the linguistic culture and with all 
segments of the speech community” (p.122), whereas the latter refers to cases 
where more than one L variety may exist, and an occasional need may arise to resort 
to H as a lingua franca of communication. Most Arabic communities are 
characterised by the existence of an urban L variety which can be used for spoken 
communication across each community, e.g. Cairene for Egypt (cf. Section ‎3.2.6), and 
would therefore belong to Schiffman’s homogenous category, which he deems more 
stable than heterogeneous diglossia.  
                                                             
10 The question of language and power in the (classically) diglossic Egyptian setting is a central theme 
in this thesis, and I engage with it in multiple locations: sections ‎3.2.5, ‎3.4 and ‎6.3. 
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Finally, Schiffman distinguishes between active and passive diglossia: “the former 
requiring time, money, and effort to learn another variety. The latter require[s] only 
passive observance. Active diglossias are more threatening (shift-enhancing) than 
passive diglossias” (p.128). Arabic would appear to belong to active diglossia (cf. 
Section ‎2.8), which in this case does not favour stability. The applicability of the four 
conditions outlined here to the case of Arabic diglossia in Egypt is presented in Table 
2 below, painting a mixed picture about the stability of diglossia in Egypt. 
Diglossic condition Stable? Stability-enhancing Shift-enhancing 
9 Classical (genetic) 8 Extended (non-genetic) Yes 
9 Total 9 Partial ? 
9 Homogeneous 8 Heterogeneous Yes 
8 Passive 9 Active No 
Table 2. The conditions of Arabic diglossia in Egypt 
Schiffman also discusses other factors which can influence the stability of a diglossic 
situation. For example, he uses the term linguistic culture to refer to “the set of 
behaviours, beliefs, attitudes, and historical circumstances associated with a 
particular language. That is, the beliefs (one might even use the term myths) that a 
speech community has about its language are part of the social conditions that affect 
the maintenance and transmission of that language” (1993: 120). This description 
resonates with what Ferguson terms language ‘evaluations’, which he also links to 
language change (cf. Section ‎1.1), but more importantly, it relates to ‘language 
ideologies’ which are discussed at length in Section ‎3.3.  
Here, diglossia must be perceived not as a feature of language or speakers, but of the 
speech community and its ‘linguistic culture’ (Schiffman, 1993). An example of 
linguistic culture at work is how beliefs about the purity of H can serve to resist 
status change in the language; that is, the linguistic community may feel the need to 
retain domains for H as a result of their linguistic culture. For example, Schiffman 
notes that “religious concerns are strong indices of solidarity; religious devotion may 
help to exacerbate and preserve diglossia” (p. 127). Nevertheless, Schiffman notes 
that “while diglossia as a fact of linguistic culture may be stable, the distribution of 
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domains reserved for one variety or other can vary: the dominance of a particular 
domain by a particular variety can shift, with one variety encroaching on domains 
previously restricted to another” (1993: 120). It is this kind of shift which is the 
central concern of this work. 
Of particular interest here is the importance that Schiffman accords to shifting 
domains as an index of instability, and to the role of language ideologies in 
preserving (or perhaps subverting) diglossia. Schiffman’s concept of linguistic culture 
comes up again in the next chapter and language ideologies are discussed in more 
detail in Section ‎3.3. In the meantime, it is perhaps prudent to conclude the 
discussion on language shift with Schiffman’s suggestion that “the relationship 
between diglossia and language shift must … be seen as a complex one, not readily 
predictable without recourse to careful scrutiny of local historical, social, 
geographical, and economic conditions” (1993: 116). I will now turn to the more 
urgent matter of terminology. 
2.6 A note on terminology 
Versteegh (2001: 190) believes that Ferguson’s use of the terms H and L reflects the 
standing of these two varieties in Arab society: “The low variety is held in very low 
esteem, and the name by which speakers refer to it normally implies a humble 
position: ʿāmmiyya literally means, ‘common’ or ‘vulgar’”; “the high variety, on the 
other hand, is prestigious: it is the language of a cultural, and often religious, 
heritage”. This too is reflected in how speakers refer to this variety: al-fuṣḥā, literally 
meaning ‘the most eloquent’. The Arabic equivalent for the term diglossia itself is 
izdiwājiyyat al-luġa (literally, linguistic duality) (Badawi, 1973), although this is an 
academic term which one would not expect laypersons to use. 
Ferguson designates the H variety in the case of Arabic to be Classical Arabic [CA], 
but Bassiouney notes that there are in fact two types of H in Arab communities. She 
observes that “Ferguson spoke only about a distinction between H and L, without 
distinguishing the two different kinds of H such as exist in the Arab World, where 
there is a distinction between CA and MSA” (2009: 11). I have already introduced the 
terms Classical Arabic and Modern Standard Arabic in Section ‎2.2 where they were 
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described as two different stages in the development of the Arabic language; the 
relationship there was diachronic. However, the terms CA and MSA are 
simultaneously used to designate two varieties of Arabic which sustain a synchronic 
relationship: “CA is the religious language of the Quran and is rarely used except in 
reciting the Quran, or quoting older classical texts, while MSA could be used in a 
public speech, for example” (Bassiouney, 2009: 11-12).  
Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) can be described as a simplified form of Classical 
Arabic “which is readable and comprehensible by any literate Arab” (Zughoul, 1980: 
206). Ryding (2005: 4) attributes the emergence of MSA to “the spread of literacy, 
the concept of universal education, the inception of journalism, and exposure to 
Western writing practices and styles”. Zughoul (1980) notes that it is also referred to 
as luġat al-jarāyid (the language of newspapers). Crucially, “MSA is not a spoken 
language; it is nobody’s mother tongue, and the man who wants to talk at all times 
like a book or newspaper is a decided oddity” (Mitchell, 1982: 124). MSA is uniform 
across the Arab World; despite some minor differences in lexicon, the structure 
remains remarkably constant (McCarus, 2008). Mitchell (1986: 8-9) provides this 
comprehensive definition of MSA: 
The label Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) is commonly applied to the written language 
of contemporary literature, journalism, television, and radio news broadcasts, scientific 
and technological writing, administration, and diplomacy. Though differences in written 
Arabic have developed over time and space within the Arab World, MSA nevertheless 
shares most of its morphology and syntax with the classical Arabic (CA) of the Quran 
and canonical literature of Islam, so that its prestige as a model of eloquence and 
excellence is thereby further enhanced. 
It is worth noting, however, that MSA is a term which exists only in the scholarly 
work of Western linguists or specialists who have received their training in the West. 
The distinction between CA and MSA “is a western invention and does not 
correspond to any Arabic term” (Bassiouney, 2009: 11). To Arabic native speakers, CA 
and MSA are one and the same (Bassiouney, 2009; Meiseles, 1980); both the 
language of the Quran and the language of newspapers would be referred to as 
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fuṣḥā. This discrepancy between the native and non-native perspectives is of course 
problematic (cf. Suleiman, 2008). 
Another term which warrants delineating is how native Arabic speakers refer to their 
language: al-luġa al-ʿarabiyya (literally meaning ‘the Arabic language’). It is also the 
term used to designate the official language in the constitutions of almost all Arab 
countries (Maamouri, 1998). Maamouri (1998: 38) notes that “the term is highly 
ambiguous and reflects the existence of a certain ‘cultural blindness’ which seems to 
be imposed by the weight of the Arabic-Islamic heritage”. This ‘cultural blindness’ is 
discussed in Section ‎2.9, while its impact on education is discussed in Section ‎2.8.  
Indeed, it has been argued that the distinction between CA and MSA has been 
intentionally blurred in Arabic. Parkinson (1991: 36) for example calls the unity 
between CA and MSA “a political imperative to be enforced, rather than an empirical 
question, to be decided by observation”, citing the lack of distinction between 
archaic and modern meanings in the dictionaries released by the Arabic Language 
Academy as an example. Grandgillaume (1983, cited in Haeri, 2000) presents a 
similar view, arguing that ‘modern Arabic’ is essentially a secularised version of CA: 
the terminological distinction is meant to underscore a historical shift from the 
emphasis on the religious tradition of CA to more secular concerns. Haeri (2000: 73) 
glosses Grandgillaume’s argument, perceiving the use of the term MSA in English as 
“a way of establishing the factual existence of the language that is based on Classical 
Arabic but also removed from it”. She claims that “those who insist on the existence 
of ‘modern Arabic’ as distinct from Classical Arabic generally do so to substantiate 
their claim that secularism has become a major force within the cultural and political 
life of at least parts of the region” (Haeri, 2000: 74), (cf. Section  3.3.2.2). 
In consistency with what has become a scholarly tradition in Arabic linguistics, I will 
use the term MSA to refer to the official, formal variety which is taught in schools 
across the Arab World and that Arabic speakers are exposed to from various sources 
on a daily basis. However, in instances where it is necessary to blur the line between 
CA and MSA (for example, to capture a native speaker’s perspective) I will be using 
the term SA (which I interchange with fuṣḥā) instead. I also use the terms EA and 
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ʿāmmiyya interchangeably to refer specifically to the Cairo-based colloquial of Egypt. 
The distance between these two diglossic ‘poles’ is discussed in the next section. 
2.7 The Distance between H and L 
In theory, the H and L of Arabic differ significantly in their phonology, morphology 
and syntax (for a comprehensive account, see Holes, 2004). Alrabaa (1986: 77) 
blames these differences for the poor performance of Arab learners in normative 
aspects of writing in the H variety (see section ‎2.8), noting that they are a result of 
the great distance between H and L which “is not merely a formal one of synchronic 
nature; it also reflects several centuries of chronological distance”. Indeed, some 
psycholinguists have argued that MSA is a second language to the native Arabic 
speaker (for example: Eviatar & Ibrahim, 2000; R. Ibrahim & Aharon-Peretz, 2005; 
Khamis-Dakwar & Froud, 2007).  
This view is shared by Eligbali (1996) who turns to cognitive theory for support. He 
points to Chomsky’s position that the true test for grammaticality is the native 
speaker’s intuition11, where a shared competence between speakers and hearers 
determines what is grammatical and what is ungrammatical. The crux of the matter 
here is that this competence must be the product of native acquisition and not of 
formal learning – which cannot be said to be true for Arabic. This is demonstrated by 
Parkinson’s (1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 2003) work which indicates the variability of 
MSA skills among educated Egyptians, with generally ‘poor’ grammar skills when it 
comes to discerning correctness of grammatical forms based on prescriptive ideals (I 
discuss speakers’ awareness in more detail in Section ‎2.9). 
The view that MSA is a second language to Arabic speakers relies on a dichotomous 
perspective which treats MSA and colloquial Arabic as discrete varieties. From this 
perspective, the distance between fuṣḥā and colloquial Arabic has often been 
exaggerated (Zughoul, 1980). For example, the role of fuṣḥā in the Arab World has 
been equated by Gumperz (1972 [1968]) with the cases of Latin in medieval Europe 
and Sanskrit in South Asia. According to Gumperz (1972 [1968]: 222), all these H 
                                                             
11 It is worth noting that Ferguson (1997 [1990]) uses the case of Arabic diglossia to challenge the 
strength of native speaker grammaticality judgments as a tool for linguistic analysis. 
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forms are associated with “elaborate ritual and etiquette” and “can be learned only 
through many years of special training” which is only available to a socially and 
economically privileged few. Brame (1970: 1 in Zughoul, 1980) notes this tendency to 
amplify the differences between fuṣḥā and colloquial Arabic and considers the claim 
that fuṣḥā is artificial to be ill-informed. To him, “the only really difficult problem for 
the Arab approaching literary Arabic is the problem of supplying the correct case 
endings to nouns and mood endings to verbs, as he, understandably, has none in his 
native dialect”. 
The dichotomous perspective of H and L in Arabic is particularly common in the 
description of written/spoken behaviour.  M. H. Ibrahim (1983: 508) for instance 
states that “the terms ‘standard’ and ‘written’ are synonymous in the Arabic  context 
since Standard Arabic is virtually the only written variety to the exclusion of all 
spoken vernaculars”. Similarly, Versteegh (2001: 189) notes that, “In written Arabic, 
the choice between the standard norm and the colloquial language appears to be 
relatively uncomplicated: in writing, Standard Arabic is always used”. Versteegh 
mentions two exceptions however: he refers to the case of people who, while writing 
with a MSA target in mind, their insufficient knowledge of MSA results in a product 
which falls short of MSA standards, which Versteegh refers to as ‘Middle Arabic’ (cf. 
Section ‎2.2). He also refers to writers who deliberately choose to write in colloquial 
Arabic “for ideological or literary reasons”, but he notes that “even these authors 
usually mix their colloquial language with elements from the standard language” 
(ibid.).  
In the same vein, Meiseles (1980: 122) refers to “the emergence of that mainly oral 
(but lately to some extent, also written) use of a language occupying an intermediate 
position between the extremes of Arabic diglossia”. It is these mixed forms that 
Mitchell (1982: 129) has in mind when he states that “we should not push the 
separateness of speech and writing too far”. He elaborates that “linguists have found 
it fairly easy to describe vernaculars but have always resorted when doing so to an 
unconfessed purism, editing out without acknowledgment the prestigious, ‘literary’-
cum-vernacular forms of the language that are in fact probably its commonest 
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manifestation” (p. 124). These ‘mixed’ styles, Mitchell contends, “exemplify the 
vernacular in its plainest form” (p. 140).  
These intermediate and mixed styles have received considerable attention in the 
literature after Ferguson’s (1959b) landmark article in an attempt to bridge the gap 
between the H and L poles. Some of these works adopt a ‘continuum’ approach to fill 
that gap; the most cited of these are Blanc (1960), Badawi (1973) and Meiseles 
(1980). Figure 1 illustrates how these three continuums compare to Ferguson’s 
original model.  
Ferguson (1959) Blanc (1960) Badawi (1973) Meiseles (1980) 
 
H Standard Classical 
















 Koineized Colloquial   
L Plain Colloquial 
Colloquial of the 
Literate Basic or Plain 
Vernacular Colloquial of the 
Illiterate 
Figure 1.  A comparison of Blanc (1960), Badawi (1973) and Meiseles (1980) continuums 
against Ferguson’s H and L. 
Despite the marked differences in delineating the nature and boundaries of the 
levels proposed in each of the three diglossic continuum studies, what they have in 
common is that they were all motivated by dissatisfaction with the dichotomous 
view of H and L as two discrete varieties. Elgibali (1996) highlights the importance of 
Badawi’s study in particular, not solely for its contribution, but because it is a 
contribution in Arabic by an Arab linguist who treats colloquial Arabic, not as a 
corrupt version of CA or MSA (cf. Section  2.2), but as a discrete variety worthy of 




















The significance of this leap cannot be overstated, for the study of colloquial Arabic as a 
discrete entity had previously been undertaken almost exclusively by Western scholars 
– a situation which, given the accepted dogma of the sacrosanct nature of the Classical 
language, made these scholars, as well as their findings, suspect. But in Badawi we have 
an Arab – motives indisputably genuine, ties to the classical heritage unremitting and 
intimate, and proficiently trained in modern linguistics – who concedes the actuality and 
bona fide theoretical status of the colloquial varieties, the true native tongues of the 
Arab peoples. 
A fourth, more recent, continuum model was advanced by Hary (1996) who uses the 
term ‘Arabic multiglossia’ to refer to the language situation in the Arab World. Hary’s 
approach differs from that of his predecessors in that he does not assign a finite 
number of discrete levels “as it is impossible and impractical to determine an exact 
number in the multiglossic situation of Arabic” (Hary, 1996: 71). 
The three continuum studies outlined in Figure 1 referred either implicitly or 
explicitly to a variety which has received its own fair share of attention in Arabic 
linguistics literature;  namely Educated Spoken Arabic (ESA). The most elaborate 
accounts of this variety appear in a series of articles by Terrence F. Mitchell (1975, 
1978, 1982, 1986); the 1986 paper being the most refined of these12. Mitchell (1978) 
describes ESA as a pan-Arabic, koineized form of speech which exists in spoken 
rather than written form which appears “to serve most purposes and to be infinitely 
extensible, at least over sizeable areas of the Arab World transcending the 
boundaries of national states” (1978: 228). It is motivated by the speaker’s desire to 
proclaim an educated identity, to ‘share’ with Arabs with similar educated 
backgrounds, to promote pan- or inter- Arabic forms required by the forces of 
modernisation, and to display sufficient colloquial usage to demonstrate local 
patriotism or loyalty (Mitchell, 1982, 1986). 
Despite the efforts of Mitchell and his project team to outline the form and structure 
of ESA, the term remains subject to much variation with no clear consensus as to 
                                                             
12 The papers result from a project to study ESA in Egypt and the Levant at the University of Leeds in 
the 1970’s. The project involved building a corpus of ESA based on 52 tape recordings collected in 
Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Kuwait in 1976 (El-Hassan, 1977). Related work which stems from the project 
includes El-Hassan’s (1977, 1978) articles on ESA, and a book by Mitchell and El-Hassan (1994). Much 
of the project’s findings remain unpublished (Holes, 2004). 
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what it designates in the literature13. In particular, confusion is caused by the fact 
that the term ESA is used simultaneously to designate an inter-dialectal as well as 
intra-dialectal variety (Eisele, 2002). Indeed, Eisele (2002) points to several 
conceptual contradictions in accounts of ESA even within the work of the Leeds 
project. The variation in definitions of ESA calls into question the very need for them. 
Parkinson (2003: 29) points out that despite widespread claims that ESA is rule-
governed, no one seems to be able to come up with these rules, and he wonders if 
this may be because ESA is not actually anything. The same point is raised by Nielsen 
(1996: 225) who calls ESA a “very badly codified” mixed variety.  
The efficacy of the entire continuum approach has been challenged on similar 
grounds. According to Holes (2004: 345), the continuum model presents a descriptive 
difficulty because the underlying language levels “are probabilistic, not absolute”. In 
the same vein, Boussofara-Omar (2008: 631) argues that the outcome of the 
continuum studies has been “the emergence of a constellation of labels to categorise 
a tentative taxonomy of ‘ill-defined’ middle varieties of Arabic, and hence, a failure 
to articulate their description in a coherent manner or to relate these sets of 
practices to a theoretical linguistic model that can account for them”.  
Frustration with the inadequacy of the continuum approach has spurred Arabic 
linguists to propose alternative ways of studying mixed varieties of Arabic. 
Boussofara-Omar, for example, favours a code-switching approach (cf. Boussofara-
Omar, 2003, 2006). She argues that the complex interactions between fuṣḥā and 
colloquial cannot be accounted for simply by “either the Fergusonian idealised 
paradigm or the vague continuum notion” (Boussofara-Omar, 2008: 355). She 
concludes that this interaction is both socially motivated and structurally constrained 
in the tradition of ‘classic’ code-switching between any language pairs. She believes 
that what was being conventionalised in the continuum studies is not levels such as 
ESA, but rather the “patterns of switching between the two varieties of Arabic where 
the dialect serves as the matrix variety in which constituents from fuṣḥā are 
embedded”  (Boussofara-Omar, 2008: 634). 
                                                             
13 For examples of how ESA has been used or adapted in very different ways, see: Ryding (1991); Ezzat 
(1974); Zughoul (1980). 
45 
 
The code-swiching approach has gained currency among Arabic sociolinguists14, 
although not all of them are as dismissive of the ‘Fergusonian paradigm’ or the 
‘continuum notion’ as Boussofara-Omar. Mejdell (2006: 4) for one states: 
My preferred term to designate the situation in Arabic speech communities, in a 
comparative sociolinguistic (typological) framework […] is the ‘diglossic continuum’. The 
linguistic properties of this continuum—a product of the interaction of the basic 
varieties—may be correlated with dimensions of context and style—the informal-formal 
cline, the casual-careful cline; unplanned vs. planned discourse, and of mode/medium, 
i.e. spoken vs. written.  
However, her use of the term ‘diglossic continuum’ comes with the caveat that 
“working with natural spoken data, one feels that the data only rarely, or only 
partially, fit into the levels as defined—so they should be (explicitly) presented as 
theoretical, abstract categories” (Mejdell, 2006: 45-46). Mejdell proposes a definition 
of style which links function to form, so that the co-occurrence of MSA variables with 
colloquial variables can be regarded as a feature of the style adopted by the speaker 
to serve a certain purpose; to her, code-switching is essentially ‘style-shifting’ (cf. 
Mejdell, 1996, 1999, 2006). This notion of style-shifting by alternating or mixing 
between MSA and colloquial Arabic is also adopted by other Arabic linguists such as 
Eid (2007) and Faust (2012). 
In principle, Mejdell (2006) agrees with Ferguson (1991) that diglossia is still the most 
appropriate label because “the analyst finds two poles in terms of which the 
intermediate varieties can be described; there is no third pole” (Ferguson, 1991: 
226). So does Bassiouney (2009: 13), who states: “It may be that ‘pure H’ or ‘pure L’ 
does not occur very often, and that there are usually elements of both varieties in 
any stretch of normal speech, but still one has to consider a hypothetical pure H or L 
in order to presuppose that there are elements that occur from one or the other in a 
stretch of discourse”. 
                                                             
14 Examples of studies employing some kind of code-switching approach to study the language 
situation in Egypt include: Bassiouney (2003, 2006); Eid (1982, 1988, 2007); Mejdell (1999, 2006). 
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2.8 Diglossia as problem 
Boussofara-Omar (2008: 629) notes that when addressing Arabic diglossia, “a 
significant number of Arab intellectuals and researchers continue to describe the 
diglossic situation in terms of a crisis (azma), a cause (qaḍiyya), or a clash (ṣirāʿ)”, 
while other scholars construct it as a social problem. This view of diglossia as a 
problem abounds in the academic literature. Sotiropoulos (1977: 7) describes 
diglossia generally as a hindrance, stating that “the presence of diglossia in a speech 
community has limiting and even crippling effects on its expressive capacity”. 
Similarly, Zughoul (1980: 201) refers to diglossia in Arabic as a “major sociolinguistic 
and educational problem that faces the Arabic-speaking countries”. Bassiouney 
(2009: 265) notes that diglossia “has been accused of hindering Arabicisation15 
processes, of causing an increase of illiteracy levels and even of promoting and 
sustaining non-democratic systems”. 
One area where diglossia in Arabic is commonly problematised is education16. One of 
the broadest (and most cited) works on the relationship between education and 
diglossia in the Arab World is that of Maamouri (1998). Maamouri (1998: 30) cites 
Neustupný’s (1968: 286) definition of a ‘language problem’ as a situation which 
relates to conditions “of which the speech community is not fully aware, which have 
not become a target of language policy, and which are still capable of contributing 
largely to the tension within the society”, noting that it fits the Arabic situation 
perfectly. Maamouri states that “in order to get the best understanding of the 
‘problem’ of the Arabic language, one has to link it with the current situation of 
education in the Arab countries” (1998: 12). He writes: 
The education structures of the Arab countries are currently characterised by their 
growing inadequacy and deterioration, the questionable relevance of their curricula, 
and the unacceptably low level quality of their output. Arab schooling suffers from 
exceptionally high repetition and drop-out rates, especially in poor rural and suburban 
communities. (Maamouri, 1998: 5) 
                                                             
15 Bassiouney uses the word ‘Arabisation’, but this has been changed in accordance with the 
distinction I make between Arabisation and Arabicisation in Section ‎3.2.2. 
16 I am specifically referring to education in the Arab World here, but it is worth noting that diglossia is 
also frequently problematised in teaching Arabic to foreign learners (see for example: Ferguson, 1971 
[1963]; Nielsen, 1996; Ryding, 1991; Schmidt, 1986). 
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In the same vein, Altoma (1974: 280) observes that in order to learn MSA in school, 
“pupils have to unlearn or suppress most of their linguistic habits while trying to 
acquire new ones”. He adds that the “burden of internalising or reinforcing these 
acquired habits is compounded by conflicting practices”: while the actual speech of 
the pupils is deliberately neglected, the use of MSA does not encompass other 
subject areas where the teachers themselves are likely to use colloquial Arabic 
(ibid.). Similarly, Alrabaa (1986) notes that the conditions of language use in Arabic 
societies do not afford the learners with opportunities to internalise MSA to the 
extent of achieving full command of it. He reasons that because MSA is not used fully 
or frequently enough in a sufficient range of circumstances, it will remain an alien 
form to the speaker. Therefore, Arab learners commonly suffer from linguistic 
insecurity arising from low understanding of MSA and low identification with its 
norms.  
The detrimental pedagogical impact of this ‘distance’ between MSA and the 
colloquial (cf. Section ‎2.7) is emphasised by a number of scholars. For instance, 
Shaaban (2008: 701) states that, because MSA is not used in everyday 
communication, “learning Arabic grammar is much like learning the grammar of a 
foreign language, with one major difference: Arab teachers avoid using foreign-
language methodology in order not to be accused of treating the ‘native tongue’ as a 
foreign language”. M. H. Ibrahim (1983: 511) also compares the Arabic form taught in 
schools to a foreign language “evidenced by the constant complaints of Arabic 
teachers of the numerous cases of interference, in all aspects of language, from 
spoken Arabic into standard Arabic”. In fact, M. H. Ibrahim (1983: 514) concludes his 
article by categorically stating that “standard Arabic is the learner’s second language 
and should be treated as such”, adding that “it is no use pretending that standard 
Arabic is our native language when it is not”.  
This point is reiterated by Maamouri (2008: 76) who notes that Arab learners 
“cannot put their inherent native linguistic competence to task”: “They cannot use 
their lexical familiarity with their native basic Arabic sounds, forms, structures, and 
syllabic and prosodic features” as these aspects will differ significantly between H 
and L despite some similarities. It has been suggested that learning a variety which is 
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markedly different from their mother tongue “heavily burdens the Arab child, 
delaying his/her learning of academic skills until the language of literacy (literary 
Arabic) is mastered, if at all” (Ayari, 1996: 246). This goes against UNESCO 
recommendations that a child be taught in their mother tongue in the initial stages 
of education (Ayari, 1996; Shaaban, 2008). Calls to replace MSA with colloquial 
Arabic as a language of instruction or to reform the grammar of MSA to improve 
Arabic education were rejected on ideological grounds (Ayari, 1996; Shaaban, 2008), 
(cf. Section ‎3.2.2).  
Another problem that Maamouri (1998) notes relates to the ambiguity of the term 
al-ʿarabiyya (the Arabic [language]), (cf. Section ‎2.6). The fluidity of this term is 
reflected in the school systems, where the nature of al-ʿarabiyya which ought to be 
used in education is not clearly defined, causing “a great deal of confusion in the 
implementation and transferability of pedagogical directions across school systems 
and country education structures for clear standards of evaluation of Arabic reading 
and writing and the comparability of their results” (p. 37). Although al-ʿarabiyya is 
generally equated with fuṣḥā, the term makes no clear distinction between H and L 
and may in fact be regarded as encompassing L forms in a ‘single system’ (cf. sections 
‎2.6 and ‎2.9). In a sense, it means that the common use of colloquial Arabic in oral 
instruction in the classroom does not conflict with the direction to use al-ʿarabiyya as 
a medium of instruction in schools. 
A related point is raised by M. H. Ibrahim (1983) who says that al-ʿarabiyya is 
considered by teachers and educators to be the pupil’s mother tongue, but the same 
people are likely to define al-ʿarabiyya in this context with reference to MSA – a 
variety far removed from the learner’s vernacular – causing major problems in 
spreading mass literacy. M. H. Ibrahim argues that the classical binary of H and L, 
though reductionist, is actually valid in the discussion of literacy in the Arab World 
because the option of intermediate varieties such as ESA does not exist for non-
literate speakers: “only diglossia in the classical sense obtains for them. Spoken 
Arabic is what they have already mastered; Standard Arabic is the target they must 
aim at if they want to become literate” (M. H. Ibrahim, 1983: 509). The view that 
diglossia is to blame for illiteracy in the Arab World is shared by other linguists. Kaye 
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(1972: 47), for example, states: “The Arab countries are massively illiterate (on the 
whole) and I suggest that the main reason for this fact is that teachers have to teach 
an ill-defined system (MSA) to speakers of well-defined systems” (cf. Section ‎2.4). 
However, Zughoul (1980: 213) challenges the association between diglossia and 
illiteracy, claiming that the “high percentage of illiteracy in the Arab World is the 
result of five centuries of Turkish rule and a century of Western colonial 
exploitation”. If anything, Zughoul believes that it is this high percentage of illiteracy 
which has widened the gap between the H and L varieties of Arabic (and not the 
other way round). Similarly, Ayari (1996: 248) nuances the direct link between 
diglossia and illiteracy by citing studies which indicate that the gap between MSA and 
colloquial Arabic “is not necessarily the direct cause of illiteracy and poor academic 
performance, but is in itself a symptom of a larger problem that should be addressed 
if the high rate of illiteracy in the Arab World is to be curbed”. Aspects of this ‘larger 
problem’ that Ayari refers to include: lack of early exposure to MSA, favouring 
English or French as a language of instruction, and ‘shortcomings’ in the Arabic 
writing system. 
The Arabic writing system is often cited as an impediment to literacy and a hindrance 
to reading acquisition (Altoma, 1974; Ayari, 1996; Maamouri, 1998). This is usually 
attributed to two features: the fact that Arabic letters change shape depending on 
their position in a word, whether initial, medial or final (allomorphs), and the fact 
that short vowels – which are denoted using diacritics – are absent from most daily 
reading material in Arabic resulting in a high frequency of homographs. The latter 
feature means that readers often have to rely on context to disambiguate the 
meaning of words in a sentence. Maamouri (2008: 77) comments that “because the 
Arabic reader needs to understand in order to read, the Arabic reading process 
seems to have completely reversed what is usually the norm in other languages, 
where people read in order to understand”. M. H. Ibrahim (1983: 512) however is 
not convinced that these features of the Arabic script “can have such permanent and 
damaging effects on the learning process”. He cites a study by Mahmoud (1979) who 
concludes that attributing poor literacy to defects in the Arabic orthography is based 
on observation and impressionistic evidence rather than empirical research. 
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Another issue which has been indirectly linked to diglossia in education is poor 
political participation. For instance, Haeri (2003: 151) blames the “the dire state of 
pre-college education” in Egypt for making MSA, which is already difficult as it is, 
even less accessible to Egyptians and therefore creating an obstacle to “participation 
in the political realm”. She clarifies that this is of course not the only reason for the 
absence of democracy in Egypt but adds that “there seems to be deeply entrenched 
political interests in having [MSA] to be the sole official language” (cf. Section ‎3.2.5).  
I have focussed in this section on the pedagogical and literacy dimensions of the 
‘diglossia problem’, which are admittedly the mostly widely discussed dimensions. 
However, diglossia is also commonly presented as a ‘problem’ which is to be entirely 
blamed on the vernaculars – a puristic attitude which will be discussed in Section 
‎3.3.1.2. Even here, the issue is presented as one of strife between two contending 
varieties. Boussofara-Omar (2008: 635) comments on this perception: 
The conceptualisation of the coexistence of languages/varieties within a speech 
community in terms of rivalry, clash, tension, conflict, and constraints alone ignores 
their fluidity, downplays the dynamically ‘positive’ nature of the mutual impact on each 
other, and disallows any effort to explore the conditions under which the languages 
come together naturally, either through speech or context, and the complex patterns 
and configurations of use that arise out of their coexistence. 
In general, whatever the concern (pedagogical, social, etc.) and whatever the 
ideological standpoint, it is very rare to come across works which attempt to paint 
Arabic diglossia in a positive light: If it is not a problem, it is a burden at best. One of 
these rare exhibits is Bassiouney’s (2009) Arabic Sociolinguistics where she highlights 
the ability of children growing up in diglossic environments to “adapt to and later 
even manipulate the linguistic situation” (Bassiouney, 2009: 267). She cites 
numerous case studies which demonstrate how “the diglossic situation provided an 
opportunity for speakers to project their identity and leave an effect on their 
audience” (ibid.) She concludes that digolssia is “an asset rather than an 
impediment”, remarking that “diglossia is dragged into the conflict without capturing 
the fact that diglossia itself is linguistic diversity, and by eliminating it we are 
suppressing a linguistic richness in Arab society” (ibid.).  
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2.9 Speaker Awareness 
Thus far, I have been giving an account of Arabic diglossia from the point of view of 
the trained linguist. It is however pertinent to the present work that I take stock of 
how diglossia is perceived from the point of view of the speakers themselves. Holes 
(2004), for instance, notes that native speakers may not be as sensitive as linguists 
assume to the formal variation observed by linguists. In particular, the a priori 
assumptions about the H and L of the Fergusonian diglossic model are not 
necessarily shared by “the linguistically naive native” (Holes, 2004: 343): 
The model is that of an observing linguist, and the definitions of H and L on which it 
depends are derived from other linguists’ grammatical descriptions, which are always to 
some degree idealizations of (or in the case of H often prescriptions for) behaviour.  
Hary (1996: 78-79) notes that most of the 93 native speakers he interviewed from 
Egypt, Syria and Palestine “felt that both varieties are part of one language; they do 
not consider the two varieties to be separate languages. In other words, both 
standard and colloquial Arabic are ‘Arabic’ in one system”. The same view is 
highlighted by Bassiouney (2009: 266-267) who notes that “Arabs do not consider 
their colloquial another language. It is still Arabic; whether it is good Arabic or bad 
Arabic that they speak is a moot point”. She mentions expressions such as al-lahga 
al-miṣriyya ‘the Egyptian dialect’ and al-ʿāmmiyya al-miṣriyya ‘Egyptian colloquial 
Arabic’ which are used by intellectuals in Egypt to refer to Egyptian Arabic, but notes 
that “the average Egyptian when asked what she or he speaks would reply 
automatically ‘Arabic’”. She cites the example of children who watch cartoons 
dubbed in MSA without complaining that they cannot understand the language.  
According to Maamouri (1998: 30), this view by most Arabs that there is one ‘Arabic 
language’ encases “an ambiguous reality and a symbolic abstraction comprising the 
old and new language norms and standards of all the linguistic varieties of Arabic”. 
Maamouri (1998: 34) also highlights “the strong cultural disposition of Arabs to 
consider fuṣḥā a ‘mother tongue’”, labeling this “attitudinal blindness in favour of 
fuṣḥā”. It is a view which appears to owe, at least in part, to a reluctance to admit 
that colloquial Arabic constitutes an independent system, resonating with Ferguson’s 
(1959b: 330) statement that speakers in a diglossic situation will sometimes claim 
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that L does not exist; only H is regarded as a real language, while “people may say 
that the L variety has no structure, no grammar, no rules, and it is only chaos” 
(Ferguson, 1991: 226), (cf. Section ‎3.3.1.2). 
However, this is not to say that speakers are not aware of variation within this 
‘system’ of Arabic. Native Arabic speakers can make intuitive distinctions between at 
least fuṣḥā and dialect forms (Parkinson, 1993; 2003; Walters, 1996). Indeed, the 
difficulty in delineating boundaries by linguists, as described in the previous section, 
by no means suggests that speakers are not aware of variation within Arabic. 
Boussofara-Omar (2008: 633) refers to a consensus among scholars “about the 
native speaker’s consistent ability to linguistically differentiate between mixed forms, 
fuṣḥā forms, and dialectal forms, despite their apparent fluidity and elusiveness”. 
On the one hand, Mejdell (2006:45) notes that “native Arabic speakers do recognise 
and have a concept of language use which is neither (high) formal fuṣḥā nor everyday 
spoken ʿāmmiyya”, but that “apart from its ‘in-between’, ‘mixed’, quality, native 
speakers express rather vague ideas about the linguistic properties” of this middle 
variety. On the other hand, Schmidt (1974: 10, cited  in Boussofara-Omar, 2008) 
suggests that speakers’ awareness is heightened enough to enable them to make 
judgments about intermediate levels: 
Although native speakers of Arabic tend to perceive their speech and the speech of 
others as discrete CA [Classical Arabic] or EC [Egyptian Colloquial], they are able to make 
judgments, in some cases finely detailed, about intermediate forms and they can 
arrange these forms into hierarchies. 
A notable study which explores speakers’ awareness in a diglossic setting is Parkinson 
(1991). Parkinson investigated what forms native speakers in Cairo accepted as fuṣḥā 
and found great disparity in the judgments and attitudes of his informants. To a 
group in his study, fuṣḥā implied the classical literary ideal of grammatically correct, 
high-flown, elaborate language. Within this group there were those who favoured 
this form, while others preferred a less elaborate written style. To the rest of his 
informants, fuṣḥā meant grammatically correct language, whether classical or 
modern in style, as opposed to ʿāmmiyya. Even the ‘least correct’ version (containing 
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the most colloquial features) was judged by 75% of informants to be fuṣḥā, 
demonstrating that “most subjects have room in their notion of fuṣḥā for all of these 
various styles, even though they are clearly able to distinguish between the styles” 
(Parkinson, 2009: 58). Educated Egyptians “appear to be clearly aware that their 
modern formal language differs in many respects from the classical language, but 
they differ about whether this is a good or bad thing, and about whether they have a 
right to use the term fuṣḥā to refer to the modern form” (Parkinson 1991:35). 
This evidence of disparity between speakers in their judgments of varieties is 
significant as it impacts the kind of the questions I ask in the language survey 
(Chapter 5). The purpose of my study is not to gauge speakers’ awareness of 
language levels (specifically H and L), but to investigate their attitudes towards them. 
I must therefore strike a balance between assuming that they have an understanding 
of what they mean without forcing a definition on them. I therefore use the common 
Arabic labels of fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya, assuming that speakers can at least distinguish 
these two levels: I peg fuṣḥā to the Arabic taught at school, and allow respondents to 
choose an appropriate definition for ʿāmmiyya (although the focus here is ideological 
rather than linguistic). I deliberately avoid any questions about intermediate 
varieties. However, it is important to acknowledge that, ultimately, I will be dealing 
with the participants’ perceptions; that is, what they perceive to be fuṣḥā or 
ʿāmmiyya (cf. Section ‎5.6). Such perceptions may not reflect actual practices but they 
are very valuable in a study of language ideology. 
This approach is in line with Suleiman (2008: 28) who delimits his discussion to these 
two terms (fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya) because they “are consistent with the native 
tradition, in which these two dichotomous categories resonate with how most 
Egyptians conceptualise the language situation in their country”. Suleiman reasons 
that “in spite of the criticisms leveled against the empirical validity of Ferguson’s 
concept of Arabic diglossia, there is no doubt that this concept has a great socio-
psychological and cultural validity for most Arabic speakers” (ibid.). Suleiman 
overcomes the paradox of fuṣḥā being considered ‘native’ to Arabic speakers by 
proposing two conceptual chains: the first focuses on the speech community, on 
mother tongue, and hence on ʿāmmiyya; the second focuses on the linguistic 
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community, on native language and hence on fuṣḥā. He notes that although 
designating fuṣḥā a native language deviates from cognitive linguists’ claims that 
fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya behave as different languages, “it reflects a societal attitude 
which sociolinguistics must capture if it is to come to grips with the social life of a 
language, and how this language resonates with those who think they belong to it 
and it belongs to them” (Suleiman, 2013a: 271-272). This designation also captures 
the common position in Arabic ‘folk linguistics’ (cf. Section ‎3.3.1). Since I align myself 
with this conceptual chain, I will conclude this chapter with the following extended 
quote from Suleiman (2008: 30) which explains the full logic behind his 
conceptualisation: 
The use of mother tongue to link ʿāmmiyya to speech community captures the nature of 
this form of Arabic as a spoken variety that is informally acquired and as a site of 
cultural intimacy. The use of ‘native language’ to link fuṣḥā to linguistic community is 
intended to express the ideological meanings of ‘nativeness’, the fact that although 
fuṣḥā is not a mother tongue to the Egyptians (due to being acquired formally through 
instruction in school), it still is a site of belonging and intimacy to them in socio-
psychological terms. I believe that these chains allow us access to a more nuanced 
concept of language in discussing national identity construction in Egypt. In particular, 
they allow us to excavate layers of meaning that go beyond the instrumental role of 
language as a means of communication that dominates so much of Arabic 
sociolinguistics, thus stunting its ability to engage symbolically with politics, sociology, 
and anthropology. 
2.10 Summary 
Arabic had a long history in the Arabian Peninsula, although the first chapters of this 
history are rather obscure. Theories abound about the pre-Islamic language situation 
in the peninsula, ranging from complete linguistic purity to a situation of standard-
with-dialects and even diglossia. However the existence of some degree of regional 
variation in the vernaculars is hardly disputed. Islam accelerated the development 
and codification of Arabic as well as brought it to a vast stretch of land where it often 
replaced the original language. In Egypt, Arabic replaced Coptic and was minimally 
influenced by it in the process. From the thirteenth century, Arabic went into a 
period of decline, mirroring the disintegration of the Islamic empire, from which it 
55 
 
did not recover until the nineteenth century. The boom in printing and publishing in 
Egypt during the nahḑa gave it a central role in leading the linguistic revival and 
reform of Arabic. Though ruled by a succession of non-Arab rulers for many 
centuries, and in spite of nationalist emphasis on the Egyptian identity, Egypt 
emerged in the mid twentieth century as an Islamic Arab state with the Arabic 
language asserting both identities. 
However, by then, diglossia had become deeply entrenched in Egyptian society. 
Ferguson defines diglossia as a fairly stable situation characterised by the existence 
of two varieties of the same language in a speech community; a variety of higher 
prestige (H) and a variety of lower prestige (L), each serving different functions. 
Ferguson’s conceptualisation has undergone numerous expansions and revisions. In 
particular, the stability of diglossia has been challenged. Examining the relationship 
between language shift and diglossia in Egypt provides a mixed picture as to the 
susceptibility of the language situation in Egypt to language shift.  
While the H and L of Ferguson’s diglossia are regarded as two poles, and there is 
consensus that intermediate varieties exist between these poles, different 
perspectives abound about the distance between H and L, the nature of the 
intermediate varieties, and how they can be studied. The distance between H and L is 
often regarded as a problem in the literature, particularly with regard to education 
where this distance is amplified. Arabic linguists vary between them in how they 
frame diglossia, but the terms they use are generally removed from how native 
Arabic speaker see their language. Even though native speakers generally recognise 
the existence of two distinct levels of Arabic with a fuzzy in-between, these are 




3 Language Policy, Ideology and Practice in Egypt 
S A LANGUAGE EXISTS ULTIMATELY BECAUSE THE COMMUNITY WILLS IT T 
Sue Wright (2004: 2), Language Policy and Language Planning 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is dedicated to reviewing three important and intricately linked 
concepts with respect to the Arabic language situation: language policy, ideology and 
practice. Referring once more to the concept of linguistic culture discussed in Section 
‎2.5, Schiffman (1996: 276) gives a definition of language policy which provides 
excellent reasoning for the inextricable link between language policy and ideology: 
 [L]anguage policy is primarily a social construct. It may consist of various elements of 
an explicit nature – juridical, judicial, administrative, constitutional and/or legal 
language may be extant in some jurisdictions, but whether or not a polity has such 
explicit text, policy as a cultural construct rests primarily on other conceptual elements 
– belief systems, attitudes, myths – the whole complex that we are referring to as 
linguistic culture, which is the sum totality of ideas, values, beliefs, attitudes, 
prejudices, religious strictures, and all the other cultural ‘baggage’ that speakers bring 
to their dealings with language from their background.  
Language policy is itself shaped by language ideology (or ideologies), typically ones 
which prevail in the society in question. Language policies do not necessarily exist in 
the form of a written document, although a distinction could be made between overt 
and covert language policies as discussed in Section ‎3.2.1. A closely related term is 
language planning, which “refers to the efforts to manage, modify or influence the 
habitual practice of individuals as part of a community” (Bassiouney, 2009: 205); it is 
“the formulation and proclamation of an explicit plan or policy, usually but not 
necessarily written in a formal document, about language use” (Spolsky, 2004: 11). I 
discuss language policy and planning in Section ‎3.2. 
As can be seen already, central to this entire discussion is the concept of language 
ideology, which is defined by Spolsky (2004: 14) as “a general set of beliefs about 
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appropriate language practices … assigning values and prestige to various aspects of 
language varieties used in it”. These beliefs influence language practices and are 
influenced by them. Moreover, they inform language planning and are crucial for the 
maintenance of language policies, although language planning may be specifically 
intended to alter language ideologies (ibid.). In Section ‎3.3 I discuss language 
ideologies associated with the Arabic language – a language shrouded in mythology 
and embraced as a symbol of nationalism. I also rein in the discussion to focus on 
language and national identity in Egypt. 
In Section ‎3.4 I discuss language practices in Egypt, looking into other forces at play, 
such as globalisation and economics. In particular, I focus on “the use of English as 
symbolic capital linking Egypt to the “prosperity” of the West” (Stadlbauer, 2010: 3-
4). This discussion brings the review up to speed on more recent socio-economic 
trends in the country with a focus on how this impacts language use. 
For Spolsky (2004), language ideologies, language practices and language planning 
are all part and parcel of language policy. He posits that “the language policy of a 
speech community” consists of three components: “language practices – the habitual 
pattern of selecting among the varieties that make up its linguistic repertoire; its 
language beliefs or ideology – the beliefs about language and language use; and any 
specific efforts to modify or influence that practice by any kind of language 
intervention, planning or management” (2004: 5). He also argues that all three 
components must be studied together for a complete unbiased view of language 
policy. After establishing the link between language policy, ideology and practice,  
Spolsky (2004: 14) attempts to elucidate the difference between them: “language 
ideology is language policy with the manager left out, what people think should be 
done. Language practices, on the other hand, are what people actually do”.  
Bassiouney (2009: 204) notes that language practices are more significant than 
language policies: “If a policy works against language practices, there is no guarantee 
that it will be successful”. This is because “the dynamic forces at work in the 
everyday activity of language communities are far more powerful than conscious, 
ideologically motivated policies” (Spolsky, 2004: 7). Therefore, “For a policy to be 
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successful, it has to lay claim to both language practices and language ideologies” 
(Bassiouney, 2009: 204). 
It is in fact possible for all three areas (policies, ideologies and practices) to be in 
conflict. This relates to “the symbolic function of language as opposed to its 
instrumental function” – after all, “the fact that SA has survived for such a long time 
even though it is not a spoken language may have to do with its power as a symbol” 
(Bassiouney, 2009: 203). I must warn from the outset that despite my best efforts to 
separate the discussion on language policies, ideologies and practices into individual 
sections, the fact that these three concepts are almost always discussed together in 
the literature has made it nearly impossible to discuss one concept without referring 
to the other two. 
3.2 Language policy and language planning 
This section covers a range of topics related to language policy. In Section ‎3.2.1, I 
examine the relationship between Diglossia and language policy, drawing mostly on 
Schiffman’s work in this area. Then, in Section ‎3.2.2, I focus on the case of Arabic 
diglossia by reviewing the Arabicisation policy and related language planning efforts 
adopted in the Arab World. In Section ‎3.2.3, I outline the role of the Arabic language 
academies and their puristic approach to language planning. The concept of standard 
language and the standardisation of Arabic are discussed in Section ‎3.2.4, while the 
relevant concepts of power and prestige are discussed in sections ‎3.2.5 and ‎3.2.6 
respectively.   
3.2.1 Diglossia and language policy 
Schiffman (1992: 3) considers diglossia a good example of a social feature which 
“operates at times in defiance to the explicit policy of the area”. To explain why, he 
distinguishes between two types of policy: “overt (explicit, formalised, de jure, 
codified) policies and covert (implicit, informal, unstated, de facto, grass-roots) 
aspects of the policy”, noting that covert aspects are usually ignored (ibid.). He adds 
that “diglossic linguistic situations often mask the true nature of linguistic repertoires 
(and therefore of languages policies) by presenting a view of language that is skewed 
in favour of the ‘high’ language, ignoring the actual domains of the ‘low’ language” 
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(p. 4). Indeed, Schiffman notes that “few policies ever take any cognizance of the 
existence of L variety language, let alone establish guarantees of its domains and 
registers” (p. 7). In such diglossic settings, official mentions of language “tend to be 
both in the H version of the language and about the H version … and give no mention 
of rights for the L variety” (p. 8). Schiffman notes that this “follows the general 
practice of assuming that the H variety is the language” (ibid.) (cf. the discussion on 
al-ʿarabiyya in Section ‎2.6). 
Policy makers in diglossic settings often turn a blind eye to the reality of actual 
linguistic use within the policies they establish. The overt policies of Arabic-speaking 
countries would give an outsider a very misleading picture of their linguistic reality, 
which is perhaps why Bassiouney (2009: 199) states that “to be able to appreciate 
fully the discussion on language policy in the Arab World, one has to resort to 
political science, sociology, psychology, anthropology and history as well as 
sociolinguistics”. Indeed, the very persistence of diglossia “is not so much an overt 
policy issue as it is a deep-seated cultural behaviour towards language” (Schiffman, 
1996: 5). In the next section where language planning is discussed, “diglossia has to 
be considered to be a given, an underlying assumption, an input to the decision-
making process, even an underlying cultural policy if you will, not a result of it, and 
not something that can be ignored” (ibid.). Schiffman adds that because diglossia “is 
not part of the explicit policy, it is not amenable to change in the same way that 
more explicit aspects of policy might be” (ibid.). The resulting disparity between 
policy and practice in the case of Egypt is discussed in Section ‎3.4.  
3.2.2 Arabicisation and Language planning  
Schiffman (1996) feels it is important to distinguish between language policy and 
language planning: while the former refers to the positions, principles and decisions 
of a language community towards its linguistic repertoire, the latter refers to 
concrete measures which aim to direct language roles. Although one might expect 
language policy and language planning to go hand in hand, they are different in that 
official language policies may not be implemented by language planning (Bassiouney, 
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2009). Official policies usually satisfy ideological motives and expectations, whereas 
language planning may take a more pragmatic route.  
All Arab countries adopted a policy of Arabicisation17 (taʿrīb) shortly after gaining 
their independence from colonial powers in the twentieth century, “mainly as a 
reaction to years of deliberate suppression or marginalization of their native 
language(s) and culture” (Shaaban, 2008: 694). Even before independence, Arabic 
had “served as the rallying point of opposition to the hegemony of the coloniser” 
(Shaaban, 2008: 696), (cf. Section ‎3.3.2.1). Hence, when their constitutions were 
drawn up after independence, all Arab countries (that is, those that identified 
themselves as Arab) stipulated the adoption of Arabic (al-ʿarabiyya) as their official 
language (ibid.). Altoma (1974: 285) defines the policy of Arabicisation as: 
[A] process aiming at achieving maximum use of Arabic in different Arab countries in 
oral and written communication. It covers issues ranging from the general question of 
making Arabic the official language of the state, the language of instruction, to matters 
related to the preparation of technical and scientific terminology in Arabic. 
The language planning which stemmed from this Arabicisation policy in the Arab 
World is divided by Maamouri (1998) into two kinds: status planning Arabicisation in 
the countries of the Maghreb (West), and corpus planning Arabicisation in the 
countries of the ‘Machrek’ (East; to which Egypt belongs)18. Status planning 
Arabicisation involved minimising the use of French in favour of Arabic in the 
Maghreb countries (cf. Chejne, 1969; Haeri, 2000; Shaaban, 2008), while corpus 
planning Arabicisation “mainly focused on the ability of Arabic to cope with the 
demands of education promotion, scientific development and industrialisation” 
(Maamouri, 1998: 23). This entailed efforts to reform and update the Arabic lexicon 
to meet the demands of modernisation, as well as a preoccupation with the 
standards and quality of written production in Arabic. The Arabic language 
                                                             
17 The term Arabisation is alternatively used in some sources (for example: Altoma, 1974; Maamouri, 
1998) to designate the same process. This is replaced by ‘Arabicisation’ here as it more accurately 
captures the intended meaning: Arabicisation “involves the language not the ethnic group” (Shaaban, 
2008: 696). Compare this to my use of Arabisation in Section ‎2.3. 
18 The terms status planning and corpus planning were originally coined by the Norwegian-American 
linguist Einar Haugen (1968).  
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academies played a central role in corpus planning Arabicisation and Arabic language 
reform (cf. Section ‎3.2.3). 
Schiffman (1992: 1) notes that “there is a tendency to separate corpus planning and 
status planning and act as if they are rather unrelated (‘the linguists do the corpus 
planning and the politicians do the status planning’)”. However, Schiffman suggests 
that status planning is essentially embedded in overall language planning. Schiffman 
is primarily concerned with accounting for status planning failures where the aim is 
to reassign domains from an H (usually exogenous) variety to another indigenous L 
variety (such as in the case of status planning described by Maamouri in the 
Maghreb). However, where there are policies in place to reinforce the status and 
hold of H in certain domains but the L variety seems to be gaining ground anyway 
(such as in Egypt), it could be said that status planning is also failing, and Schiffman’s 
explanations seem to apply here too. 
A third type of language planning which Wright (2004) includes as part of nation-
building language policies is acquisition planning, a term coined by Cooper (1989) 
and “generally employed to describe the policies and strategies introduced to bring 
citizens to competence in the languages designated as ‘national’, ‘official’ or 
‘medium of education’” (Wright, 2004: 61). This includes aspects such as the spread 
of literacy – “because a written language can be standardised and monitored more 
easily than spoken interaction” (ibid.) – and the introduction of a national school 
system where the (planned) standard language is taught (cf. Section ‎3.2.4).  
Language planning in education is significant as it “can have far-reaching 
consequences in the structure of the languages involved, in the patterns of 
communication in the nation, and in the broader political processes within which 
language policy decisions take place”, which is why it is “most often the focus of 
political pressure and governmental policy making at the national level” (Ferguson, 
1977: 12). I will now focus on a particular aspect of language planning in Egypt, 
namely the role of the Arabic Language Academy (ALA). 
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3.2.3 Linguistic purism and the role of the language academies 
Wright (2004: 57) notes that “written languages with a literary canon will occasion 
purist attitudes as scholars and teachers hold up literary models for emulation”, 
stating that this is particularly true for languages which also have religious 
significance such as Arabic. She also notes that purism tends to be most intense 
during nationalist periods: “national education systems in nationalist times inculcate 
nationalist attitudes along with and through the national language” (Wright, 2004: 
61). This ties in with what De Silva calls the ‘colonial hangover’ in most diglossic 
societies (cf. Section  3.3.2.1), where “any apparent threat to the ‘pure’ language  of 
the liberated is capable of bringing back memories of past colonial experiences” 
(1982: 113). In such cases, a “declared policy of maintaining and protecting the ‘pure’ 
language is often politically advantageous” (ibid.), (cf. Section  3.2.4). It is in this 
context that the role of the ALAs in language planning should be understood. 
In 1932, “the Egyptian authorities established ‘The Royal Academy for the Arabic 
language’ (majmaʿ al-luġa al-ʿarabiyya al-malakī) to overlook, coordinate and 
authorise the various developments taking place in the use of Arabic” (Mejdell, 2006: 
15). Like other Arabic language academies, the primary objective of the academy in 
Egypt has been “the preservation and renovation of Classical Arabic as an effective 
and unified language for all Arabic speaking people” (Altoma, 1974: 302). Its goals 
also included “preservation of the purity of the language; making Arabic self-
sufficient so as to meet the requirements of the arts and sciences; and rendering 
Arabic a suitable instrument of communication in the modern world” (Chejne, 1969: 
105).  
In pursuing these objectives, the academies “have continued to resist the 
penetration of colloquialism from within, and loan words from without” (Altoma, 
1974: 302). The Arabic language academies generally reflect the views of language 
Classicists (Altoma, 1974; Maamouri, 1998), whose position can be summarised in: 
insisting on the need to preserve fuṣḥā; a desire for fuṣḥā to replace colloquial Arabic 
as a natural spoken language; undermining colloquial Arabic and rejecting any 
change in fuṣḥā; a belief that the spread of education and universal literacy would 
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bridge the gap between fuṣḥā and colloquial Arabic; a belief that language planning 
could spread the use of fuṣḥā to all functions in society (Maamouri, 1998: 24).  
However, it is worth noting that some academy members diverged from this 
position, “[tolerating] the study and use of the colloquial and [accepting] the need 
for modifications and enrichment” Maamouri (1998: 25). Two famous examples are 
Aḥmad Luṭfī Al-Sayyid (1872-1963; henceforth, Ahmad Lutfi Al-Sayyid) and Ṭāhā 
Ḥusayn (1989-1973; henceforth, Taha Husayn) who presided over the Arabic 
language academy in Egypt in 1945-1963 and 1963-1973 respectively. Al-Sayyid 
(1937, cited in Zughoul, 1980) recognised the need for reforming fuṣḥā and called for 
‘linguistic tolerance’; “that is, using loan words and [colloquial] lexical items in 
writing” (Zughoul, 1980: 209). Al-Sayyid “was aware that fuṣḥā was in need of lexical 
and stylistic modernisation, a task he tackled from the perspective of an Egyptian 
nationalist who believed in the Egyptianisation of fuṣḥā (tamṣīr al-luġa), perhaps to 
make it fit for defining Egyptian national identity at some future date” (Suleiman, 
2008: 32), (cf. Section ‎3.3.2.3). 
Husayn (1996 [1937]), who was less ‘radical’ in his views than Al-Sayyid, highlighted 
the need for reforming the grammar of fuṣḥā to make it more accessible to learners. 
Husayn saw a paradox in the puristic position of those who resisted Arabic language 
reforms, pointing out “that failure to reform the grammar, under the pretext that 
any reform of this kind would willy-nilly constitute an infringement of the integrity of 
the text of the Quran, will inevitably lead to depressing literacy in the schools and to 
heightening the danger which the colloquial poses to the standard form of the 
language in Egypt” (Suleiman, 2003: 193). It is the same paradox highlighted by 
Wexler (1971: 342-343) who notes that while “purism contributes to the 
maintenance of diglossia by protecting the written norm from encroachments from 
the dialects”, it simultaneously “assists in the resolution of diglossia by enabling the 
spoken norm to displace the previous written norm from its functions.” 
It is perhaps the role of figures such as Al-Sayyid and Husayn which causes Altoma 
(1974: 302) to single out the Egyptian academy for being “most involved in attempts 
to modernise the language”. Such modernisation efforts usually entailed a struggle 
against the influence of al-Azhar in Cairo, an institution “charged with the 
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responsibility for perpetuating the traditional approach … which was, until the late 
thirties, in charge of training teachers of Arabic in Egypt” Altoma (1974: 294), (cf. 
sections  2.3,  2.3.2 and  6.2.1). Giving an account of the Arabic language academy in 
Egypt, Mejdell (2006: 15) writes: 
It is a story of an institution ridden by internal cultural-ideological conflicts between two 
main tendencies amongst its members: the reformist, ‘modernist’ writers and 
academics (often bilingual in education) vs. the ‘conservatives’ (mostly with an Azhari 
connection)—with “l’orientation puriste” nearly always getting the upper hand. This 
was not because of the conservatives’ numerical strength (they were in fact fewer than 
the modernists), but more likely because of a certain malaise among most academicians 
when confronted with charges of undermining the fuṣḥā, which made them recede on 
more radical issues. 
One thing which is clear is that, despite the well-documented efforts of the language 
academy and its members “the decisions they (may) arrive at have no real 
authoritative force, but may be challenged or ignored at will” (Mejdell, 2006: 17). 
Altoma (1974) attributes the inefficacy of the Arabic language academy of Egypt in 
bringing about real change to a number of factors: lack of funds, slow decision-
making processes, lack of coordination with other academies and resistance from 
traditionalists. As a result “there emanates from the Academy only a sort of 
whispering that nobody in language, education, and culture pays attention to” 
(Mejdell, 2006: 18-19). 
It is also worth pointing to another institution which has played a prominent role in 
language planning in the Arab World: the Arab League (LAS). Established in 1945, LAS 
set up a cultural committee which promoted cultural unity in the Arab World through 
sponsoring conferences in specialised fields and publishing translations and 
manuscripts in Arabic. LAS also established a committee for Arabic which was 
concerned with the pedagogical functions of Arabic and sought to standardise 
scientific and technical terms in Arabic (Chejne, 1969). The linguistic endeavours of 
LAS played an important role in modernising Arabic and in many ways have 
contributed to the development of MSA. 
Before concluding this section, it is worth pondering the role of language academies 
more broadly, and musing at the hegemony of the linguistic purism which has 
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effectively curtailed any substantial efforts to reform the Arabic language. After all, 
linguistic purism is itself a kind of language policy (Schiffman, 1996). Schiffman 
characterises linguistic purism as an attempt to control the language premised on a 
‘belief system’. Language academies in the Arab World play a fundamental role in 
maintaining this purism (Spolsky, 2004), and the ‘beliefs’ that Schiffman lists aptly 
capture the ideology of the Classicists in their midst: 
x A belief that there exists somewhere, perhaps in the past, or in a particular textual 
tradition, a state of ‘purity’ that the language can aspire to, or return to. 
x A belief that there are people with special knowledge, capable of making decisions 
about what is pure and what is not. 
x A belief that purity is a good thing, capable of renewing or strengthening the moral 
fibre of the language, its linguistic culture, or its speakers. 
x There may also be a belief that purity is associated with a religious state, that is by 
keeping the language pure we keep religion pure, which helps keep the world from 
disintegrating. 
x Purism may be associated with religious fundamentalism and fundamentalist 
movements, with political movements, nationalism, national integration, 
millennialism, and many other kinds of social, political and cultural phenomena. 
(Schiffman, 1996: 62) 
For the Arabic language, the state of ultimate purity exists in the Quranic texts, and 
more broadly in the Arabic of early Islam. It is believed that traditional Arabic 
linguists, having usually undergone Islamic education or ‘heritage studies’, are in a 
position to safeguard the purity of the language. The purity of Arabic is often seen 
not only as linguistically, but as morally important: to preserve the Arabic language is 
also to preserve the ideals and traditions that it embodies. Conversely, a decline in 
the state of Arabic is perceived as a decline in the state of Islam and Islamic societies. 
It is therefore no surprise that religious and nationalist arguments are often invoked 
for the preservation of the Arabic language in its ‘pure’ state. These and other ideas 
are explored further in Section  3.3.1. I shall now turn to the subject of 
standardisation, another important component of language planning. 
3.2.4 Standardisation 
In its most basic sense, standardisation is “the imposition of uniformity upon a class 
of objects” (Milroy, 2001: 530). Applying this to the ‘object’ of language, language 
standardisation is essentially a by-product of corpus planning (cf. Section ‎3.2.2), 
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whereby “citizens should exhibit minimal variation of form and maximum variation 
of function” (Wright, 2004: 52). It is the process of producing a ‘legitimate’19 
language, a ‘semi-artificial’ language, a ‘theoretical norm’; and effectively a 
‘standard’ “against which all linguistic practices are objectively measured” (Bourdieu, 
1991: 45). “Standardisation is in part a fiction”  (Wright, 2004: 53, also cf. Milroy & 
Milroy, 1985),  but it is also “the means by which large groups become and remain 
communities of communication” (Wright, 2004: 54). 
Typically, the language ‘norm’ is determined and codified by a central group 
empowered by the state. It is then disseminated in the form of a standard ‘official’ 
language and policed by state institutions – most notably the educational system 
which helps to “devalue popular modes of expression” and impose “recognition of 
the legitimate language” (Bourdieu, 1991: 49). To maintain its claim to legitimacy, a 
standard language “has to be sustained by a permanent effort of correction” 
(Bourdieu, 1991: 60):  
The official language is bound up with the state, both in its genesis and in its social uses. 
… Ignorance is no excuse; this linguistic law has its body of jurists – the grammarians – 
and its agents of regulation and imposition – the teachers – who are empowered 
universally to subject the linguistic performance of speaking subjects to examination 
and to the legal sanction of academic qualification. (Bourdieu, 1991: 45) 
All of these efforts involved in maintaining the standard language constitute 
language policy and planning.  
Standardisation is “a highly political and ideological business, which relies on the 
imposition of arbitrary norms of usage by authority” (Wright, 2004: 53), and 
accepting the standard also signals accepting the language attitudes which are 
typically circulated within the community. It could therefore be said that 
standardisation is motivated by, as well as perpetuates, a standard language 
ideology; “a bias toward an abstracted idealised, homogeneous spoken language 
which is imposed from above, and which takes as its model the written language. The 
most salient feature is the goal of suppression of variation of all kinds” (Lippi-Green, 
                                                             
19 Bourdieu’s use of the qualifier ‘legitimate’ semantically incorporates both ‘standard’ and ‘official’. 
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1994: 166, my Italics). This ideology is a ‘kind of belief’ which “affects the way in 
which speakers think about their own language and about ‘language’ in general” 
(Milroy, 2001: 530). Citing Lippi-Green’s definition, Walters (2008: 655) notes that “in 
many regards, we can claim that diglossia of the sort found in Arabic represents the 
most complete instantiation of standard language ideology”. While I agree with the 
general point that Walters makes, I believe that the phrase ‘homogeneous spoken 
language’ in Lippi-Green’s definition should not be overlooked. In this respect at 
least, standard Arabic diverges sharply from a ‘typical’ standard language as Mejdell 
(2006: 44) notes: 
While fuṣḥā is as prototypical a High variety as you get in diglossia (with modified claims 
on discreteness of codes and functions), … it may hardly be considered typical as a 
‘standard’ variety: although it shares certain properties and functions with a typical 
standard, most Arabic language users tend increasingly to shun it for other than written 
functions. 
Immediately, this highlights a complexity in the case of standard Arabic. The 
following two sections explain why this has implications for two key attributes which 
are traditionally associated with standard language in Western linguistics: power and 
prestige. 
3.2.5 The question of power 
Language policy is inextricably linked to power, more specifically “the power and 
legitimacy to enforce a policy” which pushes an official, standard language 
(Bassiouney, 2009: 201). Spolsky (2004: 40) observes that “in the modern world, 
states are an obvious locus of power, with a constitutionally established authority of 
governments over their citizens”. This power enables governments to establish and 
enforce language policies. The relationship between language policy and power is 
mutually reinforcing: “The implementation of language policy requires power” and “a 
strong centralized language policy enhances the power of the central government” 
(ibid.). In relation to this point, Wright (2004: 7) notes that “in non-democratic 
societies it serves to mark class and caste acquired through non-linguistic means; in 
democratic societies it is power itself, since authority in a democracy derives 
ultimately in a leader’s ability to persuade the electorate to accord that authority.” 
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All of this makes language “a potentially powerful political issue which is capable of 
deciding the fate of politicians and political parties” (De Silva, 1982: 112-113). De 
Silva adds that “linguistic emotions can be harnessed to divert people’s attention 
from more fundamental economic and political issues, and administrations are 
aware of this” (De Silva, 1982: 113). He relates this to diglossic situations where 
“endeavours to maintain the ‘purity’ of the High variety of the language is a 
significant political weapon that can be used in the name of national heritage and 
interest in order to divert attention from other problems” (ibid.). In such cases, a 
“declared policy of maintaining and protecting the ‘pure’ language is often politically 
advantageous” (ibid.).  
It is clearly in this spirit that Carter (1983, cited in Versteegh, 1996) argues that the 
works of early Arab grammarians – which sought to standardise the Arabic language 
– served as a political tool in controlling Muslim society. Indeed, Brustad (2011) 
argues that what was revived during the nahḑa (cf. Section ‎2.3.2) was not CA, but the 
standard language ideology associated with it. She states that “the MSA that resulted 
by mid-twentieth century and that is taught in schools across the Arab World is an 
anti-literacy MSA that serves, whether by design or not, as a form of social control”.  
Elsewhere, she argues that the standard language ideology associated with MSA is 
used by regimes as “a tool for curbing public discourse” (Brustad, 2012). That is, “by 
‘educating’ people that the appropriate code to use in public discourse is hopelessly 
complex and an unachievable goal, the political elite furthered their own aims” 
(ibid.). 
Walters (2008: 655) notes that the ‘symbolic loadings’ resulting from the association 
between Standard Arabic (fuṣḥā) and Islamic heritage (cf. Section  3.3.1), have meant 
that SA “has understandably come to be imbued with near-totemic power”. Haeri 
(2000: 68) also points to the ‘textual authority’ of Standard Arabic which derives 
from the fact that it is the language of a significant body of classical texts emanating 
from Islamic civilisation, and owes to the centrality of such texts. However, Haeri is 
quick to point out that “the language of these texts does not belong to any social 
group as their ordinary means of communication” (ibid.). This is essentially what 
Mejdell (2006) means when she points out that the ‘validity domain’ of Standard 
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Arabic is much greater than its ‘practice domain’. This latter point raises the question 
of the accessibility of Standard Arabic and, by extension, of the power it denotes, 
motivating Ferguson (1991: 227) to observe that “the proportion of the community 
competent in the H variety and the social position of the H-competent group make a 
big difference in terms of access to power”.  
It is useful here to refer to Bourdieu’s (1991: 59) discussion on the “dispossession of 
the dominated classes”. He associates this with “the existence of a body of 
professionals, objectively invested with the monopoly of the legitimate use of the 
legitimate language, who produce for their own use a special language predisposed 
to fulfil, as a by-product, a social function of distinction in the relations between 
classes and in the struggles they wage on the terrain of language” (ibid.). Bourdieu 
also links this to the role of the educational system which, “charged with the task of 
sanctioning heretical products in the name of grammar and inculcating the specific 
norms which block the effects of the laws of evolution, contributes significantly to 
constituting the dominated uses of language as such by consecrating the dominant 
use as the only legitimate one, by the mere fact of inculcating it” (Bourdieu, 1991: 
59-60). 
This system is responsible for propping up a dominant language (and a dominant 
culture), and an ideology which favours this language (i.e. standard language 
ideology). An official language (as a component of ‘dominant culture’) in contributing 
to the “integration of the dominant class” also contributes to the “fictitious 
integration of society as a whole”, and hence to “the apathy (false consciousness) of 
the dominated classes” and “the legitimation of the established order” (Bourdieu, 
1991: 167). This ‘ideological effect’ is produced by “concealing the function of 
division beneath the function of communication: the culture which unifies (the 
medium of communication) is also the culture which separates (the instrument of 
distinction) and which legitimates distinctions by forcing all other cultures 
(designated as sub-cultures) to define themselves by their distance from the 




Hence, thus far we can understand that, as far as MSA (or more generally, fuṣḥā) is a 
standard, language, it is a variety imbued with power by virtue of its association with 
Islamic heritage and the fact that it is the official variety sanctioned by the 
government. In this capacity, it should also follow that MSA has the power to include 
groups and exclude others in its power domains, and to confer benefits on groups 
and bar others. All of this would imply a straightforward relationship between 
standardisation and access to power, whereby a standard variety becomes more or 
less synonymous with power. 
However, there is an important caveat to this relationship: when we speak of 
language and power, this “refers to both political power and economic power” 
(Bassiouney, 2009: 201, my emphasis). Of course, it is worth noting that political and 
economic powers may not be shared by the same entities; “governments can try to 
impose languages as much as they like, but unless their plans reflect the economic 
reality, they will not be appealing to the people” (Bassiouney, 2009: 204). As Haugen 
(1966: 933) points out: “Mastery of the standard language will naturally have a 
higher value if it admits one to the councils of the mighty. If it does not, the 
inducement to learn it, except, perhaps passively, may be very low; if social status is 
fixed by other criteria, it is conceivable that centuries could pass without a 
population’s adopting it”. I shall defer discussing the economic value of language to 
Section ‎3.4. Now, I turn to another concept which is often associated with 
standardisation: language prestige.  
3.2.6 The question of prestige 
As highlighted in the previous section, Standard Arabic has strong associations with 
Islamic civilisation and Arab cultural heritage. There is therefore no doubt that, at 
least as a written variety, MSA is regarded as a prestigious variety. For instance, 
Mitchell (1986: 8) observes that “written Arabic enjoys very great prestige among 
Arabic speakers”, while Maamouri (1998: 39) refers to the ‘prestige valuation’ of 
fuṣḥā, which is “explained by Arabs as relating to such qualities as beauty, logic, and 
a high degree of expressiveness” (cf. section ‎3.3.1).  
71 
 
However, the complexity of the notion of prestige in the Arabic language context has 
been pointed out by a number of researchers (see for example: Abd-El-Jawad, 1987; 
M. H. Ibrahim, 1986; Nader, 1962; Schmidt, 1986). Abd-El-Jawad’s (1987) important 
work calls into question the essentialising of the link between standard language and 
language prestige. Contrary to expectation, the Jordanian/Palestinian village women 
that Abd-El-Jawad studied did not accommodate to the standard forms – which is a 
deviation from the general pattern seen in sociolinguistic studies of gender and 
language the world over. In fact, the women studied preferred forms which were 
urban but not standard over forms which were simultaneously rural and standard. 
These unexpected results cannot be explained away as a consequence of the inferior 
social status of women in a segregated society (M. H. Ibrahim, 1986), or lack of 
access to the standard form (Haeri, 2000)20. What these findings seem to point to is 
“that the issue lies not in deviant behaviour from Arab women, but in the 
unwarranted equation ‘prestige features = standard features’” (Mejdell, 2006: 21).  
Commenting on an earlier account of Abd-el-Jawad’s findings (Abd-El-Jawad, 1981), 
Labov (1982: 79) notes that, “to resolve this apparent contradiction, we must first 
generalise our notion of prestige, to take into account local as well as national 
prestige”. This is taken a step further by M. H. Ibrahim (1986: 115) who states that 
“the identification of H as both the standard and the prestigious variety at one and 
the same time has led to problems of interpreting data and findings from Arabic 
sociolinguistic research”.  He cites findings from Abd-El-Jawad’s work alongside 
similar findings from other phonological studies investigating language variation 
along gender lines in Syria, Iraq  and Egypt. They all had “one conclusion in common: 
unlike women in the rest of the world, Arabic speaking females tend to approximate 
standard Arabic to a lesser degree than Arabic-speaking males” (M. H. Ibrahim, 1986: 
116). M. H. Ibrahim also points to the findings of Clive Holes whose research on 
Bahraini Arabic (see for example: Holes, 1983, 1986) indicates that Shiite Bahrainis 
accommodate to the speech of the more socially prestigious Sunni Bahrainis, even 
though this is an accommodation away from the Standard rather than towards it. M. 
H. Ibrahim reasons that “to assume that H is the only standard and prestigious 
                                                             
20 These reasons are stated by Kojak (1982-1983) as the main explanation for her findings in Syria. 
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variety would entail that all speakers of Arabic who have no functional knowledge of 
H are sociolinguistically unstratified in regard to these characteristics of H” (M. H. 
Ibrahim, 1986: 118) – an assumption so ‘absurd’ that it logically follows that “the L 
varieties of Arabic must have their own hierarchical order of prestige independently 
of H and any of the latter’s features” (p.119) while “Standard Arabic H is socially 
neutral and unmarked with respect to the speaker’s class” (p. 124-125). M. H. 
Ibrahim’s argument is so compelling that his conclusions about standard and prestige 
varieties in Arabic are widely accepted by Arabic sociolinguists today (see for 
example: Bassiouney, 2009; Haeri, 2000; Mejdell, 2006; Walters, 2008).  
There is however one important point which goes unspoken in this literature 
(perhaps because it is so obvious it does not need stating). In the studies cited above, 
prestige is dealt with in relation to the spoken form only. This is subtly pointed out by 
M. H. Ibrahim (1986: 124) who argues that women use locally prestigious forms 
because they are “socially prestigious … at least when it comes to speaking” (my 
emphasis).  
What needs to be spelled out here is that this does not necessarily detract from the 
prestige valuation of MSA as a written form (as pointed out in Section ‎3.2.4), 
especially since it is this written form which is the object of the language 
standardisation process after all (cf. Haugen, 1972 [1962]). Indeed, M. H. Ibrahim 
himself states in an earlier article that “the terms ‘standard’ and ‘written’ are 
synonymous in the Arabic context since standard Arabic is virtually the only written 
variety to the exclusion of all spoken vernaculars” (1983: 508). The discrepancy in 
prestige between spoken and written MSA is a topic which has not received 
sufficient elucidation or investigation in the Arabic linguistics literature. I have 
therefore split valuations of fuṣḥā in the survey (Chapter 5) into spoken and written 
use to avoid conflating the two in a single (misleading) category. 
3.3 Language Ideologies 
Language ideologies are terminologically packaged in a manner of ways in the 
literature. I shall begin this section with defining some key terms and phrases, 
starting with the most obvious two: language ideology and language attitudes. 
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According to Walters (2008: 651), “language attitudes are psychological states 
related in complex ways to larger abstract language ideologies”. Language ideology is 
“the cultural (or subcultural) system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, 
together with their loading of moral and political interests” (Irvine, 1989: 255). As 
Woolard and Schieffelin (1994: 55-56) point out, language ideologies go beyond 
language itself to “envision and enact links of language to group and personal 
identity, to aesthetics, to morality, and to epistemology”. These linkages, they add, 
“often underpin fundamental social institutions” (ibid.). 
Although the two are often conflated, we tend to speak of discrete, isolated 
attitudes, while language ideologies “function as systems, linking aspects of language 
to aspects of social organisation and to various sorts of positioned interests” 
(Walters, 2008: 651). When an Arabic speaker regards ʿāmmiyya as inappropriate for 
written use, we speak of language attitudes. On the other hand, when this 
‘inappropriate use’ leads to judgments of the language user as uneducated, 
unpatriotic, overtly secular, etc, then we are entering the realm of language 
ideologies. In general, the term ‘language attitudes’ lends itself to the discipline of 
psychology, while ‘language ideology’ invokes a more anthropological line of inquiry 
(Walters, 2008).  
Some authors appear to get around the confusion caused by these two terms by 
devising their own terminology. For instance, Ferguson (1977: 9) speaks of 
‘evaluations’, stating that: 
All users of language in all speech communities – speakers, hearers, readers, writers – 
evaluate the forms of language(s) they use, in that they regard some forms as ‘better’ or 
‘more correct’ or ‘more appropriate’ than others either in an absolute sense or for 
certain purposes or by particular people or in certain settings. 
Ferguson points out that the role of such evaluations is central to determining the 
course of language change. He uses the term rationalised evaluation to refer to cases 
when “language evaluation is explained by members of the speech community in 
terms of particular reasons” such as the purity, beauty and efficiency of a language 
(Ferguson, 1977: 15). Such rationalised evaluations can be central to processes of 
language planning. The term evaluations is also mentioned by Walters (2008) who 
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notes that, based on the psychological tradition, ‘evaluative responses’ to language 
may be cognitive, affective, or behavioural: “Cognitive responses involve beliefs, and 
affective responses involve emotions, feelings, and sympathetic nervous system 
activity, while behavioural responses involve overt actions” (Walters, 2008: 650). 
One of the most elaborate frameworks addressing language ideologies and attitudes 
in Arabic sociolinguistics is perhaps that devised by Eisele (2002) who assumes the 
presence of ‘authorising discourses’ in society, which he terms regimes of authority:  
Each of the regimes of authority present in a society/culture may have an effect on the 
kind of language which is valorized, and on the metalinguistic views of language in 
general, and ultimately on the views and analyses of language professionals themselves 
(linguists, grammar specialists, language teachers, L1 and L2), who participate as well in 
their own discursive regimes of authority. (Eisele, 2002: 5) 
However, Eisele (2002: 6) notes that “individuals do not always adopt the value 
system of one regime of authority alone and for all time, but rather manipulate the 
various regimes of authority and their differing systems of values (and thus the 
meanings that inhere in them) in fashioning their own identity”. 
Building on Ferguson’s myths about Arabic, Eisele recognises four recurring ‘topoi’ 
underlying the value system of the most dominant regime of authority about the 
Arabic language (Eisele, 2000, 2002). These are motifs which frequently emerge in 
the narrative about the Arabic language; namely: unity, purity, continuity and 
competition. The topos of unity underscores the value of the Arabic language as 
uniting pre-Islamic Arabs in a single culture. This topos has been more recently 
“reinterpreted in the service of various nationalisms, initially Islamic but most 
strongly and successfully for Arab nationalism and Arab unity” (Eisele, 2002: 7), (cf. 
Section ‎3.3.2.2). The topos of purity encapsulates the traditional preoccupation to 
protect the Arabic language from ‘contamination’ resulting from interaction with 
non-Arab populations following the spread of Islam (cf. Section ‎2.2). In the modern 
period, this is exemplified in the prescriptivist role of education and language 
academies in maintaining the purity of “the classically derived modern written 
language” and stigmatisation of the Arabic vernaculars (Eisele, 2002: 7), (cf. Section 
‎3.3.1.2). Continuity is linked to the “development of a complex and highly esteemed 
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written tradition, which is passed down through the generations and in which 
inheres the most highly valued features of the culture” (ibid.). In modern times, this 
topos can be seen in the 19th century revival of Arab culture and the Arabic language 
with an emphasis on the classical literary canon as a source for modern values (cf. 
Section ‎2.2). Competition involves rivalry with other languages, initially other Islamic 
languages such as Persian and Turkish, but more recently European colonial 
languages, particularly English (cf. sections ‎3.3.2.1 and ‎3.4). I find Eisele’s approach 
particularly valuable in unpacking some of the ideological positions manifested in the 
interviews I carried out (Chapter 4). 
One thing which should be pointed out about language ideologies in the Arabic 
language situation in general, and in the Egyptian language situation in particular, is 
that they are many, complex and overlapping – attempting to provide a faithful 
account of these is nothing short of a mammoth task. As Woolard and Schieffelin 
(1994: 56) observe, even where language ideologies are not explicitly named, their 
underlying presence cannot be ignored in “studies that address cultural conceptions 
of language, in the guise of metalinguistics, attitudes, prestige, standards, aesthetics, 
hegemony, etc.”.  Indeed, all of these terms pop up in the Arabic sociolinguistics 
literature as will become apparent in this section, in addition to another term which 
is often invoked in relation to Arabic: language myths (cf. Section ‎3.3.1). In reviewing 
this literature, some recurring themes emerge. Some of these have already been 
covered (purism in Sections ‎3.2.3, standard language ideology in Section ‎3.2.4, 
hegemony or power in Section ‎3.2.5, and prestige in Section ‎3.2.6). This section aims 
to cover the remaining themes which are structured under two main headings. 
Section ‎3.3.1 deals with the theme of the superiority of Arabic and examines the 
relationship between language and religion. Section ‎3.3.2, which is considerably 
longer, is dedicated to the themes which fall under the topic of language and identity 
– a vast and multi-layered topic which covers several themes including colonial 
heritage, nationalism and territorialism.  
3.3.1 Language myths: the superiority of Arabic 
Language myths are a type of language attitudes: they are ‘ideas’ – or perhaps more 
accurately – ‘beliefs’ about language which have become a well-established part of 
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the culture of a speech community (Bauer & Trudgill, 1998). That is, while “ideologies 
serve particular interests which they tend to present as universal interests, shared by 
the group as a whole”, myth “is a collective and collectively appropriated product” 
(Bourdieu, 1991: 167). As Schiffman (1996: 67) notes:  
[M]any linguistic cultures have myths about language and these beliefs are often strongly 
cherished by members of the linguistic culture. Where they affect policy is in the area of 
attitudes toward the language, attitudes about other languages (and their speakers), the 
rights of other language speakers, and in challenges to the established policy. 
Elgibali (1996: 1) describes Arabic as “a language long shrouded in mythology and 
confined by dogmas, a language whose self-appointed keepers believed in its 
supremacy over all other languages”. In an article which deals specifically with 
language myths about Arabic, Ferguson (1997 [1959]: 150) describes language myths 
as attitudes and beliefs which are “probably current about the language of the 
community as well as about other languages and language in general. Some of these 
are true, i.e. correspond very well to objective reality, others are involved with 
esthetic or religious notions the validity of which cannot be investigated empirically, 
and still others which purport to deal with facts are partly or wholly false”. This 
conceptualisation of language myths corresponds to what Suleiman (2008) calls “folk 
linguistics”. Ferguson’s article covers three central themes: the superiority of Arabic, 
dialect rating (that most dialect speakers perceive their respective dialects to be 
better and closer to fuṣḥā than other dialects)21, and the future of Arabic (the belief 
by many Arabs that all Arabs will speak and write a single unified variety of Arabic in 
the future, representing some simplified form of fuṣḥā). In this section, I deal with 
the ‘myth’ of the superiority of fuṣḥā. Indeed, the majority of Ferguson’s article is 
dedicated to this myth, which he summarises under the points of beauty, logic, 
lexical richness and religious aspects. I structure the discussion of the superiority of 
Arabic into two main themes: the divine selection of Arabic as the language of 
revelation, and hence its superiority over other languages (Section  3.3.1.1), and the 
purity of fuṣḥā Arabic, and hence its superiority over colloquial forms of Arabic 
(Section  3.3.1.2).  
                                                             
21 Ferguson’s remarks on this point are critiqued by Nader (1962) and Z. Ibrahim (2000). 
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3.3.1.1 The chosen language 
Schiffman (1996: 55) notes that “one of the most basic issues where language and 
religion intersect is the existence, in many cultures, of sacred texts”. He adds that 
“for cultures where certain texts are so revered, there is often almost an identity of 
language and religion, such that the language of the texts also becomes sacred, and 
must be controlled, kept pure, kept out of the wrong hands (or wrong ears)”. This 
statement is true of the Arabic language which is “the chief instrument and vehicle of 
the sacred message of Islam”, and “analysis of its roles and functions over the past 
14 centuries has taken a predominantly ideological orientation because of this” 
(Maamouri, 1998: 19). Maamouri adds that the view of Arabic as a sacred language 
has “led to the prevailing traditional ideology which has validated and preserved until 
now the cultural and historical uniqueness of Arabic by manifesting a highly 
pronounced sensitivity for purism and a low level of tolerance (and even some 
disdain) towards mistakes and error [sic] of common language use” (1998: 21). 
This purist ideology affected Muslims in particular, further highlighting the 
inextricable link between language and religion in the case of Arabic. Indeed, 
referring to an earlier work by him (Hary, 1992), Hary (1996: 75) notes that Christian 
and Judeo-Arabic authors “were unaffected by the ideal of al-ʿarabiyya, and 
therefore allowed Colloquial elements to enter their writings”. He adds that the 
“pressure of the doctrine of the inimitability of the Quran (ʾiʿjāz al-qurʾān), which has 
been so effective for Muslims, did not apply for Christians and Jews, since their 
sacred texts were not written in Arabic” (ibid.). On the other hand, Boussofara-Omar 
(2008: 636) refers to “the relentless efforts to reinforce the sacred and divine origin 
of fuṣḥā together with the majestic aura in which it is – and must continue to be – 
shrouded,” noting “the exaggerated focus on the high reverence that Arabs have for 
fuṣḥā, its perfection and purity of speech or eloquence (faṣāḥa), remain as widely 
prevalent and advocated as they were in the pre-Islamic era”. 
Ferguson (1997 [1959]: 253) states that it is easy to imagine an unanswerable 
argument as to the superiority of Arabic: “God is all-knowing, all powerful; he knows 
and can utilise all languages; he chose Arabic as the vehicle of ultimate revelations to 
the world; consequently, the Arabic language must be, in important respects, better 
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than other languages.” However, Eisele (2003) points out that while this argument 
may be ‘unanswerable’ from a theological perspective, “religiously inspired views of 
language also have political and social aspects to them, which are answerable and 
can be dealt with”. In particular, Eisele criticises the absence of the political 
dimension in Ferguson’s article. He considers Ferguson’s treatment of language 
attitudes to be ‘limited’, ‘selective’, ‘essentialising’, ‘impressionistic’ and based in 
part on anecdotal evidence. Nevertheless, he does not question the truth value of 
Ferguson’s observations and in fact seeks to build on them (Eisele, 2003). In 
particular, Ferguson’s views on the sacredness of the Quranic text are reflected in 
the question of translating it into colloquial Arabic22. Nader (1962: 26) notes that “no 
one would conceive of paraphrasing the [Quran] in colloquial Arabic. So we could say 
that colloquial Arabic and [Quranic] sayings are mutually exclusive”. The same view is 
expressed by Haeri (2000: 75) who cites this evidence from her research: 
In my own fieldwork in Cairo, Egyptians of diverse backgrounds were not only greatly 
surprised at the question of whether the Quran should be translated, they also gave 
similar answers as to why that cannot and should not be done. They argued that the 
form and meaning of the holy book cannot be separated. That is, the form is as 
important as the meaning and because one cannot translate form, much can be lost in 
translation. In other words, they do not consider, in this case, the relation between the 
signifier and the signified as arbitrary. The language of the Quran, they explained, is 
after all the word of God and one must read His word and not some translation of it. 
Furthermore, they said that as they are “Arabs” and already speak “Arabic,” there is no 
need for translations. 
In 2010, news emerged of a translation of the Quran into the Moroccan vernacular 
(dārija) in what could best be described as an ‘Internet scandal’ (Al-Shalh, 2010). The 
                                                             
22 It is worth noting that the idea of ‘translation’ here is usually understood to mean a written 
translation. The Quran is otherwise ‘translated’ into colloquial Arabic on a daily basis by religious 
scholars across the Arab World, where the transfer takes the form of a written-to-oral 
translation/explanation (described as Quranic exegesis). A prominent example is the highly popular 
collection of televised Quranic exegesis by the late Egyptian Islamic scholar Muhammad Metwalli Al-
Shaʿrāwī (1911-1998). One might argue that this act of ‘translation’ is not contested because it 
operates within the functional domains of diglossia. It would therefore follow that the question of 
translating the Quran into colloquial Arabic becomes more a question of recognising ʿāmmiyya as a 
separate code and professing its validity in written form. For a detailed review of the ideologies 




web is full of incredulous posts, pages and campaigns attacking the translation. The 
fact that the translator was a Moroccan convert from Islam to Christianity with 
missionary motives and professed antipathy towards Islam made it easy to denounce 
the translation on religious grounds: the argument goes that the sanctity of the 
Quran is bound to the sanctity of its form, therefore any action which is perceived to 
undermine this form must surely be intended to undermine Islam itself, and in this 
case at least, it was glaringly true. More recently, a campaign page surfaced on 
Facebook calling for the translation of the Quran into Egyptian ʿāmmiyya. This 
attracted negative attention rapidly enough, that by the time I had heard about the 
page and attempted to visit it, it was already gone as a result of reports for ‘abusive 
content’. While the controversy of the Moroccan translation seems to have now 
blown over, leaving only a whisper in its wake about the real linguistic issue at stake, 
the response to it is in itself testimony to the continuing validity of the views 
reported by Haeri (2000). The final statement in the long quote from Haeri above is 
echoed in the response of one Moroccan religious scholar to the Moroccan 
translation; he is quoted to have said that, because dārija originates from [fuṣḥā] 
Arabic, “there is therefore no need to translate the Quran into dārija because 
everyone understands Arabic” (Al-Shalh, 2010, translated). The attitude captured in 
this statement is elaborated in the next section. 
3.3.1.2 Good Arabic and bad Arabic 
Inherent to the exaltation of fuṣḥā and its superiority is the inferiority of colloquial 
Arabic. Maamouri notes that “fuṣḥā carries in its own etymology the myth about its 
eloquence and high degree of correctness” (1998: 39), reflecting the “superiority that 
Arabs bestow on their heritage language” (1998: 38). This superiority results in a 
“quasi-general denial” of the existence of the spoken colloquial forms, which are 
“despised” and regarded as degraded and corrupt forms of the language (ibid.). 
Echoing this and articulating the attitude referred to at the end of the previous 
section, Bassiouney states that colloquial Arabic “is considered a corrupted version of 
[fuṣḥā]. [Fuṣḥā] is the ‘Arabic tongue’, the real language; dialects are not Arabic”  
(2009: 203). That is, most Arabs believe fuṣḥā “to be the real language of which the 
spoken counterparts are inadequate renditions (Alrabaa, 1986: 78). 
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In a sense, the Arabic vernaculars have “come to represent symbolically the absence 
of everything the fuṣḥā is claimed to be” (Walters, 2008: 655). While fuṣḥā “enjoys 
very great prestige among Arabic speakers, to the extent that many of them, not 
least among cultural elites, indulge a chimerical desire for written norms to replace 
those of the greatly divergent vernacular Arabics of the several Arab countries”, 
“spoken Arabic of any kind is all too often subject among Arabs to strangely 
unreasoning scorn” (Mitchell, 1986: 8). Indeed, Arabic vernaculars are often likened 
to a form of disease which needs to be overcome (see for example, Zakariyya, 1964).  
Not only are the native languages of Arabs “simply not worthy of any attention 
according to the overwhelming majority of Arabs who are willing to venture an 
opinion on this matter”, but “anyone who deals with spoken Arabic, including Arab 
linguists who have studied certain aspects of their dialects, is looked upon with 
suspicion” (M. H. Ibrahim, 1983: 513-514). Moreover, for many Arabic-speakers, “to 
seek to write the dialect or legitimate its use as a written variety is to engage in 
heresy or to favour national over pan national interests, thereby playing into the 
hands of those who would destroy the Arab World” (Walters, 2008: 662), (cf. 
sections ‎3.3.2.1 and ‎3.3.2.3). As Maamouri (1998: 38) explains:  
The common ideologically acceptable and politically correct attitude with regard to 
the place of the colloquials in Arabic diglossia is total non-acceptance of colloquial 
Arabic forms in most formal situations. The use of colloquial Arabic becomes 
suspicious and may show an unacceptable lack of linguistic loyalty equal to treason to 
‘Arab Nation’ feelings. This ‘zero-tolerance’ and high sensitivity of Arabs to ‘linguistic 
diversity’ seen as a symbolic reflection of ‘political disunity’ has been and still is a 
marking position in pan-Arab politics. It has turned any consideration given to Arabic 
dialects and to the problem of ‘dialectal variation’ by Arabs into a serious political 
taboo. 
Indeed, departments of linguistics in Egypt’s public universities continually resist 
supervising research in this area. When it is studied, on rare occasion, the 
researchers clearly subscribe to the dominant language ideology about the 
superiority of Arabic (again, Zakariyya, 1964 is a good example). Most of the 
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academic work about diglossia in Arabic emanating from Egypt is published by the 
non-public American University in Cairo.  
That is not to say, however, that the debate is absent from non-academic spheres. 
Indeed, Haeri (2000: 63) notes that “within the Arab World, there is hardly an 
intellectual who has not written on “the language question”. From time to time, 
language debates flare up in the Egyptian media, mostly engaged in by non-
specialists and permeated with strong ideological overtones (see Mejdell, 2008 for 
an excellent review). As Mejdell observes, “that the cultural establishment today is 
deeply concerned about the status of the Arabic standard is (re)confirmed by the 
attention given to it in later [sic] years in fora that do not usually occupy themselves 
with linguistic matters” (2006: 22). For example, she refers to a special session by the 
cultural committee of the Egyptian parliament in 1998 devoted to the “degradation 
(imtihān) of SA in the country and the threat it represents to Arab identity” (ibid.). 
She also refers to a roundtable panel at al-Ahrām (cf. Section ‎2.3.2) in 1997 to 
discuss the state of Arabic in Egypt and the “challenges and dangers” that the 
language is facing from the inside and outside. She also notes the “radical” position 
taken by some writers such as Fatḥī Imbāba who claims in a 1997 article that a 
contemporary Arabic has developed as a result of modernising influences, freeing it 
from the shackles of the medieval grammarians in spoken form, although it has yet 
to be liberated in written form. The same argument has been reiterated more 
recently in a book by Sherīf El-Shubāshi (2004) titled Litaḥyā al-Luġa al-ʿarabiyya, 
Yasqut Sībawayh [Long live the Arabic language, Down with Sibawayh] which caused 
some controversy when it was published. However, as is the case with so many 
contributions to the debate, the arguments forwarded by the authors are “general 
and political rather than linguistic in scope and argument” (Mejdell, 2006: 23). 
The ‘radical’ views of these authors are clearly on the periphery of the language 
debate which has at its core a public so ideologically resolute on the superiority of SA 
that their attitudes police the language against acts of “linguistic disobedience”. For 
instance, Mejdell (2006: 24) observes that when the weekly newspaper al-Dustūr 
started using Egyptian Arabic phrases in the headlines, it was faced with protests 
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“against what many readers obviously felt was not only an act of defiance, but an act 
close to indecency”. 
Explaining resistance to calls for using the vernacular as a language of instruction, 
Ayari (1996: 247) effectively summarises the main concerns that surround any 
“upgrade” in the status of colloquial Arabic: 
Opponents of the vernacular argue that the vernacular is itself an outcome of illiteracy 
and does not have the expressive power (i.e. rich vocabulary) to be used as a vehicle 
of knowledge acquisition. They also argue, and justifiably so, that replacing fuṣḥā with 
the vernacular would cut off future generations from the vast body of works in literary 
Arabic over the centuries … In addition, the replacement of literary Arabic with the 
vernacular would undermine efforts to strengthen the unity of Arabic-speaking 
countries …. Even among illiterates who speak only colloquial Arabic, negative 
attitudes towards local vernacular make it difficult, and even impossible, to introduce 
it as a means of learning reading and writing skills. 
Mitchell makes a similar point with regard to proposals to codify colloquial Arabic in 
written form. He notes that it is not “orthographic or orthoepic difficulties that 
inhibit the ‘transcribing’ of spoken Arabic of whatever kind but rather the almost 
mystical regard in which Arabs hold their written language to the detriment of 
spoken counter-parts” (1978: 227). I shall conclude this section thus, but the points 
raised here will be invoked again when discussing language and identity in the next 
section. 
3.3.2 Language and national identity 
It is almost impossible to speak of language ideologies in relation to the Arabic 
language without grappling with the question of identity. The significance of this 
question links to its potential in bringing about language change. Fasold, for example, 
states that “language shift will only occur if, and to the extent that, a community 
desires to give up its identity as an identifiable sociocultural group in favour of an 
identity as a part of some other community” (1984: 240, cited in Omoniyi, 2006). For, 
“while identity is conditioned by social interaction and social structure, it at the same 
time conditions social interaction and social structure” (Block, 2006: 38). 
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The question of identity, particularly national identity, is also closely linked to 
language policy and planning (Wright, 2004). Wright states that academic interest in 
language policy and planning first emerged in the age of nationalism. It established 
itself as an academic discipline in universities in the wake of post WWII 
decolonisation with a focus on the language needs of new ‘nations’. The work of 
Yasir Suleiman (1996, 2003, 2004, 2006a, 2006b, 2008, 2011, 2013a, 2013b) is an 
invaluable resource on language and identity in the Arab World, hence I will be citing 
his work extensively in this section. In discussing the relationship between language 
and nation in Arabic, Suleiman (2006a: 126) argues that “nation- and state- building 
in the Arabic speaking world are two of the most important sociopolitical projects of 
the modern era, with thick manifestations that extend to other semiologies of 
nationalist signification”. What is of particular interest here is how these projects 
“construct language as one of their cornerstones” and how “the role of language in 
these projects is the subject of ideological contestation and political conflict which 
involve language in complex ways” (ibid.).  
This section addresses the relationship between the Arabic language and identity as 
constructed in the debate on language and nation in Egypt. Central to this debate is 
the ideological concept of a ‘nation’ which does not correspond to the political 
concept of a ‘state’. Whereas the term state entails a structure which exercises 
sovereign powers over a given territory and legislates laws to regulate interactions 
between the inhabitants of this territory, the term nation is primarily linked to “the 
psychological dimension of belonging to a community” (Bassiouney, 2009: 206). 
According to Bassiouney, a nation is “attached geographically to a specific territory 
and may have a specific religion”, it “may have its way of perceiving itself in relation 
to history, and may even “have its own myths” (ibid.). This distinction is important in 
understanding the ideological significance of fuṣḥā: 
Ideologically fuṣḥā has a very strong symbolic force among most people. However, it is a 
transnational standard—or rather a trans-local/regional national variety, which is 
perceived as a unifying force for the Arab nation, not the local (Egyptian) state—rather 
emphasising the Arab character of the people and state. To many people it is 
additionally a symbol for the even wider Muslim community (umma) of believers, for 
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whom Arabic (fuṣḥā) is a holy language, the language of Revelation. Thus, for ideological 
reasons, pan-Arab nationalism, cultural pride and a strong sense of Muslim identity, the 
validity of fuṣḥā as such is not challenged. (Mejdell, 2006: 19). 
Discussing nationalism in Egypt, Suleiman (2008: 39) paints a picture of “concentric 
nationalist circles” which is illustrated in Figure 2. Significantly, he uses the epithet 
“Egyptian” at the beginning of each label because of the central role that Egypt is 
perceived to play in each of these nationalisms. It is worth noting that he 
distinguishes between two types of Egyptian nationalism. Closer to the core is a 
more separatist nationalism which views Egypt as entirely removed from the Arab 
World, while integral Egyptian nationalism captures a view of Egypt as distinct from 
the Arab World but “with strong non-national links with the Arabic speaking 
countries” (ibid.). Suleiman’s notion of Eastern nationalism also warrants some 
glossing; this according to him “emphasises Egypt’s separate national identity but 
highlights its similarity of culture with nations such as China and Japan” (ibid.). 
 
Figure 2. Suleiman’s (2008) conceptualisation of Egyptian supra-nationalisms 
Against this backdrop, this section will focus on the identities encapsulated in the 
three inner circles of the above diagram given their salience in the language 
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question. I begin with a discussion of the colonial linguistic legacy of Egypt and the 
role this played in shaping language-based national identities in Section ‎3.3.2.1. I 
then discuss the two main currents of nationalism in Egypt – pan-Arab nationalism 
and Egyptian territorial nationalism – and their impact on language in sections 
‎3.3.2.2 and ‎3.3.2.3 respectively.  
3.3.2.1 The Colonial ‘hangover’ 
The dichotomy between Standard Arabic and Colloquial Arabic was first recognised 
in the West by European schools which started programs for teaching Colloquial 
Arabic, the earliest of which was in Naples, Italy in 1727 (Zughoul, 1980). While there 
was a simultaneous interest in Classical Arabic texts by European Orientalists in the 
following centuries (Eisele, 2000), colloquial Arabic continued to attract European 
interest when the Arab World was under European colonisation. This is particularly 
true of Egypt during the period of British colonisation (1882-1922), which is the 
period Stadlbauer (2010) argues present-day language ideologies in Egypt stem from. 
The British colonisers in Egypt “initiated anti-Arabic, pro-English language policies 
that assigned symbolic value to these languages: Arabic was depreciated because it 
was perceived as chaotic and random, while English was projected as being modern, 
prestigious, and desirable” (Stadlbauer, 2010: 2), (cf. Section ‎2.3.2). 
These ideas are most notably associated with one “British irrigation engineer and 
amateur language planner” in Egypt, William Willcocks (1852-1932), who magnified 
the “the problem of diglossia” out of proportion (Mejdell, 2006: 10). In a series of 
articles and lectures, Willcocks “attributed the backwardness of the Egyptian people 
and the lack of inventions and creativity of thinking to the use of [fuṣḥā], which he 
termed a dead language” (Zughoul, 1980: 208). Willcocks openly called for doing 
away with fuṣḥā and replacing it with ʿāmmiyya in reading, writing and education, 
which “may explain why Arabs have looked with suspicion and fear at every 
suggestion for reform in the language, especially if it originates in the West or is 
propagated by a westerner” (ibid.). 
This also explains why, even though calls to reform and modernise the Arabic 
language emerged relatively early in Egypt compared to other Arab countries 
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(Bassiouney, 2009), interventions for the reform of Arabic were linked to initiatives 
for the expansion of the scope of foreign languages in education in the late 19th 
century. Both were “vehemently contested on what may be called ‘nativist’ grounds: 
they were considered attempts to weaken the resistance to occupation by loosening 
people’s ties with Islam and with the other Arabs—and a way for the foreigners to 
strengthen their grip on the population, by having easier access to their language” 
(Mejdell, 2006: 11). 
Since the call to use ʿāmmiyya instead of fuṣḥā in education was first promoted by 
British colonising powers in Egypt, this call continues to be “associated in the mind of 
native speakers in general and intellectuals in particular with colonisation and 
Orientalist thinking” (Bassiouney, 2009: 265). This, Haeri (2000: 64) notes, is because, 
unlike fuṣḥā, Arabic colloquials “threaten to divide rather than unite the Arabs”. 
Indeed, Arab intellectuals often claim that the problematisation of diglossia and 
exaltation of ʿāmmiyya were part of a colonial separatist agenda (see for example, 
Hussein, 1984; Zakariyya, 1964). The association is exacerbated by the fact that 
discussions of the ‘problems’ of fuṣḥā, “including difficulties of its orthography, often 
show an unabashed admiration for European languages on the part of some 
intellectuals, particularly those who advocated modifying it or changing it to the Latin 
alphabet” (Haeri, 2000: 71), (cf. Section ‎3.3.2.3). Bassiouney notes that the 
scepticism is even greater when this call comes from non-Arabs: “For Arabs such calls 
are considered a conspiracy to divide the Arab nation” (Bassiouney, 2009: 266). This 
sceptical position captures what De Silva terms the “colonial hangover” of diglossic 
societies. It is an ideological position which ensures “a defensive kind of unity at least 
among the more nationalist sectors of the community” (De Silva, 1982: 113). The 
construction of fuṣḥā as a unifying element against a foreign other is the focus of the 
next section.  
3.3.2.2 Pan-Arab nationalism 
The Arabic word for nation is umma, and it is commonly used in the two expressions  
al-umma al-ʿarabiyya (the Arab Nation) and al-umma al-islāmiyya (the Islamic 
Nation). The first term is used to refer collectively to the peoples of al-waṭan al-
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ʿarabī (the Arab fatherland), while the latter is “a universal term rather than 
particular to a specific community with a shared culture and history” (Bassiouney, 
2009: 207). Fuṣḥā is constructed as a means of symbolic identification for Arab and 
Islamic nationalists simultaneously. By and large, Islamic and Arab nationalisms are 
not perceived as at odds with each other: “In intellectual, if not political terms, 
Islamic nationalism could imperceptibly fade into pan-Arabism without subscribing to 
its secularism, thus underpinning the move towards the strongest expression of the 
fuṣḥā-national identity link that is so characteristic of pan-Arabism” (Suleiman, 2008: 
40). In other words, although language is the unifying force in Arab nationalism and 
religion is the unifying force in Islamic nationalism, the two nationalisms are 
reconciled by the fact that fuṣḥā is valued in both of them. Indeed, the term “Islamic 
Arab nation” (al-umma al-ʿarabiyya al-islāmiyya) is not uncommon in Arabic rhetoric 
(see for example, Shaker, 1972).  
However, while there is no denying the well-established link between Arabic and 
Islam (cf. Section ‎3.3.1), this link is sometimes overemphasised in the literature (see 
for example, Haeri, 2003) to the extent that the ‘secularisation’ of fuṣḥā (a term used 
by Haeri herself, cf. Haeri, 2000: 74) is either completely overlooked or not 
emphasised enough. To understand how this secularisation came to be, we must go 
back to the 19th Century, a time when much of the Arab World was under Ottoman 
rule. The Ottomans shared the majority religion of Arabs, but not their language. This 
ruled out religion as a mobilising force by the cultural elite who resisted the Ottoman 
rulers and their Turkification policies, and language became the obvious ‘othering’ 
tool. However, to achieve this, it was necessary first to undercut the link between 
religion and language: 
Attempts at decoupling, or loosening, the exclusive link between Arabic and Islam in the 
19th century served as the foundation for launching the argument that the ties of 
language between Muslims and Christians, for whom Arabic is a mother tongue, were 
(or ought to be) more important in group identity terms than the bonds of Islam that 
linked the Arab Muslims to their Turkish coreligionists in the Ottoman Empire. 
(Suleiman, 2006a: 127) 
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The relationship between language and nation in the Arab World came to the 
forefront in the twentieth century, featuring “in government constitutions, in 
language academies, among Arab intellectuals and in the media more broadly” 
(Bassiouney, 2009: 207). As Arab countries gained their independence, “each country 
officially declared its adherence to pan-Arab nationalism [qawmiyya] with the Arabic 
language as the national language of all Arabs” (Versteegh, 2001: 196). Fuṣḥā 
became the “mainstay of Arab nationalism” (Zughoul, 1980: 204). It was increasingly 
perceived by Arab intellectuals as “a language of independence, tradition, glorious 
past, and even the language in which a sound moral system could be explained and 
maintained” (Bassiouney, 2009: 210). 
The clearest representation of the ‘the Arab nation’ in modern times is the Arab 
League (LAS) (cf. Section  3.2.3), which Bassiouney (2009) notes is primarily an 
ideological entity (as opposed for example to the European Union, which is a 
functional political and economic power). LAS consists of 22 countries23 which have 
Arabic as an official language, and in fact describes itself as “an association of 
countries whose peoples are Arabic speaking” (Bassiouney, 2009: 209). Walters 
(2008: 653-654) notes that “because definitions of ‘Arab’ often claim that an Arab is 
‘one who speaks Arabic’, the language itself becomes an essential, nondetachable 
component of group membership – often the single such component”. 
While “in ancient times the only true ‘Arab’ was the Bedouin Arab”, with kinship and 
lineage playing a central part (Bassiouney, 2009: 208), today the term ‘Arab’ indexes 
a concept of nationalism which transcends ethnicity. As Maamouri (1998: 7) 
observes, “an ‘Arab’ is defined in terms of a set of speech habits even when these 
habits do not belong to his/her own ethnic group”. He adds that the “linguistic 
focusing which is common to the countries of the Arab region frequently overrides 
ethnic identity and relates to concepts of linguistic unity and the uniformity of 
language standards”. Bassiouney (2009: 208) observes that “the Arab nation is not a 
political entity but an ideological one”, explaining that “a nation can be built on 
language ideology rather than language practice, as long as the ideology is a vessel 
                                                             
23 Normally numbering 22 states, there are only 21 LAS members at the time of writing as the 
membership of Syria – one of the founding states – was suspended by LAS on 12/11/2011 over the 
conflict in Syria. 
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for forming a sense of belonging between members of a specific community”. In the 
same vein, Versteegh (2001: 196) notes: 
Since the standard language is regarded by most Arabs as the most significant unifying 
factor of the Arab World, it also serves as a symbol of Arab unity. Most political parties 
in the Arab World at least officially propagate this unity, so that politicians are under 
severe pressure to use standard language, even though their constituents do not 
understand it. 
Although the impetus for pan-Arab nationalism had emerged in previous decades, 
expressions of pan-Arab sentiments peaked during the Nasserite era in the 1950s 
and 1960s, (Suleiman, 2008). The process was aided by increased contact, stronger 
trade links and improved transport in the Arab World, in addition to cultural 
coalescence owing in part to the spread of Egyptian audiovisual and printed media 
across the Arab World, as well as the unifying effect of the Palestinian issue.  
Suleiman (2008: 40) concludes that “pan-Arab nationalism in Egypt was not, 
therefore, a completely ideological creation, but one that is also rooted in objective 
material conditions with discernible social and cultural consequences”. Pan-Arab 
nationalism afforded Egypt with the opportunity to enhance its cultural and political 
influence and was therefore “laced with a healthy degree of political calculation and 
enlightened pragmatism” (Suleiman, 2008: 41). 
The Nasserite era was a period of major political and social changes in Egypt. The 
revolution which resulted in the upheaval of the monarchy in 1952 aimed to close 
the gap between social classes, and one outcome was making free school education 
available to the Egyptian population and making primary school education 
compulsory (Khidr, 2000). Fuṣḥā (or more specifically, MSA) was at the centre of 
these new educational policies, with an eye on developing a new image for the 
young Arab generation where fuṣḥā was a unifying force between different Arab 
nationals (Bassiouney, 2009). As a “new image of Egypt was being formed: that of 
Egypt as part of the Arab nation” (Bassiouney, 2009: 242), the attitude towards fuṣḥā 
developed positively. Schools started teaching classical Arabic literature and poetry 
to enhance young Egyptians’ sense of belonging in a new, independent Arab World. 
Calls to reform and simplify fuṣḥā, which had previously surfaced, were drowned out 
and temporarily forgotten, and Egyptian Arabic was relegated to everyday language 
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status once more. Not only did MSA become the official language of Egypt, but it 
effectively “gained the status of a prestige language, which carries political 
significance” (Bassiouney, 2009: 242).  
This was a period characterised by linguistic optimism. It was common among Arabs 
to predict a future where all Arabs would speak a single unified language modelled 
after fuṣḥā (Ferguson, 1997 [1959]), which indeed seemed to be the ultimate goal of 
the educational systems set up during this period (Eisele, 2002). Blanc’s (1960) study 
(cf. Section  2.7) which was conducted during the Nasserite period captures this 
attitude. Blanc (1960: 87-88) notes that the participants in his study believed that the 
difference in their spoken dialects was a direct result of a lack of contact between 
the Arabic-speaking regions as a result of political boundaries imposed by foreign 
powers. They also believed that these boundaries were now being progressively 
removed24, and that with them would come the removal of dialectal differences, 
ultimately resulting in linguistic unification which will be enhanced by increased 
education. The perceived result would be a language very close to fuṣḥā and very far 
from colloquial Arabic, with a lexically unified Arab World but with regions retaining 
their own peculiarities of pronunciation: they likened it to the language they were 
speaking which they termed ‘the language of the educated’ (cf. Section ‎2.7). They 
estimated that this linguistic unification would come into effect in the space of 50 
years – something which of course has not happened. 
While pan-Arab nationalism was, and still is, an important aspect of politics in the 
Arab World, it is important to look beyond it to better understand the history of 
contemporary debates related to language and identity. An important side to this 
debate centres around territorial nationalism. It is common in the literature to find a 
chronological review of nationalisms in Egypt which begins with territorial 
nationalism and ends with pan-Arab nationalism (see for example: Bassiouney, 2009; 
Suleiman, 2003, 2008), suggesting either implicitly or explicitly that the former has 
been superseded by the latter. Haeri (1997: 798), for example, expressly states that 
“pan-Arab ideology overrode other ideologies on the issue of language” (emphasis in 
                                                             
24 This is likely in reference to the short-lived Egyptian-Syrian union (1958-1961) which was in effect at 
the time that Blanc’s (1960) article was written. 
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original). I find that this arrangement can generate a prejudiced reading of events, 
and have therefore deliberately discussed pan-Arab nationalism before territorial 
Egyptian nationalism, working my way inwards across Suleiman’s nationalism circles 
(cf. Figure 2 above). My purpose is to present the two nationalisms as co-existing 
ideologies, with one occasionally overtaking the other in line with the political 
atmosphere.  
3.3.2.3 Egyptian nationalism 
In the same way that language was operationalised as an instrument of unity in pan-
Arab nationalism, it was used as an instrument of separation by territorial 
nationalists in ‘Arab separatism movements’ which called for the adoption of the 
colloquial variety as a national language (Zughoul, 1980). In Egypt, Egyptian territorial 
nationalism – which originated in the latter part of the 19th century – was given an 
enormous boost in the 1920s due to: 
 … the pride the country felt in the 1919 revolution against British colonial rule, the 
establishment of a parliamentary democracy in 1922-3, the excitement following the 
discovery of the tomb of Tut-Ank-Amon in 1923 and the success of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk in promoting Turkish nationalism with its keen interest in language reform, 
which the Egyptian territorial nationalists looked to as a model. (Suleiman, 2008: 32) 
Suleiman (2008) summarises the ideological positions of Egyptian nationalists in two 
main attitudes. First, that “fuṣḥā was not seen to be invested with the power to 
define Egypt’s national identity” (p. 37). To accept fuṣḥā as a marker of Egyptian 
identity would be to concede that Egypt is an Arab country. To refute this 
connection, Egyptian nationalists resorted to an “acute application of the principle of 
alterity in national self definition: the greater the substantive linguistic similarities 
between national Self and significant Other, the greater the desire to deny or explain 
away these similarities as a basis for a shared national identity between this Self and 
the Other” (p. 38). Second, Egyptian nationalists showed “a strong and sustained 
interest in language reform [which was linked] to the socio-economic modernisation 
of their country” (ibid.). The reforms they proposed ranged from reforming the 
grammar of fuṣḥā (Husayn, 1996 [1937]), Egyptianising fuṣḥā (Al-Sayyid, 1937), to 
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replacing the Arabic script with a Roman script (Musa, 2012 [1945]), (cf. Section 
 3.2.3). 
Egyptian nationalists shunned the link to Arabic-speaking countries and looked 
elsewhere for self-definition. They felt a direct racial and psychological link to the 
ancient Egyptians, and as heirs to such an ancient civilisation, they felt superior to 
and more advanced than Arabs (Suleiman, 2003, 2008). As Suleiman notes, “it is a 
general feature of all nationalisms to emphasise continuities with the past, and to 
use these continuities to endow themselves and those whom they ‘nationalise’ with 
pedigree and authenticity” (2008: 28).   
Suleiman (2008: 33) observes that “some territorial nationalists went so far as to 
claim that to be true to their history, the Egyptian Copts, as the legitimate heirs of 
ancient Egypt, must abandon Arabic and revert to Coptic”. This claim was usually 
anchored in projecting “the seventh-century conquest of Egypt as an Arab invasion 
or occupation” and in painting “Arabic as an imperial language, equating it 
symbolically with English as the language of the British colonial rule” (ibid.). The Arab 
component of Egypt’s past was treated “as historical rupture, which Egypt repaired 
through its ‘historically proven’ assimilatory powers” (ibid.). This view is expressed in 
the work of two prominent Egyptian writers: Salāma Mūsā (1887-1958; henceforth 
Salama Musa) (Musa, 2012 [1945], 2013 [1956]) and Lewīs ʿawaḍ (1915-1990; 
henceforth, Louis Awad) (Awad, 1989 [1947], 2006 [1981]). Significantly, both of 
them were born to Coptic parents, even though Musa had professed atheist 
inclinations (cf. Musa, 2012 [1912]). 
Salama Musa is described by Eisele (2000) as a “language maven” heavily influenced 
by Marxist thought, and by Suleiman as a territorial nationalist who shunned 
language as the basis for national self-definition while paradoxically showing “a 
sustained interest in it as the object and means of modernisation” (Suleiman, 2008: 
35). Musa “constructed a dire picture of fuṣḥā, painting it as lexically defective in 
dealing with the exigencies of science, industry, and modernity at large owing to its 
origins in a desert ecology and culture from which it has been unable to break 
completely free” (Suleiman, 2008: 34). He claimed that fuṣḥā had “fossilised to the 
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point where it could be declared (almost) a dead language” (ibid.). On the other 
hand, Musa “strongly promoted the Pharaonic theme in the nationalist ideology, 
considering this theme as the major authenticating and motivating force for Egypt” 
(ibid.). He also “called for the revival of the Coptic language, the demotic form of 
ancient Egyptian, which he stated was still alive in the monasteries of the Coptic 
Church” (Suleiman, 2008: 35), and proposed using the Roman alphabet to write 
colloquial language to facilitate borrowing from European languages and keep up 
with modern technology. 
Musa’s views are generally shared by Awad who “believed that Egyptian creativity  
was permanently handicapped” by fuṣḥā, and that Egyptians needed to nurture 
ʿāmmiyya to embark on a modern era “unfettered by the linguistic shackles of the 
past” (Suleiman, 2008: 37). He also argued that EA “has developed its own 
phonology, morphology, syntax, lexicon, and prosody, and that it had done so under 
the influence of an Egyptian substratum (Coptic) that made it distinct from other 
ʿāmmiyya varieties outside the borders of Egypt” (ibid.). In fact, Awad even went as 
far as to claim that EA was “an outcome of the special physiology of the Egyptian 
vocal tract”; EA “therefore separated Egyptians from non-Egyptians in a genetically 
coded manner” (ibid.). 
While Musa and Awad represent Egyptian nationalism in its most separatist forms 
(the first circle from the centre in Figure 2 above), there were other Egyptian 
nationalists with a more integral disposition towards the Arab World (the second 
concentric circle). One such example was the Azhar-educated writer, Taha Husayn 
(cf. Section  3.2.3), who believed that education was “the most secure basis for 
bringing about cultural redefinition of the national identity in a manner which 
preserves and enhances the national unity of Egypt” (Suleiman, 2003: 192). While 
Husayn looked to Europe as a model, as Musa did, he believed that Egypt “should 
aim at integration with the West and not at assimilation” (Bassiouney, 2009: 241). He 
argued that the very foundations of European culture were influenced by ancient 
Egyptian civilisation, and hence Egypt would be betraying its own historical legacy if 
it were to stay outside the scope of modern European culture (Suleiman, 2003).  
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However, unlike separatist Egyptian nationalists, Taha Husayn did not “see Egypt as 
distinct from the surrounding countries” (Suleiman, 2003: 197). Rather than isolate 
itself from the region, he believed “that an independent Egypt has a duty towards its 
Arab neighbours, and that it can execute this by inviting Arab students to come to 
study in Egypt or by opening Egyptian educational institutes in these countries” 
(ibid.). Husayn stressed the importance of MSA in education, but also recognised the 
need for reforming Arabic grammar and script. Moreover, at no point did he call for 
elevating ʿāmmiyya because he felt it was “unfit for literary expression, and that its 
adoption would deprive Egyptians of a link with their literary heritage” (Suleiman, 
2003: 194). The same could be said of another Egyptian nationalist and Arabic 
language reformer, Ahmad Lutfi Al-Sayyid (cf. Section  3.2.3), who did not support 
ʿāmmiyya, but rather held it in contempt “as a corrupt form of Arabic” (Suleiman, 
2003: 173). 
According to Suleiman, Egyptian nationalism dwindled towards the middle of the 20th 
century as Egyptian nationalists were engulfed by “the currents of political thinking 
towards supra-forms of national identification” (Suleiman, 2008: 35). Suleiman adds: 
The attempts of some Egyptian nationalists to endow ʿāmmiyya with ideologically 
impregnated symbolic meanings, to make it a durable marker of a territorial national 
identity, failed because of the historically sanctioned position of fuṣḥā in Egyptian 
society, the lack of political will to go down this nationalist route, and the lack of 
resources – for example dictionaries, grammars and school curricula – that could carry 
this nationalism forward institutionally. (Suleiman, 2008: 42)  
It did not help either that some of the most vocal voices associated with this 
nationalism like Salama Musa and Louis Awad came from the Coptic minority in 
Egypt, which made their motives immediately suspect. A telling example is Shaker’s 
(1972) pointed criticism of Louis Awad, where the latter is called a “charlatan”, a 
“clown”, a “missionary”, a puppet of foreign intelligence, and a begrudging and 
malevolent “lie-telling crusader” harbouring ill-intent towards Islam and its people. 
However, the surge in pan-Arab nationalism and heightened sense of Arab identity 
were to abate as the Nasserite era drew to a close (1970), particularly following the 
signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 1979 during Anwar El-Sadat’s presidency 
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(1970-1981), resulting in Egypt being excommunicated by many Arab states. During 
this time, feelings that Egyptians were different from other Arabs began to fester 
once more, the importance of colloquial Arabic as part of this distinct Egyptian 
identity surfaced again, and Egyptian nationalists, such as Louis Awad, marginalised 
for decades, found a fresh voice (Bassiouney, 2009). Sadat’s ‘open-door’ economic 
policies also encouraged Egyptians to learn foreign languages, particularly English, as 
promoting relations with the Western world (which had waned during Nasser’s 
presidency) became a priority for the new government (cf. Section  3.4). This change 
in the attitude towards Egyptian identity was reflected in educational policies: 
starting in the 1980’s school children were taught that Egyptian identity came before 
Arab identity: their affiliation is to their country first, then to the Arab nation, 
followed by their religion (usually Islam) (Bassiouney, 2009).  
These conditions have clearly favoured the revival of Egyptian nationalism – a point 
which receives very little attention in the academic literate, if at all. Indeed, in the 
same article where she states that Egyptian nationalism has been overtaken by pan-
Arab nationalism, Haeri (1997: 798) reports in a footnote that during her fieldwork in 
Egypt, she heard of “a group with a Pharaonic name”25 which opposed fuṣḥā on the 
grounds that it was the language of “Arab invaders”. It has been more recently noted 
that Egypt was experiencing a ‘surge in Egyptian nationalism’, evidenced in attempts 
at “raising the nation’s awareness of its ancient spirit” (Darwish, 2007: 22). In 
particular, Darwish points to the celebration of the (ancient) Egyptian New Year 
under wide media attention in September 2007, where “for the first time in modern 
history Egyptians publicly revived the old rituals in Giza” (cf. Section  4.2). Darwish 
links “this feverish revival by Egyptians of their ancient spirit” to the momentum of 
Egyptian nationalism, which he argues is at its strongest since the early twentieth 
century (ibid.).   
However, that is not to say that pan-Arab nationalism died with Nasser. In a study 
conducted by Khidr (2000) in 1991-1992 and involving 270 postgraduate students at 
a prominent university in Cairo, the participants were asked to submit essays 
                                                             
25 It is not inconceivable that this was some earlier form of the Liberal Egyptian Party, which was then 
known as Maṣr el-Umm [Mother Egypt] (cf. Section ‎4.2). 
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articulating how they envisioned “the future of the Arab fatherland”26 (Khidr, 2000: 
135). While Khidr reports a proportion of pessimistic responses about the future of 
the region, the majority of responses demonstrated a deep faith in the inevitability of 
Arab unity, with Egypt playing a central, leading role. Similarly, Boussofara-Omar 
(2008: 629) notes that the exaltation of fuṣḥā as “the sole unifying force of an 
otherwise politically and economically divided Arab World” is still pervasive today. 
She refers to an inaugural speech by the president of the Arabic Language Academy 
in 2001, where he claimed that colloquial Arabic was intruding on the uses of fuṣḥā 
and warned that this would dismantle the ties between the peoples of the umma. 
She also notes that “allegiance to ‘perfect’ fuṣḥā (fuṣḥā salīma) continues to be 
constructed as allegiance to the unity of the Arab World, its glorious Golden Age and 
magnificent heritage” (ibid.). In the same vein, it is suggested by Peterson (2011), 
who conducted his fieldwork in Cairo a decade ago, that pan-Arabism is a component 
of a hybrid modern identity for young Egyptians in Cairo. 
More recent studies addressing the question of national identity in Egypt are needed 
to further our understanding of how the Arab Spring (and the ensuing and unfolding 
chain of events) has impacted pan-Arabism in Egypt. What is certain however is that 
the question of identity has come to occupy a prominent position in Egyptian 
thought during and after the 2011 revolution. Reem Bassiouney (2012, 2013, 2014) 
has made some valuable contributions which shed light on the role of language and 
identity during the revolution, particularly how code choice played a part in stance-
taking and indexing group membership. I draw on her framework of indexes when I 
discuss my findings in Chapter 6. It is hoped that the identity component of the 
language behaviour and attitudes survey in Chapter 5 will contribute in some way 
towards an understanding of the relationship between language and identity 
following the 2011 revolution. The question of identity – with a particular focus on 
political identity – is revisited in Section 6.2. 
                                                             
26 Significantly, instead of the less ideologically marked term ‘Arab World’ (al-ʿālam al-ʿarabī), Khidr 
(2000) uses the term ‘Arab fatherland’ (al-waṭan al-ʿarabī) which, although admittedly common in 
Arabic discourse, itself has strong connotations of pan-Arabism. 
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3.4 Language practices 
As discussed in section  3.2.1, it is not always possible to trace the language policy of 
a speech community to an official written document, and in the case of the diglossic 
Arab nations where such a document exists (in the form of the constitution), it is in 
fact a poor reflection of their linguistic reality. This section is dedicated to discussing 
the disparity between language policy and practice in Egypt in an attempt to paint a 
fuller picture of its linguistic reality. While I have been primarily concerned with 
fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya in this chapter, this section brings in another language variety 
into the equation – English – which has a prominent position in Egypt’s linguistic 
reality. This triggers a discussion on the role of globalisation and of the ‘economics of 
linguistic exchanges’ (cf. Bourdieu, 1977) in Egypt. 
To understand where English fits into the language practices of Egyptians, it is worth 
dwelling on both its historical and global significance in Egypt. Since the 19th century, 
and well into the 20th century, both English and French were regarded as languages 
of prestige in Egypt – more in their capacity as European languages of enlightenment 
than as (ex-) colonial languages. Competence in English or French (and to a lesser 
degree, German) was a sign of affluence and good education. Their spread was aided 
by 18th century policies which regarded European civilisation as a source of modern 
culture and progress, and by the many missionary schools which were established in 
Egyptian cities (Schaub, 2000). Of the two, French was the more highly valued 
language during most of the 19th century, but English started to make significant 
gains in education towards the end of the 19th century with pro-English educational 
policies under British occupation (ibid.). Some of these policies were reversed in 
favour of Arabic in the early 20th Century (Bassiouney, 2009; Suleiman, 2003), and 
enrolment in foreign language education remained steady, if it did not decline, under 
Abdel-Nasser in the 1950s and 60s at the height of pan-Arab nationalism (Schaub, 
2000), (cf. Section  3.3.2.2). However, Sadat’s ‘open door’ policy ushered a new age of 
Western-oriented education and lifestyle with a focus on English (Bassiouney, 2009; 
Schaub, 2000), by which time English had completely overtaken French as the 
preferred language of foreign education. At the turn of the century, Schaub (2000) 
described a state of ‘hysteria’ for learning English in Egyptian society. While this 
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historical and political backdrop is important, the role of English in Egypt today is 
perhaps better understood in the context of globalisation. 
Bassiouney (2009: 268) notes that there are “changes affecting the world at large, 
whether social political, or economic, and related directly to globalisation”, causing 
one to wonder “to what extent official language policies influence language 
practices”. Two social dimensions of globalisation impact language indirectly. The 
first is ideological, the second economic; and the two are not completely separate. At 
the ideological level, the concept of identity (cf. Section ‎3.3.2) comes up once more. 
As far as language is concerned, “globalisation has meant that increasing numbers of 
people find themselves needing to communicate or access information outside their 
primary language group”, “leading to a situation where increasing numbers are 
functionally bilingual, with their language of group identity not the language that 
they need in most of their acts of communication” (Wright, 2004: 7). In fact, people 
in contemporary societies “appear more and more willing to free themselves from 
society and, rather than cultivate on citizenship, want to profit from the improved 
flow of social interaction due to the development of new technologies” (Martin et 
al., 2006: 500-501). Martell (2010) notes how globalisation is seen as detrimental to 
traditional nationalism because it challenges some of the core tenets of nationalist 
self-definition. Globalisation is encouraging people to view themselves as part of a 
greater global collective that transcends their national boundaries. It is a view 
promoted by media consumption in Egypt, and younger generations are growing up 
to grapple with hybrid identities which tout both the local and the global (Peterson, 
2011). It is in this spirit that Suleiman (2008: 43) highlights the need for research into 
“the impact of globalisation on the continued ability of fuṣḥā to provide a robust 
definition of the national self in Egypt” (cf. Section ‎6.4). 
Closer to the heart of the issue of language practices in Egypt is the economic 
dimension of globalisation. Indeed, the very definition of globalisation – as “the (dire) 
possibility of ubiquitous competition around the globe from the products and 
employees of ﬁercely competitive multinational companies” (Martin et al., 2006: 
503) – is economic in nature. Similarly, Wright defines globalisation in terms of global 
Capitalism which “can be seen as deriving from American led thinking and existing 
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within a framework of institutions dominated by the United States” (2004: 145) . She 
adds that “it is this framework that has led many to speak of ideological domination”, 
which in turn “has meant that economic globalisation has led to Anglicisation” (ibid.). 
Hence, returning to the ideological dimension, because globalisation has at its centre 
an Anglophone global market dominated by Western values, to identify with this 
market is perceived to be pro-West at some level.  
This ideological/economic question is mirrored in Lambert’s (1967) integrative/ 
instrumental dichotomy. Walters (2008: 660) observes that “questionnaires about 
language attitudes often demonstrate that students across the Arab World exhibit 
instrumental, rather than integrative, motivations for studying Western languages”. 
However, he problematises Lambert’s (1967) dichotomy arguing: 
One might contend that students who report wanting to master English in particular, 
because of its current global status – a motivation that might traditionally be seen as 
instrumental – simultaneously seek to integrate themselves into a globalised economy 
that uses English as its language and is much influenced by Anglo-American capitalist 
practices that currently may have little to do with American or British culture directly. 
(Walters, 2008: 660) 
Whether or not it is regarded as a marker of Western culture, English has come to 
dominate the global market by dominating discourse within it as well as about it. 
Aiding the penetration and spread of English is “the psychological support given by 
the omnipresence of the language in the aggressive marketing and publicity to 
increase the consumption of the products produced by the TNCs [transnational 
corporations]” (Wright, 2004: 146). Cities all over the world are “bristling with 
adverts, signs and slogans in a variety of international English” (ibid.). It is therefore 
no surprise that the economic role and psychological effect of English “pushes 
parents to demand provision for learning and state education systems to respond” 
(Wright, 2004: 148).  
The Arab World is no exception: Shaaban (2008: 700) notes that “all Arab countries 
have recently started to emphasise knowledge of English as a necessity for students 
of scientific and technical fields, a very rational move in the age of globalisation, in 
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which English is the language of over 80 percent of scientific and technical research”. 
Understandably, such students “are loath to cut themselves off from international 
developments in their fields, which flourish primarily in English; that is, there is an 
internationally recognised English register for these disciplines and one cannot 
participate in the work of the discipline without doing so in English” (Schiffman, 
1992: 5). Educational authorities in Arab countries claim that they cannot wait for 
Arabicisation efforts by language academies; they resort to foreign languages instead 
in response to pressure to keep up with modernisation and technology. In fact, 
Shaaban (2008: 703) states that “Arab citizens themselves believe it is important to 
get education through the medium of international languages in order to stay 
competitive in the age of globalisation”. He adds: 
Parents who, for economic or ideological reasons, send their children to Arabic-
medium educational institutions remain uncomfortable with their decision, as it 
becomes obvious to them that their children do not have the same competitive edge 
in the job market as children who have had their education in English- or French-
medium schools. (ibid.) 
As a result, Shaaban refers to a ‘new utilitarian attitude’ which has come to prevail in 
the Arab World: “parents seem to be looking for what gives their children an edge in 
a competitive world of globalisation”, fearing that their children would fail to 
compete in the job market if they lack a solid base in foreign languages (Shaaban, 
2008: 703). Manifestations of this growing reach of foreign languages (particularly 
English) in Arab countries include “the production of literature in French and English 
by Arab writers in an attempt to achieve international recognition” as well as the 
establishment of “many American-style, English-medium universities that teach all 
specialisations in English” (Shaaban, 2008: 703). 
In Egypt, Bassiouney (2009: 254) points to “the great number of private universities 
that are opening up beside the American University in Cairo, and the increase in 
private schools that are not supervised by the Egyptian Ministry of Education and in 
which SA is basically not taught at all”. Mejdell (2006: 35-36) makes the same point, 
noting that “the socio-economic elite of Egyptian society do not send their offspring 
to overpopulated government schools, but to private schools, where instruction is 
conducted mostly in English (or French), where Arabic is taught as a discipline, but 
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where higher competence is achieved in reading and writing and speaking the 
foreign language than the national ‘standard’, the H variety, i.e. fuṣḥā.” 
It is generally possible to distinguish between two educational systems in Egypt, a 
public system and a private system, each catering to differing parts of the labour 
market (Bassiouney, 2009; Haeri, 1996). Broadly speaking, public schools focus on 
education in fuṣḥā, while private schools focus on education in foreign languages. 
Government posts are the largest sector of the job market requiring moderate to 
advanced knowledge of fuṣḥā. On the other hand, more attractive and better paid 
jobs such as “the ownership of a small and large businesses, (construction, boutique, 
pharmacy), medicine, television production, positions in international firms of 
banking as well as research, movie and stage acting” do not require proficiency in 
fuṣḥā (Haeri, 1996: 163-164). The situation is thus one where the more socio-
economically privileged members of society fill the posts requiring proficiency in 
foreign languages, while those who can only afford public education have limited 
employment options where fuṣḥā is more important than foreign languages. Haeri 
(1996: 162) comments on the situation in Egypt saying: “It appears that by and large 
members of the upper classes in Egypt are not the ones who know the official 
language the best or use it the most”. Bassiouney (2009: 252) summarises this 
situation: 
The problem in Egypt that may have a direct effect on SA is the clear gap between the 
elite and the masses … The elite send their children to private schools, in which they 
learn English, French or German, and the masses can afford only state schools, in which 
Arabic is the main language of instruction. With Egypt now moving into a capitalist 
system and privatising most of the companies owned by the government, knowledge of 
SA is downplayed and knowledge of English specifically is becoming a must. Since the 
government is basically failing to provide any jobs, the private sector will set the rules.  
Indeed, with so many parents sending their children to private schools in Egypt, 
private education has become ubiquitous. As a result, the competitive job market in 
Egypt has triggered the rise of a new sect of ultra-refined private schools, referred to 
as international schools. The “commodification of the schools” in Egypt and the 
resulting hierarchy of school types is summarised by Peterson (2001: 39): 
The free, [public] schools established during the Nasserist revolution of the 1950s, 
with instruction in Arabic, are almost universally agreed to be in the midst of an 
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“educational crisis” (muškilat al-taʿlīm) caused by untrained teachers, obsolete 
schooling practices, and overcrowded classrooms. This has stimulated the 
development of a hierarchy of increasingly expensive private schools. At the top of this 
hierarchy are the “international schools” … partially staffed by foreign teachers and 
administrators, offering instruction in European languages and curricula based on 
American, British, French, or German models. Less expensive, but still out of reach of 
most Egyptians, is a range of private “language schools”, owned and staffed primarily 
by Egyptians, but offering instruction in various foreign languages. These language 
schools often have two tracks, one preparing students for the national exam, the 
ṯānawiyya ʿāmma, and the other fulfilling the requirements for an international 
baccalaureate. 
These distinctions in type of school translate into class distinctions (Haeri, 1996; 
Peterson, 2011). Education in foreign languages in Cairo has become a class marker. 
However, the competencies associated with it “are no mere status symbols; they 
have real economic consequences for the middle class. Competence in displaying the 
appropriate symbolic capital is readily transferable into economic capital” (Peterson, 
2011: 40). For instance, the ability to distinguish clearly between the /b/ and /p/ 
phonemes represents a kind of shibboleth which can translate into substantial salary 
differences (ibid.).  
In light of the fact that English language proficiency is the “number one criterion that 
multi-national recruiters in Egypt cite in looking for job candidates”, “the promise of 
more money or better jobs that many Egyptians associate with the ‘commodity’ of 
English” becomes completely understandable (Schaub, 2000: 228). In a country 
“where social mobility is usually a generational project, parents imagine social 
futures for their children that are better than their own present” (Peterson, 2011: 
33), and one way they can influence their children’s future is by maximising their 
competitiveness in a job market which accords so much value to English. 
This commodification of linguistic competence calls to mind Bourdieu’s 
conceptualisation of the linguistic marketplace, where language users are conceived 
as consumers, language itself is perceived as a commodity, and a standard language 
is no more than “a ‘normalised’ product” (Bourdieu, 1991: 46). Bourdieu (1991: 66) 
explains the ‘economics of linguistic exchanges’ as follows: 
Linguistic exchange – a relation of communication between a sender and receiver, 
based on enciphering and deciphering, and therefore on the implementation of a code 
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or a generative competence – is also an economic exchange which is established 
within a particular symbolic relation of power between a producer, endowed with a 
certain linguistic capital, and a consumer (or a market), and which is capable of 
procuring a certain material or symbolic profit. In other words, utterances are not only 
(save in exceptional circumstances) signs to be understood and deciphered, they are 
also signs of wealth, intended to be evaluated and appreciated, and signs of authority, 
intended to be believed and obeyed. 
In Bourdieu’s conceptualisation, it is standard language (what he calls the ‘legitimate 
language’) – as the language sanctioned and upheld by the ‘dominant’ groups in 
society – which possesses the highest symbolic capital and the potential of earning 
the highest symbolic profit. However, this model is challenged for the case of Arabic 
in Egypt, where it is competence in foreign languages, not the standard/official 
language, fuṣḥā, which earns the highest rewards (Haeri, 1996, 1997). While it 
provides a valuable framework for studying languages in economic terms, Bourdieu’s 
model was proposed for ‘typical’ standard language situations – and I have already 
established that Standard Arabic is by no means a typical standard language in 
Section ‎3.2.4.  
One aspect of Bourdieu’s model which is of particular relevance here is the 
importance he accords to the role of the educational establishment in maintaining 
the dynamics of the linguistic marketplace. The importance derives from the fact that 
“this institution has the monopoly in the large-scale production of 
producers/consumers, and therefore in the reproduction of the market without 
which the social value of the linguistic competence, its capacity to function as 
linguistic capital, would cease to exist” (Bourdieu, 1991: 57, my emphasis). Bourdieu 
has at once presented us with the reason why his model is deficient in accounting for 
the linguistic marketplace in Cairo, and with the key to reconciling them (that is, the 
model and the market). In Egypt, the public educational system does not have a 
monopoly over access to the labour market, “and thus does not alone create 
linguistic value” (Haeri, 1996: 166). Therefore, Haeri notes that whilst “Bourdieu’s 
assertion that the labour market is the primary determinant of linguistic value seems 
to be in part borne out” by her findings, the caveat is that “if one is a member of the 
dominant group [in Egypt], one does not have more of what others have less. One 
has an entirely different capital” (ibid., my emphasis); i.e. there is more than one H 
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variety. The same point is argued by Stadlbauer (2010: 15) when he contends that 
“despite both English and fuṣḥā being H varieties, they have different symbolic 
capital, since only the upper-middle and upper classes have access to learning English 
in private schools”. I engage with these ideas and with Bourdieu’s theoretical model 
more deeply when I revisit the question of language and power in Section ‎6.3.  
For now, it is worth examining how all of this impacts valuations of Standard Arabic 
(fuṣḥā) in Egyptian society, in light of the existence of “a new generation of Egyptians 
who are highly educated and who speak [EA] but who are illiterate in SA because in 
their private schools SA is not taught at all” (Bassiouney, 2009: 254). The use of 
foreign languages such as English and French in education “gives the impression that 
French and English, unlike Arabic, are languages of the sciences and upward 
mobility” and this discourages Arab learners from mastering fuṣḥā (Ayari, 1996: 249). 
As a result, “the higher one’s social class, the less likely it is that one will learn [fuṣḥā] 
well” (Haeri, 2000: 68). 
It is a question of utility and calculated profits (or the lack thereof): “Professionals 
who have a linguistic repertoire that consists of proficiency in English in a 
professional register do not see the utility of adding to their repertoire knowledge of 
a register whose usefulness has not been proven.” (Schiffman, 1992: 5). These 
professionals “see themselves as part of a potential international job market; their 
skills are portable, and therefore worth more, only if they are based in an 
international language” (Schiffman, 1992: 6). Learning another register involves extra 
cost but no clear reward, “i.e. there is a stick, but no carrot” (Schiffman, 1992: 5).  
It is therefore no surprise that globalisation is often constructed as ‘a threat to the 
Arabic language’ (which basically means a threat to fuṣḥā). For example, Suleiman 
notes that “in recent years, fuṣḥā in Egypt has been perceived to be under attack 
from the forces of globalisation in a way that compromises its purity and undermines 
its ability to serve as an emblem of the nation” (2008: 42). In the end, Bourdieu 
argues, it all boils down to economics: 
One cannot save the value of a competence unless one saves the market, in other 
words, the whole set of political and social conditions of production of the 
producers/consumers. The defenders of Latin or, in other contexts, of French or 
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Arabic, often talk as if the language they favour could have some value outside the 
market, by intrinsic virtues such as its ‘logical’ qualities; but, in practice, they are 
defending the market. (Bourdieu, 1991: 57) 
3.5 Summary 
In this chapter, I have reviewed language policies, ideologies and practices in Egypt. I 
have attempted to demonstrate the indelible link between these three concepts, as 
well as their intricate connection to historical, political, economic and social 
conditions. In Section ‎3.2 I addressed a number of topics bearing on language policy 
and planning which illustrate that “language policies do not evolve ex nihilo” 
(Schiffman, 1996: 74) but are rather influenced by religious beliefs and ideologies 
and by power constructs. I discussed why studying language policies in diglossic 
societies is particularly challenging as they often don’t reflect the linguistic reality of 
the language users. I looked at the post-WWII Arabicisation policies in the Arab 
World and the kind of language planning policies this entailed. I then turned to the 
role of the ALAs, particularly the Egyptian ALA, in reforming and modernising fuṣḥā. 
In discussing standardisation, I covered standard language ideology and how it 
applied to the case of MSA. I also discussed the notion of power, outlining how a 
standard language can serve a gate-keeping function. Finally, I examined the notion 
of prestige – which is often equated with standard language in sociolinguistic studies 
– illustrating that the relationship in the case of Arabic is a complex one, calling for a 
distinction between written and spoken language prestige. 
My discussion of language ideologies in Section ‎3.3 formed the heart of this chapter. 
Here, I pointed to the range of terms and topics under which language ideologies are 
addressed in the literature. The first part of this section was dedicated to myths 
about Arabic, where I focused on the superiority of fuṣḥā Arabic – both with respect 
to other languages as well as vis-à-vis the vernaculars – and unpacked the main 
arguments which are used to assert the superiority of fuṣḥā. In the second part, I 
engaged with the question of language and national identity, demonstrating how 
“both languages and national identities are a matter of construction, of manipulation 
and counter manipulation to suit different historical and political contingencies, 
orientations, and ideological positions” (Suleiman, 2008: 28). I discussed how the 
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colonial legacy of Egypt and the main nationalist positions influenced language 
ideologies in the country. I gave particular attention to pan-Arab nationalism and 
Egyptian territorial nationalism, noting that the two nationalisms are co-present in 
contemporary Egypt. 
Finally, in Section  3.4, I addressed the discrepancy between the language policies 
promoted by the Egyptian state, and the actual linguistic practices of Egyptians in 
Cairo. English comes into the equation as another H variety in Egypt, where the 
influences of globalisation and the economics of linguistic exchanges prop it up as a 
highly prized commodity. The effect of globalisation is not purely economic however; 
on the ideological level it challenges traditional nationalism as it proposes an 
alternative imagined cosmopolitan identity for the self as part of a wider global 
community which transcends national boundaries.  
In cases where the official language policy provides a poor indication of the linguistic 
reality of a community of speakers, as is the case in Egypt, “the nature of their 
language policy must be derived from a study of their language practice and beliefs” 
(Spolsky, 2004: 8). The present work aims to do just that. The next two chapters 
present the investigations carried out to study the relationship between language 




4 The Interviews: Agents and Resisters of Change 
S AS LINGUISTS, WE ARE VERY MUCH AWARE THAT ORDINARY PEOPLE 
HAVE SOME WELL-ESTABLISHED IDEAS ABOUT LANGUAGE … SOME 
OF THESE IDEAS ARE SO WELL ESTABLISHED THAT WE MIGHT SAY 
THEY WERE PART OF OUR CULTURE. IT IS IN THIS SENSE THAT WE 
REFER TO THEM AS MYTHS … BUT IN VERY MANY CASES, OUR 
REACTION, AS PROFESSIONALS, TO THESE ATTITUDES, TO THESE 
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to answer the following two research questions:  
RQ1: What motivates pro-ʿāmmiyya agents of change? What role does ideology 
play? 
RQ2: How are the recent changes perceived by pro-fuṣḥā resisters of change? How is 
this linked to their ideologies? 
For practical reasons, I limit my response to RQ2 to three specific language 
developments and investigate the extent to which they were ideologically motivated: 
(a) the establishment of the Liberal Egyptian Party in 2008, an Egyptian political party 
with an ideology of separatist Egyptian nationalism and an aim to standardise 
Egyptian Arabic; (b) the establishment in 2007 of Malamih, a publishing house which 
published work by young Egyptian writers in a range of language varieties, and 
crucially championed publishing in ʿāmmiyya; (c) Vodafone Egypt’s replacement of 
recorded service messages in Standard Arabic with messages in Egyptian Arabic in 
2006. Interviews were arranged and conducted with representatives from each of 
these organisations in June-July 2010. However, since interviewing these agents of 
language change would have only served to illuminate one side of the picture, it 
seemed necessary to simultaneously investigate the views of resisters of this change. 
To this effect, a focus group interview with representatives from three prominent 
Arabic language conservation societies (henceforth, ALCSs) in Egypt was conducted 
in June 2010 to answer the second research question. 
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All of the interviews were semi-structured, however, it was rarely the questions I 
asked which generated the most important responses. From the outset, I did not 
intend the interviews to be a purely fact-finding mission, but rather to elicit 
ideological positions vis-à-vis the language situation in Egypt. Indeed, I argue that 
although two of the organisations I interviewed (LEP and Malamih) no longer exist, 
the ideological underpinnings of their agency in language change remain salient.  
My analysis of the interviews draws on three main theoretical approaches 
implemented to varying degrees to each of the interviews. The first approach draws 
on Eisele’s topoi which underscore the most dominant regime of practice for the 
Arabic language (see Section ‎3.3), namely: unity, purity, continuity and competition – 
to which I add three more topoi: conspiracy, authenticity and superiority. These 
topoi provide a valuable analytical framework for recurrent themes in the four 
interviews.  
The second approach focuses on the ways interviewees project their identities and 
how these identities form part of their ideologies. This was particularly relevant in 
the interviews with LEP, Malamih and the ALCGs. The analysis here is premised on 
the notion of multiple identities, which is referred to in a variety of ways in the 
literature. For example, Omoniyi (2006) uses the term “hierarchy of identities”, while 
Suleiman (2006b: 51) prefers the term “identity repertoire”. Omoniyi, who argues 
that “an individual’s various identity options are co-present at all times but each of 
those options is allocated a position on a hierarchy based on the degree of salience it 
claims in a moment of identification” (2006: 19), offers an analytical framework for 
studying these identities. He makes a case for “moments as the focus of analysis in 
identity research”, with the underlying logic that “contexts and acts are constituted 
of different moments within a stretch of social action” (Omoniyi, 2006: 12). He 
defines a ‘moment’ as “a temporal unit of measurement and/or monitoring in the 
identification process” (Omoniyi, 2006: 21). These moments “are points in time in 
performance and perception at which verbal and non-verbal communicative codes 
(e.g. advertisements, clothes, walk style and song lyrics, among others) are deployed 
to flag up an image of self or perspectives of it”. As a means of analysing how co-
present identities are encoded in discourse, Omoniyi proposes counting the order in 
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which identities are foregrounded. He notes that “some texts may suggest more than 
one identity – a function of different interpretive cultures. Such situations may 
produce a cluster of identities which in our discussion we then attempt to proffer an 
explanation for, such as a performer’s deliberate attempt to create a complex or 
ambiguous self” (ibid.).  
In addition to looking at how the interviewees’ personal identities are constructed 
(where relevant), I also look at how Egyptian identity is constructed. I am guided in 
my analysis of identity construction in the interviews by Omoniyi’s approach as 
outlined above, but I focus only on the verbal codes in the interview transcripts. The 
choice of code itself forms a part of identity construction: “language is an acceptable 
identity marker” says  Omoniyi, “so that the alternative languages not chosen in a 
given moment within an interaction would be alternative identities that are 
backgrounded or that are less invoked” (2006: 20). I take account of the code(s) 
chosen in the interviews vis-à-vis the identities and ideologies expressed by the 
interviewees. The codes chosen were fuṣḥā, ʿāmmiyya, English or a mixture of more 
than one variety.  
The third theoretical framework draws on the discourse mythological approach, a 
critical discourse analysis approach developed by Darren Kelsey (Kelsey, 2012a, 
2012b, 2014) for textual analysis of news stories. In Section ‎3.3.1, I reviewed 
language myths about Arabic and I highlighted Ferguson’s (1997 [1959]) definition of 
language myth which was independent of the actual truth value of the ‘myth’ in 
question. This is in line with the scholarly use of the term ‘myth’ which “stresses the 
unquestioned validity of myths within the belief systems of social groups that value 
them” as opposed to the popular use of the term where it is synonymous with 
falsehood (Kelsey, 2014). As Kelsey points out, “a myth is not a lie. Rather, it is a 
construction of meaning that serves a particular purpose through the confirmations 
and denials of its distortion”. In this sense, myth becomes an expression of values 
and ideologies; a means of legitimating the speaker’s position while simultaneously 
discrediting those who do not subscribe to the same values. In other words, myth 
becomes “a vehicle for ideology” (Kelsey, 2014). By employing CDA conventions of 
studying dominant tropes and discursive constructions, Kelsey’s approach aims to 
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underline how ideology is transported through myth. I should point out that I have 
deliberately broadened the focus from language myths to myths in general because 
some of the myths which are not directly related to language can still be linked to 
language ideology – and the discourse mythological approach helps me underline 
this link. 
The three analytical approaches I highlighted have one thing in common: at the heart 
of all of them is a concern with ideology. My analysis is presented in the next four 
sections (‎4.2 to ‎4.5), with each interview covered in a separate section. I then 
conclude the chapter with a summary of the main findings in Section ‎4.6. 
4.2 The Liberal Egyptian Party (LEP) 
The Liberal Egyptian Party (LEP) was a political party with an Egyptian separatist 
ideology established in 2008, although it was not officially recognised by the 
government under laws which restricted the formation of new political parties. LEP 
was an offshoot of an earlier party founded in 2004 called Maṣr el-Umm (Mother 
Egypt). In the interview, Abdel-Aziz Gamal El-Din explains that the two parties only 
differ in name; after the application to establish Maṣr el-Umm was rejected by the 
authorities, they could not re-apply under the same name. Both parties, he explains, 
are an extension of the Egyptian nationalist current which dates back to the early 
20th century (cf. Section ‎3.3.2.3). He notes that the Internet has helped them 
communicate their views to a wider audience, but describes LEP as ‘a party 
predominantly for intellectuals, and not so much for the masses’. The activities of 
LEP have received some attention in recent literature. Panovi  (2010) mentions that 
a ‘Masry Wikipedian’ he interviewed is a former LEP member (cf. Sections ‎1.1 and 
‎6.4), while Darwish (2007) points to the role of LEP (then in its formative stages) in 
organising a televised celebration of the (ancient) Egyptian new year in  2007 (cf. 
Section ‎3.3.2.3). 
The party had an agenda focussed on re-asserting the Egyptian ethnic identity, 
establishing a secular democratic national government emphasising the separation 
of religion and state, and standardising the Egyptian vernacular. The latter item in 
the agenda is the reason I identified LEP as an agent of change. It is worth noting 
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however that following the 2011 revolution and in the lead-up to the 2011-2012 
parliamentary elections, LEP assimilated into the Social Democratic Egyptian Party 
who share LEP’s overarching aims for a secular state, but do not have a language-
related item in their official manifesto (cf. Section ‎6.2.2).  
When I contacted LEP and expressed my interest in their language policy, they 
immediately nominated Abdel-Aziz Gamal El-Din for the interview. It was clear that 
he was – to borrow Eisele’s (2000, 2003) term – the ‘language maven’ in the party. 
One of four founding members of the party, Gamal El-Din was seventy when I 
interviewed him. He spoke in a mixture of fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya which is closer to the 
former than the latter. Gamal El-Din describes himself as a ‘researcher of Egyptology’ 
(bāḥiṯ fi l-maṣriyyāt) with a particular interest in ‘the evolution of the Egyptian 
language’. He has more recently become known for editing and introducing a 
number of historical works which chronicle specific periods in Egypt’s history (Gamal 
El-Din, 2006, 2011c, 2012), in addition to authoring books on aspects of Egyptian 
history (Gamal El-Din, 2007, 2011b, 2013). This recent publishing activity has earned 
him the title of ‘historian’ (muʾarrix) in publishers’ descriptions of his works.  
It is worth noting here that the focus of Gamal El-Din’s published works is in line with 
LEP’s Egyptian separatist ideology. Three common themes which run through all of 
them is a focus on Egyptian Coptic identity (and by extension, Coptic Christianity) as 
an expression of authentic Egyptian identity27, identifying Arab (and by extension, 
Islamic) ‘invasions’ as a foreign element in Egyptian history28, and Egyptian 
nationalism and resistance against oppressors and foreign invaders29. It is worth 
                                                             
27 Such as in his ‘History of Christianity in Egypt’ (Gamal El-Din, 2007) and his introductions to two 
Christian sources of Egyptian history: ‘The History of Egypt from the Beginning of the First Century to 
the End of the Twentieth Century AD Based on the Scroll of the History of the Patriarchs by Severus 
ibn al-Muqaffa’ (Gamal El-Din, 2006) and ‘John of Nikiû’s History of Egypt and the Old World’ (Gamal 
El-Din, 2011c). 
28 The term commonly used in Arabic is al-futūḥāt al-islāmiyya (the Islamic conquests; literally 
‘openings’), which has positive connotations. However, Gamal El-Din uses the markedly negative term 
ġazw (invasion) instead. Similarly, Gamal El-Din (2013) uses the negatively marked term iḥtilāl 
(occupation) to refer to the period of Ottoman rule in Egypt. 
29 This is clear in all his authored and edited works. For example, one of the books edited and 
introduced by Gamal El-Din (2012) is Al-Jabarti’s three-volume history of events in Egypt between the 
Hijri years of roughly 1070 to 1220 (1659-1805 AD), which includes accounts of Egyptians’ resistance 
against the French campaign at the end of the 18th century (which Al-Jabarti witnessed). It is also 
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noting that the first two themes are the same themes which ran through the writings 
of Egyptian separatists such as Salama Musa and Louis Awad (Suleiman, 2008), (cf. 
Section ‎3.3.2.3). 
Gamal El-Din also established a printed magazine called Maṣriyya30  in the 70s, which 
has recently taken the form of an electronic blog31. The magazine forwards the same 
themes mentioned above with particular emphasis on Egyptian nationalism, 
democracy and secularism. Significantly, one year after I interviewed him, Gamal El-
Din published a book titled Ḥawl Taṭawwurāt Luġatinā al-Miṣriyya al-Muʿāṣira (On 
the Evolution of our Modern Egyptian Language) (Gamal El-Din, 2011a). This book 
fleshes out the view of Egyptian Arabic which Gamal El-Din expresses in the 
interview. His consistent use of the term ‘Egyptian Language’ warrants glossing. This 
definition is provided at the beginning of his book:  
From the outset, we must acknowledge that every living language, including our 
Egyptian language, has a popular everyday level in common use by all the people of this 
language. In addition to its widespread use, this level has its popular disciplines and art 
forms such as folktales, poetry, puppet theatre [masraḥ al-ʾaragōz] and traditional 
theatre [masraḥ al-sāmir]. Indeed, it also possesses the language of modern theatre, 
cinema and [TV] soaps. 
From this popular level emanates the official level which some scholars and 
intellectuals formulate into [grammar] rules and a writing system to be used in the 
state’s official documents. However, this does not mean that this level of the Egyptian 
language (i.e. the official level) does not have the capacity for literary creativity for 
those who wish to employ it. 
Thus, we see that the popular level of the language provides its grammatical basis 
and evolutionary grounds, and we cannot imagine a language without this level. 
(Gamal El-Din, 2011a: 5, my translation) 
                                                                                                                                                                               
particularly true in Gamal El Din’s two recent books on the history of resistance and revolutions in 
Egypt (2011b, 2013). 
30 Maṣriyya is the female form of the adjective ‘Egyptian’. Gamal El-Din mentions that he has given his 
daughter the same name. 
31 The blog can be found here: http://masryablog.blogspot.co.uk/2009/01/normal-0-
microsoftinternetexplorer4_18.html (accessed 01.07.2014) 
113 
 
In what follows, I will not evaluate the linguistic accuracy of Gamal El-Din’s 
conceptualisation of the Egyptian language (henceforth, EL)32, but will use this term 
prima facie and comment only on the ideological aspects of the account given of it. 
According to Gamal El-Din, all the living languages of the world have an official level 
and a popular level; a language myth which normalises the language situation in 
Egypt. Gamal El-Din deliberately refrains from using the terms fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya. 
Instead, he refers to the popular and official levels of ‘Egyptian language’. 
Significantly, even the official level (i.e. fuṣḥā) is qualified as ‘Egyptian’, and it is the 
popular level not the official level which is seen as the ‘original source’ of the 
language. When I used the term ʿāmmiyya to ask him about his view of language in 
relation to Egyptian identity, he responded33: 
‎SEG1: The issue of Egyptian ʿāmmiyya has come to a problem of terminology. I feel that 
some of those who claim to be linguists invest it to demean the Egyptian language. 
Meaning that there would be an Egyptian ʿāmmiyya and an Arab(ic) fuṣḥā, when, 
scientifically, this is not really available. What is available is that there is an 
Egyptian language which has been evolving throughout history and draws from all 
the languages that have entered it, from Persian to Turkish, to Arabic, to English, to 
German, to French, to Italian, to Greek… to Nubian and African and Tamazight. All 
of these have entered the Egyptian language. And all of these influences do not 
form the majority of the Egyptian language so that we can call it a Greek language 
or a French language or an English language or even an Arabic language, or Turkish. 
No, we can call it an Egyptian language influenced by all this, and herein lies the 
value of the Egyptian language; that, in absorbing all the civilisations that have 
entered it, it was able to absorb the lexical items which have come to it from these 
languages. But it has continued, since ancient times and up until our present day, 
to dwell in its own house of grammar34 rules. And this is very clear in the modern 
linguistic studies which confirm that the modern or contemporary Egyptian 
language is the daughter of ancient languages in its final contemporary form which 
is present now, and which will of course evolve into other forms as other forms 
emerge‎SEG1. 
                                                             
32 I point the reader to the historical overview of the origin of Arabic and the Arabisation of Egypt and 
to the section on the substratal influence of Coptic in Chapter 2. Together, these sections should 
provide sufficient context against which the validity of the concept of EL can be evaluated. 
33 The transcription of extended interview segments is provided in Appendix I. 
34 Single underlining indicates words which were said in English in the interview. 
114 
 
Two main myths can be noted in this account of EL (noting that this account 
addresses the popular level of EL; i.e. ʿāmmiyya). The first myth is that Egypt has a 
special assimilatory capacity which has enabled it to absorb various cultures and 
civilisations throughout history. This myth is extended to language, where EL has 
absorbed some of these languages through its special assimilatory power. Note that 
Egypt and EL are frequently conflated in this account. A second myth is that EL is a 
direct descendant of ancient Egyptian languages and that it has preserved its 
grammatical form over time. This invokes Eisele’s topos of continuity, which is 
commonly found in the dominant regime of practice about fuṣḥā. Significantly, 
however, it is essentially applied here to ʿāmmiyya. EL is described as ‘the daughter 
of ancient languages’ and this historical continuity contributes to it superiority. 
In line with the definition he presents in his book, Gamal El-Din then proceeded to 
explain that EL – like any other language – has two levels: an Egyptian fuṣḥā and an 
Egyptian ʿāmmiyya; the latter is the level of everyday use and the former is the level 
used in the writing of ‘newspapers and magazines, etc.’. However, he categorically 
refuses to refer to this latter level as Arabic fuṣḥā, offering the following reasoning: 
 SEG2: … but for fuṣḥā to be called Arabic, I don’t really think that there was, at some 
point in time, an Arabic fuṣḥā language which existed in any clear historical period. 
There was an Arabic language, which was an amalgamation of many disparate 
languages which were present in the Arabian Peninsula, and which varied amongst 
them in the names of things: in the names for palm trees, and the names for lion, 
and the names for sword. And it is normal for a language which develops in a poor 
desert community to be less advanced and accomplished than a language which 
has developed in an agricultural community like Egypt. The agricultural community 
in Egypt has contributed an ancient civilisation with multiple levels in culture, arts, 
science, language and literature, which cannot be attained by what I call ‘the 
tongues’ (al-alsina). And I insist on calling them ‘tongues’ because they were mostly 
spoken and not written […] and they were only written belatedly, and when they 
were written it was at a time when this language had not yet stabilised. […] Indeed, 
when the whole region wanted to learn Arabic in the modern, contemporary age, 
they resorted to the Egyptian teacher. They actually say that the Egyptian is 
teaching them Arabic; it is impossible for the Egyptian to teach them Arabic, he will 
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teach them Egyptian […] If the whole region is Arab then they don’t need an 
Egyptian teacher to teach them Arabic; but when they learned, they learned 
Egyptian SEG2. 
Again, a number of myths can be traced here. First, the myth that a language which 
develops in an agricultural environment is more sophisticated than a language which 
develops in a desert environment. The second myth is that a written language is 
more prestigious than a spoken language. Two more language myths about Arabic 
can be found in the excerpt: that the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula did not speak a 
single language, and that Egyptian teachers of Arabic teach ‘Arabs’ EL. This latter 
myth is significant because it implies that the fuṣḥā used by ‘all Arabs in the region’ is 
in fact ‘Egyptian’ (effectively stripping ‘Arabs’ of ‘Arabic’ and of a standard/written 
language of their own). The topos of superiority is invoked throughout this excerpt, 
and the myths outlined above help to achieve this: EL is superior to ‘the Arabic 
tongues’ because it developed in an agricultural environment and was recorded in 
writing earlier. Significantly, the distinction between EL/Egypt/Egyptians/Egyptian 
culture is blurred, to the effect that the superiority of EL over ‘Arabic tongues’ 
becomes synonymous with the superiority of Egypt and Egyptians over Arabs. The 
result is the following chain of reasoning:  
x Egypt has an ancient civilisation which developed in an agricultural environment;  
x This ancient civilisation gave rise to a written language which predates the 
writing of Arabic;  
x The reason Arabic was mainly spoken and not written is that it developed in a 
less sophisticated desert environment;  
x Because Arabs were less advanced, they resorted to Egyptians to educate them;  
x Because it was Egyptians who educated them, the language they taught them is 
Egyptian not Arabic;  
x Ergo, the Arabs speak Egyptian and there is no such thing as an Arabic fuṣḥā. 
As Gamal El-Din explains in the interview, it is the popular level of EL (i.e. ʿāmmiyya) 
which LEP seek to codify to become the official language of Egypt. He argues that the 
authentic language is that which people use, saying that ‘language is the daughter of 
the people and the populace not the intellectuals’ (al-luġa hiya ibnet al-gumhūr wa-l-
nās, miš ibnet al-musaqqafīn) – employing the metaphor of parenthood a second 
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time. He asserts that all Egyptians ‘essentially speak the same language, with only 
slight differences, possibly at the phonetic level but not at the grammatical level’ 
( SEG3). The codified variety, he explains, should be modelled after the EL found in art 
forms such as poetry, theatre and cinema ‘where Egyptian fuṣḥā is absent’. Gamal El-
Din points to the shortcomings of the Arabic writing system in representing the full 
range of ‘Egyptian phonics’ and says that this writing system will need to be adapted, 
or indeed an entirely new writing system adopted, in the process of codifying EL. 
Significantly, Gamal El-Din makes it clear that the process of codifying EL involves 
simply recording it, and not laying down rules for it since the people who use it have 
already established its rules. 
Two topoi are invoked in laying out this argument: authenticity and unity. The 
popular level of EL which LEP seek to make official language is the ‘real’ language 
which Egyptians – all Egyptians – speak. This in turn suggests the superiority of EL. 
This is made explicit later in the interview when Gamal El-Din asserts that recent 
developments such as the relaxation of publishing laws and the spread of mobile 
phones and the Internet have favoured EL because it is ‘the smoothest and easiest in 
interaction, circulation and derivation’ (al-aslas wa-l-ashal fi l-tadāwul wa-l-taʿāmul 
wa-fi l-ištiqāq). He then revisits the point about codification from below: 
 SEG4: Of course a [pan-]Arabist will tell you “What ruin! What a mess!” and “Whither the 
Arabic language?”, “The language of religion and the Quran and so on is lost!”, “All 
of this is ḥarām (forbidden)!”, and he will stand in its way. But why? Well, people 
have already used it; [to the pan-Arabist] sit there and say what you wish while 
people go about their business normally. […] And unfortunately these words do not 
enter the dictionary, and the dictionaries are themselves inept; they do not reflect 
actual language [use]. While dictionaries in the scientific sense must derive from 
the bottom – that is, from the people – to record in dictionaries, the opposite 
happens over here. We revert to the speech of Lisān el-ʿarab35 and these archaic 
things when they are outdated. […] all the dictionaries of the world are developed 
by deriving from people’s speech and making dictionaries out of them, while we do 
the opposite: we come up with terms and try to force them into use in spite of the 
people. Like when the Arabic Language Academy starts using the word muxašlab 
                                                             
35 A Classical Arabic dictionary 
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instead of izāz or zugāg (glass). Zugāg is faṣīḥa and izāz is ʿāmmiyya, but neither is 
Arabic because the Arabic for it is muxašlab. So I find myself under siege, but this 
siege lifts despite itself, and it melts like others before it have melted away and 
vanished from history. Because the nature of life is evolution and progress. The 
problem is that those who are trying to force [on] people how to pronounce and 
how to speak do not realise that it is an impossible mission. 
The topos of authenticity is invoked once more, with the forms used in EL presented 
as more authentic than the archaic Arabic forms. Authenticity here seems to be at 
odds with purity. Purity, which is positively valued in the dominant discourse about 
Arabic (cf. Section  3.3), is in fact negatively valued in Gamal El-Din’s account. This in 
turn invokes the topos of competition: EL competes with (and is metaphorically 
‘besieged’ by) Arabic. The tension between them is transmitted in a binary of 
progressive EL on the one hand versus archaic Arabic on the other. This tension is 
also reflected at the level of identity, where ‘Egyptian’ and ‘Arab’ are seen as 
contradictory categories. Another aim which LEP declared in their mission statement 
was to delete the word ‘Arab’ from Egypt’s official title, The Arab Republic of Egypt. 
Gamal El-Din explains the reason for this in the following excerpt: 
 SEG5: Well this is the equivalent to [certain] people calling our language Egyptian Arabic. 
It doesn’t work; I can’t be French English, or Egyptian English, or Egyptian Arabic. 
You are putting together things… which don’t really go together. I can’t be Arab 
and Egyptian. How could it be? So they say, well, Arab is qawmiyya and Egyptian is 
waṭaniyya36. No, I am neither Egyptian qawmiyya nor Arab qawmiyya, I am 
[concerned with] Egyptian identity. 
This Egyptian identity according to Gamal El-Din encompasses anyone who carries an 
Egyptian identification card (kul man huwa yaḥmil biṭāʾa teʾūl ennu maṣrī fa-huwa 
maṣrī). He highlights however the diversity of Egyptians in terms of social, economic, 
religious, ethnic and class differences. In spite of these differences, Egyptians share a 
                                                             
36 While both terms would translate into nationalism in English, there is a subtle difference in 
meaning. The term waṭaniyya derives from the Arabic word waṭan, while qawmiyya invokes the 
concept of umma (see section 4.3.2.2). While waṭan refers to “the place to which a person belongs, 
the fatherland”, umma refers to “the group of which a person is a member, the nation” (Suleiman, 




‘cultural’ identity which dwells in the ‘traditional Egyptian consciousness’ (al-wigdān 
al-maṣrī al-taqlīdī) and speak the same language. Crucially, although Gamal El-Din 
mentions many types of diversity in the make-up of Egyptian identity, linguistic 
diversity is not among them. Instead, language becomes the one shared feature 
among an otherwise diverse nation (invoking once more the topos of unity).  
Addressing the increasing emphasis on Egyptian identity in recent times, Gamal El-
Din attributes this to the ‘failure of the project of [pan-]Arab unity and qawmiyya’. 
He states that Nasser’s pan-Arab policies were a cause for division. He reasons that 
pan-Arabism in Egypt came to be associated with Islam, so that when pan-Arabism 
faded, only Islam was left, which created a problem for the Copts who rejected pan-
Arabism because now it would appear as though they are rejecting Islam, resulting in 
sectarian strife as a by-product of so-called pan-Arabism. Gamal El-Din states that 
pan-Arab authorities persecuted those who championed Egyptian identity or wrote 
in ʿāmmiyya such as Louis Awad, and mentions that he himself came under attack 
when he established his magazine Maṣriyya (in the 1970s) only because it was 
named ‘Egyptian’. At the time, speaking in the name of Egypt and Egyptianness was 
categorically rejected as anti-pan-Arabism. These authorities, Gamal El-Din says, are 
now no more; they have weakened and retreated, accounting for the ‘return’ to 
Egyptian identity. He is quick to point out however that pan-Arabism as an ideology 
still exists and that LEP often comes under attack from pan-Arabists (ʿurūbiyyīn) and 
those ‘who are still under the illusion that it is possible to resurrect pan-Arabism’. 
Hence the competition/tension highlighted between EL and Arabic at the linguistic 
level, and between ‘Egyptian’ and ‘Arab’ at identity level, is extended to tension 
between Egyptian separatism and pan-Arabism at the ideological level.  
4.3 Malamih publishing house 
Malamih is a publishing house established by Mohamed El-Sharkawi in 2007 with a 
mission to empower young Egyptian writers ‘without ideological, national, or 
linguistic boundaries’37. By the time I interviewed El-Sharkawi in July 2010, Malamih 
                                                             
37 From Malamih’s website: 
http://www.malamih.com/ar/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5&Itemid=6 (last 
accessed October 2010). The website is no longer active. 
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had published more than 75 works for Egyptian writers in a range of language 
varieties and combinations, including SA, EA, English, French, SA and EA, and English 
and LA. This overtly liberal attitude towards publishing in varieties other than 
Standard Arabic is the reason Malamih was identified as an agent of language 
change. El-Sharkawi emphasises this point in the interview, indicating that other 
publishers who publish works in ʿāmmiyya are quick to hide behind the author and 
say that it is the author’s choice and not theirs.  
I should point out that Malamih mysteriously closed down towards the end of 2011, 
shortly after which El-Sharkawi left Egypt. His current whereabouts remain unknown 
despite my best efforts to locate him. It appears that the closure of the publishing 
house was financially motivated, although political factors may have also played a 
part. El-Sharkawi had had his skirmishes with the Egyptian authorities because of his 
anti-regime views and his affiliation with the pro-democracy group, Kifāya (Enough). 
He was jailed several times for short periods between 2006 and 2010, the most 
recent being a little over a month before I interviewed him in 2010.  
The issue of identity is particularly salient in this interview; the identity of Malamih as 
a publishing house is inseparable from the identity of its founder, Mohamed El-
Sharkawi. As well as referring to Malamih in the third person, El-Sharkawi alternates 
between the first person pronouns ‘I’ (anā) and ‘we’ (iḥnā) when he talks about the 
publishing house. Using Omoniyi’s (2006) ‘hierarchy of identities’ framework, the 
identity which El-Sharkawi foregrounds the most is his political identity as a leftist, 
anti-regime activist. At the beginning of the interview, El-Sharkawi addresses 
Malamih’s declared mission of publishing works ‘without boundaries’ to include the 
caveat: ‘There are boundaries. In the end I am leftist; I cannot publish something 
which talks about capitalism for example; I cannot publish something which supports 
the regime. There is a political dimension in the matter’ (‎SEG6). 
El-Sharkawi’s activist identity is similarly fronted at various other points in the 
interview, where he highlights his differences with Mubarak’s government, 
particularly his multiple arrests for his political views. He refers to himself as a ‘highly 
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confrontational person’ (šaxṣ ṣidāmī giddan) and a [political] ‘instigator’ (muḥarriḍ). 
He also mentions his previous employment in a leftist publishing house, Merit. 
El-Sharkawi was 28 years old when I interviewed him, and his bias to young writers is 
a bias to his own generation. He refers to his ‘young’ age in various ways throughout 
the interview. He mentions that he is part of ‘a new generation’ in the publishing 
industry. At another point he explains that they [Malamih] had initially aimed to 
publish works by writers no older than 35 because ‘beyond that is a different 
generation’ (baʿd kida da gīl tānī) and jokes that ‘[being] 40 means you’ve seen 
Sadat; surely I don’t want to know you!’ (arbiʿīn da yaʿnī intā šuft el-Sadāt; akīd anā 
miš ʿāyiz aʿrafak!). 
Another aspect of El-Sharkawi’s identity which comes up more than once in the 
interview is his background. El-Sharkawi mentions at three different points in the 
interview that he is from Kafr El-Sheikh, a rural governorate in the Nile delta. He 
refers to his humble upbringing and his father’s small income and how he struggled 
to buy books which he could not afford. 
Returning to Malamih’s language ‘policy’ (if we might call it that), El-Sharkawi 
emphasises that it sets them apart from other publishers. He explains that the 
reason they do not enforce ‘linguistic boundaries’ is that ‘language is a means of 
communication, it should not be an instrument for withholding culture from another’ 
(el-luġa hiyya adāt tawāṣul, fa-mayinfaʿš el-luġa tibʾā adāt manʿ saqāfa ʿan āxar). He 
vehemently states that the books Malamih publishes ‘will not undergo linguistic 
editing because there is no such thing as editing a writer’s [work]; the writer is free’ 
(el-kutub miš hayiḥṣallahā taʿdīl luġawī laʾinn ma-fīš ḥāga ismahā inn anā aʿaddil ʿalā 
kātib; el-kātib huwwa ḥur). The only caveat is that the writer does not offend with 
their writing; that is, El-Sharkawi explains, they are free for example to criticise the 
idea of religion, but not to criticise one religion in favour of another. It is worth 
noting that despite Malamih’s ‘no-language-editing’ policy, later in the interview El-
Sharkawi mentions a novel written by a young writer from his own home 
governorate where he had to interfere to ‘correct’ the ʿāmmiyya because it was too 
‘regional’. Explaining the corrections he made, it was clear that what El-Sharkawi had 
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done was ‘convert’ the script to Cairene ʿāmmiyya. This calls to mind the guidelines 
set out for the editors of Wikipedia Masry, which reflect a clear bias towards Cairene 
(Panovi , 2010). 
El-Sharkawi’s attitude towards ʿāmmiyya in particular warrants attention. He refers 
to it as el-luġa el-ʿāmmiyya el-maṣriyya (the Egyptian colloquial language). What is 
significant here is the qualifier ‘language’ which is a conscious choice on El-
Sharkawi’s part. El-Sharkawi explains that Malamih has been biased to ʿāmmiyya 
from day one, raising the slogan Yasquṭ Sībāwēh (down with Sībāwayh)38. He 
fervently defends this view: 
‎SEG7: … we said from day one that we have a special orientation to support the Egyptian 
colloquial language. We are a country with our own distinctiveness, whether we 
like it or not by the way […] Down with Sībāwayh of course! Of course! There is no 
such thing as Sībāwayh! Sībāwayh! What have I got to do with Sībāwayh? Sībāwayh 
was a man who lived there; in Najd and Ḥijāz. What have I got to do [with that]? 
El-Sharkawi’s view of ʿāmmiyya is inseparable from his view of fuṣḥā. He states that, 
even though he studied Arabic at Al-Azhar University, he could not be less concerned 
with fuṣḥā grammar rules, meter and rhyme, etc. He refers to fuṣḥā as luġa aṣīla 
(pure language)39 to mean that it has not developed from any other language. This 
he says makes it a very difficult language with complicated grammar. ʿāmmiyya on 
the other hand, because it is not a ‘pure language’, is easier and more flexible: 
‎SEG8: ʿāmmiyya language gives me more room to express [myself], given that I am 
Egyptian, and it reaches a lot of people, as opposed to fuṣḥā. Not everyone has a 
taste for fuṣḥā, and it is always difficult because… the Arabic language (el-luġa el-
ʿarabiyya), meaning the language of the ḍād40 (luġet eḍ-ḍād), is tough and very 
difficult. It is even classed as one of the [most] difficult languages in the world, 
like… like German, because German is a pure language and Arabic (el-ʿarabiyya) is a 
pure language, meaning that it is not derived from anything. 
                                                             
38 A reference to the 8th century Arabic grammarian Sībawayh (cf. Section ‎2.2) 
39 The Arabic word aṣīl (for male, aṣīla for female) is an adjective which denotes authenticity, purity 
(especially of lineage) and rootedness (i.e. being well-established). It is often used with respect to 
animals, for example ḥiṣān ʿarabī aṣīl (horse of pure Arab breed), and is used here in that sense. 
40 The Arabic language was labelled ‘the language of the ḍād’ by early Arab grammarians after a letter 
in the Arabic alphabet denoting a sound which was thought to be unique to Arabic (Suleiman, 2012). It 




‎SEG9: ʿāmmiyya gives me some room to talk about more topics that are close to the 
people. Because this is the language that people speak. Like I told you, fuṣḥā on the 
other hand is like… [makes strangling motion with hands] this. Poetry in ʿāmmiyya 
is always closer to people than [poetry in] fuṣḥā. Fuṣḥā language (el-luġa el-fuṣḥā) 
sometimes makes me bypass ʿāmmiyya; ʿāmmiyya sometimes makes me elaborate. 
But this is where the storyteller’s skill emerges. Don’t we have something called el-
ḥakawātī ‘storyteller’? This is it. If I don’t have the intense suaveness and ability to 
maintain my presence- because I’m chattering; ʿāmmiyya makes me chatter; not 
one word sealed by another41; Arabic (el-ʿarabī) is one word sealed by another. […] 
And ʿāmmiyya is also rich with its terminology, but also because many foreign 
words have entered it and because it is not a pure language – meaning that 
ʿāmmiyya is not pure. ʿāmmiyya at the end of the day is Coptic mixed with Greek 
mixed with Hieroglyphic mixed with Arabic. This is not our language; meaning 
Arabic (el-ʿarabiyya) is not a language of Egyptians. […] This is why we invented 
ʿāmmiyya. Why is Egyptian ʿāmmiyya the only one which is understood throughout 
the – Arab – World? It is impossible for Palestinian ʿāmmiyya to be understood 
throughout the Arab World – in the Levant [perhaps]; it is impossible for Algerian – 
not the Tamazight, the Arabic, which is called ‘el-dārga’ [dārija] in Algeria – to be 
understood [throughout the Arab World]. 
When asked why it is that Egyptian ʿāmmiyya is the only colloquial Arabic understood 
throughout the Arab World, El-Sharkawi replies: 
‎SEG10: Because it has its distinctiveness, and because… it is derived from several things, 
and it’s easy, and I can explain many things with it, it’s verbose; it has verbosity, 
and it sounds nice to the ear. Algerian doesn’t, Iraqi doesn’t. […] We are closer to 
the Arabic language (el-luġa el-ʿarabiyya) than any of the other languages\  
dialects, but at the same time it (ʿāmmiyya) gives me space [to elaborate], because 
it is not a pure language. 
These three segments ( SEG8 to  SEG10) require detailed analysis. While El-Sharkawi 
refers to ʿāmmiyya in the interview as ‘the Egyptian ʿāmmiyya language’ (el-luġa el-
ʿāmmiyya el-maṣriyya) – sometimes contracted to ‘the Egyptian ʿāmmiyya’ (el-
ʿāmmiyya el-maṣriyya) or simply el-ʿāmmiyya – the above excerpts highlight that he 
refers to fuṣḥā in a number of ways (wavy underlining). In particular, he uses the 
words for Arabic (el-ʿarabī or el-ʿarabiyya) to refer exclusively to fuṣḥā. At no point in 
the interview does he use the qualifier ‘Arabic’ in conjunction with ʿāmmiyya. Note 
                                                             
41 The Arabic expression kilma w-rad ġaṭāhā (a word and a [one-word] response to seal it) is used to 
denote brevity and economy of speech.  
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also that both fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya are referred to as languages. However, El-
Sharkawi is not as willing to award the same title to other Arabic colloquials; when he 
begins to refer to them as ‘languages’ this is quickly repaired to ‘dialects’, a label 
which he does not use in conjunction with Egyptian ʿāmmiyya at all. 
There are many language myths which can be extracted from El-Sharkawi’s account 
of fuṣḥā, ʿāmmiyya and other colloquial Arabics (summarised in Table 3). These 
myths invoke a number of topoi. The topos of purity, which is traditionally invoked to 
exalt fuṣḥā, is portrayed here as a shortcoming: ʿāmmiyya is simpler and more 
flexible than fuṣḥā because it is not a pure language. The topos of authenticity is also 
invoked; ʿāmmiyya is closer to the Egyptian people because of their ‘auditory culture’ 
(šaʿb saqaftu samʿiyya). It is worth noting here that although El-Sharkawi paints an 
overall negative picture of fuṣḥā in comparison to ʿāmmiyya, he does not explicitly 
state that ʿāmmiyya is superior. For instance, when he compares the restricting 
conciseness of fuṣḥā to the verbosity of ʿāmmiyya, he acknowledges that both of 
these qualities have their advantages and disadvantages. Conversely, when El-
Sharkawi compares ʿāmmiyya to other colloquial Arabics, he is adamant that the 
former is better. The ‘rationalised evaluations’ (cf. Section  3.3) provided to support 
his view invoke the topos of superiority. For example, the theme of inherent beauty 
which is often associated with fuṣḥā (cf. Ferguson, 1997 [1959]) is reappropriated 
here for ʿāmmiyya, which ‘sounds nicer’ than other colloquial Arabics. This is also 
evident in El-Sharkawi’s choice – conscious or not – to reserve the label ‘language’ to 
Egyptian ʿāmmiyya, but relegate other colloquial Arabics to ‘dialects’.  
 fuṣḥā ʿāmmiyya Other colloquial Arabics 
Far from people Close to people  
Pure language Impure language  
Limited vocabulary (rigid) Richer vocabulary (flexible)  




Complex/difficult Simple/easy Not as simple/easy 
 Sounds nice Do not sound (as) nice 
 Closer to fuṣḥā Further from fuṣḥā 
 Understood throughout 
Arab World 
Not understood throughout 
Arab World 




Another myth outlined in the excerpt is that Egyptians ‘invented’ ʿāmmiyya as a way 
of forging their own language in response to the foreignness of fuṣḥā. Indeed, El-
Sharkawi’s view of ʿāmmiyya is also closely linked to his view of Egyptian identity; 
both Egypt and ʿāmmiyya are special – they have their ‘distinctiveness’ (xuṣūṣiyya, 
this word is underlined twice in the excerpts above). He uses this term a third time in 
the excerpt below. When asked whether one of the first poetry collections Malamih 
published was in fuṣḥā or ʿāmmiyya, he responds: 
‎SEG11: Poems in fuṣḥā, but in our fuṣḥā, not the fuṣḥā of the Bedouins of the [Arabian] 
Peninsula… I’m sorry, but I’m against\ they don’t\ they… the Wahhabis have ruined 
Egyptians’ lives generally – even in Islam they have their own interpretations – but 
also those of the Peninsula ruined the language, I mean ours. In the end this is not 
our language, but you discover that we have our distinctiveness; our ʿāmmiyya has 
distinctiveness and it has amazing pronunciation and writing rules, but of course no 
one cares for them.  
This account transports the myth that Egyptians have their own version of fuṣḥā. 
However, unlike LEP’s Gamal El-Din, El-Sharkawi does not go as far as to claim that 
the fuṣḥā used everywhere in the Arabic-speaking world is Egyptian fuṣḥā. In fact, El-
Sharkawi highlights that the Egyptian fuṣḥā he refers to is different from the fuṣḥā of 
the ‘Bedouins of the Arabian Peninsula’. However, this belief in the special status 
(xuṣūṣiyya) of Egyptians and the language they speak does not translate into 
Egyptian separatist nationalism on the part of El-Sharkawi. Unlike, Gamal El-Din, El-
Sharkawi’s statements do not carry clear nationalistic undertones. When El-Sharkawi 
compares ʿāmmiyya to other colloquial Arabics, he places Egypt within an ‘Arab 
World’, a concept which was completely absent from Gamal El-Din’s account (who 
refers to ‘Arabs in the region’ instead). At the same time, when El-Sharkawi refers to 
the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula, he refers to them as Bedouins, and then uses the 
Arabic words betūʿ šibh el-gezīra (those of the Peninsula) which have a derogatory 
tone to them. Similarly, to El-Sharkawi, the superiority of ʿāmmiyya does not 
necessarily imply the superiority of Egypt as a nation. One might argue that while 
Gamal El-Din expressed Egyptian separatist nationalism, El-Sharkawi is expressing 
integral Egyptian nationalism (cf. Section ‎3.3.2). 
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El-Sharkawi notes that Malamih has two main agendas, change and a secular state 
(taġyīr w-dawla madaniyya), and even though they do not necessarily publish works 
which directly further these agendas, they do not publish works which support a 
religious state or the status quo. The overlap in the view of religion between Gamal 
El-Din and El-Sharkawi is worth noting here, particularly their antagonism to the 
religious influence of the Arabian Gulf countries. Indeed, ‎SEG11 suggests that 
Egyptians not only have their own distinct version of fuṣḥā but also of Islam. 
El-Sharkawi acknowledges the increase in publishing activity in ʿāmmiyya, owing this 
to the relaxation in publishing rules and the emergence of more publishers. Writers 
are no longer forced to publish via government publishers where the approval 
process alone can take up to seven years. Now there are many private publishers and 
writers have more choice. However, El-Sharkawi notes that even though works 
published in ʿāmmiyya are on the rise, they are not presented as such, which is 
where Malamih stands out: ‘Malamih presents the works it publishes in ʿāmmiyya as 
being in ʿāmmiyya, other publishing houses do not do this, because they panic’. He 
adds that other publishers who have published several works in ʿāmmiyya deny that 
this is an orientation they have. They are quick to state that the opinions expressed 
in the works they publish are those of the authors. This statement provokes El-
Sharkawi who says this is not true; ‘If I am not convinced then I should not publish, 
because this represents me and represents my orientations, ambitions and 
ideologies’ ( SEG12).  
Publishers’ reluctance to support ʿāmmiyya overtly owes to the stigmatisation of 
publishing in ʿāmmiyya, as El-Sharkawi points out. Even though the flourishing of 
private publishing has curtailed the policing of the language authorities and the 
hegemony of the standard language, there is constant tension between those who 
write and publish in ʿāmmiyya and the upholders of the standard language. For 
instance, El-Sharkawi mentions how others in the publishing circle frequently criticise 




‎SEG13: It was constantly newspapers and it was constantly… big writers, and it was 
constantly intellectuals in [cultural] gatherings [who criticized us]. They would start 
to say “No, Mohamed, you cannot do that” or “Mohamed it is imperative (lāzim) 
that you do I-don’t-know-what”. So I tell them, yes, it is imperative, so we will do 
that which is imperative in another publishing house, but because we established 
Malamih to break all imperatives, we are doing all the things which are not 
imperative. 
Significantly, El-Sharkawi notes that it was when they started publishing in English 
that they came under the most attack and Malamih was accused of ‘undermining the 
foundations of Egyptian culture’ (bitqawwiḍū arkān el-saqāfa el-maṣriyya). He 
explains their motive for publishing in English noting that it acknowledges the 
presence of an audience that prefers to read and write in this language: ‘bilingual 
people who speak both [Arabic and English]’ (el-nās ellī humma bilingual; ellī humma 
beyitkallimū el-itnēn) or those who think in English. He points to youths educated in 
prominent private universities, with special reference to the American University in 
Cairo (AUC). He also cites the economic virtues of publishing in English: books they 
publish in English, he says, are priced higher, because the target readers are willing 
to pay more for them. Malamih’s English novels range in price between L.E. 50 and 
L.E. 80, the Arabic books sell for around L.E. 20. Hence, although the English books do 
not necessarily sell more than the Arabic books, they generate more revenue. As El-
Sharkawi puts it, publishing one book in English enables him to finance 5 books in 
Arabic. It is clear that Malamih’s motives for publishing in English are very different 
from the motives to publish in ʿāmmiyya. While El-Sharkawi is clearly passionate 
about publishing in the latter, the former is more of an economic necessity. On 
publishing in the two language varieties he says: 
‎SEG14: We want what unites [people] not what divides. The English language divides, it 
does not unite; in the end of the day how many people will read a novel [in] 
English? But we started to look at it in a different way: that there is an audience we 
cannot reach. So, we already produce things which go to the audience that we 
want to reach, and there is another audience which exists around there [gestures 
with hands] that we can reach, they’re [just] in Taḥrīr; in the private universities 
you talked about – I mean the AUC – so let’s go [to them]. 
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The topos of unity is invoked in this account. When El-Sharkawi speaks of the variety 
which ‘unites’ Egyptian people, he is referring to ʿāmmiyya. The audience he wants 
to reach is young Egyptians whom he is aiming to attract with a language which is 
accessible to them in order to trigger their interest in social issues. These he reaches 
by publishing books in ʿāmmiyya which are priced to make them affordable to a wide 
range of readers. English, he acknowledges, enables him to reach a different 
audience: a much smaller audience, granted, (hence the ‘dividing’ capacity of 
English), but one with substantial economic capital. ‘I want to reach these people,’ El-
Sharkawi says, ‘I want to make them read about Egypt in their language, but through 
my tongue; through me; through my mind’ (ʿāyiz arūḥ li-l-nās dōl […] ʿāyiz axallīhum 
yiʾrū ʿan maṣr bi-luġethum bas bi-lisānī; bi-yya; bi-ʿaʾlī). Later in the interview, El-
Sharkawi (calling himself an ‘instigator’) explains that part of Malamih’s mission as he 
sees it is to produce works which highlight social and political problems, albeit 
indirectly, in order to engage readers who would not necessarily be engaged with 
these issues. This involves speaking to readers in the language they prefer in a bid to 
reach out to them and tell them ‘come, you exist’ (intā mawgūd, taʿālā). El-Sharkawi 
states that Malamih does not have a specific ‘reader profile’, but is rather willing to 
tailor its language to reach as many audiences as possible. He says, we tell our 
readers: ‘Read, Egyptian. Read, and if you like what you read, then try to read what is 
between the lines’ (iʾrā yā maṣrī. iʾrā, w-law itbaṣaṭṭ ḥāwil tiʾrā ellī bēn es-suṭūr). 
At the same time, El-Sharkawi recognises that the language used by the writer is also 
associated with the topic of the work, and not only with the target audience. For 
example, he points out that certain topics are easier to address in English within 
conservative Egyptian society. These include intimate sexual relations and using 
swearwords, which is more acceptable in English.  He says it is difficult to talk about 
intimate relations in ʿāmmiyya without sounding cheap or vile, more difficult than 
fuṣḥā in fact. Similarly, talking about religion and God is easier in English: in Arabic 
saying ‘you are not here’ (intā miš hinā) is akin to saying ‘you do not exist’ (intā miš 
mawgūd) leaving the author open to accusations of atheism, but in English they are 
not synonymous. It is clear from this account that using English is not a mere 
language choice, but also a cultural one; using English to tap into Western culture 
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and values makes it acceptable to address otherwise difficult topics. El-Sharkawi also 
points out that it is difficult to use ʿāmmiyya when tackling scientific or academic 
issues. ʿāmmiyya is well-suited for novels because it has a captivating quality in 
narration. However, if you’re going to talk about the COMESA (Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa) summit for instance, it will be difficult to use ʿāmmiyya 
without irritating the reader. Here, El-Sharkawi says, as in certain works of non-
fiction such as self-help books, one might resort to el-luġa el-wasīṭa (the 
intermediate language). El-Sharkawi describes this as a mixture between fuṣḥā and 
ʿāmmiyya; a variety which incorporates fuṣḥā vocabulary but does not conform to its 
complex grammar rules; a variety ‘wherein Sībāwayh falls’ (yasqut Sībāwēh fīhā): it is 
not fuṣḥā and it is not ʿāmmiyya, he says, it is ʿāmmiyya faṣīḥa (eloquent ʿāmmiyya). 
4.4 Vodafone Egypt 
This interview stands out from the rest, mainly because the arguments presented 
could not be analysed along the usual lines of language ideology. Vodafone Egypt 
(henceforth, VE) was launched in 1998 (initially under the brand name Click GSM). It 
is the second oldest and second largest of the three mobile networks in Egypt42. I 
interviewed Ashraf El-Sagheer, the Self-Help Team Leader at Vodafone Egypt’s 
Commercial Communication Department. Throughout the interview, El-Sagheer 
spoke mostly in ʿāmmiyya with frequent code-switching to English. VE was selected 
as an agent of change because their Interactive Voice Responses (IVRs)43 underwent 
a radical change in 2007, essentially from fuṣḥā to ʿāmmiyya. This was an 
unprecedented move in Egypt and the Arabic-speaking world where such messages 
are customarily in fuṣḥā. For example, the service message that a caller would hear 
when they called a switched off VE line used to be: 
                                                             
42 The mobile network market in Egypt is dominated by Mobinil and Vodafone Egypt, which had 26 
million and 24 million subscriptions respectively in 2010, according to El-Sagheer. The third network, 
Etisalat, is a relative newcomer which only joined the market in 2007 and is less established than the 
other two networks.  
43 This refers to a technology which allows customers to indirectly interact with the company. 
Customers use their keypad (or in more advanced systems, voice commands) to navigate through 
recorded messages until their need is met. Many companies resort to IVRs to cut costs by eliminating 
the need for human interaction, although most IVRs will also have the option to speak to an operator. 
I use the term here to encompass all of VE’s recorded service messages, even non-interactive ones 
(which is consistent with how El-Sagheer uses it). 
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al-hātifu allaḏī ṭalabtahu rubbamā yakūnu muġlaqan yurgā 
the-phone that called-2msg maybe 3msg-be closed 3msg-pass-request 
 
iʿādatu l-muḥāwala fīmā-baʿd  
repetition the-attempt later  
‘The mobile you have called may be switched off. Please try again later.’ 
The message above has now been replaced with this: 
el-mubāyl ellī ṭalabtuh maʾfūl mumkin tebʿatlu mini-call 
the-mobile that called-2msg closed possible 2msg-send-pr3msg mini-call 
 
bi-ṣōtak iṭlub negma w-baʿdēn raqam el-mubāyl  
in-voice-poss-2msg call-2msg star and-then number the-mobile  
 
w- ūl risāltak  
and-say-2msg message-poss-2msg  
‘The mobile you have called is switched off. You may send it a mini-call in your voice: dial star 
followed by the mobile number and say your message.’ 
The first message is in MSA both structurally and lexically, complete with case 
endings. Nevertheless, it is still distinctively Egyptian because of the voiced velar stop 
/g/ in yurgā (instead of the palatal approximant /j/) which is accepted in MSA reading 
in Egypt (Bassiouney, 2009; Holes, 2004). On the other hand, the vocabulary and 
structure of the second message is distinctively in EA. The content of the first half of 
the two messages is almost identical; compare the following MSA/EA word pairs in 
this first half: hātif/mubāyl; allaḏī/ellī; muġlaq/maʾfūl. Mubāyl (mobile) is an English 
loan word which has become widely common in EA. Note also the use of the English 
product name ‘mini-call’ in the EA segment. This is only one of hundreds of messages 
which VE changed across the board. The main purpose of the interview was to 
understand the motivation behind this change. The first thing that stands out is how 
El-Sagheer refers to fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya: 
‎SEG15: From [19]99, all of Vodafone’s IVRs were formal. What do I mean by formal? 
[Meaning] that I give all the commands or orders to the customers formally. Even 
the indicational IVR that they [customers] call was also all formal. As I told you: 
where did the change came from? That\ because… none of the customers were 
listening to any of the IVRs at all, and they were trying to reach agents in the call 
centres to understand more from them. We carried out research like I told you, and 
the majority said that they could not understand anything, and that they prefer to 
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speak to someone they can understand more from; [someone] they can ask and 
[who will] respond to them… After we conducted this research we decided that all 
of Vodafone’s IVRs would change from formal to slang. Even the messages we send 
to customers have all become slang. They don’t have\ there is no order structure, 
as in ‘you have to do so-and-so’, no, it is now in a manner which is friendly, reaches 
the customers very quickly, and that they understand. I wish to tell you that since 
we did that we now have a very big [successful] self-help tool. What do I mean by 
self-help? I mean that the customer can rely on themselves; they do not need me 
to provide them with help. I can let them [do everything] from A to Z, from buying 
the line to making an Internet – ADSL – subscription, all of these things without 
speaking to anybody. They [can] do everything themselves. 
The use of the English words “formal” and “slang” to refer to the old messages in SA 
(fuṣḥā) and the new messages in EA (ʿāmmiyya) respectively is interesting: while it 
indicates awareness of a linguistic difference between the old and new messages, 
this is portrayed as a change in style rather than code (cf. Section ‎2.7). This is evident 
when El-Sagheer remarks that the old messages would give the customer orders 
while the new messages do not order customers, but rather speak to them in a 
“friendly” way. The fact is both the old and new messages give the customers 
instructions, and both use imperatives. In fact, the instruction given in the MSA 
message above to try again later is hedged with yurgā. On the other hand, the form 
used in the EA message, iṭlub (call) is a direct imperative. What this seems to suggest 
is that even though imperatives are used in both codes (indeed, it would be difficult 
to imagine how instructions can be given to customers without resorting to 
imperatives), the styles associated with using fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya can make 
commands in the latter sound less overbearing. Hence, the claim that customers are 
not given orders in the new EA messages is a perception rather than a reality.  
This emphasis on style is also clear when El-Sagheer later explains what he means by 
“slang”. This, he says is not what would be considered ‘weak language’ (miš luġa ellī 
beysammūhā rakīka); it is ‘respectable slang’ (slang muḥtaramma) but not very 
formal (miš formal awī), as opposed to the old messages which ‘were initially totally 
formal’ (kānit fi l-awwel formal-formal). He also describes the new messages as 
“friendly” and “interactive”, ‘just as though we were sitting together now’ (akkin be-
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l-ẓabt aʿdīn maʿ baʿd delwaʾtī). The description that El-Sagheer provides and the 
comparison he draws evidently relate to style.  
It is also possible that El-Sagheer may not have the linguistic awareness (or concern) 
to class the old and new messages as different codes. Indeed, there is a lesson there 
not to assume such awareness and congruent use of terminology in members of the 
wider public; I had to check my own use of fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya in this interview so as 
not to cue in terms that El-Sagheer wouldn’t use himself. Another explanation is that 
El-Sagheer could simply be using terminology which is current in the marketing 
industry. 
Shedding further light on how the change in the messages came about, El-Sagheer 
explains that the company issues periodical operational reports which indicate the 
monthly number of calls received by the call centre and how many of these were 
routed to a call centre agent. Before the change was implemented, 90-95% of 
messages were routed to an agent. This flagged a problem as the self-help tool 
clearly wasn’t serving its purpose, and the large volume of calls requiring an agent’s 
attention was also a substantial cost. It was this problem which triggered the 
research study in an attempt to cut costs but also achieve customer satisfaction. 
The research involved surveying customers, the majority of whom indicated that 
they could not understand the old messages and that they would prefer messages in 
“slang” (although El-Sagheer wasn’t clear on the exact word used in the survey). It 
also indicated that they preferred a female voice. El-Sagheer explains that the most 
likely reason that many could not understand the messages is that the ‘base’ of their 
customers is not very ‘well-educated’. He elaborates that their customer core is 
segmented by subscription plan into pre-paid card holders and premium and 
platinum customers. Premium and platinum customers are their ‘high customers’ 
and they make up 10% of subscribers. These are mainly well-educated professionals; 
what El-Sagheer describes as the ‘crème’ of society. VE’s research showed that these 
customers always prefer speaking to an agent; they don’t like IVR at all. El-Sagheer 
explains that their busy lifestyles mean that they usually have an issue they want to 
fix quickly or they will be late for a conference or an important engagement. Since 
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they could not change the behaviour of these customers, they had to turn their 
attention to the majority; their main customer base. This customer base includes 
customers with humble social and cultural standing, customers with little or no 
education, and customers living in rural governorates. These customers struggled to 
understand the “formal” messages, and many would not listen to them point blank. 
El-Sagheer explains that the decision and process of changing the messages was not 
easy. For instance, he highlights how the old message transcribed at the beginning of 
this section had become an iconic VE message and even featured in some movies. He 
notes that there was particular reluctance to change this message which had become 
part of VE’s corporate identity. The process of changing the messages was a gradual 
one, and this message was the last to be changed. When it was eventually changed, 
they added the option to send a ‘mini-call’ (voicemail) so that the change would not 
simply entail replacing the message, but allow the customer to take specific action. 
On the challenges they encountered in the process of changing the messages, El-
Sagheer says: 
‎SEG16: At first it was very difficult of course. I mean, there are certain words which were 
very difficult to change from formal to slang. For example, I want to say abl kida 
(previously; EA); min qabl (previously, SA), I mean that’s how we used to say it 
before. Words like that were very difficult. But to be honest in the beginning we 
were dealing with a vendor, an advertising agency, and they prepared this script for 
us […] until\ I mean, also not very long ago we became in charge and now we 
prepare the script ourselves, but we got the experience from them [regarding] how 
to say things. 
This segment highlights a number of important points. It illustrates that the process 
of changing messages from “formal” to “slang” was indeed a process of translating 
them from fuṣḥā to ʿāmmiyya as El-Sagheer’s example suggests. The difficulty that El-
Sagheer describes is understandable: they are trying to tap into the informal style of 
ʿāmmiyya, but without wishing to sound vulgar. This highlights the fact that this 
unprecedented change involved negotiating the functional parameters of ʿāmmiyya: 
the boundaries of its functional suitability were pushed in order to appropriate it for 
this novel function. It is therefore not surprising that VE consulted an advertising 
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agency at first: ʿāmmiyya, both spoken and written, has long been used in 
advertising. Later in the interview, El-Sagheer elaborates that it is not always possible 
to use ‘complete slang’. He says describing the new messages: 
‎SEG17: … they are in a very simplified form and very slang. At the same time there are 
things I cannot say [in slang], so they have to be converted to formal slightly. So it’s 
between the two, but not too formal and not too slang. For example I can’t tell 
them [the customer]: “if you enter on the day after that you will be able to do I-
don’t-know-what…” [EA]. I mean, there are certain things where we incorporate a 
bit of formal because I cannot say it in complete slang. So we are not too slang – 
that is, talking as though I am talking on the street – and not formal. So it’s 
between the two. This is what’s really difficult. 
This segment points to an awareness of intermediate form(s) between two “formal” 
and “slang” poles. This description, coupled with the discussed emphasis on style, 
evokes Mejdell’s (2006) notion of ‘mixed styles’ where code-switching between 
fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya achieves style-mixing. El-Sagheer’s description also suggests a 
virtual scale of formality, whereby one can increase or decrease formality by 
incorporating elements from ‘slang’ or ‘formal’ which preside on either ends of the 
scale, very much in line with the concept of the diglossic continuum (cf. Section ‎2.7). 
Interestingly, El-Sagheer notes that this intermediate form is the most difficult to 
script, influenced perhaps by perceptions of (lacking) correctness or naturalness. 
With respect to the impact of the change in the IVR messages, El-Sagheer notes that 
it was a success on many fronts. The company’s self-help tool is now much more 
efficient, and the volume of calls that agents handle has declined considerably. In the 
past, when VE launched a new service or offer, the service level of the call centre 
would crash because of the volume of incoming calls routed to the agent. Now ‘that 
the customers understand’, El-Sagheer says, the IVR handles up to 26 million calls a 
month. El-Sagheer even notes that in the previous Ramadan – a month when the 
volume of calls they receive usually increases – the IVR handled 60% of incoming 
calls. This was the first time in eleven years that the target service level was 
achieved. According to El-Sagheer, they have successfully changed the customer’s 
behaviour and experience. He also feels that this change has given them a 
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competitive edge, because they are the first network to deploy messages in “slang”. 
El-Sagheer notes that they have been receiving positive feedback from customers 
saying that they like the new messages and the female voice. If customers complain 
that they don’t understand a specific message, VE replace it with a simpler message.  
I asked El-Sagheer if they received negative feedback over the replacement of the old 
messages. Surprisingly, the negative feedback they received was in relation to the 
English messages: some customers commented on the grammaticality or vocabulary 
of the new English messages! El-Sagheer explains that they never had a problem with 
their old English messages (which are used by 5% of their customers, including 
expatriates), but they had to be changed to match the new Arabic messages. He also 
notes that they have some product names in (Egyptian) Arabic, like ḥakāwī kul yōm 
(stories everyday) which they could not translate literally in the English IVRs. He says 
that customers using the English IVR (and who don’t understand Arabic) can 
sometimes be taken aback when they hear a string of words in Arabic such as this.  
On the flip side, VE also has its English product names, such as ‘mini-call’, which are 
not translated in the Arabic messages. I asked El-Sagheer if customers with lesser 
education struggle with these terms. He provided the same reasoning, that these are 
product names which they expect the customer to learn. He notes however that 
customers often refer to these products using their own terms. For instance, many 
customers refer to a “USB modem” as ṣubāʿ el-net (literally, Internet finger). 
Similarly, customers will understand what is meant by the term GPRS, but will often 
refer to it themselves as gapris. El-Sagheer notes that this is another way they have 
influenced customer behaviour: by using the English product name they are forcing 
the customer to learn it, and even if they have their own way of referring to the 
product, what matters is that they recognise what is being referred to. 
El-Sagheer also mentions that the messages sent out to their customers are either 
“slang” Arabic or “Franco-Arab” (English mixed with Arabic in Latin script particularly 
for product names), (cf. Section ‎1.1). While the majority of messages they send are in 
Arabic, he notes that many customers opt to receive the latter – even though they 
are not “foreigners” – because they prefer them to the Arabic messages. It could be 
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argued that the adoption of these LA messages, like the use of ʿāmmiyya, is a 
reflection of wider changes in the language community. Indeed, when I asked El-
Sagheer if he feels that they have contributed towards a wider change where “slang” 
is becoming more widely acceptable, he responds: 
‎SEG18: Well, we went with the\ “cope with the change”. That is, we found that this is what 
people wanted. And we are supposed to be a company which provides services […] 
so I have to know the customer’s needs and fulfil them. So, this issue had already 
started to spread and spread - this issue of slang - even on Facebook, on mobile 
text messages: all of that was in slang. So we had to cope; we can’t be walking in 
one direction while people are walking in an entirely different direction. So maybe 
we contributed to this change, I mean, as part of that change, but the change was 
already happening. 
4.5 Arabic Language Conservation Societies (ALCSs) 
So far, the interviews above have presented the standpoint of what I have termed 
agents of change; that is, groups and individuals who have either directly contributed 
to or have a vested interest in changing the language situation in favour of ʿāmmiyya. 
This section presents the findings from the focus group interview with three ALCSs. 
As resisters of change, these groups have a vested interest in preserving the role and 
status of fuṣḥā, and hence present the view from the opposite side of the spectrum. 
The three groups represented in the interview were (as described by their 
representatives): 
x Jamʿiyyat Lisān al-ʿarab (Arabs’ Tongue Society, henceforth ATS): 
Established in 1992, the society organises various activities aimed at promoting 
the Arabic language (that is, fuṣḥā). This includes an annual conference – 
described as ‘an Arab cultural and linguistic demonstration’ (taẓāhura luġawiyya 
ṯaqāfiyya ʿarabiyya) – at the LAS general headquarters, in which more than 50 
researchers from the Arab World and some Islamic countries participate. The 
activities also include organising an annual competition commemorating 
International Mother Language Day under the auspices of the UNESCO and in 
partnership with the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Higher Education. 
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Notably, the society sought to move the affiliation of the Arabic Language 
Academy from the Ministry of Higher education to the direct control of the 
president or the prime minister. The society has more than 200 members, most of 
whom are not Arabic language specialists. The society was represented in the 
focus group interview by Fawzy Tag El-Din, the society’s media consultant. 
At 61, Tag El-Din was notably older than the other two representatives. He 
voluntarily shares information about himself, constructing an identity which goes 
hand in hand with his views about Arabic. In 2005, he presented his papers as a 
candidate in the presidential elections. He says ‘I am not even fit to be president 
of a club in a popular neighbourhood’ (anā lā aṣluḥ li-riʾāsat ḥattā wa-law nādī fī 
ḥāra šaʿbiyya), but he presented his papers ‘because of [the strength of] his Arabic 
language’ (bisabab luġatī al-ʿarabiyya). His candidacy was therefore more of a 
public statement about the state of Arabic44. He states that his main objective was 
to move the affiliation of the Arabic Language Academy from the ‘foreignised 
Ministry’ (wezāra xawagātī) of Higher Education to the presidency. 
x Jamʿiyyat Ḥumāt al-Luġa al-ʿarabiyya (Society of the Protectors of the Arabic 
Language, henceforth SPAL): 
SPAL was established in 2000 and is the second oldest ALCS in Egypt after ATS. It 
was established by a prominent radio host, Tahir Abu Zeid, who was famous for 
his concern for the Arabic language45, which explains why many of the members 
are media personalities (particularly of the older generation). The society has 
about 400 members including specialists and non-specialists. The society holds 
semi-monthly seminars, in addition to organising conferences in partnership with 
different bodies such as the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Education and the 
Ministry of Higher Education. They also organise competitions aimed at 
encouraging teachers and students to care for Arabic, and published a book titled 
                                                             
44 Tag El-Din came to the interview with a photocopy of a newspaper clipping containing an interview 
that was conducted with him in light of his candidacy. It was clear that this interview he shared was 
used as an opportunity to focus on the Arabic language. 
45 Tahir Abu Zeid died in January 2011, aged 88. Al-Wafd newspaper eulogised him with a piece titled 
wafāt ḥāmī al-luġa al-ʿarabiyya ṭāhir abu zēd (The Death of the Protector of the Arabic Language, 
Tahir Abu Zeid), (Al-Wafd, 2011). 
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ʿasal al-naḥw (Grammar’s Honey) to this end. Members of the society who work 
in the media use their professional capacity to talk or write about (fuṣḥā) Arabic, 
which includes commending efforts to promote or preserve it, and criticising 
actions which undermine it. The society also liaises with other ALCSs inside and 
outside Egypt and honours public personalities with a concern for the Arabic 
language. The society was represented in the interview by Mohamad Salah, who is 
a member of the society’s board of directors. 
x Jamʿiyyat al-Mutarjimīn wa-l-Luġawwiyīn al-Miṣriyyīn (Egyptian Translators and 
Linguists Society, henceforth ETLS): 
ETLS was officially established in 2006, and has over 2000 members (mainly 
translators). The society was represented in the interview by its president, 
Hussam El-Din Mustafa. Noting that there is no syndicate or professional code for 
translators in Egypt, Mustafa states that the society was formed as a coalition for 
translators seeking to establish and promote the professional standards of 
translation, and to find solutions for the problems faced by translators. The 
society’s concern with the Arabic language stems from it being at the centre of 
their profession, either as a source or target language. Mustafa notes that Arabic 
to them is a matter of ‘national security’, whether Arab or Egyptian, which is why 
they have taken a ‘military approach’ (manḥā ʿaskarī) to protecting it. That is, he 
says that unlike other ALCSs which work from the inside outwards and focus on 
defensive strategies, ETLS have shifted their activities to the offensive by running 
Arabic language courses for non-speakers of Arabic. Mustafa says that he has 
found that one of the main factors which lead to the deterioration of Arabic and 
the crisis it is facing is the incursion of foreign languages, which is why their 
offensive strategy focuses on teaching Arabic to ‘those who seek to disfigure the 
[Arabic] language or influence it’ (ellī beyasʿū le-tašwīh el-luġa aw el-taʾṯīr ʿalēhā). 
Throughout the duration of the interview, Tag El-Din spoke almost exclusively in 
fuṣḥā (often complete with case endings). Even when he resorted to ʿāmmiyya, he 
would flag this switch, for example by saying ʿafwan (excuse me). Indeed, at the 
beginning of the interview, Mustafa, whose turn to speak followed Tag El-Din 
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remarks that ‘it is a problem to speak after someone who speaks in fuṣḥā’ (muškila 
ennik tetkallemī baʿd ḥad beyitkallim fuṣḥā), implying that he cannot match Tag El-
Din’s ability to speak fuṣḥā consistently. Salah also spoke mostly in fuṣḥā with 
occasional switches to ʿāmmiyya, but only rarely used case endings. Mustafa on the 
other hand spoke in a mixture of fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya with a few flagged English 
words or expressions which were immediately preceded or followed by the Arabic 
translation. It is worth noting that all three interviewees frequently write in 
newspapers, appear in the media and participate in various cultural forums with 
respect to their concern for the Arabic language. 
At the beginning of the interview, I asked the representatives of the three ALCSs to 
define Egyptian ʿāmmiyya. These were their answers: 
‎SEG19: Tag El-Din: ʿāmmiyya is a dialect and not a language, because a language has 
written and known [grammar] rules. It is not ʿāmmiyya only, all of the languages of 
the world have a dialect. The ʿāmmiyya dialect is the most famous of all the Arabic 
ʿāmmiyyas, owing perhaps to Egyptian art which entered these countries in an 
early period and that most of those artists came to Egypt and became famous in 
Cairo, so [Egyptian] ʿāmmiyya spread as a result. ʿāmmiyya is considered one of the 
components of the language of journalism because […] the language of 
contemporary journalism is the third language; it is more elevated than ʿāmmiyya 
and lower than fuṣḥā; it is in between them. 
‎SEG20: Salah: My opinion is that Egyptian ʿāmmiyya is a level among the levels of the 
language, and it is a legitimate daughter of the Arabic fuṣḥā language. […] My 
definition of the ʿāmmiyya dialect is that it is used in public life at the popular level, 
away from the official level and official communication. 
‎SEG21: Mustafa: ʿāmmiyya to me is a way of escaping the problematic issues that one 
might fall into which are dictated by fuṣḥā in terms of adhering to the rules of the 
language, to a certain level of rhetoric, to certain principles of pronunciation. So to 
a certain extent ʿāmmiyya represents the escape exit from all of these restrictions, 
if they may be called restrictions. Indeed they are rules, but they have become 
restricting rules, so that it is difficult to interact using them over different social 
levels. Hence ʿāmmiyya has become for everyone a compromise […] as a means of 
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communication which could link between groups and sectors of society with 
different cultural levels and social standing. 
While all three definitions communicate a perceived inferiority of ʿāmmiyya, there 
are significant disparities: First, it is important to note how the three representatives 
refer to ʿāmmiyya. Tag El-Din explicitly states that ʿāmmiyya is a dialect and not a 
language, and Salah similarly uses the label ‘dialect’ to refer to it. Out of the three, 
Mustafa is the only one who refers to ʿāmmiyya as a language (although this does 
not occur in this particular segment). It is also significant that Salah describes 
ʿāmmiyya as ‘the legitimate daughter of fuṣḥā’, employing the same metaphor of 
parenthood which was used by LEP’s Gamal El-Din when he stated that ʿāmmiyya 
was the daughter of ancient Egyptian languages. Tag El-Din refers to an intermediate 
variety used in journalism which is ‘higher than ʿāmmiyya but lower than fuṣḥā’ and 
refers to this as ‘the third language’. 
The notion that ʿāmmiyya is a dialect while fuṣḥā is a language invokes the topoi of 
authenticity and superiority simultaneously: ʿāmmiyya is inferior to fuṣḥā because it 
is not codified; it is not a ‘real’ language like fuṣḥā. Similarly, Mustafa’s statement 
that ʿāmmiyya links different classes of society – whether he intended it or not – 
invokes the topos of unity. Moreover, the myth that all the world’s languages have a 
standard and colloquial comparable to fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya normalises diglossia. It is 
worth noting that the same myth is expressed by LEP’s Gamal El-Din. 
Noting the spread of ʿāmmiyya in recent years, the representatives of the ALCSs cite 
a number of reasons for this. Salah states that media, both public and private often 
reinforce the use of ʿāmmiyya particularly in programs or magazines directed at 
youths, ‘and it’s not [even] the elevated ʿāmmiyya dialect or the so-called ʿāmmiyya 
of the educated, but […] a ʿāmmiyya much lower than the desired and required level’ 
(‎SEG22). Salah also blames educational institutions for this ‘bad phenomenon’ 
(ẓāhira sayyiʾa), pointing to the poor standards of Arabic teaching, particularly in the 
early stages of education. He adds that universities also share part of the blame, 
where professors – even of Arabic language – rarely speak in ‘sound Arabic’ (luġa 
ʿarabiyya salīma). A third reason that Salah gives is the ‘deterioration of general taste 
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in the Egyptian street’ (inḥidār aḏ-ḏawq al-ʿām fi l-šāriʿ al-maṣrī) which has led to the 
prevalence of ʿāmmiyya and making those who use fuṣḥā, even at its easiest level, 
subject to ridicule. 
The main reason that Mustafa cites behind the spreading use of ʿāmmiyya is the 
reconfiguration of social classes (at-taġayyur fī ṭabaqāt el-mugtamaʿ). He notes that 
there was a time when speaking fuṣḥā was a sign of respect and dignity (ʿalāma min 
ʿalāmāt el-iḥtirām w-el-waqār). This was a time when the “well-educated” owned the 
economic capital in society. However, when the societal make-up changed (with the 
1952 revolution/coup), a class of people who had little or no education got rich very 
quickly. These people now owned the economic capital in society – which is linked to 
all kinds of domination imaginable – from public taste to lifestyle, and this extended 
to language. Hence, ʿāmmiyya – as the language of the less educated – started to 
dominate because it was the language of the economically dominant class. He adds 
that the average class of society has become the uncultured class, that is, people 
who sometimes haven’t completed intermediate education, and therefore don’t 
have a foundation to enable them to speak in fuṣḥā. Hence, using fuṣḥā – even at an 
easy or flexible level – is deteriorating. He adds that art plays a role in this 
deterioration, noting that a few generations ago, songs would be composed in fuṣḥā 
or a mixture of fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya, but now they have reached the ‘lowest level of 
ʿāmmiyya language’ (adnā mustawayyāt el-luġa el-ʿāmmiyya).  
Another reason that Mustafa cites is to avoid making mistakes in fuṣḥā, he says 
‘someone like me […] is afraid to commit a linguistic aberration and face disgrace in 
his academic position as a result’, and so uses ʿāmmiyya as a language of 
communication. Mustafa adds that ‘fuṣḥā has now become confined to the elite, and 
has therefore become something disregarded […] and it has sometimes come to be 
considered a kind of condescension’ (‎SEG23). Mustafa’s use of the term ‘elite’ 
(nuxba) here is worth noting. This elite is clearly different from the economic elite he 
described – those who don’t speak fuṣḥā and influence public taste. This is relevant 
to my discussion of the notion of multiple elites in Section ‎6.3.  
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On the other hand, Tag El-Din cites an example which goes counter to the prevalent 
trend of the expanding use of ʿāmmiyya: 
‎SEG24:  [in] metro stations, a few years ago [the announcer] used to pronounce in 
ʿāmmiyya and in a sound which disturbed the commuter, so that instead of moving 
away from the pavement, they moved closer to it. But when I [now] listen to a 
(female) announcer with a voice which is beautiful, musical, etc, speaking in 
beautifully melodious fuṣḥā… I am one of the people, in honesty, I go to the metro 
stations, not to take the metro, but to listen to [the] sound\ I even thought initially 
that it was a woman sitting [there] and I requested to thank her, [but] it turned out 
that it was an audio recording and this was amusing. 
This account demonstrates how, as in previous interviews, opinions of ʿāmmiyya are 
tied to opinions of fuṣḥā. A number of rationalised evaluations are presented to 
assert the superiority of fuṣḥā. Tag El-Din associates fuṣḥā with beauty and melody, 
whereas ʿāmmiyya is associated with unpleasantness and even unintelligibility. He 
adds that fuṣḥā is a language of beauty and elegance (gamāl wa-riqqa) as well as 
brevity and economy (ixtiṣār wa-iqtiṣād). He also states that ‘the Arabic language is 
the only language […] where all the letters or sounds exist’ (al-luġa l-ʿarabiyya hiyya 
l-luġa l-waḥīda […] ellī gamīʿ el-ḥurūf aw el-aṣwāt mawgūda guwwāhā). Similarly, 
Mustafa states that ‘the Arabic language [fuṣḥā] is the richest language on the 
surface of the Earth’ (al-luġa al-ʿarabiyya aṯrā luġa ʿalā wagh el-arḍ); that is, there is 
no other language where you can form a root out of two letters. All of the above 
evaluations invoke the topos of superiority where fuṣḥā is endowed with superior 
qualities of which ʿāmmiyya and other languages are deficient (cf. Section ‎3.3.1). 
Tag El-Din also invokes the topos of unity, stating that fuṣḥā is what ‘unites all Arabs’. 
He elaborates: ‘if the Arabs sat in a closed room like this one, and each spoke their 
language, the proportion of understanding will be 30-40% […] but when someone 
speaks in fuṣḥā, everyone will understand’ ( SEG25). In the same vein, Mustafa 
compares language to religion, stating that fuṣḥā is ‘the foundation which unites’ (el-
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asās ellī beyegmaʿ) speakers of different dialects of Arabic, anything beyond this 
foundation is igtihād46. He says: 
 SEG26: ʿāmmiyya language [note the label ‘language’] is a language of communication; one 
of the codes of communication, but I absolutely cannot make it a standard or a 
basis or a language of unity. […]ʿāmmiyya to me is a language of igtihād, a kind of 
agreed signs; phonetic signs which became current among a [small] group and then 
spread and were transferred from individual to group, and so on and so forth. 
Mustafa elaborates by likening fuṣḥā to a tree: ‘it has roots, it is easily classified, has 
known origins and a known history: we know how this seed was planted here and 
who watered it’ (līhā guzūr w-sahl inn anā aṣannafhā w-maʿrūf aṣlahā w-maʿrūf 
tārixhā: el-bezra dī etbazaret hina ezzay w-mīn ellī rawāhā). ʿāmmiyya on the other 
hand is a weed: it may look like a plant and behave like it, but it has very limited 
utility. This metaphor does not only transport the superiority of fuṣḥā, but also 
invokes the topos of competition by painting the image of the tree and the weed 
which compete for resources (speakers). In addition, the fact that fuṣḥā is compared 
to a real tree while ʿāmmiyya is denied this status invokes the topos of authenticity 
again, where fuṣḥā is considered a real language but ʿāmmiyya isn’t. 
The idea of the ‘rootedness’ of fuṣḥā also invokes the topoi of purity and continuity. 
Mustafa elaborates that, ‘no matter how profuse a word in fuṣḥā is, and no matter 
how wide its expressive scope, it is governed [by rules of interpretation]’ (mahmā 
kānet jazālat el-lafẓ, w-mahmā kān muḥtawāh ed-dalālī kebīr, lākinnu maḥkūm), 
whereas in ʿāmmiyya ‘everyone interprets as they please’ (kul wāḥid yefassar ʿalā 
kēfu). Similarly, while in fuṣḥā you can trace the roots of a word to the Arab tribe 
where it originated, Mustafa jokes that in ʿāmmiyya if perchance someone – 
‘because they have taken out a tooth – produces a distorted pronunciation of [a 
word], it enters the lexicon’ (ʿašān xāliʿ ḍirs naṭaʾhā maʿwūg, bitxušš guwwa el-
muḥtawā el-luġawī)! It is this which leads Mustafa to consider ʿāmmiyya ‘one of the 
grave threats to the language, because one day you will be unable to distinguish 
between that which is fuṣḥā [eloquent] and that which is not fuṣḥā, and what the 
                                                             
46 Igtihād (MSA: Ijtihād) is a religious concept in Islam, referring to the efforts of religious scholars to 
derive rulings based on independent study and interpretation of the Quran and prophetic traditions. 
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measure of fuṣḥā-ness (faṣāḥa) is. Is it the prevalence of use? Is it the expressive 
capacity? Is it the origin? Is it the conjugation?’ ( SEG27).  
Mustafa elaborates on another aspect of the ‘threat’ of ʿāmmiyya, this time invoking 
the topos of conspiracy. Commenting on the link between ʿāmmiyya and Egyptian 
separatism, he refers to a ‘they’ who are aiming to divide peoples of the Arab World 
into smaller and smaller groups without explicitly naming who ‘they’ refers to. The 
strategy employed, he says, is to make each group feel different and superior – or 
persecuted – by playing on race, tribalism, special interests, etc. so that they would 
seek separation and independence. For instance, Egyptians are encouraged to seek 
separation from Arabs through claims such as ‘you are the pharaohs! Look at that 
statue; it resembles you. Look at the tanned colour of the Nile; it resembles you. You 
have your language. […] Those Caucasians you see in Egypt […] were brought by Amr 
ibn Al-‘as47 on camels’ backs! They are not Egyptian’ ( SEG28). Acknowledging that 
these separatist inclinations are common in Egyptian society today, Mustafa says:  
 SEG29: There was no way that you would one day see – as I’m sure you’ve learned – that 
you would hear in the days of Gamal Abdel Nasser – I mean the period of course, 
not that Abdel Nasser was the prophet of qawmiyya, but in that period what was 
the [popular] song? “The Earth Speaks Arabic” (el-arḍ btetkallim ʿarabī’) – there 
was no way that Egypt would quarrel with Algeria over some [foot]ball. But what 
happened after the football quarrel? “You are the country of the I-don’t-know-
how-many so-and-so” of course, it was no longer ‘martyr’48, it was any other 
[derogatory] word. “You? Who are you? You are [enemy] agents and Zionists, sons 
of so-and-so” – that’s in reference to Egyptians. So the rift began to grow deeper. 
Now they can’t find something to play on; at the end of the day if he places me 
next to an Algerian and neither of us spoke you would say that we were brothers: 
the same appearance, the same height, the same hair and the same colour. And if 
the call to prayer (āḏān) sounds you might find us both getting up to pray. So how 
do you separate us? With language. With dialect. If the Algerian speaks with some 
of that French they use [he will say] “look, isn’t that who you call my brother in 
                                                             
47 ʿamr ibn el-ʿāṣ was the leader of the Muslim troops which brought Islam to Egypt in 640 AD (cf. 
Section ‎2.3) 
48 Algeria is commonly referred to in the Arab World as “the country of the million and a half martyrs” 




Arabness [ʿurūba]? There you go mate, three quarters of his speech is in French!” 
[…] So now they are playing on the element of the Orange Revolution in its worst 
form – based on what? On racism. 
Mustafa uses the term nazʿa istiqlāliyya (inclination for independence) to describe 
the goal of such conspiracies. He also draws an analogy between the disintegration 
of the Arab World and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (hence the reference to 
the Orange Revolution). This choice of analogy and terminology is interesting 
because it is applied to the already independent countries of the Arab World. This 
suggests how powerful and deeply rooted the concept of the ‘Arab nation’ is even 
though it is an ideological rather than physical entity (cf. Section  3.3.2.2). Mustafa’s 
account romanticises the Nasserite era as a ‘golden age’ for the Arabic language and 
Arab nationalism. This is contrasted with the present situation where an apparent 
conspiracy exists to divide the peoples of the Arab World. In the segment above, the 
‘conspirers’ are referred to vaguely using a range of pronouns (underlined with a 
wavy line), although the reference “my brother” suggests that Mustafa’s perceived 
conspiracy is not external.  
This inference is supported by Tag El-Din’s statement, which follows Mustafa’s: ‘I will 
rule out conspiracy; the conspiracy this time is from the inside not the outside. That 
is, conspiracy exists but the source has changed’. He adds, ‘we are obsessed with 
copying the West even after the West have left’ ( SEG30). To Tag El-Din, the rise of 
national languages based on regional dialects of Arabic is not only a national threat, 
but a religious one: ‘the fear is also that if the ʿāmmiyyas triumphed and became a 
codified language or a written language, I ask this; what will we do with the Quran?’. 
He adds that ‘turning these ʿāmmiyyas into languages – so that we have the Egyptian 
language and the Tunisian language and so on and so forth; twenty or twenty-two 
languages – this would be a catastrophe. Why? Because the single noble Quran will 
be finished!’ ( SEG31). While Tag El-Din’s argument proceeds under the topos of unity 
invoked by Mustafa, the war metaphor transported by the use of the word 
‘triumphed’ (intaṣarit) is a clear invocation of the topos of competition. 
Mustafa elaborates on this latter point stating ‘the [inimitable] wonder of the Quran 
lies in its text’ (iʿgāz el-qurʾān nafsu fī lafẓu), (cf. Section  3.3.1.1). ‘Just chanting the 
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Quran in recitation’ (mugarrad enn anā aʿʿud atarannam bi-telāwat al-qurʾān) before 
someone who does not understand Arabic ‘is a wonder in itself’ (dī iʿgāz le-
waḥdahā). He therefore says that when sacred texts like the Quran are translated, 
what is translated is the ‘content’; the ‘concepts’; the ‘meaning’. Nevertheless, he is 
adamant that the Quran cannot be translated into ʿāmmiyya ‘because it is not an 
alternative, foreign or different language’ (laʾenn dī miš luġa badīla, miš luġa 
agnabeyya, miš luġa muxālfa). He adds: 
 SEG32: ʿāmmiyya is not a language of translation. Maybe, maybe it could be a language of 
interpretation; a language of explanation; of simplification; but of translation? No. 
When I translate the noble Quran into the English language, I don’t simplify it. 
Why? Because interpretation or simplification is a complex level of language that I 
achieve through a lower level using words and synonyms. […] that’s for 
interpretation. But to translate, [this involves] finding an equivalent term – with the 
same meaning, the same connotation, and the same associative value – and then 
work with that. 
The reasons that Mustafa gives for the impossibility of translating the Quran into 
ʿāmmiyya are significant. By stating that ʿāmmiyya is not a different or alternative 
language, he is essentially saying that ʿāmmiyya and fuṣḥā are [levels of] the same 
language. The other reason he gives is that ʿāmmiyya is considered a level of 
simplification; that it is not possible to capture the same connotations transported in 
fuṣḥā via ʿāmmiyya. This resonates with the difficulties expressed by VE’s El-Sagheer 
when he recounted the challenge of ‘translating’ the IVR messages into ‘slang’ 
without sounding vulgar (cf. Section  4.4).  
Indeed, Tag El-Din goes a step further than Mustafa by stating that ʿāmmiyya itself is 
untranslatable. What is to be feared if ʿāmmiyya is codified or used in creative 
writing or science, he says, is that ‘in this case, it will not be translated’ (fī hāzihi l-
ḥāla lan tutargam). Mustafa himself does not say that ʿāmmiyya is untranslatable, 
but notes that the problem with translating it is that the translator must find, not 
only an equivalent term in the target language, but also an ‘equivalent linguistic 
level’ (mustawā luġawī mukāfiʾ) which does not exist in the target culture. This ties in 
with the indexes of fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya which I discuss in Section  6.4. 
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It is worth noting that all three ALCS representatives hedge their criticism of 
ʿāmmiyya by emphasising that they are not opposed to ʿāmmiyya. For instance, 
Mustafa – despite the very serious picture he paints of the ‘threat’ of ʿāmmiyya – 
says: ‘I am not against\ I am not a hater of ʿāmmiyya’ (anā miš ḍid\ anā miš kārih lel-
ʿāmmiyya), but the problem with it is that it removes us from ‘the foundation of 
communication, which is the original language’ (aṣl el-tawāṣul, ellī huwwa el-luġa el-
aṣliyya). Similarly, Tag El-Din says ‘we are not against ʿāmmiyya’ (naḥnu lasnā ḍid el-
ʿāmmiyya), ‘but that ʿāmmiyya becomes a language of writing and creativity is the 
dangerous issue’ (lākin an tuṣbiḥ luġat kitāba wa-ibdāʿ hāzā huwwa al-amr al-xaṭīr). 
Indeed, he goes as far as to say that creativity (ibdāʿ) – whether scientific or literary – 
if written in ʿāmmiyya, ceases to be creativity. On the other hand, while SPAL’s Salah 
(who had mostly remained silent while Mustafa and Tag El-Din expressed 
unfavourable views of ʿāmmiyya) also uses the ‘I’m not against ʿāmmiyya, but…’ 
hedge, he is more equivocal in his view: 
 SEG33: I am not against fuṣḥā and I am not against ʿāmmiyya. I lean more towards fuṣḥā 
than ʿāmmiyya, but ‘every context has its appropriate speech’ [Arabic idiom]. Fuṣḥā 
language has its level, and ʿāmmiyya language has its level, but with conditions […] I 
am opposed to ʿāmmiyya language\ dialect becoming a language of writing, but I 
also agree that it becomes a language of creativity. I mean, creativity in ʿāmmiyya 
language\ dialect is needed because it also has its expressive fields and its required 
creative and indicational capacities. And creativity in fuṣḥā also has the same. And 
each of these literary genres, or each linguistic level of literary creativity, has its 
audience and has those who receive it or have a taste for it. 
Salah’s inconsistent use of the labels ‘language’ (luġa) and ‘dialect’ (lahga) to refer to 
ʿāmmiyya is worth noting. While, his two repairs suggest that ‘dialect’ is the target, 
and that uses of ‘language’ are mere lapses, it also raises the question of whether 
ʿāmmiyya is being deliberately relegated to dialect status in the context of this 
discussion due to the symbolic loadings associated with these two labels. This is 
interesting because Mustafa, who adopts a more hard-line position against ʿāmmiyya 
compared to Salah, consistently refers to ʿāmmiyya as a language throughout the 
interview. This would suggest that the choice between these two labels is not 
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necessarily an accurate indication of the speaker’s ideological position vis-à-vis the 
status of fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya.  
Although Salah states that he is against the ‘codification of ʿāmmiyya’ (taqnīn el-
ʾāmmiyya), he believes that if ʿāmmiyya ‘occupied its proper place in Egyptian 
society’ (axazat waḍʿahā as-salīm fi l-mugtammaʿ al-miṣrī), ‘it could be a good form 
of language’ (yumkin an takūn šaklan gayyidan min aškāl al-luġa). The essential 
criterion is the conditions of the use of ʿāmmiyya. However, Salah is still ardent in his 
pro-fuṣḥā stance. He states that instead of calling for the codification of ʿāmmiyya, 
we should call for the simplification of Arabic language teaching and regulate the use 
of fuṣḥā in the media and enforce the laws which govern this. For instance, he notes 
that in 1958 a law was issued to ensure that the names of shops, companies and 
organisations are in Arabic, but this law has never been enforced. Salah adds that a 
minister of Supply and Internal Trade in the 1990s tried to enforce this law, but he 
was faced with severe opposition, and it is said that he was ultimately removed from 
his position because of his concern for the Arabic language. 
Despite the strong views expressed by the ALCS representatives against the 
‘incursions’ of ʿāmmiyya, it is when the incursion of foreign languages is addressed 
that these views become very passionate. ʿāmmiyya in comparison is the lesser of 
the two evils. Indeed, referring to the growing use of Latinised Arabic, Tag El-Din 
remarks that ‘the disaster of ʿāmmiyya is much more bearable than the disaster of 
writing in non-Arabic letters’ (muṣībat al-ʿāmmiyya arḥam bi-kasīr min muṣībat al-
kitāba bi-ḥurūf ġēr ʿarabiyya). He says ‘this is really a catastrophe’ (dī karsa ḥaʾīʾī), 
and that ‘the goal is to move us away from the constitution of the noble Quran’ (el-
hadaf ibʿadnā ʿan dustūr el-qurʾān el-karīm). Again, Islam is portrayed as being under 
threat and the topos of conspiracy is invoked once more. 
Accounting for the spread of English and the use of Latin characters to write Arabic, 
Mustafa reasons that there are deep historical roots. He says that Egypt was 
occupied by foreigners for thousands of years, which has created a complex inside 
the Egyptian personality; ‘an inclination to obey the white race; that all that is foreign 
is sacred’ (el-mēl li-l-inṣiyāʿ li-l-gins el-abyaḍ; enn kul mā huwa agnabī fa-huwa 
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muqaddas). By extension, everything which is received from the ‘white man’ – be it 
culture, art, fashion, food, speech habits, etc. – is also sacred. That is, occupation has 
been transferred from the level of physical military occupation to ‘intellectual 
occupation’ (iḥtilāl fikrī). Even though Britain has left with its troops, Mustafa says, ‘it 
left an educational system, it left cultural residues, it left social systems, it left 
principles which persuaded the Egyptian people that […] to be advanced, the concept 
of modernity is bound to the concept of alienation, I [have to] borrow from the West’ 
( SEG34). Incidentally, the point Mustafa makes echoes Diem (1974, cited in Mejdell, 
2006) who refers to Arabs’ conviction of their inferiority and the superiority of 
Western culture evidenced in parents preferring to teach their children European 
languages – a view which Mejdell deems both reductionist and Orientalist.  
According to Mustafa, part of the colonial legacy that the West left in Egypt is that 
scientific advancement is restricted to the West without any acknowledgment of the 
scientific contributions that Arabs made in the past, which created an inferiority 
complex in the Egyptian mind. ‘My credit [of knowledge] has become zero, so I 
became an importer; I became mentally and intellectually drained, and I started to 
import ideas’, he says, ‘until I reached a level of emptiness where I started to import 
the language’ ( SEG35). Mustafa notes that the associations between foreign 
languages and modernity are mirrored in associating Arabic with tradition and 
antiquity, and in parallel evaluations of people who speak these languages: 
 SEG36: Now the synonym of culture, the synonym of a person being [deemed] educated, is 
blending with Western culture. That is, when someone like my brother Dr 
Muhammad Gamaly49 sits next to me, a man who – masha’Allah!50 – is well-versed 
in the grammar of the Arabic language and has memorised the treasures of [Arabic] 
heritage and the mothers of books (i.e. classical references), etc. – there is no way 
that I would call him cultured, civilised, etc. I will describe him as a Sheikh-like 
fellow (mistašyax); an outdated fellow (antīka); an old-fashioned fellow (meʿattaʾ). 
But if he then spoke to me with three-four foreign words, [I will say] “Wow! This 
guy is in close touch with modern Western thinking”. So, here in Egypt specifically, 
                                                             
49 In reference to SPAL’s Muhammad Salah. 
50 Arabic expletive used to express admiration (literally: behold God’s will!) 
149 
 
blending with the West, keeping in pace with the West, or emulating the West 
have become a sign of modernity. 
Mustafa also invokes the topos of conspiracy when he refers to the cultural influence 
of foreign languages (more specifically English). He notes that satellite channels have 
contributed to the spread of foreign language use; that TV hosts often mix Arabic 
with English in their speech. Indeed even the names of many of these channels are in 
English, because ‘we have grown accustomed that anything good must be stamped 
with a foreign stamp’. ‘Of course, [the person] from outside giving me this, is not 
giving me to build my character the way I want it to become,’ Mustafa says, ‘no, he 
wants to build my character the way he wants it’. He adds, ‘If I am not comparable to 
him then at least I am aligned with him in the same direction’ ( SEG37). Again, 
Mustafa refers to an ambiguous other (‘he’) who is understood to be working against 
the interests of Egyptians, but significantly, this time the other is clearly from 
‘outside’ (barra). 
Foreign language schools and universities in particular are seen as a direct threat to 
the Arabic language. Tag El-Din recounts how when his granddaughter applied for a 
place in a ‘language’ school (cf. Section  3.4), her parents had to be interviewed (in 
English) to ensure that they met the school’s standards. They were even instructed 
to speak English at home. Tag El-Din considers this a threat because it undermines 
the child’s Arabic linguistic foundation. Foreign languages are also deemed a threat 
to the Arab[ic] moral system; language is the vessel through which the moral values 
of the West are transported. Mustafa notes that the English language introduces 
words such as ‘boyfriend’ and ‘girlfriend’ which are not translatable into Arabic 
because the concept itself does not exist in Arab culture. Similarly, Tag El-Din 
expresses his offence at attending a theatrical performance at a ‘foreign’ university 
in Cairo because the subject matter of the performance (which took place in English) 
dealt too openly with intimate sexual relations. Tag El-Din considers this ‘toying with 
religion’ (ʿabaṯ b-ed-dīn), and asks, ‘Isn’t this targeted?’ (alysa hāzā mustahdafan?). 
His opinion is that part of the mission of these universities – next to spreading and 
reinforcing foreign languages – is to corrupt the moral fabric of Arab society. The 
idea of the inseparability of language and culture resonates closely with the point 
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made by Malamih’s El-Sharkawi about the appropriateness of topics dealt with in 
English and Arabic respectively.  
Mustafa notes that this spread of foreign languages and Western values has resulted 
in an identity crisis, where ‘my belonging is no longer to my country or to my 
language or to anything’ (intimāʾī ma-baʾāš le-baladī wa-la le-luġatī wa-la le-ay 
ḥāga). Mustafa notes that it is this fear of the influence of globalisation which has 
triggered an increased concern for the Arabic language as well as Arabicisation as a 
protective, defensive measure: 
 SEG38: This globalisation has triggered something else. What is it? A fear and horror, based 
on which a kind of opposite reaction has started to emerge. In what [form]? In that, 
out of my great fear I started to do what I should have done some time ago; I now 
started to call for Arabicisation, I started to call for the preservation of the Arabic 
language. Because the content of globalisation, to me, is coming to me like a 
monster, so we feared that we might be colonised once more. Don’t think all that is 
happening now in terms of concern for Arabicisation and concern for protecting 
the Arabic language and all that is out of concern for the language. No, we have 
been concerned for the language since the days… we shall say since the days of the 
noble Quran. But why did it increase? Because I am now faced with a monster, I 
don’t know what [part] of me it wants to devour. So now I started to cling to what? 
I started to cling to my identities.   
Hence, according to Mustafa, it is fear of the ‘monster’ (ġūl) of globalisation and fear 
of the loss of identities (which is significantly expressed in the plural) which triggered 
the establishment of several ALCSs in recent years (Salah notes that his society 
counted 26 ALCSs in the world in their latest survey). This increased protectiveness 
may not ‘restore the Arabic language (fuṣḥā) to its former position in the lead’, 
Mustafa says, ‘but it will at least protect it from declining and assert its endurance’ 
( SEG39).  
Salah is more sceptical, noting the need for cooperation and coordination between 
the ALCSs and their lack of resources. He also points to the many shortcomings in the 
Arabic Language Academy in Egypt (cf. Section  3.2.3). He explains that he attends the 
Academy’s conference almost every year, and every year it is the same people 
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talking about the same things. The Academy’s projects take an unreasonably long 
time to accomplish – Salah cites a historical dictionary which has been forty years in 
the making. Moreover, the Academy is dominated by members of the old generation 
(the youngest member being over seventy) and women are not allowed into the 
Academy. Salah notes the need for new blood and for engagement with modern 
technology within the Academy.  
Tag El-Din reiterates this point, stating that the Academy is ‘sacred’ (muqaddas); it 
does not allow anyone to come near (lā yasmaḥ le-aḥad be-l-iqterāb). He agrees that 
the Academy needs more resources and power. He notes that part of his 2005 
‘presidential campaign’ included moving the affiliation of the Arabic Academy to the 
presidential office like other organisations such as the National Council for Childhood 
and Motherhood. He says that in these organisations ‘if a decision is made at 9am it 
is fully implemented at 9am, and if the cost of that decision is ten piasters, a hundred 
piasters will be allocated to it’. He notes that in 2008, a presidential decree ruled that 
the Arabic Academy became the highest authority in the service of the Arabic 
language, and adds that although this was not exactly what they had in mind, it is still 
a step on the right path. 
Tag El-Din expressed his intention to run again in the 2011 presidential elections, and 
that his program will include establishing a Ministry of Arabic language, and that the 
biggest budget be allocated, not to the military or the Ministry of Exterior, but to the 
Arabic language51. He says that even though this is madness, all great ideas begin 
with a degree of madness. He notes however that the feasibility of his ideas is not 
the point. ‘Of course I am not going to win,’ he says, ‘but I am piquing the stagnant 
waters. I mean, it’s the first time it is said that a candidate calls for respecting the 
Arabic language’ ( SEG40). Tag El-Din is the most optimistic about the future of the 
Arabic language. Employing the war metaphor again, he states that despite the crises 
facing it now, ‘the Arabic language will triumph in the end and return to its former 
glory’ (fī n-nihāya sa-tanṭaṣir al-ʿarabiyya wa-taʿūd ilā magdihā as-sābiq). 
                                                             
51 Tag El-Din collected an application for presidential candidacy in 2012 (but did not become an official 
candidate). However, this was drowned out by greater political concerns at the time (cf. Section ‎6.2) 
and he did not receive the media attention he got in 2005. 
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The interview with the ALCSs is rich with mythology. The myths expressed in this 
interview – all of which belong to the dominant regime of authority about Arabic – 
can be summarised as follows: 
x All the languages of the world have colloquials (diglossia is normal). 
x A (real) language must have written rules (i.e. must be codified). 
x ʿāmmiyya is a dialect not a language. 
x ʿāmmiyya is untranslatable (into other languages). 
x ʿāmmiyya is volatile: new words enter it all the time and it is subject to different 
interpretations. 
x The origins of the words in ʿāmmiyya are not traceable. 
x Poor Arabic teaching is aiding the spread of ʿāmmiyya. 
x The deterioration of general taste is aiding the spread of ʿāmmiyya. 
x The calls to codify ʿāmmiyya into a national language are part of a conspiracy to 
divide the Arab World. 
x If the situation persists, the boundaries between fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya will be lost 
(fuṣḥā will be compromised). 
x Fuṣḥā sounds more pleasant and is more intelligible than ʿāmmiyya. 
x Fuṣḥā is a language of beauty and economy. 
x Fuṣḥā contains all the sounds of the languages of the world. 
x Fuṣḥā is the richest language in the world. 
x All the words in fuṣḥā have a traceable origin. 
x Fuṣḥā unites all Arabs. 
x If the regional varieties of Arabic become national languages, the Quran will be 
lost. 
x The Quran cannot be translated into ʿāmmiyya. 
x Writing Arabic in Latin script is a threat to Islam. 
x Foreign languages are a threat to morality. 
x The colonial legacy left an inferiority complex which is [partly] to blame for the 
uptake of foreign languages and culture. 
x The spread of foreign languages is part of a conspiracy to disintegrate the moral 
and religious fabric of Arab society. 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have attempted to answer RQ1 and RQ2 by highlighting the 
ideological underpinnings of some of the activity that the language scene in Egypt 
was witnessing in 2010, with agents of change on one end (RQ1) and resisters of 
change on the other (RQ2). The interviews themselves were quite different from one 
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another. Hence, although I attempted to look at all four of them through three 
different lenses (Eisele’s topoi, the discourse mythological approach, and the 
hierarchy of identities), these lenses were not an equal fit for all the interviews. The 
interview with VE for example was particularly difficult to subject to any of these 
lenses. This is because I selected them for their capacity to capture ideology, which 
was arguably not as tangible in this interview as in the other three. Nevertheless, the 
language attitudes expressed in this interview make it equally important52.  
The framework for the hierarchy of identities was also only salient in the interview 
with Malamih, where the identity of the publishing house and its owner were often 
conflated. However, language choice as an identity marker was important in all the 
interviews. The heavy use of fuṣḥā in the ALCSs’ focus group interview for instance is 
in line with the expected ideologies they express. So is the identity of the young, 
educated, professional indexed by the frequent code-switching between ʿāmmiyya 
and English in the interview with VE. Similarly, the use of ‘elevated’ ʿāmmiyya by El-
Sharkawi with occasional English words is in line with the identity of the educated, 
pro-ʿāmmiyya Marxist. The interview where language choice flouts expectations is 
that with LEP. Here, Gamal El-Din’s use of a mixed variety which was arguably closer 
to fuṣḥā than ʿāmmiyya in many points goes against his pro-ʿāmmiyya ideology. To 
account for this, one must explore the full pool of indexes associated with fuṣḥā and 
ʿāmmiyya (see Section  6.4). 
One of the most notable findings of the interview analysis was the range of terms 
used to refer to fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya. I was sometimes taken aback by this in the 
course of the interview itself. For example, VE’s El-Sagheer’s use of the terms 
‘formal’ and ‘slang’ was not something that I had anticipated. Yet, the language 
attitude they capture – where the diglossic poles or language levels are treated as 
different ‘styles’ of the language – is still very important, not least because it 
challenges our assumptions about the language awareness and perspectives of non-
linguistically trained language users. Gamal El-Din’s concept of ‘the Egyptian 
language’ (al-luġa al-miṣriyya) was equally confounding, and also equally important. 
The elaborate concept, which was clearly based on an ideological foundation 
                                                             
52 Cf. Section ‎3.3 for a delineation of the terms ideologies and attitudes.  
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espousing the superiority of Egyptians, does not only demonstrate the existence of 
different terminological traditions in Egyptian society (even if they only belong in the 
realm of ‘folk linguistics’), but also that the same term can mean different things to 
different people. Compare for example Gamal El-Din’s use of the term ‘Egyptian 
language’ to El-Sharkawi’s use of the same term: the former used it to refer to a 
system which encompasses both fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya (in the same way that al-luġa 
al-ʿarabiyya would be used), while the latter used it to refer specifically to ʿāmmiyya.  
I have also found that the (conscious) use of the labels dialect (lahga) and language 
(luġa) with reference to ʿāmmiyya can be indicative of the speaker’s ideological 
position. Similarly, it is notable how the notion of some intermediate variety – or 
varieties – between fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya came up in all interviews, except the 
interview with LEP. It was only LEP’s Gamal El-Din who seemed to subscribe to the 
idea of two discrete levels. 
The most important findings were perhaps in the area of language myths. Here, the 
discourse mythological approach was particularly helpful. Subjecting the interviews 
to discourse analysis does not only bring out the myths in the discourse, but also 
demonstrates how these myths are transported through language choice, 
argumentation, metaphors, labelling, hedging and the use of pronouns. It is 
important to reiterate here that the term myth is used independently of the truth 
value of the myth itself; it does not matter whether the ‘myth’ is true or false, what 
matters is its unquestionable validity to a certain group. Hence, I have deliberately 
avoided polemics about the truth value of these myths. Some myths have been 
addressed in earlier chapters, others clearly lend themselves to inaccuracy, and some 
are neither necessarily true nor false. I have therefore opted to focus on analysing 
how these myths fit into the broader ideologies of the interviewees.  
I have found that the discourse mythological approach complements Eisele’s topoi 
very well as various topoi are often invoked through myths. What is particularly 
striking is how the topoi in the (pro-fuṣḥā) dominant regime of authority (which were 
found in the ALCSs interview) were reappropriated in the pro-ʿāmmiyya discourse of 
the LEP and Malamih interviews. The occurrence of these topoi in the three 
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It is useful to juxtapose the ideological underpinnings of LEP and Malamih on the one 
hand against those of the ALCSs on the other. In addition to the former’s pro-
ʿāmmiyya stance and the latter’s pro-fuṣḥā stance, the two stand at opposite ends of 
the ideological spectrum in many other ways. The professed Egyptian nationalism of 
LEP and Malamih’s emphasis on the ‘distinctiveness’ of Egyptians is in stark contrast 
to the taken-for-granted pan-Arabism of the ALCSs. Similarly, while LEP and Malamih 
were at odds with the government authorities generally and the language authorities 
more specifically, the ALCSs operated under the auspices and in cooperation with 
these very authorities.  
It is important to point out, however, that even though LEP and Malamih shared a 
pro-ʿāmmiyya ideology, there were significant differences in their arguments. These 
differences spanned how they viewed ʿāmmiyya and how they viewed Egypt in 
relation to the Arab World. In particular, while LEP’s Gamal El-Din expressed 
unequivocal support for ʿāmmiyya, Malamih’s ‘bias’ for ʿāmmiyya was coupled with 
‘linguistic liberalism’: an openness to publish in a range of linguistic forms in order to 
reach different audiences. 
Finally, it is important to point to the limitations of the interview findings. My 
investigation was limited to three agents of change and it could therefore be argued 
that I only gave a partial response to RQ1. However, because I cannot possibly access 
or account for all agents of all change, it was never my intention to claim that the 
positions of these agents of change are representative of all agents of pro-ʿāmmiyya 
change in Egypt. My aim was to study the arguments presented by these agents of 
change and simply highlight that such views exist.  
Even though the interviews were conducted prior to substantial political change in 
Egypt and two entities (LEP and Malamih) no longer exist in the capacity in which I 
interviewed them in 2010, their ideological positions are enduring and, in that 
respect, more significant than the entities themselves. At the end of the day, LEP’s 
plans to make EA an official language may not have been any more realistic than Tag 
El-Din’s plans to establish a Ministry of Arabic. What matters is not the feasibility of 
these plans, but the ideological statements they make. 
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5 The Survey: Investigating Language Attitudes and 
Practices in Greater Cairo 
S AND YET NOT EVERYONE IN CAIRO IS EQUALLY CONNECTED, AND 
NOT EVERYONE IS CONNECTED IN THE SAME WAYS. 
 
T 
Mark A. Peterson (2011: 2), Connected in Cairo 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to answer the third research question: 
RQ3 What are the attitudes of language users towards the recent changes and how 
are these attitudes related to the users’ identities and language practices? 
In order to answer this question I must first identify who the language users I will be 
investigating are and how they will be investigated. With respect to ‘how’: a web 
survey was used to reach the language users. In Section ‎5.2 I explain why this 
method was chosen and provide a detailed review of the merits and issues 
associated with this choice. With respect to ‘who’: a sample of Cairo-based Internet 
users was targeted for the study. In Section ‎5.3 I provide a demographic profile of the 
population of Greater Cairo followed by a profile of the target population. I then 
explain how the web survey was designed, tested and distributed in Section ‎5.4. 
Here, I address how the survey was designed to answer RQ3. The survey analysis and 
results are presented in Section ‎5.5 and the limitations are highlighted in Section ‎5.6. 
Finally, I conclude with a summary of the survey findings in Section ‎5.7. 
5.2 The Web-based survey as a research method 
While using a questionnaire for data collection has the advantage of maximising the 
number of responses in cases where there is one principal researcher, using 
questionnaires to collect information about language behaviour and attitudes has its 
limitations. Walters (2008: 651) observes that, because questionnaires rely on self-
reporting, “many find questionnaire-based studies suspect, contending that their 
findings are best taken as evidence of overt or imagined norms rather than actual 
behaviours”. In particular, he underscores the difficulty associated with asking a 
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participant to rate their ability to speak fuṣḥā and the validity of “using self-report 
data to assess abilities in such a value-laden attitude object” (Walters, 2008: 657). 
Terms such as fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya are after all open to different interpretation by 
the respondents (cf. Section ‎2.9).  
In addition, Walters cites problems of representativeness and generalisability, noting 
that “most of the questionnaire-based research on Arabic has polled students or 
faculty, an elite and important group but hardly representative of society as a whole” 
(Walters, 2008: 653). Walters also notes that questionnaire-based studies tend to 
report their findings in “descriptive statistics, rather than inferential statistics”, and 
that “discussions of reliability and validity with respect to questionnaire items or 
methods are rarely found” (ibid.). Finally, Walters observes that most research on 
language attitudes in Arabic is “locked in the past”, noting that researchers have not 
kept up with empirical and theoretical work in this field. 
The present study aims to address Walters’ points by designing a survey which is 
informed by the latest developments in the language situation in Egypt, and by a 
careful study of the literature on web surveys. In addition, I give due consideration to 
issues of representativeness and generalisability, and use inferential statistics in my 
analysis. While the analysis presented in Section ‎5.5 illustrates that the survey is 
reliable in as far as it demonstrates internal consistency of results, the self-reporting 
nature of surveys remains an inherent limitation which could undermine the validity 
of these results. I address this by not assuming that participants have a specific, 
shared definition of fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya. Since my overarching concern is language 
ideologies, that participants say or think they are using fuṣḥā or ʿāmmiyya is equally 
important. The survey can therefore be more accurately described as a survey of 
language attitudes and perceived language practices. 
In the following sections, I explain why I chose to deploy a web survey and address 
the issues that this method raises through a review of the relevant literature. In 
Section ‎5.2.1, I review the benefits of web surveys (in comparison to paper-based 
surveys), in Section ‎5.2.2 I discuss factors which influence response rate in web 
surveys, and in Section ‎5.2.3 I address the questions of representativeness and 
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generalisability in web surveys. I should point out from the outset that although 
there is an abundance of literature on web surveys from an array of disciplines, I 
could not find studies which deal specifically with conducting linguistic surveys on 
the web. Nevertheless, the majority of the principles and findings outlined in the 
literature can be extended to apply to web surveys in general. More detrimental 
perhaps is the fact that the literature transports a Western bias; most of the studies 
are based on work carried out in the United States and Europe. In addition, because 
this is a field which is rapidly evolving, many of the issues discussed in papers 
published a few years ago may not be as relevant today. With this in mind, the 
following discussion focuses only on those points which were deemed relevant to the 
present time and context.  
5.2.1 Why web surveys? 
With the advent of the Internet and increasing Internet penetration in many 
societies, the potential for conducting surveys via the Internet has not been lost on 
researchers. There are several well-documented advantages to web-based surveys:  
Speed 
The data collection period is significantly reduced: the invitation reaches the subjects 
instantaneously and responses are recorded and available for analysis immediately 
after completion. This saves time both in survey administration and data entry. On 
the other hand, “researchers often end up spending considerable time solving 
technical problems before and during implementation of an online survey” (Van Selm 
& Jankowski, 2006: 438). That is, researchers require considerable technical expertise 
to administer web surveys compared to traditional surveys (Umbach, 2004).  
Low Cost  
Web surveys have an economic advantage over conventional surveys by cutting 
production costs such as the “cost of copying, postage and data entry” (Duffy, 2002: 
84). However, some warn that “the start-up expenses involved in Web based 
surveys, particularly expenses incurred to secure the necessary expertise for 
designing instruments, can be quite substantial” (Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006: 437). 
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On the other hand, the “offsetting” cost of constructing a web survey and placing it 
online becomes dramatically less significant with big sample sizes (Umbach, 2004; 
Watt, 1997). In conventional survey methods, the cost will keep going up as the 
sample size increases.  
Accuracy  
Because the information in the completed surveys can be automatically imported 
into a spreadsheet application or statistical analysis package, the data entry step is 
completely eliminated. This automatic transfer of data avoids the various potential 
human errors which may occur during manual data entry. 
Reach 
This refers to “the ease by which potential respondents can be approached” (Van 
Selm & Jankowski, 2006: 438). By transcending geographical boundaries, Internet 
research makes it easier to reach larger, more diverse populations as well as 
populations with specific qualities. However, the reach of web surveys has its 
limitations. Although it is claimed that by recruiting from the Internet “one can 
obtain samples that are heterogeneous with respect to age, education, income, 
social class, and nationality” (Birnbaum, 2004: 818), certain user demographics are 
over-represented on the Internet (cf. Section ‎5.2.3). 
Anonymity  
Gosling et al. (2004: 101) note that “although many traditional methods take steps to 
ensure participants’ confidentiality, few can claim to provide complete anonymity”. 
In contrast, web surveys can be considered anonymous as far as they enable 
participants to complete the survey without disclosing their identity and without 
ever coming into contact with the researcher. However, this has its pros and cons: 
while the promise of anonymity encourages participants to provide honest answers, 
particularly with regards to sensitive issues,  it implies less control over the quality of 
the data as it leaves the survey vulnerable to multiple or false responses (Duffy, 
2002; Gosling et al., 2004; Solomon, 2001; Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006). Moreover, 
it has been argued that full anonymity is difficult to achieve with web surveys, and 
that confidentiality should be considered a satisfactory alternative (Van Selm & 
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Jankowski, 2006). For example, researchers can assure participants that their 
responses will be stored securely and that they will only be analysed at the aggregate 
level. On the other hand, Umbach (2004) points out that no one can guarantee the 
total security of data collected on the Internet. In particular, data transferred online 
can sometimes be subject to government surveillance under legislations such as the 
American PATRIOT Act (cf. de Jung, 2008). Hence, while researchers are of course 
under an obligation to do their part in safeguarding the information that they collect 
online, they must also be wary not to over-promise assurances of security and 
confidentially that they may not be able to deliver. 
Convenience 
The features discussed above demonstrate why web surveys are convenient for 
researchers, but they are also considered convenient for respondents (Best et al., 
2001; Medlin et al., 1999; Umbach, 2004; Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006). This medium 
offers a lot of possibilities for creating surveys which are attractive, interactive and 
respondent-friendly, and for making filling out a survey a more pleasant experience: 
More than any other survey mode, web-based surveying allows innovative 
questionnaires to be developed. Visual and audio stimuli can be incorporated, prompts 
can alert respondents if they skip or incorrectly answer questions, drop-down boxes can 
present respondents with a range of possible answers, pop-windows can provide 
additional information, questions can be ordered randomly, skip patterns may be built 
for ease of navigation, even multi-lingual formats are possible. (Fleming & Bowden, 
2009: 285) 
5.2.2 Response Rate Issues 
There are four types of error which a good survey must aim to overcome: coverage 
error, sampling error, measurement error and nonresponse error (Dillman, Tortora, 
& Bowker, 1998; Umbach, 2004). Coverage error occurs when all members of the 
target population do not have an equal chance of being selected for the survey; 
some members may have multiple chances of selection while others may have none 
at all. Sampling error occurs when only a portion of the population is surveyed rather 
than the entire population. Measurement error is the result of inaccurate responses 
which may be directly linked to poor question presentation, the survey mode or the 
behaviour of participants. Finally, nonresponse error is a consequence of failing to 
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secure responses from a segment of participants in the sample who might have 
swayed results in a certain direction. Where it is not possible to eliminate the sources 
of these errors, measures should at least be taken to reduce them. Coverage and 
sampling errors relate to how the target population is identified and sampled, which 
is discussed in section 3.3. This section will focus on factors that contribute to 
nonresponse error (and often also measurement error) and the measures that can 
be taken to reduce these two types of error. It is noteworthy that nonresponse and 
measurement errors are associated with survey design, and that reducing these 
sources of error may also contribute to reducing coverage and sampling errors. This 
section is therefore crucial as it influences some of the design decisions made in 
Section ‎5.4.  
Response rate is defined as “the percentage of the contacted sample that has 
answered and returned the questionnaire” (Deutskens et al., 2004: 27). One of the 
advantages of web surveys is that they can provide a vivid picture of response 
behaviour. For example, Bosnjak and Tuten (2001) devised a methodology for 
classifying the response behaviours of web survey respondents, ranging from 
complete response to complete non-response and covering a number of drop-out 
patterns in between. Response rates in web-based surveys appear to be generally 
increasing owing to higher Internet penetration and the fact that web users are 
becoming more technologically savvy (Greenlaw & Brown-Welty, 2009). Much of the 
literature on web-surveys is devoted to studying factors which affect response rate 
and what can be done about them, with consensus that “the best way to deal with 
non-response error is to increase the response rate through the questionnaire design 
and deployment process” (Archer, 2008).  
Design features which have been noted to negatively impact response rate and 
alienate novice web-users include ambiguous instructions, open-ended questions, 
questions presented in tables, pull-down menus, and the absence of navigation aids 
(Dillman, 2000; Knapp & Heidingsfelder, 1999). The more that specialised skills are 
required to navigate the survey, the more likely this is to contribute to bias in 
response rate and quality due to variation amongst respondents in experience and 
comfort with Internet-based tools (Manfreda et al., 2008; Solomon, 2001). 
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Moreover, the more sophisticated the design, the longer it will take to load which 
can negatively impact response rate and intensify the effect of environmental factors 
(different connection speeds, browsers, etc.) which can influence response quality 
(Duffy, 2002; Solomon, 2001). Simple design and structure have generally been 
shown to contribute to higher response rate in web surveys (Dillman, Tortora, 
Conradt, et al., 1998), although it has also been noted that graphically enhanced 
surveys appear to result in better response quality (Deutskens et al., 2004). 
Deutskens et al. (2004) also investigated the effect of survey length. They found that 
a short questionnaire had a higher response rate and that the length of the survey 
negatively impacted the completeness of responses. Another study investigated the 
effect of the time estimate that the respondents were given for how long it would 
take to complete a web survey (Trouteaud, 2004). Response rate was significantly 
higher among those given a shorter time estimate, while respondents who were 
given a longer time estimate were more likely to wait for a few days before 
completing the survey. Umbach (2004) recommends designing surveys so that they 
take no more than 20 minutes to complete, as well as displaying a progress indicator 
in order to reduce dropout rate.  
It has also been reported that respondents are discouraged from continuing the 
survey when asked to provide their email address (Solomon, 2001), resonating with 
suggestions that lower response rates may be linked to privacy and security concerns 
associated with Internet use (Manfreda et al., 2008; Sax et al., 2003; Sheehan & 
McMillan, 1999; Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006). Conversely, assurances about 
anonymity (that the identity of the respondent cannot be traced by the researcher or 
others) or at least confidentiality (that the identity of the respondent will be 
protected by the researcher) and about the legitimacy of the study are likely to boost 
respondent confidence and hence response rates. 
Response rates can be enhanced in web surveys by getting in touch with potential 
respondents before the survey is sent to inform them of the intent to survey, 
personalising email invitations, and following up with non-respondents (Archer, 
2008; Schaefer & Dillman, 1998; Solomon, 2001; Umbach, 2004). Deutskens et al. 
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(2004) note that follow up reminders appear to be the most powerful strategy to 
maximise responses. Moreover, there is evidence that the wording of the invitation 
could influence response rate (Trouteaud, 2004). Trouteaud found that 
invitations/reminders that ‘pleaded’ for the help of the respondent generated 
significantly higher response rates than invitations that took an offer form, though 
the author warns that “a fine line exists between asking for help and sounding 
desperate” (Trouteaud, 2004: 390)! 
Incentives (e.g. shopping vouchers, prize draws, etc.) have generally been found to 
increase response rate both in online and offline surveys (Bosnjak & Tuten, 2001; 
Deutskens et al., 2004; Schonlau et al., 2002; Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006) although 
there are some contradictory findings. For example, in a study of banner-advertised 
web surveys, Tuten et al. (2000) found that the banner-ad generated significantly less 
click-throughs when a chance to win a prize was offered than when the message 
appealed to the participants’ altruistic motives, such as highlighting the contribution 
to scientific research. This is congruous with the view that participants in web 
surveys are typically “true volunteers” who seek out these studies and participate in 
research for purely intellectual rewards (Duffy, 2002: 84). While such ‘true 
volunteers’ might have particular motives for completing the survey – posing a 
potential limitation – self-selected participants have been shown to provide clearer 
and more complete responses than non-self-selected volunteers (Gosling et al., 
2004). The salience of the survey topic to the sampled population has also been 
found to positively impact response rate (Sheehan & McMillan, 1999). 
Some researchers have suggested using a mixed-mode approach (combining a web-
based and a paper-based version of the survey) to enhance response rate and 
eliminate coverage error (Greenlaw & Brown-Welty, 2009; Schaefer & Dillman, 
1998). However, the associated cost is considerable and must be weighed against the 
nature and purpose of the survey. In the end, it boils down to the available resources 
– both time and money. As Archer (2008) points out, if there are resources to deal 
with non-response error, then the researcher must utilise these resources to 
maximise response rate and decrease non-response error. If resources are limited, 
then the researcher should report only what the respondents contributed without 
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attempting to generalise the findings. This is of particular relevance to the present 
study where, with only one principal researcher, a web survey is being deployed for 
the potential it offers to optimise resources in terms of cost, time and manpower. 
However, the limitations in generalisability are inevitable and must be considered 
carefully. This is addressed in detail in the next section. 
5.2.3 Sampling Issues 
There are three types of samples in Internet research: unrestricted, screened and 
recruited (Medlin et al., 1999; Watt, 1997). An unrestricted sample is one where 
anyone on the Internet can complete the survey. Respondents are self-selected and 
hence this type is deemed highly unrepresentative. A screened sample is one where 
the researcher imposes certain demographic criteria and only respondents who meet 
these criteria complete the survey and responses that do not are filtered out, e.g. by 
using branching logic in the survey. This makes the sample more representative. In 
addition, a quota may be assigned for each demographic segment in order to obtain 
a stratified sample. A recruited sample is the type with the most control over the 
sample composition. Here, access to the survey is restricted to a group of previously 
identified respondents who meet the required demographic criteria and are selected 
from an existing sampling frame (e.g. full list of students at a particular university). 
Access to the survey may then be restricted by assigning passwords to respondents. 
Representativeness is a central issue in Internet research and it is always associated 
with the rate of Internet use among the target population. Duffy (2002: 84) rightly 
notes that “If only a small percentage of the population of interest has Internet 
access, then attempting a Web-based study is pointless”. Low Internet penetration in 
the target population results in what is known as coverage error or bias (cf. Section 
‎5.2.2). A particular concern is that Internet access will be restricted among particular 
groups. For example, people of a lower socioeconomic level or in disadvantaged or 
marginalised groups are underrepresented on the Internet (Best et al., 2001; Duffy, 
2002). On the other hand, those most likely to have Internet access are “high 
income, urban, educated individuals” (Gosling et al., 2004: 98). The International 
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Telecommunication Union (ITU)53 indicated that Internet use in 2010 was much 
higher among those who were more highly-educated as this often implied higher 
income and better computer literacy. Although this ‘digital divide’ was found in all 
the countries surveyed by the ITU, the difference was particularly marked in 
countries with higher inequality in the distribution of incomes (ITU, 2011). The report 
also highlights a rural/urban divide in terms of Internet users, with people living in 
urban areas more likely to be connected than those living in rural areas. Another 
dominant characteristic of Internet users internationally is young age. This is more 
pervasive in developing countries where 47% of Internet users are under 25 versus 
28% for developed countries. The ITU report reasons that “younger people are more 
curious, more interested and more active in some of the most popular Internet 
activities, such as those related to personal communications, and social networks” 
which have become major drivers for Internet adoption, particularly in developing 
countries (ITU, 2011: 127). Findings of web survey studies generally support this 
information about the age, education and income of Internet users (see for example: 
Bosnjak & Tuten, 2001; Deutskens et al., 2004). It is worth noting that the 
overrepresentation of participants with higher levels of education and income is not 
exclusive to web surveys, but has been highlighted in paper surveys as well (see for 
example: Ekman et al., 2006; Fleming & Bowden, 2009). 
Another influential demographic reported by the ITU is gender: more men than 
women use the Internet (ITU, 2011). The gender gap is generally more pronounced in 
developing countries, although there are also developed countries where a 
significant difference exists between the percentages of male and female users 
(ibid.). It has been noted that gender is a strong predictor in both traditional and web 
surveys; women are more likely to participate in both mediums, but the difference is 
less marked in web surveys (Gosling et al., 2004; Sax et al., 2003). However, it could 
be that the rate of women’s participation in web surveys is not so much an 
‘improvement’ over traditional surveys as an ‘offsetting’ of an existing trend caused 
by the presence of more men to women on the Internet. 
                                                             




ITU data indicates that the issue of unequal representation of the different members 
and segments of society becomes less of a problem in countries with high Internet 
penetration. It hence follows that where Internet penetration is high, coverage bias 
is less of a concern. While earlier studies had emphasised that the proportion of 
households with Internet access was too small to conduct general public surveys on 
the Internet, the rapidly growing population of Internet users in many countries has 
prompted researchers to contemplate the feasibility of this method in large 
population-based studies. One such study was conducted in Sweden, which, at an 
Internet penetration rate of 80% at the time was considered a prime candidate for 
web research (Ekman et al., 2006). Both paper and web questionnaires were used, 
and the web version yielded a 10% higher response rate.  
Thus far, I have been addressing the question of whether findings from web surveys 
could be deemed representative of the general population. I will now turn to the 
question of whether they are representative of the population of Internet users. 
According to Duffy (2002: 84), using the Internet to collect data provides “the 
ultimate convenience sample”. Since no sampling frame can be drawn to ensure that 
every user has a chance of being selected, it is impossible to draw a representative 
sample of Internet users (Best et al., 2001; Birnbaum, 2004; Schonlau et al., 2002; 
Van Selm & Jankowski, 2006). It therefore follows that we cannot be confident about 
the representativeness of the findings since “the representativeness of survey 
marginals requires that every unit in the target population possesses some chance of 
being selected so that the statistical likelihood of drawing each population unit can 
be computed” (Best et al., 2001: 132). In other words, it is impossible to guarantee 
that those excluded from the sample will behave in the same way as those selected 
to participate in research, making sampling error inevitable.  
Hence, web surveys are most appropriate for studies of non-probability samples (Van 
Selm & Jankowski, 2006). In non-probability samples, researchers cannot calculate 
the probability of certain values occurring in the population (Best et al., 2001), which 
means that the results are not generalisable by definition. However, even though 
web surveys are not representative of the total population because they primarily 
rely on non-probability samples, they can still be a valuable representation of a sub-
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group of the total population. Because it is difficult to overcome coverage and 
sampling errors in such samples, web researchers are advised to direct their 
attention to reducing the measurement and non-response errors (Dillman, Tortora, 
& Bowker, 1998). 
Ultimately, the extent to which we can trust data collected from an Internet sample 
hinges on our ability to make the assumption that the psychological mechanisms 
governing the decisions, attitudes and/or behaviours under investigation are 
constant across the population. If such an assumption can be made, then a 
representative sample of Internet users is not necessary in order to extrapolate the 
findings to the general population; a diverse rather than a representative sample 
would suffice to infer relationships within the population (Best et al., 2001). It is the 
same underlying principle used in psychological experimental studies which rely on 
samples of undergraduate students to generate generalisable findings. On the other 
hand, our ability to generalise findings would be restricted if the variable being 
investigated is perceived as a function of Internet use, that is to say “that the 
experience of using the Internet [generates or primes] beliefs or attitudes that would 
directly influence the dependent variable under investigation or indirectly mediate or 
moderate how other factors influence this dependent variable.” (Best et al., 2001: 
133). In such cases, we cannot generalise findings to the general population, but we 
may still be able to generalise to the population of Internet users if the assumption 
about the generation of attitudes and beliefs can be made about accessible and non-
accessible users. These points are considered when the target population is defined 
in the next section. 
5.3 Defining the target population 
The purpose of this section is to describe and profile the target population. Section 
‎5.3.1 sketches out the demographics of Greater Cairo, which is the wider population 
from which the sample of Internet-users is drawn. The study focuses on Cairo city for 
a number of reasons. Cairo is the Egyptian capital, and the populous city is 
considered Egypt’s cultural and commercial centre. More importantly, as pointed out 
in sections ‎1.2 and ‎3.2.6, and clearly demonstrated in the interviews (Chapter 4), 
although a number of distinct regional Egyptian dialects exist, it is the Cairene dialect 
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or koine which is invoked to represent Egyptian Arabic. This is also true of the 
sociolinguistics literature (see for example: Holes, 2004; Kaye, 2001; Mejdell, 2006; 
Stadlbauer, 2010). Section ‎5.3.2 follows on to discuss Internet penetration in Greater 
Cairo and describe the sample profile in the backdrop of what has already been 
discussed in section ‎5.2.3. 
5.3.1 Getting to grips with the demographics 
One of the central issues which exist in discussing the demographics of Greater Cairo 
is outlining its size and boundaries. Cairo city or ‘Greater Cairo’ is an urban 
metropolis that spans the Cairo governorate and spills over into a number of 
neighbouring governorates. The administrative division of the city is at once 
ambiguous, confusing and inconvenient for research purposes. The fact that Cairo 
city does not represent a single governorate makes it difficult to extrapolate data 
which relates specifically to the city. As Sabry (2009: 11) points out, “until May 2008, 
the city of Greater Cairo was inconveniently divided between three governorates: 
Cairo, Giza and Qalyoubia. Greater Cairo included Cairo governorate as a whole, Giza 
city which is in the governorate of Giza and Shubra El Kheima city in Qalyoubia 
governorate”. In May 2008, Helwan and 6 October – two suburbs of Cairo and Giza 
respectively – became separate governorates and the new administrative division 
was reflected in the 2006 census (CAPMAS). This further subdivision has made it 
more complicated to extract data relating to Cairo city, and even though it was more 
recently reversed in April 2011 (Dawwa, 2011), this only adds to the complexity as it 
undermines the comparability of recent data. Figure 1 which highlights the formal 
and informal settlements of Greater Cairo illustrates how the city used to spread 




Figure 3. The City of Greater Cairo (formal and informal settlements) 
Source: The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) 
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The boundaries of Cairo city are “unclear and ever-changing” (Sabry, 2009: 11). Sabry 
notes that depending on the boundaries chosen for greater Cairo, the population of 
the city can be anywhere between 12.5 million to 18 million according to the 2006 
population census. According to this census, the sum of the urban populations of the 
five governorates in which Greater Cairo falls is 13,497,480 and it is believed that 
Greater Cairo makes up the majority of this figure (Sabry, 2009). However, the 
distinction between rural and urban areas here is in itself problematic. This is 
because the census follows administrative criteria in defining what is “urban”, and 
therefore “areas which are in reality a continuation of the Greater Cairo 
agglomeration are not included in Greater Cairo’s figures and are considered rural” 
(Sabry, 2009: 12). 
Moreover, the informal settlements shown in Figure 3 present an issue which 
undermines the reliability of official demographic data. These settlements are 
directly linked to poverty, which is a central problem in Egypt. According, to a 2002 
World Bank report, 19.8% of Egyptians lived on less than two US Dollars a day (World 
Bank, 2002), a percentage which is thought to have been grossly underestimated 
“because poverty lines are set too low in relation to the costs of basic needs and 
because the household surveys which inform poverty line studies under-sample 
people living in informal settlements as they are based on census data which under-
count the populations of informal settlements” (Sabry, 2009: 1). World Bank figures 
indicated that Egypt’s urban population was more well off than people living in rural 
parts of the country, and that poverty appeared to be dropping significantly in the 
country as a whole. However, Sabry notes that growing slums (informal settlements) 
in the cities shed doubts on these figures. There is a disparity between the reported 
drop in poverty rates and the under-sampling of slum populations which live in dire 
poverty and are growing at a much faster rate than the rest of the population; clearly 
the two figures cannot be reconciled. Sabry also emphasises that the basic costs of 
living are not sufficiently reflected in poverty reports about Egypt. It is perhaps telling 
that of those that the World Bank classed as non-poor, 18.2% did not have indoor 
access to water (2002: x)! Hence, Sabry dispels the grave fallacy underlying the claim 
that poverty in pre-2011 Greater Cairo was “quite low (in the range of 5–10 per cent 
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of the city’s population), decreasing and contributing to bringing down the national 
incidence of poverty” (2009: vii). These figures are usually based on the poverty 
reports of organisations such as the World Bank and UNDP. Sabry presents sufficient 
evidence to shed doubt on the accuracy of these reports, and makes a compelling 
argument that the true figures are likely to be much higher. 
While poverty itself may not be of direct relevance to the present study, what is 
relevant is the conditions that are symptomatic of poverty and that poverty is 
symptomatic of. The 2002 World Bank report on poverty in Egypt highlights that “the 
strongest correlate of poverty was education, with more than 45% of the poor 
illiterate” (p. iii). The report also states that “poverty measures among the urban 
illiterate persons were about double the rates on average” (p. vii). Official literacy 
figures from Egypt’s most recent census in 200654 put literacy rates at 70.36%. The 
census results, published on the website of the government’s Central Agency for 
Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) list citizens as either completely 
illiterate, can “read and write”, having become literate as a result of adult literacy 
campaigns, or by highest educational level attained (CAPMAS). Of these 
classifications, perhaps the most ambiguous is the “read and write” category. 
CAPMAS explain that this category refers to any person, aged 10 or over, who can 
read and write but has not attained an academic qualification. They also indicate that 
this declaration is made by the head of a household55. 
Even if such classifications were to be taken at face value, the inherent ambiguity of 
this category raises the question: is it possible to assume that a person who has not 
attained any academic qualification but is classed as someone who can “read and 
write” in the census can undertake a literacy practice such as completing a self-
administered written survey? It is difficult to provide a conclusive answer, but it is 
likely that there will be individuals within this category who would struggle with this 
more complex literacy practice which requires more than the baseline ability to read 
and write. This is important to bear this in mind, considering that the percentage of 
                                                             
54 Population censuses are carried out every 10 years in Egypt. 
55 Email Communication with CAPMAS, November 2nd, 2011. 
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individuals who were classed under the “read and write” category in the 2006 census 
was a bewildering 6.87 million (CAPMAS)! 
It is worth noting that Egypt follows a functional definition of literacy in its censuses. 
However, it is not the same as the definition that Ayari (1996: 243-244) gives: 
Functional literacy has been defined as people’s ability to read print material, such as a 
newspaper or magazine, and to understand instructions for using common household 
appliances and comprehend information accompanying common medicines and 
doctors’ prescriptions. Functional literacy also involves the ability to communicate 
successfully through writing, for example filling out voting papers, questionnaires, 
passport appliances and driver’s license forms. Such reading and writing abilities make it 
possible for people to actively participate in their societies politically, civicly and socially. 
Egypt follows UNESCO guidelines which define as literate “persons who possess a 
certain degree of the ability to read and write” (UNESCO, 1951: 2), noting that any 
extension of the definition beyond the ability to read and write has been abandoned. 
According to UNESCO, the definition for literacy employed by Egypt in the 1986 
census was: “A person is defined as literate if he/she can, with understanding, both 
read and write a short, simple statement on his/her everyday life”56. However, the 
definition is missing from UNESCO data for the most recent 2006 census. It is likely 
that such classifications are also based on a declaration from the head of the 
household, although it is not clear whether the definition above is disclosed to the 
head of the household or whether they are left to apply their own interpretation of 
being able to read and write. This in turn presents a further problem in Egypt, a 
country where illiteracy is widespread and where being able to “read and write” can 
be understood as simply being capable of signing one’s name – a distinction that 
UNESCO deems misleading (1951: 2). 
Despite the issues of poverty and illiteracy outlined above, Egypt has a very high 
mobile penetration rate. At the end of 2012, this was almost 117% at 96.8 million 
subscriptions (Egypt ICT Indicators), and the rate in Greater Cairo is likely to be 
                                                             





higher since this is where the service was first launched. These figures would suggest 
that there is a significant subset of mobile users in Egypt with little or no literacy. 
Indeed, El-Sagheer refers to this issue in explaining the motives behind changing VE’s 
messages (Section ‎4.4). Although this is not directly relevant to the present study, 
the sociolinguistic implications of the discrepancy between literacy rates and mobile 
penetration rates in Egypt certainly require researchers’ attention. In the next 
section, I focus on a more relevant technology demographic: Internet use. 
5.3.2 Identifying and profiling the sample 
The Egypt ICT Indicators website57 indicates that at the end of 2012 (when the survey 
was launched), Internet penetration in Egypt was just shy of 40% (32.62 million 
users)58. However, no data is available on how exactly this figure is distributed across 
Egypt’s governorates and there appears to be no straightforward way to work out 
the rate of Internet penetration in Greater Cairo. Nevertheless, if we take into 
account the facts that Greater Cairo is mainly urban59, and that Internet was first 
launched in Cairo (the city therefore houses the longest established community of 
Internet users in Egypt), it seems safe to assume that the rate of Internet penetration 
in Greater Cairo would be substantially higher than the national average. 
Given the difficulty in determining the geographical distribution of Egypt’s population 
of Internet users, it is perhaps more useful to examine the demographic makeup of 
this population, which is generally in line with international trends when it comes to 
income, gender and age. There is evidence that Internet access in Egypt increases in 
proportion with household income: at the end of 2009, only 19.7% of households 
with a monthly income below L.E. 1000 (about $167) had Internet access, as opposed 
to 83.4% of households with an income higher than L.E. 8000 (about $1,333) (MCIT, 
2011). Internet use is also higher among males. At the end of 2009, 55.6% of users 
                                                             
57 The website is run by Egypt’s Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (MCIT) 
58 It is worth noting that Egypt experienced a surge in the number of Internet users in 2011 linked to 
the role that the Internet played in the January 25 revolution (Murad, 2011). 
59 Internet use is substantially higher in Egypt’s urban localities: In 2009, 39.7% of households in urban 
areas had Internet access, compared to 23% in rural areas (MCIT, 2011). Similarly, the ITU reports that 
the percentage of individuals using the Internet in Egypt’s urban areas in the same year was 30.7%, 
compared to 14.3% only in rural areas (ITU, 2011). In addition, not all localities have access to the 
Internet: in December 2010 only 47% of all of Egypt’s localities had access to the Internet (UN, 2011). 
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were male and 44.4% were female, although the gap is closing compared to previous 
years (ibid.). In addition, young people make up the vast majority of Internet users. In 
2009, 35% of users were under 18 and 60% were under 25. Only 22% were 35 or over 
and only 7% were over 50 (ibid.). It should be noted here that there is also an age 
bias within Egypt’s general population reflecting the country’s rapid population 
growth. In the 2006 census, 63% of the population was under 30, 31% were aged 15-
30, and only 13% were over 50 (CAPMAS). 
While there is no official information about the distribution of Internet users in Egypt 
by education, it is likely that any such information will be skewed by the fact that a 
high proportion of Internet users are of school age. For example, the only data 
relating to education on the Egypt ICT Indicators website provides the distribution of 
males and females over four educational levels (the data from 2010 is extrapolated 
in Table 5). What is particularly noteworthy is the ‘primary or no formal education’ 
category. This leads us to wonder whether there are people with no formal 
education accessing the Internet in Egypt – which would have been thought highly 
unlikely, not only based on international figures, but also based on Egypt’s particular 
context where illiteracy correlates significantly with poverty (World Bank, 2002). 
 Male Female 
Primary or no formal education 52.5% 47.5% 
Lower secondary 53.3% 46.7% 
(Upper) secondary or post-secondary 56.5% 43.5% 
Tertiary 58% 42% 
Table 5. Percentage of male and female Internet users in Egypt in 2010 by education (Egypt 
ICT Indicators)  
The overrepresentation of higher income and younger groups on the Internet in 
Egypt would make it problematic to lay any claims about the generalisability of the 
findings to the general public. Moreover, response bias can occur as a result of the 
fact that some of the language behaviours and attitudes under investigation (such as 
those relating to English and Latinised Arabic) may be linked to language practices on 
the Internet. Hence, in line with the recommendations of Best et al. (2001), rather 
than rely on an Internet sample and attempt to extend the findings to non-Internet 
users, I will consider Internet use a necessary condition in the survey respondents. 
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In light of the above discussion, the present study relies on a screened, self-selected, 
non-probabilistic sample of Internet users in Egypt. Non-probability is a consequence 
of using the Internet as a mode to recruit participants and the lack of a sampling 
frame that would guarantee that each member of the population of Internet users 
has a chance of being selected. Self-selection has been favoured as an alternative to 
spamming potential respondents with survey invitations. Another benefit of this 
approach is the likelihood of receiving more complete and meaningful responses 
from respondents who choose to complete the survey voluntarily as opposed to 
those who feel an obligation to participate.  
Finally, the sample was screened to ensure that conditions for participation were 
met. Screening questions were introduced to ascertain that the respondents are 
Egyptian, live in Greater Cairo, have lived there for the past five years, and have 
completed the majority of their school education in Egypt. The purpose of these 
questions is to control for nationality, restrict the sample to Cairo city, and control 
for the effect of living or being educated outside Egypt. The sample will thus exclude 
residents of Cairo city who have migrated from other regions of Egypt, as well as 
Egyptians living or who have lived outside Egypt in the past five years, or who have 
received their schooling abroad. Imposing the five year threshold on how long the 
respondent has been living continuously in Egypt is to ensure that they are 
acquainted with recent linguistic changes in the city, while imposing the restriction 
on where they received their schooling is to eliminate the possibility that being 
educated abroad would create a bias in the respondent’s language behaviour or 
preferences. It is worth noting that restricting participation for Egyptians who are 
living or have lived abroad effectively excludes a large segment of Egyptians in a 
country that exports a substantial proportion of its labour force overseas (Feiler, 
1991; McCormick & Wahba, 2003). The proportion of participants filtered out by 
each of the screening questions is outlined in Section ‎0. The survey design is 




5.4 Survey Design 
This section outlines the design process. I cover aspects of the technical design in 
Section  5.4.1. I then clarify how the design addresses RQ3 in Section  5.4.2. I discuss 
the process of testing and piloting in Section  5.4.3, and explain how the survey was 
distributed in Section  5.4.4.  
5.4.1 The technical design 
One of the first design decisions that had to be made relates to the language of the 
survey. Standard Arabic was the obvious unmarked variety to use for this purpose60, 
but given the popularity of English in the online communication of Egyptian Internet 
users (cf. Aboelezz, 2009) there was a case for a questionnaire which offers 
respondents the choice to complete the survey in Arabic or English. To this effect, a 
professional web survey hosting company which specialises in multilingual surveys 
was contracted for this study61. This approach made it possible to compare the 
responses of those who chose to complete the survey in each language. On the 
negative side, designing a bilingual survey is complicated and time-consuming, and it 
requires extensive testing as discussed in Section  5.4.3. 
When respondents clicked on the survey link, they were met with a bilingual 
message asking them to select a language. They were then redirected to a series of 
screening questions in the selected language to establish that they met the 
participation criteria explained in Section  5.3.2. If the participants ‘passed’ the 
screening questions, they proceeded to the information page. This page is important 
in web surveys; accepting to proceed with the study after reading the information is 
the equivalent of signing an informed consent form in other research methods 
(Duffy, 2002). A short, general introduction about the researcher and study was 
given in addition to an explanation about the purpose of the study and how the data 
would be used. The information page also included a link to a webpage with 
information about my university’s research ethics, and another link to my university 
                                                             
60 Although the survey also investigates the use of Egyptian Arabic in written form, no survey option 
was offered in Egyptian Arabic. This is because this choice was deemed too marked given the 
academic nature of the survey, which would risk aligning the researcher ideologically and raising 
questions about the purpose of the study. 
61 The main website of the survey hosts: http://www.keysurvey.co.uk/ 
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webpage. Because the survey did not record participants’ IP addresses as an extra 
measure towards protecting their identities, it was not possible for the survey to be 
completed over several sessions. The participants were therefore instructed that 
they had to complete the survey in one sitting and told that it is estimated to take 
10-15 minutes (cf. Section  5.4.3). Participants were redirected to my university 
webpage upon completing the survey to provide assurance of legitimacy as well as 
provide more information about my research for those seeking it. 
In line with the advice for ‘best practice’ in web survey design outlined in Section 
 5.2.2, I kept the design as simple as possible while taking advantage of the media 
capabilities of this medium. Apart from the institutional logo which appeared on 
every screen, only five images were used in the survey. These illustrative images 
were embedded to aid understanding. For instance, when the term ‘Franko-Arabic’ 
(a popular term used to refer to Latinised Arabic) is first introduced, an image 
containing an example of LA accompanies the question. In the feedback survey which 
accompanied the pilot version of the survey (cf. Section  5.4.3), 20 out of 21 
respondents said that they found the images helpful. Another example of how I took 
advantage of the media capabilities of web surveys was to include an audio clip of 
one of VE’s new recorded messages in ʿāmmiyya62 in the question investigating 
attitudes towards this change. A download link was also included in case the 
embedded Adobe Flash player did not work. The survey also included a simple 
progress indicator in the form of a plain text percentage. Including progress 
indicators in web surveys has been shown to reduce dropout rates as they give 
participants a ‘sense of bearings’ (Couper et al., 2001; Umbach, 2004).  
One of the greatest advantages of web surveys is the ability to customise the survey 
so that respondents would only complete relevant questions. In the present study, 
demographic questions were asked at the beginning of the survey to filter the 
questions accordingly. For example, only participants who indicated they were 
employed were asked about their language choice when emailing their superior at 
work. It has been suggested that presenting the entire survey on a single screen 
reduces dropout rates as it provides a sense of context (Couper et al., 2001; Dillman, 
                                                             
62 This is the message transcribed at the beginning of Section ‎4.4. 
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Tortora, & Bowker, 1998). However, incorporating skip logic made breaking down 
questions into separate screens inevitable. Generally, related questions were 
presented on the same screen except where branching logic dictated otherwise.  
While the capacity to force respondents to provide an answer before proceeding to 
the next question is considered an ‘advantage’ in web surveys over paper surveys, 
this has been linked to higher dropout rates (Dillman, Tortora, & Bowker, 1998; 
Medlin et al., 1999; Schonlau et al., 2002). Forcing responses also does not sit well 
with ethical research practices (Dillman, Tortora, & Bowker, 1998: 11). The present 
survey was designed to force a response for the majority of questions. This was often 
necessary as it affected the branching logic of the questionnaire. However, to 
address the ethical concern and reduce potential dropouts, categories such as “I do 
not know”, “I do not care” and “other” were provided wherever relevant to maintain 
response integrity. Moreover, participants were allowed to skip sensitive questions 
such as religion and the political party voted for. 
The most important design decisions were related to the type of questions used in 
the survey. A range of question types were used: radio buttons, dropdown menus, 
check-all-that-apply, 5-point Likert scales, and forced rank. In questions which 
included a list of radio buttons (such as in the language attitude questions) the order 
of the items in the list (which was repeated almost entirely for each of the relevant 
questions) was randomised on every screen so as to avoid bias towards the first 
options (an issue which was reported by Dillman, Tortora, & Bowker, 1998). In 
general, open-ended questions were avoided in order to ensure data uniformity and 
make data transfer and cleanup less cumbersome. However, one entry box question 
was included at the end of the survey for participants to write any additional 
comments. The comments which were left by the participants provide a richer 
picture of the respondent’s language behaviour and attitudes. I quote some of these 
in chapters 6 and 7. 
Incorporating different question types in the survey makes it important to include 
specific instructions on the computer action that the respondent needs to take for 
each question (Dillman, Tortora, & Bowker, 1998). In the present survey, “floating 
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windows” provided specific operation instructions for each action. When the 
respondent moved the pointer over a question, a small window appeared and 
floated atop the existing browser widow (e.g. “select only one answer”). The 
participant could recall this floating window when needed. Similarly, error messages 
appeared right above the question where the issue occurred, explaining the specific 
nature of the problem and how it can be solved. These features were already 
integrated in English, but had to be developed and tested in Arabic.  
5.4.2 Addressing the research question 
I will now address how the survey was designed to answer RQ3: What are the 
attitudes of language users towards the recent changes and how are these attitudes 
related to the users’ identities and language practices? The question can be broken 
down to three components: attitudes towards recent changes, language practices, 
and identity.  
Six identity variables of interest were identified: gender, age, religion, education, 
socio-economic status (SES) and political ideology. Questions about gender, age, 
religion and education were asked at the beginning of the survey while political 
ideology questions were asked at the end so as not to put off participants. There was 
no direct question about SES. Instead, some of the demographic questions were 
designed to provide a covert indication of the respondent’s SES (cf. Section  5.5.2.3). 
These identity variables were treated as explanatory variables in the survey analysis. 
Of course, the selected survey language can itself be considered an identity marker. 
Walters (2006: 660) cites Riguet (1981-1982a, 1981-1982b) who used French and 
Arabic versions of his survey of attitudes on non-linguistic matters in Tunisia and 
“found that educated subjects reported different attitudes on some items depending 
on the language of the questionnaire, with the French-language version favouring 
certain modernist attitudes”. Although I do not treat the survey language as an 
explanatory variable, I highlight its relationship to the other variables in the analysis. 
Following the initial set of demographic questions, participants were asked a series 
of matched questions about language practices and attitudes which relate 
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specifically to SA and English (cf. Section  5.5.1.1). This was followed by a series of 
questions about language attitudes with a focus on recent language developments 
(cf. Section  5.5.1.2). The participants were asked about their attitudes towards: EA in 
printed magazines, VE’s new recorded messages in EA, Wikipedia Masry, LA in 
billboards, and LA in English magazines. Finally, the participants were presented with 
a set of matched questions about language practices in written communication, 
where the audience and medium were manipulated (cf. Section  5.5.1.3) before the 
political ideology questions63. 
5.4.3 Testing and Piloting 
The survey was thoroughly tested and piloted before it was rolled out to the target 
audience. It took three months to develop and test the initial survey. This was piloted 
in 2010, however, the final survey was not launched until October 2012 after 
undergoing revisions and further testing (cf. Chapter ‎7). 
Testing the survey included viewing it from different computers and web browsers, 
to preview the range of experiences of the potential respondents. This was of 
paramount importance in the present survey where the cursive nature of the right to 
left Arabic script resulted in a number of display problems in the Arabic version. For 
example, the text in the pop-up windows in the Arabic version would not display 
properly in Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome. In the pilot, participants wishing to 
complete the survey in Arabic were instructed to use Microsoft Internet Explorer in 
the survey invitation, but a permanent solution was developed for the final survey. 
While the survey design gave respondents a choice to complete the survey in Arabic 
or English, the final results were collated in a single spreadsheet. This meant that it 
was crucial to ensure equivalence between the two versions. To do this, my 
translation of the survey was refereed by three academic colleagues who are also 
professional translators. I then revised the translation in light of the feedback I 
received. Another step in the testing process involved sending a mock version of the 
survey to colleagues, some of whom were based in Cairo. Some of those colleagues 
                                                             
63 The survey printout is attached at the end of this thesis as Appendix III 
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were asked to test the English version while others were asked to test the Arabic 
version. No issues were reported in these tests.  
With the survey thoroughly tested and all major issues resolved, the next step was to 
pilot the survey by taking it to a segment of the target population and collecting real 
data. The survey was piloted for three months between June and September 2010 
using a convenience sample and returned 43 valid responses. 35 of these were 
completed in English and 8 in Arabic, confirming the need for a bilingual survey. 
Piloting an instrument provides an opportunity to uncover any problems which have 
not been detected in the testing process so that these may be resolved before fully 
rolling out the survey. With this in mind, respondents were invited to complete a 
short feedback survey about their survey-filling experience at the end of the pilot 
survey. 22 respondents complied and were automatically redirected to the feedback 
survey. The responses from the feedback survey were very valuable in understanding 
the respondents’ experience and the issues that they faced. For instance, it provided 
an indication of how long it takes to complete the survey. The majority of those who 
completed the feedback survey reported that it took them between 10 and 15 
minutes to complete the pilot survey, which is in line with recommended ‘best 
practice’ (cf. Section ‎5.2.2). It is of course worth noting that because of the skip logic, 
not all respondents would have answered the same number of questions, causing 
inevitable variation among participants in the length of the customised surveys. The 
feedback survey also asked respondents about the type of information which they 
would have liked to see in the survey introduction. The information page of the final 
survey was revised in light of the responses as discussed in Section ‎5.4.1.  
The final step of the pilot involved analysing the pilot results in order to detect design 
flaws which impede analysis. Some question types were revised in light of the pilot 
analysis and one question was completely removed. However, it is worth noting that 
despite extensive testing and piloting, some design issues did not become apparent 




In a bid to maximise the diversity of the sample (an important consideration in light 
of the discussion in Section ‎5.2.3), three modes of distribution were used to 
disseminate the survey. The first mode was email: the cooperation of a number of 
academic colleagues at Cairo-based universities was secured to distribute the survey 
to their students. While this mode had the advantage of providing participants with 
assurance about the legitimacy of the study, it had the disadvantage of creating an 
‘educational bias’ in the sample with many holders of higher academic qualifications 
(cf. Section ‎5.5.2.4). 
Second, the survey was distributed via Facebook. I made a public post appealing for 
participants and asking for the post to be shared. The post was shared and re-shared 
by friends and friends-of-friends. The main drawback of this mode is that it is 
essentially a convenience sample. Finally, the survey was distributed on Twitter: the 
survey link was tweeted with a request for followers to retweet. In particular, the 
tweet was channelled through a number of politically active friends who had Twitter 
followers in the tens of thousands.  
Using Facebook and Twitter to distribute the survey has to do with the large 
population of Egyptian Internet users on these social networks, particularly post-
2011 (Amer, 2011; Mubarak, 2011; Newbert, 2011). Employing these three 
distribution modes together enhanced the diversity of the sample, particularly in 
terms of education and political ideology. A reference tag was added at the end of 
the web link distributed over these three mediums to make it possible to monitor the 
responses received through each medium. In all three mediums, the survey invitation 
was emailed, reposted and retweeted at regular intervals to ensure maximum reach 
in this mixed approach. Incentives were not used to recruit respondents; instead, the 
invitation highlighted the scholarly benefit of participating in a survey which would 
shed light on the language situation in Egypt. The findings of the survey are discussed 




5.5 The Survey Results 
The survey attracted 2,474 click-throughs. Out of these, 1,969 (78.6%) attempted the 
survey but dropped out before completing it64. Of the remaining 536 responses, only 
389 were complete responses: 136 were filtered out in the first 4 questions because 
they did not meet the participation criteria (see Figure 4), and a further 11 quit at the 
information statement page. One response was omitted during analysis as it became 
clear that it did not meet one of the conditions for participation65. 
 
Figure 4. Number of participants filtered out by each screening question 
Of the remaining 388 participants, 33.5% were recruited by email, 13.9% were 
recruited from Twitter, and 52.6% from Facebook. In Section ‎5.5.1, I provide an 
overview of the survey findings. A full report with basic descriptive statistics and 
charts is included in Appendix II. In Section ‎5.5.2, I focus on the main findings in 
relation to the identity variables and carry out more advanced statistical tests66.  
                                                             
64 Because the survey was designed not to save the respondent’s IP address, it is possible that some of 
the respondents who abandoned the survey may have completed the survey later. 
65 The respondent stated in the comments box at the end of the survey that they had in fact lived and 
studied outside Egypt but completed the survey anyway ‘because they were trying to help’. 
66 The statistical analysis of the data was carried out using SPSS 19 and SPSS 22. Most tests were 
performed using values from all 388 responses. Where the number of values is less than 388, this is 
clearly indicated (denoted as N). The number of values fluctuates because some questions were not 
answered by all participants, either because they were optional or as a result of the survey’s skip logic. 








Are you Egyptian? Has Egypt been your 
primary place of 
residence for the past 5 
years? 
Are you a resident of 
Greater Cairo? 
Have you completed all 
or most of your school 
education in Egypt? 
185 
 
5.5.1 Overview of the findings 
The main body of the survey is divided into three parts as explained in Section ‎5.4. 
The next three sections overview the findings from each of these parts. 
5.5.1.1 The two H varieties: SA vs. English 
As noted in Section ‎3.4, both SA and English may be considered H varieties in Egypt. 
Participants were given a choice to complete the survey in (Standard) Arabic or 
English: 59.3% chose Arabic and 40.7% chose English. Questions 16 through 23 of the 
survey were designed to compare these two H varieties. The questions asked for SA 
were mirrored for English to allow the comparison of question ‘pairs’. There were 
four questions for each language variety: 
- How confident are you in using …? 
- How often do you use … in your daily life? (excluding religious rituals for SA) 
- In your work, how important is competence in …? 
- In your opinion, how important is it that … should be part of: (a) compulsory 
school education? (b) higher education (university)? 
There were separate ‘spoken’ and ‘written’ ratings in the first three questions to 
address the commonly reported written/spoken divide between SA and EA and the 
different prestige attached to them (cf. sections ‎2.7 and ‎3.2.6). The third question 
only appeared to those who indicated they were employed earlier in the survey (N = 
244). 
Figure 5  illustrates the participants’ responses to the first question. Immediately, the 
disparity between ‘written’ and ‘spoken’ is clear; the difference is significant for both 
SA (Z = -7.255, p = .000) and English (Z = -4.658, p = .000). The higher confidence 
reported in using written SA than spoken SA appears to support the notion that SA is 
regarded mainly as a written variety. However, the fact that this difference is also 
present in English might have something to do with the domain of oral ‘performance’ 
requiring more confidence than writing. Still, the sharper difference between 
‘written’ and ‘spoken’ in SA should be noted. Participants in this sample reported a 
higher level of confidence in using written and spoken English than written and 
spoken SA (Z = -4.212, p = .000 and Z = -6.121, p = .000 respectively), though the 




Figure 5. How confident participants indicated they were in using SA and English (%). 
The results from the first question are mirrored in the frequency of use question 
(Figure 6), but the differences are even more significant. The disparity between 
‘written’ and ‘spoken’ is still clear for both SA (Z = -8.386, p = .000) and English (Z = -
7.467, p = .000) – again sharper for SA. In addition, written English is used 
significantly more frequently than written SA (Z = -8.313, p = .000) and spoken 
English more so than spoken SA (Z = -11.171, p = .000) – again, the difference is 
sharper for ‘spoken’. It is worth noting that there was a significant relationship 
between level of confidence and frequency of use for the four items, where the 
former was treated as a predictor for the latter: spoken SA (Wald = 58.737, p = .000); 
written SA (Wald = 88.893, p = .000); spoken English (Wald = 147.645, p = .000); 
written English (Wald = 129.712, p = .000). 
 
Figure 6. How frequently participants reported using SA and English in their daily lives (%). 
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The same general trend sustains in the third question regarding importance at work: 
written English is seen as the most important and spoken Arabic as the least 
important. Again there was a highly significant difference between the importance of 
written and spoken English (Z = -3.720, p = .000) and written and spoken SA (Z = -
6.079, p = .000) – a bigger difference is seen for SA once more. Moreover, written 
English is reported as significantly more important at work than written SA (Z = -
10.031, p = .000), as is spoken English than spoken SA (Z = -11.443, p = .000) – and 
once more the difference is greater in the ‘spoken’ item. One remarkable finding 
from this question is the fact that SA (both spoken and written) is reported as being 
‘not important at all’ at work by a considerable portion of the participants. 
 
Figure 7. How important participants indicated SA and English were in their work (%). 
The story is somewhat different for the last question. Notwithstanding the fact that 
SA had the lowest level of confidence, lowest frequency of use and lowest 
importance at work in the previous questions, the majority of participants indicated 
that it is extremely important that it should be part of compulsory school education. 
Indeed, SA is considered significantly more important in compulsory school 
education than English (Z = -4.303, p = .000). This is in line with Mejdell’s (2006) 
observation that the validity domain of SA is greater than its domain of use (cf. 
Section ‎3.2.5). However, the picture is reversed in university education where English 
is considered significantly more important than SA (Z = -7.257, p = .000). In general, 
both SA and English were considered more important in school than university. 
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However, while the difference for English was only marginally significant (Z = -1.997, 
p = .046), the difference for Arabic was not only highly significant (Z = -12.473, p = 
.000), but the difference margin is remarkable! Given the role of universities as 
gatekeepers to the job market in Egypt, the shift in the emphasis from SA to English 
between school and university could signal recognition of the greater utility of 
English in the job market, especially in light of the results from the previous question. 
 
Figure 8. Participants’ opinions about the importance of SA and English in education (%) 
Two explanatory variables of particular relevance to this section – especially the first 
three questions – is the participants’ SES (cf. Section ‎5.5.2.3) and main language of 
education (cf. Section ‎5.5.2.4). The relationship between political ideology and the 
participants’ attitudes towards the importance of English and SA in education is also 
investigated in Section ‎5.5.2.5.  
5.5.1.2 Attitudes towards recent language changes 
In questions 25 through 31, participants were asked about their attitudes towards 
five specific examples of recent changes in language use: the use of EA (in Arabic 
script) in printed Arabic magazines, Vodafone Egypt’s replacement of a SA service 
messages with an EA message, the launch of Wikipedia Masry, the use of LA in movie 
billboards, and the use of LA in printed ‘English’ magazines. A short description of the 
language change item was provided along with a visual example (an audio recording 
was provided for the Vodafone message and a web link was provided for Wikipedia 
Masry). The participants were then presented with a number of positive and 
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negative evaluative statements about the item, and they were required to select 
whether they agreed or disagreed with each statement. Some statements were 
mirrored across the five items to facilitate cross comparison.  
Out of the five items, the two items related to the use of LA generated the greatest 
consensus over the evaluative statements, highlighting negative attitudes towards LA 
use in these contexts. The use of EA in print and the launch of Wikipedia Masry were 
also negatively evaluated overall although the difference was not as marked as in the 
LA items. Participants were almost equally divided when it came to the Vodafone 
message, with no clear overall positive or negative orientation. To illustrate this, 
Figure 9 shows the proportion of participants who agreed to the statement “I think it 
is a threat to the Arabic language” in relation to the first four items. A McNemar test 
determined that there is a significant difference between the responses to the 
Vodafone message item and each of the three other items (p=.000 in all three cases). 
 
Figure 9. Frequency of agreement that these changes pose a threat to the Arabic language 
Similarly, Figure 10 shows the proportion of participants who agreed that it was good 
to see/hear EA being used as described in the item. Again, a McNemar test reveals a 
significant difference between the responses to the Vodafone message item 
compared to EA in print (p=.008) and Wikipedia Masry (p=.000). That the Vodafone 
message generated the least negative attitudes could be associated with the fact 
that it was the only example of oral use in the item list. This could suggest that it is 
more acceptable for EA to encroach on SA in the spoken domains than in the written 
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domains, lending credence to the interpretation of the findings in Section ‎5.5.1.1, 
and to the validity of the written association of SA. 
 
Figure 10. Frequency of agreement that it is good to see/hear EA being used in this way 
In general, most of the participants were aware of the language change items; the 
only exception being Wikipedia Masry – 69% of the participants had never heard of it 
before. Figure 11 indicates the participants’ awareness of the different items.  
 
Figure 11. Number of participants who were not aware of each item 
Although there are clear differences between how the different language change 
items were evaluated, running a series of chi-square tests also reveals highly 
significant relationships between how the participants responded to each of the 
items; that is to say that a participant who perceived one item as a threat to the 
Arabic language, was likely to indicate the same with respect to other items. Such 
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Indeed, in Q25, although 49.7% of respondents indicated that they found it easier to 
understand the content of magazines with EA, 61.1% disagreed that it was good to 
see EA being used in this way, and 66% agreed that it was a threat to the Arabic 
language. That more participants accept this change as an improvement from a 
literacy point of view than are willing to evaluate it as ‘good’ change can only be 
explained in ideological terms. This is investigated further in Section ‎5.5.2.5.  
5.5.1.3 Language choice: medium and audience effect 
Questions 32 through 39 were language choice questions. Participants were 
presented with a number of scenarios of written language use and asked to select 
the language variety they were most likely to use in each case. To allow examining 
medium and audience effect, the scenarios were manipulated so that either the 
recipient or medium changed, but the options remained the same: SA, EA in Arabic 
script, LA, English, and a combination of English and LA. The participants were also 
presented with an ‘other’ option. A recurring option which came up in the 
participants’ ‘other’ comments box was ‘SA mixed with EA’. Not including this option 
in the list was clearly a grave oversight on my part67. The scenarios given to the 
participants were: 
- Q32: Writing an email to a close Egyptian friend 
- Q33: Writing an email to your superior at work 
- Q34: Writing an email to your teacher/lecturer 
- Q35: Writing a text message to a close Egyptian friend 
- Q36: Writing a text message to one of your parents 
- Q37: Writing a handwritten letter to a close Egyptian friend 
- Q38: Writing a handwritten memo to your superior at work 
- Q39: Writing a handwritten letter to your principal/dean 
Questions 33 and 38 were only asked of those who had indicated they were 
employed, and questions 34 and 39 were only asked of those who had indicated they 
were students. All participants were asked the remaining questions.  
                                                             
67 In some cases, more than 10 participants who selected the ‘other’ option indicated that they would 
use SA+EA. As I could not ignore this, I added an extra entry in the analysis for this option. However, 
this does not rectify what is fundamentally a design flaw in the survey; this workaround comes with 
the caveat that, since all participants were forced to choose from the 5 options they were presented 
with, there is always the possibility that more participants could have chosen SA+EA had they been 
given this option in the list. 
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Figure 12 illustrates participants’ language choice when writing an email to a close 
friend (N = 368), to their superior at work (N = 235), and to their teacher/lecturer (N 
= 150). Immediately, it is glaringly clear that SA and English are favoured in the two 
more formal functions of emailing a superior and emailing a teacher/lecturer – in 
essence confirming the status of SA and English as H varieties. It is particularly worth 
noting here how English overtakes SA in both cases. The picture is quite different 
when emailing a friend, showing greater diversity in choice and a preference for EA 
in Arabic script and English mixed with LA, which are only selected by a minority of 
participants for the two more formal functions. 
 
Figure 12. Language choice in the medium of email 
Figure 13 tells a similar story. Again, there is more spread across the language 
choices when writing a handwritten letter to a close friend (N = 374) than when 
writing a handwritten message to a participant’s superior at work (N = 222) or 
principal/dean (N = 166), with SA and English dominating the more formal functions. 
 
Figure 13. Language choice in the handwritten medium 
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Figure 14 compares language choice in the two functions of texting a close friend (N 
= 384) and texting a parent (N = 349). The premise here is that communicating with a 
parent is not as informal as communicating with a friend, and that it involves 
addressing someone who is generationally senior. There is considerable spread 
across the language choices in both functions, however what is striking here is that 
the use of LA and English mixed with LA, which are popular choices when texting a 
friend, decline sharply when texting a parent in favour of EA in Arabic script, English 
and SA (in this order). This suggests that parents who belong to an older generation 
may have more difficulty understanding LA than a friend who is likely to be 
generationally closer. This is supported by the findings in Section ‎5.5.2.2.  
 
Figure 14. Language choice in the medium of mobile text messages 
To investigate medium effect, Figure 15 illustrates language choice across the three 
different mediums when writing to a close friend (N = 378 for email; N = 384 for text; 
N = 380 for handwritten letter). The similarity between the two electronic mediums 
(email and text) is worth noting. That more participants selected LA when texting 
(25%) than when emailing (10.6%) a friend may be explained by the fact that, as one 
participant noted in the comments, a standard text message allows more Latin 
characters than Arabic characters68. In other words, it effectively ‘costs more’ to use 
Arabic script in text messages. In general, there is a clear preference for the Latin 
script choices in the electronic mediums, compared to a preference for the Arabic 
script choices (SA and EA in Arabic script) in the handwritten medium. In particular, 
SA sustains the greatest ‘increase’ in the handwritten medium (27.3%) when 
compared to the electronic mediums (9% in email and 3.6% in text).   
                                                             
68 Most mobile phones use 7-bit encoding for Latin characters (as in English) and 16-bit encoding for 
non-Latin characters (as in Arabic). Hence, while the limit on a Latin script text message is typically 160 




Figure 15. Language choice when the addressee is the participant’s friend 
As Figure 16 illustrates, when communicating with their superior, participants 
demonstrate greater preference for SA in the handwritten medium (N = 222, 33.8%) 
than in email (N = 235, 23.4%), although the difference is not as great as in the 
context of communicating with a friend. A straightforward script explanation does 
not work here since even EA in Arabic script is selected by 5.1% in the medium of 
email, but by 1.4% only in the handwritten medium. The overall picture is not very 
different: general preference for the H varieties, but clearly more for English. LA is 
absent in both mediums, and English mixed with LA is only present in email (1.3%). 
 
Figure 16. Language choice when the addressee is the participant’s superior at work 
This general preference for the H varieties sustains when comparing email to 
teacher/lecturer (N = 150) with handwritten letter to principal/dean (N = 166), as 
illustrated in Figure 17. The greater preference for SA in the handwritten medium is 
worth noting here, although this may in fact be the result of manipulating the 
recipient (communicating with a principal/dean could be regarded as more formal 
than with a teacher/lecturer). As above, EA in Arabic script is chosen by less 
participants in the handwritten medium (0.6%) than in the medium of email (8.7%). 
Also, LA is completely absent from both mediums, and English combined with LA is 




Figure 17. Language choice for email to teacher/lecturer and handwritten letter to 
principal/dean 
Overall, the language use questions indicate a clear medium effect particularly 
between electronic mediums and the handwritten medium where preference for SA 
increases. In general, there appears to be a preference for the Latin script choices in 
the electronic mediums, compared to a preference for Arabic script choices in the 
handwritten medium. This is clearest in the case of writing to a friend. There is also a 
strong addressee effect: in the more formal contexts a clear preference for the two H 
varieties can be seen, with low preference for EA in Arabic script, even lower for 
English combined with LA and complete absence of LA (an order which could suggest 
their perceived degree of informality). On the other hand, language choice is more 
spread out in the informal context of communicating with a close friend; here, EA in 
Arabic script is a popular choice. Moreover, generational difference between writer 
and addressee in the case of texting parents appears to have a negative impact on 
choosing LA and English mixed with LA. Other factors which could influence language 
choice are investigated in Section ‎5.5.2. 
5.5.2 Identity Variables 
In the following sections, I treat the identity variables as explanatory variables and 
investigate the relationship between these variables on the one hand and the 
participants’ language attitudes and reported language practices on the other. The 
identity variables investigated are gender, age, socio-economic status, education and 
political ideology. Religion (RQ5) has been excluded since the sample was not diverse 
enough for religion to be treated as an explanatory variable: the majority of 
participants (93%) indicated that they were Muslim, while 12 indicated they were 




154 (40%) of the survey participants indicated they were male, and 234 (60%) 
indicated they were female. This biased gender distribution is consistent with the 
higher rates of female participation reported in survey studies (cf. Section ‎5.2.3). 
Comparing the responses of males and females reveals a few instances of significant 
differences: males reported higher confidence and frequency in SA use. There was 
also a significant difference in code choices between males and females in some of 
the language use questions. However, it is also worth noting that a significantly 
higher proportion of females attended private schools and received education in a 
foreign language. Figure 18 illustrates the significant difference between males and 
females in terms of language of education (χ2 = 39.265, df = 2, p = .000).  
 
Figure 18. Number of males and females who studied in each language 
Moreover, as Figure 19 illustrates, survey participants with higher socio-economic 
status (SES) were more likely to be female (Wald = 19.639, p = .000). Regression 
analysis reveals that it is actually the effects of school type and SES (see sections 
‎5.5.2.3 and ‎5.5.2.4 respectively) confounded with gender, which result in the 




Figure 19. Percentage of males and females within each SES category 
5.5.2.2 Age 
As illustrated in Figure 20, there was a clear bias towards younger respondents with 
a mean age of 27.4 years69. Again, this is in line with the findings of web survey 
studies (cf. Section ‎5.2.3), as well as what might be expected given the age 
distribution of Internet users in Egypt (cf. Section ‎5.3.2). Three quarters of 
participants were aged 20-30, with this pattern sustained across genders.  
 
Figure 20. Age distribution of participants 
                                                             
69 The sample includes four participants below the age of 16 – the result of an oversight on my part to 
include a condition or filtering question to ensure a minimum age for participation. 
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Generally, age was not a significant explanatory variable for language attitudes 
except in a few questions pertaining to LA. As one might expect, there was a 
significant relationship between age and familiarity with LA (Q29), (N = 388, rho = 
.251, p = .000), where younger participants reported being more familiar with LA 
than older participants (see Figure 21). Indeed, the older the participants the more 
likely they were to agree that it was confusing to read English mixed with LA in 
printed magazines (Q31), (N = 388, Wald = 10.442, p = .001). 
 
Figure 21. Familiarity with LA by mean age 
On the other hand, age was clearly important in the language choice questions. 
When writing an email to a close Egyptian friend (Q32), older participants were more 
likely to choose SA (Wald = 17.755, p = .000), less likely to choose LA (Wald = 11.289, 
p = .001)70, and less likely to choose English mixed with LA (Wald = 6.316, p = .012). 
Similarly, when writing a text to a close Egyptian friend (Q35), older participants 
were again more likely to choose SA (N = 387, Wald = 22.077, p = .000) and less likely 
to choose LA (N = 387, Wald = 12.918, p = .000). Older participants were also more 
likely to choose SA (N = 352, Wald = 15.003, p = .000) when writing a text to one of 
their parents (Q36). These results indicate a general preference for SA and 
dispreference for LA among the older participants. 
                                                             
70 It is worth noting that this option was not selected by any participant above the age of 35. 
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5.5.2.3 Socio-economic status (SES) 
Instead of asking direct questions about income or social standing, a number of 
questions were included in the survey as a means of ‘diagnosing’ the SES of the 
respondent71. Four points were used as SES indicators: mobile phone use (Q11-13), 
computer accessibility (Q14), Internet connectivity (Q15), and type of school (Q08). 
In general, the results indicate that the survey sample is technologically well-
connected with high computer availability and Internet connectivity. In fact, all but 
one participant had mobile phones, and of these 68.3% owned a smart phone. More 
strikingly, 76.8% owned their own laptop. All of these figures point to a generally 
well-off sample.  
In terms of education, the sample is well-divided between the two major types of 
schools: 46.7% for public schools (including experimental), and 53.3% for private 
schools (including international). There is a significant relationship between type of 
education and owning a laptop (N = 388, Z = -2.777, p = .005) and a smart phone (N = 
371, Z = -3.313, p = .001). An SES variable was computed out of these three variables, 
with a possible range of 1-6: 1 being the lowest possible point on the scale (attended 
a public school and does not own a smart phone or a laptop) and 6 being the highest 
(attended an international school and owns both a smart phone and a laptop). The 
distribution of the sample across this computed SES scale is shown in Figure 22. 
 
Figure 22. Distribution of the sample across the computed SES scale 
                                                             
71 Not only would have questions about income potentially deterred participants from completing the 
survey, but they could also be misleading. For instance a student who has no income of their own may 
in fact come from a very wealthy family and attend a very expensive school or university. 
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This SES indicator proves to be a powerful explanatory variable. Significantly, as 
demonstrated in Figure 23, participants with a higher SES were more likely to 
complete the survey in English (Wald = 60.924, p = .000). 
 
Figure 23. Language selected to complete the survey by SES (%) 
With respect to the two H varieties (cf. Section  5.5.1.1), Figure 24 illustrates the 
negative correlation between SES and written SA use (rho = .224, p = .000).  
 
Figure 24. Frequency of written SA use by SES (%) 
On the other hand, there was a significant correlation between SES and English 
confidence, both spoken (rho = -.453, p = .000) and written (rho = -.365, p = .000), as 
illustrated in Figure 25.  
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English confidence - spoken English confidence - written  
  
 
Figure 25. Confidence in using English by SES (%) 
Similarly, SES was significantly correlated with English use, spoken (rho = -.423, p = 
.000) and written (rho = -.457, p = .000), as illustrated in Figure 26. Interestingly, SES 
was also significantly correlated with the importance of competence in spoken 
English at work (rho = -.302, p = .000), and with how important participants 
considered that English should be part of school education (rho = -.237, p = .000) – in 
both cases, the higher the SES, the more important English was deemed. 
English use - spoken English use - written  
  
 
Figure 26. Frequency of English use by SES (%) 
SES did not correlate significantly with any of the items in the language attitudes 
section (cf. Section ‎5.5.1.2) except for two statements related to the use of LA in 
printed English magazines (Q31): The higher the participants’ SES the more likely 
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they were to agree that LA is a convenient way of delivering content which has to do 
with the Egyptian culture (Wald = 6.095, p = .014), and to disagree that it is confusing 
to read English mixed with LA in a printed magazine (Wald = 14.208, p = .000). 
On the other hand, SES was significantly correlated with language choice. As Figure 
27 illustrates, when emailing a friend, participants with higher SES were less likely to 
choose SA (Wald = 13.171, p = .000) and EA in Arabic script (Wald = 31.285, p = .000), 
and more likely to choose English mixed with LA (Wald = 37.730, p = .014). When 
emailing their superior, they were less likely to use SA (N = 244, Wald = 25.669, p = 
.000), and more likely to use English (N = 244, Wald = 21.630, p = .000). Similarly, 
when emailing their teacher/lecturer, they were less likely to use SA (N = 158, Wald = 
14.214, p = .000), and more likely to use English (N = 158, Wald = 25.409, p = .000). 
Email to friend Email to superior at work Email to teacher/lecturer 
   
 
Figure 27. Language choice in email by SES (%) 
As Figure 28 illustrates, when texting a friend, those with higher SES were less likely 
to use EA in Arabic script (N = 387, Wald = 43.051, p = .000), and more likely to use 
English mixed with LA (N = 387, Wald = 43.148, p = .000). When texting their parent, 
they were less likely to use SA (N = 352, Wald = 4.906, p = .027) and EA in Arabic 
script (N = 352, Wald = 33.789, p = .000) but more likely to use English (N = 352, Wald 
= 35.587, p = .000) and English mixed with LA (N = 352, Wald = 15.331, p = .000). 
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Figure 28. Language choice in texting by SES (%) 
Finally, as Figure 29 illustrates, when hand-writing a letter to a friend, those with 
higher SES were less likely to use EA in Arabic script (N = 384, Wald = 15.612, p = 
.000), and more likely to use English (N = 384, Wald = 21.281, p = .000) and English 
mixed with LA (N = 384, Wald = 23.613, p = .000). When hand-writing a message to 
their superior, they were less likely to use SA (N = 228, Wald = 23.007, p = .000) and 
more likely to use English (N = 228, Wald = 27.650, p = .000). Similarly, when hand-
writing a letter to their principal/dean, they were less likely to use SA (N = 170, Wald 
= 23.267, p = .000) and more likely to use English (N = 170, Wald = 23.737, p = .000). 
Handwritten letter to friend Handwritten message to superior 
Handwritten letter to 
principal/dean 
   
 
Figure 29. Language choice in the handwritten medium by SES (%) 
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These results indicate that as SES increases, preference for English use increases, as 
does dispreference for SA use. In addition, there appears to be a ‘script divide’ 
between participants of lower and higher SES – with Arabic script varieties being 
preferred by the former, and Latin script varieties being preferred by the latter.  
5.5.2.4 Education 
62.9% of participants were employed, 43.8% were students, 18.6% were both 
employed and students, and 11.9% were neither employed nor students. 94.4% of 
those who indicated they were both employed and studying already had a university 
degree or higher, i.e. they were pursuing some form of postgraduate study. This is of 
significance considering that the sample is already very highly educated with several 
holders of postgraduate degrees (see Figure 30). This is mostly the result of enlisting 
academic colleagues in Egypt to distribute the survey in their departments (cf. 
Section ‎5.4.4). As only one participant selected ‘vocational diploma’ as their highest 
academic qualification, this category was removed from the analysis. 
 
Figure 30. The distribution of participants by highest academic qualification attained 
Academic qualification correlates with a number of survey items. Those with higher 
qualifications reported greater confidence in using English (Q20), both spoken (N = 
387, rho = -.133, p = .009) and written (N = 387, rho = -.142, p = .005). They also 
reported using spoken English more frequently (Q21), (N = 387, rho = -.187, p = .000). 
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Having a higher qualification was also correlated with disagreeing that it was easier 
to understand the content of printed magazines containing EA (Q25.2), (N = 387, 
Wald = 15.564, p = .000). A possible explanation is that highly educated participants 
are better able to understand written SA, and therefore would not necessarily find 
written EA easier to understand. However, this item also correlates significantly with 
age (N = 388, Wald = 6.896, p = .009). To investigate this further, binary logistic 
regression was performed with both age and academic qualification as predictors. 
Academic qualification was still significant (N = 387, Wald = 10.722, p = .001), while 
age was no longer significant (N = 387, Wald = .476, p = .490). Highly educated 
participants were also more likely to agree that they found it confusing to read EA in 
printed publications (Q25), possibly because they are more accustomed to reading 
SA than those with lower qualifications, (N = 387, Wald = 7.734, p = .005). 
Regarding language choice, those with higher qualifications were more likely to 
choose SA when emailing a friend (Q32), (N = 387, Wald = 13.850, p = .000). Other 
marginally significant relationships between academic qualification and language 
choice were rendered non-significant in regression analysis when age was taken into 
account. The educational variable which proved more significant in relation to 
language choice was the main language of education72.  
As discussed in Section ‎3.4, language of education corresponds closely to school type 
in Egypt. In addition to public, private and international schools, the survey options 
for school type included experimental schools. These are state-funded schools which 
teach some subjects in English and therefore fall somewhere between public and 
private schools. The correlation between school type and language of education is 
illustrated in Table 6 (H = 185.811, 2 d.f., p = .000)73. Since the French-educated 
participants behaved similarly to the English-educated participants, they were 
grouped together in the analysis, yielding two categories: Arabic vs. Foreign. 
                                                             
72 For the purposes of this study, the main language of education was defined as the language in 
which science and mathematics are taught (since it is a government requirement that certain subjects, 
such as Islamic studies and social studies, are always taught in Arabic). 
73 Although, strictly speaking, type of school is a categorical variable (and hence the most appropriate 
test here would be chi-square), it was deliberately coded as an ordinal variable given the SES 
connotations of the type of school attended (see Section ‎5.5.2.3), and hence the Kruskall-Wallis test 




Main language of education 
Total Arabic English French 
Type of school Public school  149 1 0 150 
 99.3% .7% .0% 100.0% 
Experimental 
school 
 3 28 0 31 
 9.7% 90.3% .0% 100.0% 
Private school  52 118 12 182 
 28.6% 64.8% 6.6% 100.0% 
International school  0 24 1 25 
 .0% 96.0% 4.0% 100.0% 
Total  204 171 13 388 
 52.6% 44.1% 3.4% 100.0% 
Table 6. Cross tabulation of school type and the main language of education 
As anticipated, participants’ language of education – like their SES – correlates with 
the survey language they chose (Table 7), (χ2 = 98.958, df = 1, p = .000). Indeed, 
regression analysis with both SES and language of education as predictors for the 
survey language shows both explanatory variables to be significant: (Wald = 14.711, 
p = .000) for SES, and (Wald = 39.113, p = .000) for language of education. 
 
language of education 
Total Arabic Foreign 
Survey 
Language 
English 35 123 158 
17.2% 66.8% 40.7% 
Arabic 169 61 230 
82.8% 33.2% 59.3% 
Total 204 184 388 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 7. Cross tabulation of survey language and the main language of education 
The main language of education also correlates with participants’ responses to the 
questions about the two H varieties (cf. Section  5.5.1.1). As Figure 31 illustrates, 
Arabic-educated participants reported greater confidence in using SA, both spoken (Z 
= -3.644, p = .000) and written (Z = -5.354, p = .000) than foreign-educated 
participants. The former also reported higher frequency of SA use in written form (Z 
= -4.477, p = .000), and indicated higher importance for SA in university education (Z 
= -2.857, p = .004) than their foreign-educated counterparts. 
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SA confidence - spoken SA confidence - written 
  
Figure 31. Level of confidence in SA use by language of education (% within level) 
Conversely, foreign-educated participants reported greater confidence in English use, 
spoken (Z = -6.628, p = .000) and written (Z = -6.588, p = .000) than Arabic-educated 
participants. They also reported higher frequency of English use in spoken (Z = -
6.968, p = .000) and written forms (Z = -7.381, p = .000), (see Figure 32). Moreover, 
English – both spoken (N = 244, Z = -3.601, p = .000) and written (N = 244, Z = -2.991, 
p = .003) – was more important at work for foreign-educated participants. Foreign-
educated participants also indicated higher importance for English in school 
education (Z = -3.850, p = .004). 
English confidence - spoken English confidence - written 
  
Figure 32. Level of confidence in English use by language of education (% within level) 
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In terms of language attitudes, Arabic-educated participants indicated a less 
favourable attitude towards EA in new domains than foreign-educated participants. 
54.4% of Arabic-educated participants agreed that they found it confusing to read EA 
in printed magazines because they are not used to reading Arabic in this way (Q25.2) 
compared to 33.7% of foreign-educated participants (χ2 = 16.804, df = 1, p = .000). 
Moreover, 56.9% of the former preferred the old VE messages in SA (Q26.6), 
compared to 42.4% of the latter (χ2 = 8.104, df = 1, p = .004).  
On the other hand, foreign-educated participants had a more favourable attitude 
towards LA than their Arabic-educated counterparts. From the beginning, foreign-
educated participants indicated greater familiarity with LA (Z = -8.007, p = .000). In 
addition, 37% of foreign-educated participants vs. 24.5% of Arabic-educated 
participants agreed that LA was a convenient way of writing EA (Q30.2) – a significant 
relationship (χ2 = 7.082, df = 1, p = .008). Similarly, 37% of the former vs. 22.1% of the 
latter agreed that LA was a convenient way of delivering content that had to do with 
Egyptian culture (Q31.2), (χ2 = 10.402, df = 1, p = .001). Conversely, 78.9% of Arabic-
educated participants agreed that it was confusing to read English mixed with LA in 
English magazines (Q31.4), compared to 63.6% of foreign-educated participants (χ2 = 
11.199, df = 1, p = .001). 
Language of education was most significant as an explanatory variable for language 
choice in written communication. Figure 33 illustrates participants’ language choices 
in email by language of education. When emailing a friend (Q32), more Arabic-
educated participants selected SA (χ2 = 19.004, df = 1, p = .000) and EA in Arabic 
script (χ2 = 39.439, df = 1, p = .000). On the other hand, more foreign-educated 
participants selected LA (χ2 = 7.210, df = 1, p = .007) and English mixed with LA (χ2 = 
34.997, df = 1 p = .000). When emailing their superior (Q33), more Arabic-educated 
participants selected SA (N = 244, χ2 = 20.160, df = 1, p = .000) and more foreign-
educated participants selected English (N = 244, χ2 = 15.468, df = 1, p = .000). 
Similarly, when emailing their teacher/lecturer (Q34), more Arabic-educated 
participants selected SA (N = 158, χ2 = 10.725, df = 1, p = .001) and more foreign-
educated participants selected English (N = 158, χ2 = 21.381, df = 1, p = .000). 
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Email to friend Email to superior at work Email to teacher/lecturer  
   
 
Figure 33. Language choice in email by language of education (%) 
Language choices in the medium of text messages are illustrated in Figure 34. When 
texting a friend (Q35), more Arabic-educated participants selected EA in Arabic script 
(N = 387, χ2 = 35.753, df = 1, p = .000), while more foreign-educated participants 
selected English mixed with LA (N = 387, χ2 = 33.446, df = 1, p = .000). When texting 
their parent (Q36), again more Arabic-educated participants selected EA (N = 352, χ2 
= 54.115, df = 1, p = .000) and more foreign-educated participants selected English (N 
= 352, χ2 = 57.874, df = 1, p = .000) and English mixed with LA (N = 352, χ2 = 17.765, 
df = 1, p = .000). 
Text to friend Text to parent  
  
 
Figure 34. Language choice in texting by language of education (%) 
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Figure 35 illustrates the language choices of participants in the handwritten medium. 
When writing a handwritten letter to a friend (Q37), more Arabic-educated 
participants selected SA (N = 384, χ2 = 18.973, df = 1, p = .000) and EA in Arabic script 
(N = 384, χ2 = 13.841, df = 1, p = .000). On the other hand, more foreign-educated 
participants selected English (N = 384, χ2 = 23.554, df = 1, p = .000) and English mixed 
with LA (N = 384, χ2 = 24.687, df = 1, p = .000). When writing a handwritten message 
to their superior (Q38), more Arabic-educated participants selected SA (N = 228, χ2 = 
19.596, df = 1, p = .000) and more foreign-educated participants selected English (N = 
228, χ2 = 23.426, df = 1, p = .000). Similarly, when writing a handwritten letter to 
their teacher/lecturer (Q39), more Arabic-educated participants selected SA (N = 
170, χ2 = 28.445, df = 1, p = .000) and more foreign-educated participants selected 
English (N = 170, χ2 = 27.662, df = 1, p = .000). 
Handwritten letter to 
friend 
Handwritten message 
to superior  
Handwritten letter to 
principal/dean 
 
   
 
Figure 35. Language choice in the handwritten medium by language of education (%) 
What these results from the language use section point to is not only a general 
language bias – for SA by Arabic-educated participants and for English by foreign-
educated participants especially in formal communication – but also a very clear 
script bias. Even in the informal context of communicating with a friend – where 
selections were very diverse across the three mediums – there was a discernible 
script divide with Arabic-educated participants favouring the Arabic-script choices 
while their foreign-educated counterparts favoured the Latin script choices. 
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5.5.2.5 Political ideology 
There are a number of variables in the survey which index political ideology in some 
form. These include: identity rank (Q40), feelings about Egypt vis-à-vis the Arab 
World (Q41), and the political party voted for in the 2011-2012 parliamentary 
elections (Q42). I will begin with the party voted for, which did not only prove to be a 
significant explanatory variable, but is perhaps one of the most valuable 
contributions of this survey, given its critical timing.  
Q42 was an optional question, which provided participants with a drop down list of 
all the options voters would have been presented with across the different electoral 
circuits in Greater Cairo during the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections in the ‘closed-
lists’ category.  These 21 options were classified by their main political ideology, as 
shown in Table 8. Political alliances are marked with a double asterisk, and political 
parties which were not selected by any participants are highlighted in grey. I discuss 
in detail how I arrived at this ‘spectrum’ of political orientations in Section ‎6.2.2. 
Political Party/alliance Political Ideology/position 
Al-Nour **  رونلا Islamist 1 
Freedom and Justice** ةلادعلاو ةيرحلا  Islamist 2 
Egyptian Citizen يرصملا نطاوملا  
Political right 
Modern Egypt ةثيدحلا رصم  
National Party of Egypt يموقلا رصم  
New Independents ددجلا نيلقتسملا  
Al-Horeyya ةيرحلا  
Conservatives نيظفاحملا  
Reform and Development ةيمنتلاو حلاصلإا  
Al-Wasat طسولا  
Islamist-centre Egyptian Revolution ةيرصملا ةروثلا  
Egypt Revolution ةروثلا رصم  
Al-Adl لدعلا  
Centre 
Al-Wa’i يعولا  
New Wafd ديدجلا دفولا  
Liberal-centre/centre-left 
Al-Ghad ديدجلا دغلا  
Constitutional Social رحلا يعامتجلاا يروتسدلا  
Democratic Peace يطارقميدلا ملاسلا  
Arab Democratic Nasserist يرصانلا يطارقميدلا يبرعلا  
The Revolution Continues Alliance** ةرمتسم ةروثلا فلاحت  Leftist-socialist/communist 
Egyptian Bloc** ةيرصملا ةلتكلا  Secular-liberal 
Table 8. The main political ideologies/positions of the political parties/alliances running in 
the closed-list category of the 2011-2012 (lower house) parliamentary elections 
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348 participants answered this question, but 35 indicated that they did not vote74 
and 18 indicated that they could not remember who they voted for. The distribution 
of the remaining 295 valid responses by political orientation is shown in Figure 36 
(left)75. For comparison, I also demonstrate how the 332 closed-list seats won in the 
2012 parliament were distributed by political orientation on the right76. 
 
 
Figure 36. Left: the distribution of participants along the political orientation spectrum; 
Right: the distribution of closed-list parliamentary seats won in 2012 along the spectrum 
Since the top of the spectrum corresponds to religious and political conservatism, 
while the bottom of the spectrum corresponds to religious and political liberalism, I 
will refer to these ends of the spectrum as the ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ ends 
respectively. One of the things which are immediately noticeable in this political 
spectrum is that it does not include the dimension of pan-Arabism vs. separatist 
Egyptian nationalism. This is because political parties touting such nationalisms were 
spread out across the spectrum and were often part of larger political alliances (cf. 
Section ‎6.2.2). A separate variable was used to index national orientation (Q41), 
where participants were asked to select which of the following statements most 
accurately described how they felt about Egypt in relation to the Arab World: 
                                                             
74 At least 11 of these had not yet reached the voting age of 18 at the time of the 2011-2012 elections.  
75 It is worth noting – particularly in the following graphs where results are presented as percentages 
of each category in the political ideology spectrum – that there are only 8 participants in the political 
right category, and only 6 in the liberal-centre-left category. 
76 Election results from Abdel Ghani (2012). 











x Egypt is an integral part of the Arab World. Egypt and other Arab countries are one and 
the same. They have a shared identity, heritage and language. 
x Egypt is part of the Arab World, but it has its unique identity and heritage. It is misleading 
to think of Egypt and Arab countries as the same thing. 
x Egypt is very different from the Arab states. It has its unique identity, heritage and 
language. It is wrong to link Egypt with Arab countries since they have very little in 
common. 
This was then coded as an ordinal variable with the top answer indexing pan-Arabism 
and the bottom indexing separatist Egyptian nationalism. It is worth noting that, as 
seen in Figure 37, there was a highly significant – though not perfectly ordinal – 
correlation between national orientation (Q41) and political orientation (Q42), (N = 
295, rho = -.294, p = .000). This is discussed in more detail in section ‎6.2.2.  
 
Figure 37. Participants’ national orientation against their political orientation 
The dimension of national identity was also weaved into Q40 where participants 
were asked to rank the following identities from 1 to 3 based on how much they felt 
they belonged to each of them: Arab, Egyptian, Muslim/Christian. The order of 
options was randomised and religious identity only appeared if the participant 
provided an answer in Q05 (i.e. ‘Muslim’ would appear to those who indicated they 
were Muslim and ‘Christian’ to those who indicated they were Christian). While the 
ranking for ‘Arab’ identity was not a significant explanatory variable, the rankings for 
‘Egyptian’ and ‘Muslim’ were significant (the ‘Christian’ category was too small to 
use). As Figure 38 illustrates, the ranking for ‘Egyptian’ identity correlates with 




Figure 38. Participants’ ranking of ‘Egyptian’ identity against their national orientation 
On the other hand, the ranking for both ‘Egyptian’ and ‘Muslim’ identities were 
significantly correlated with political orientation, with Muslim identity ranked higher 
by those at the conservative end of the spectrum (N = 273, rho = .372, p = .000), and 
Egyptian identity ranked higher by those at the liberal end (N = 293, rho = -.345, p = 
.000). This is illustrated in Figure 39.  
Identity rank - Egyptian Identity rank - Muslim  
  
 
Figure 39. Participants’ identity ranks by political orientation 
215 
 
As Figure 40 illustrates, Political orientation as well as Egyptian and Muslim identity 
ranks were significant predictors of the survey language selected by participants. 
Arabic was more likely to be chosen by participants who were at the conservative 
end of the political ideology spectrum (N = 295, Wald = 15.714, p = .000), had a low 
rank for Egyptian identity (N = 385, Wald = 8.251, p = .004) and high rank for Muslim 
(N = 357, Wald = 24.296, p = .000). 
Political orientation Identity rank - Egyptian Identity rank - Muslim  
   
 
Figure 40. Survey language by political orientation and Egyptian and Muslim identity ranks 
Political orientation, national orientation and Egyptian identity rank were all 
significant explanatory variables for language attitudes. With respect to the H 
varieties, those at the conservative end of the political spectrum were more likely to 
indicate the importance of SA in university education (Q19.2) than participants at the 
liberal end (N = 295, rho = .180, p = .002). Similarly, those with a pan-Arab national 
orientation were more likely to indicate the importance of SA than those who felt 
Egypt was very different from Arab countries (rho = .163, p = .001), (see Figure 41). 
Political orientation National orientation  
  
 
Figure 41. SA importance in university education against political and national orientations 
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Conversely, the importance of SA in school education (Q19.1) was less highly rated by 
those who ranked their identity as Egyptians highly (N = 385, rho = -.166, p = .001) as 
illustrated in Figure 42. With regards to attitudes towards English, those at the liberal 
end of the political spectrum were more likely to indicate the importance of English 
in school (Q23.1), (N = 295, rho = -.208, p = .000) and university (Q23.2), (N = 295, rho 
= -.161, p = .006) than those at the conservative end. 
 
Figure 42. Importance of SA in school education against Egyptian identity rank 
When asked about their attitudes towards EA in printed Arabic magazines (Q25), as 
shown in Figure 43, participants were more likely to agree that it is good to see EA 
being used in this way if they were at the liberal end of the political spectrum (N = 
295, Wald = 13.734, p = .000), had a separatist national orientation (N = 388, Wald = 
6.917, p = .009), a high rank for Egyptian identity (N = 385, Wald = 16.713, p = .000) 







Political orientation National orientation  
  
 




Figure 43. Agreement/disagreement with the statement “I think it is good to see EA being 
used in this way” (Q25.1) against the various political ideology indices 
On the other hand, as Figure 44 illustrates, participants were more likely to agree 
that EA in printed publications was a threat to the Arabic language if they were at the 
conservative end of the political spectrum (N = 295, Wald = 11.969, p = .001), had a 
pan-Arab national orientation (N = 388, Wald = 5.861, p = .015), a low rank for 
Egyptian identity (N = 385, Wald = 11.668, p = .001) and a high rank for Muslim 














Figure 44. Agreement/disagreement with the statement “I think it is a threat to the Arabic 
language” (Q25.4) against the various political ideology indices 
Similarly, when asked about their attitudes towards the new VE messages in EA 
(Q26), participants were more likely to agree that it is good to hear EA being used in 
this way if they were at the liberal end of the political spectrum (N = 295, Wald = 
6.734, p = .009), had a separatist national orientation (N = 388, Wald = 11.368, p = 
.001), a high identity rank for Egyptian (N = 385, Wald = 15.885, p = .000) and low for 
Muslim (N = 357, Wald = 7.483, p = .006). Conversely, participants were more likely 
to agree that the new message was a threat to the Arabic language if they were at 
the conservative end of the political spectrum (N = 295, Wald = 12.299, p = .000), had 
a pan-Arab national orientation (N = 388, Wald = 6.675, p = .010), a low identity rank 
for Egyptian (N = 385, Wald = 14.482, p = .000) and high for Muslim (N = 357, Wald = 
10.889, p = .001). Moreover, participants were also more likely to indicate that they 
preferred the old messages in SA if they were at the conservative end of the political 
spectrum (N = 295, Wald = 5.531, p = .019), had a pan-Arab national orientation (N = 
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388, Wald = 5.773, p = .016), a low identity rank for Egyptian (N = 385, Wald = 
19.419, p = .000) and high for Muslim (N = 357, Wald = 5.461, p = .019). Figure 45 
illustrates participants’ responses to these three statements against their Egyptian 
identity rank (the most significant predictor for this question). 
It is good to hear EA being 
used in this way 
I think it is a threat to the 
Arabic language 
I prefer the old messages in 
SA 
 
   
 
Figure 45. Attitudes to new VE messages against Egyptian identity ranks 
When asked about their attitudes towards Wikipedia Masry (Q27), participants were 
more likely to agree that it is good to see EA being used in this way if they had a high 
rank for Egyptian identity (N = 385, Wald = 15.070, p = .000) and a separatist national 
orientation (N = 388, Wald = 5.917, p = .015). Conversely, as Figure 46 illustrates, 
participants were more likely to agree that Wikipedia Masry was a threat to the 
Arabic language if they were at the conservative end of the political spectrum (N = 
295, Wald = 14.020, p = .000), had a pan-Arab national orientation (N = 388, Wald = 
13.959, p = .000), a low rank for Egyptian identity (N = 385, Wald = 10.694, p = .001) 








Political orientation National orientation  
  
 
Identity rank - Egyptian Identity rank - Muslim  
  
 
Figure 46. Agreement/disagreement with the statement “I think it is a threat to the Arabic 
language” (Q28.2) against the various political ideology indices 
Participants’ ranking of Egyptian identity was also the most significant predictor of 
attitudes towards LA in movie billboards (Q30). As Figure 47 demonstrates, those 
who ranked Egyptian identity highly had a more favourable view overall of LA in 
movie billboards: they were more likely to agree that it is fun and fashionable (N = 
385, Wald = 10.374, p = .001), more likely to agree that it is a convenient way of 
writing EA (N = 385, Wald = 8.021, p = .005), and more likely to disagree that it is a 
threat to the Arabic language (N = 385, Wald = 5.664, p = .017). Similarly, those at 
the liberal end of the political spectrum were more likely to agree it is a convenient 
way of writing EA (N = 295, Wald = 9.529, p = .002); and more likely to disagree it is a 
threat to the Arabic language (N = 295, Wald = 16.974, p = .000). Those with a 
separatist national orientation were also more likely to disagree it is a threat to the 
Arabic language (N = 388, Wald = 7.053, p = .008). The ranking of Muslim identity 
was not a significant explanatory variable for this question. 
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I think it is fun and 
fashionable 
I think it is a convenient 
way of writing EA 
I think it is a threat to the 
Arabic Language  
   
 
Figure 47. Attitudes to LA in movie billboards against Egyptian identity ranks 
It was a similar picture with respect to participants’ attitudes towards LA in English 
magazines (Q31). Participants were more likely to agree that it is fun and fashionable 
if they had a separatist national orientation (N = 388, Wald = 5.725, p = .017) and 
high rank for Egyptian identity (N = 385, Wald = 6.982, p = .008). Moreover, those 
who ranked Egyptian identity highly were more likely to agree that LA is a convenient 
way of delivering content which has to with Egyptian culture (N = 385, Wald = 6.893, 
p = .009). Political orientation and Muslim identity rank were not significant. 
In terms of language choice, while political ideology indices were not as significant as 
SES and the main language of education (cf. sections ‎5.5.2.3 and ‎5.5.2.4 
respectively), they were still significant with respect to whether or not SA was chosen 
in informal written communication. For example, when emailing a friend (Q32), SA 
was more likely to be chosen by those who were at the conservative end of the 
political spectrum (N = 295, Wald = 7.164, p = .007), had a pan-Arab national 
orientation (N = 388, Wald = 5.651, p = .017), and a low rank for Egyptian identity (N 
= 385, Wald = 13.036, p = .000). 
Similarly, when texting a friend (Q35), SA was more likely to be chosen by those who 
had a pan-Arab national orientation (N = 387, Wald = 7.285, p = .007), and a low rank 
for Egyptian identity (N = 384, Wald = 5.977, p = .014). Strikingly, participants at the 
conservative end of the political spectrum were more likely to choose EA (N = 294, 
Wald = 10.264, p = .001). When texting a parent (Q36), those who had a low rank for 
Egyptian identity were more likely to choose SA (N = 350, Wald = 7.236, p = .007). 
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When handwriting a letter to a friend (Q37), SA was more likely to be chosen by 
those who were at the conservative end of the political spectrum (N = 293, Wald = 
9.686, p = .002), had a pan-Arab national orientation (N = 384, Wald = 9.023, p = 
.003), a low rank for Egyptian identity (N = 381, Wald = 9.277, p = .002) and a high 
rank for Muslim identity (N = 353, Wald = 6.066, p = .014). 
That political ideology was more significantly correlated with language attitudes than 
(reported) language practices points to a potential discrepancy between attitudes 
and practices. To investigate this further, participants’ responses to the language 
attitude questions were directly compared to their responses about language 
practices related to the two H varieties and language choice in written 
communication. The tests returned only one significant result with regard to 
attitudes to fuṣḥā/ʿāmmiyya: those who reported using written SA frequently were 
more likely to consider Wikipedia Masry a threat to the Arabic language (Wald = 
7.567, p = .006). However, running a series of chi-square tests between language 
attitudes and language choice in written communication revealed a few marginally 
significant results in either direction. That is, having a negative attitude towards a 
pro-ʿāmmiyya change was inconsistently correlated with using SA in some cases and 
with not using it in others, indicating that these correlations are not reliable. 
On the other hand, a favourable attitude towards English was reflected in (reported) 
language practices. Participants who indicated the importance of English in school 
education (Q23.1), were more likely to choose English in an email to their 
teacher/lecturer (N = 158, Wald = 16.044, p = .000), text to their parent (N = 352, 
Wald = 10.640, p = .001), handwritten letter to their friend (N = 384, Wald = 13.842, 
p = .000), handwritten note to their superior (N = 228, Wald = 7.705, p = .006), and 
handwritten letter to their principal/dean (N = 170, Wald = 6.467, p = .011). 
Attitudes and practices involving LA were similarly aligned: participants who 
expressed a favourable view of LA were more likely to report using it in informal 
written communication. There was a positive correlation between agreeing that LA in 
movie billboards was fun and fashionable (Q30.1) and choosing LA in an email to a 
friend (N = 388, χ2 = 13.409, df = 1, p = .000), a text to a friend (N = 387, χ2 = 15.298, 
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df = 1, p = .000), and a handwritten letter to a friend (N = 384, χ2 = 9.666, df = 1, p = 
.002). Similarly, there was a positive correlation between agreeing that LA is a 
convenient way of writing EA (Q30.2) and choosing LA in an email to a friend (N = 
388, χ2 = 15.462, df = 1, p = .000), a text to a friend (N = 387, χ2 = 18.292, df = 1, p = 
.000), and a handwritten letter to a friend (N = 384, χ2 = 15.667, df = 1, p = .000). On 
the other hand, there was no significant correlation between having a negative view 
of LA (considering it a threat to the Arabic language or a trend which will soon die 
out) and not choosing LA in written communication. 
In the same way, a positive attitude towards English mixed with LA was also 
correlated with choosing it in informal written communication. There was a positive 
correlation between agreeing that LA in printed English magazines was fun and 
fashionable (Q31.1) and choosing English mixed with LA in an email to a friend (N = 
388, χ2 = 18.201, df = 1, p = .000), a text to a friend (N = 387, χ2 = 18.621, df = 1, p = 
.000), and a handwritten letter to a friend (N = 384, χ2 = 27.197, df = 1, p = .000). 
Similarly, there was a positive correlation between agreeing that LA was a 
convenient way of delivering content that has to do with Egyptian culture in English 
magazines (Q31.2) and choosing English mixed with LA in an email to a friend (N = 
388, χ2 = 19.077, df = 1, p = .000), a text to a friend (N = 387, χ2 = 18.256, df = 1, p = 
.000), and a handwritten letter to a friend (N = 384, χ2 = 15.505, df = 1, p = .000). On 
the other hand, there was a negative correlation between agreeing that it is 
confusing to read English mixed with LA in English magazines (Q31.4) and choosing 
English mixed with LA in an email to a friend (N = 388, χ2 = 21.504, df = 1, p = .000), a 
text to a friend (N = 387, χ2 = 14.568, df = 1, p = .000), and a handwritten letter to a 
friend (N = 384, χ2 = 19.684, df = 1, p = .000).  
5.6 Limitations 
At the beginning of this chapter I demonstrated that web surveys can be a powerful 
research tool, but there are several issues which must be addressed. Some of these 
issues have to do with the research medium – the strengths and limitations of web 
research – while others have to do with the research method – the self-reporting 
nature of questionnaires. Following a review of the relevant literature, I have 
demonstrated that a screened, self-selected, non-probabilistic, sample was best 
224 
 
suited for the purposes of this study. The survey was designed based on the ‘best 
practices’ which have precipitated from the literature, with due consideration to the 
limitations of this method. The survey was thoroughly tested and piloted before it 
went live from October 2012 to February 2013.  
However, despite thorough testing, some design flaws did not become apparent 
except during the analysis of the final results. The survey did not specify a minimum 
participation age, and four participants were in fact under the age of 16 when they 
completed the survey. Another – greater – oversight was that the choices that were 
given to participants in the questions about written communication did not include a 
mixture of SA and EA (which several participants indicated they were most likely to 
use). Moreover, questions relating to attitudes towards recent language changes 
included two options: agree or disagree. The survey could have been improved by 
adding a ‘neutral’ option. In addition, the comparability of the items relating to 
language choice in written communication could have been improved (cf. Section 
‎5.5.1.3). 
I should also point to a number of ‘reductions’ that I have made in the survey design 
and analysis. The very approach of using identity categories as explanatory variables 
is essentialist in nature. After all, In the poststructuralist tradition, identity is not 
“something fixed for life” but “an ongoing lifelong project in which individuals 
constantly attempt to maintain a sense of balance” (Block, 2006: 35). While this kind 
of ‘strategic essentialism’ (cf. Omoniyi, 2006) is necessary in language surveys, its 
limitations must be recognised. Similarly, while the political orientation spectrum I 
use in Section ‎5.5.2.5 helps make sense of the political scene in Egypt, it is a 
simplification of a very complex reality (cf. Section ‎6.2.2).  
There are also important limitations to the survey findings. In asking participants 
about their use of fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya I have relied on their own perceptions of what 
constitutes fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya which are likely to vary from one participant to 
another. This is an inevitable shortcoming of using the self-reporting technique in 
surveys about Arabic. However, I also note that, in a study about language ideology, 
the importance of participants’ perceptions should not be undermined.  
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Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that the findings of this survey are not 
representative of Egyptian society at large because of the specific characteristics of 
the population of Internet users in Egypt. The characteristics of the survey sample in 
terms of age and SES are generally in line with the profile of Internet users in Egypt, 
however, the very medium of this survey makes it impossible to draw generalisations 
about wider populations.  
The fact that the survey relies on a non-probabilistic sample is reflected in the nature 
of the analysis. I have deliberately avoided presenting the findings as the 
‘percentages’ found in the sample because these are of limited value given the 
survey medium. That is, while the survey indicates that 60% of participants saw 
Wikipedia Masry as a threat to Arabic, I cannot make a claim that the same 
percentage would inhere in a different population. However, investigating the 
internal relationship between the variables is concerned less with representativeness 
and more with diversity – and it is these relationships which I focus on in my analysis. 
Because the survey sample contained a good distribution of public vs. private 
educated participants, and to a large extent a good distribution along the political 
orientation spectrum, this made it possible to note important correlations in the 
sample. These findings demonstrate great consistency and are therefore considered 
highly reliable. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The main purpose of the survey was to answer RQ3; to investigate the participants’ 
attitudes towards recent language developments and explore how this related to 
their identities and their self-reported language practices. In addition to questions 
which specifically addressed the recent changes, the survey was designed to make it 
possible to compare how the participants used and perceived the two H varieties (SA 
and English), and to examine how medium and audience affected their language 
choices in written communication. The analysis of the survey results involved 
exploring the relationship between participants’ responses to these questions in 
relation to five explanatory identity variables: gender, age, SES, education and 




Responses to questions about the two H varieties point to a number of interesting 
findings. Firstly, participants reported both higher confidence and frequency of use 
for SA and English in written form, but the difference between spoken and written 
forms was significantly greater for SA. Indeed, participants reported the lowest 
confidence levels, frequency of use and importance at work for spoken SA, 
supporting the widely-held view that SA is a predominantly written variety (cf. 
Section ‎2.7). In the workplace, English was seen as far more important than SA, an 
indicator of the greater utility and economic capital attached to the English language. 
However, this was not mirrored in participants’ ratings of the importance of SA and 
English in education. Despite participants reporting less confidence, less frequency of 
use and less importance at work for SA compared to English, participants indicated 
that it was more important for SA to be part of compulsory school education (by a 
staggering margin when compared to English).  
SES and the main language of education were important explanatory variables for 
participants’ responses in this section. Those educated in English or French and with 
higher SES were more likely to report higher confidence and frequency in using 
English. Significantly, they were also more likely to report greater importance for 
English at work. The association between language of education, SES and the 
importance of English at work is important because it points once more to the 
economic capital of English. It also highlights the role of educational institutions as 
gatekeepers to the job market (cf. Section ‎3.4) and to the cyclic effect of this 
relationship: those with high SES are more likely to attend expensive language 
schools and are therefore more likely to get higher-paying jobs where competence in 
English is important, thereby securing their high SES. 
Participants’ attitudes to recent language changes were most significantly correlated 
with political ideology. Here, participants’ political orientation and national 
orientation seemed to be particularly important. Changes promoting EA and 
undermining SA were more likely to be perceived as a threat to the Arabic language 
by those with a conservative political orientation and a pan-Arab national 
orientation. On the other hand, these changes were more likely to be perceived 
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favourably by those with a liberal political orientation and a heightened sense of 
Egyptian identity and nationalism.  
Participants’ age was significant in relation to attitudes towards changes involving LA. 
Older participants reported being less familiar with LA and finding it confusing to 
read. They were also less likely to choose LA and English mixed with LA in the 
language choice questions.  
Responses to the language choice in written communication questions highlight the 
differences in participants’ language choices when the medium and audience were 
manipulated. The greatest range of selections was made in the informal context of 
communicating with a friend, where EA, LA and hybrid forms (e.g. English+LA, SA+EA) 
were preferred. In the formal context of communicating with a superior at work, a 
teacher/principal at school or lecturer/dean at university, the choices coalesced 
around SA and English, with English being the code of choice in the context of work. 
This suggests that EA and LA are perceived as informal codes. The communication 
medium also played a role: The Latin-script choices were selected the most in the 
electronic mediums of email and text messages, whilst the selection of Arabic-script 
choices was higher in the handwritten medium. SA in particular was more likely to be 
selected in the handwritten mediums than in the electronic mediums. Similarly, 
there was a clear preference for Arabic-script options when texting a parent 
compared to texting a friend. This points to the role of generational differences, 
particularly with respect to using LA.  
SES and language of education were also important explanatory variables in relation 
to language choice. English/French-educated participants and those with higher SES 
were more likely to choose English, and more generally the Latin-script choices, in 
their communication. Conversely, Arabic-educated participants and those with lower 
SES were more likely to choose SA, and more generally the Arabic-script choices, in 
their communication. The political ideology indices were less significant predictors of 
language choice: they only seemed to have a role in the informal context of 
communicating with a friend, but not when language choice was already constrained 
by formality. Remarkably, whilst the Egyptian identity rank was a significant predictor 
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of whether or not changes promoting EA were perceived favourably, this did not 
have a straight forward reflection in the language choice questions: those who 
ranked their Egyptian identity highly were indeed less likely to choose SA, but were 
not more likely to choose EA. This was also true of political orientation. In fact, those 
with a conservative political orientation were more likely to choose EA when 
emailing a friend than those with a liberal orientation. Further investigating the 
relationship between language attitudes and reported language practices revealed 
that while language attitudes and language choices (in informal written 
communication) were clearly aligned in the cases of English, LA, and English mixed 
with LA, this was not so for SA and EA. These findings highlight the disparity between 




6 From Finding to Understanding: Discussing and 
situating the findings 
S baṣṣēt le-nafsī w-laʾetnī  S I LOOKED AT MYSELF AND FOUND 
meḥtāg eʿādet naẓar THAT I NEEDED REASSESSMENT 
dawart f zātī  I SEARCHED WITHIN ME 
w-allebt šrīṭ ḥayātī AND WENT THROUGH THE TAPE OF MY LIFE 
ʿašān ašūf ēh ḥaṣal TO UNDERSTAND WHAT HAPPENED: 
ma-fīš tarīx; ma-fīš hawiyya THERE’S NO HISTORY; NO IDENTITY 
anā nusxa miš aṣliyya I’M A COUNTERFEIT COPY 
zay ʿalāmī w-noṣ kalāmī LIKE MY EDUCATION AND HALF MY SPEECH 
zay el-guitar ellī oddāmī T LIKE THE GUITAR BEFORE ME T 
From the song eʿādet naẓar (Reassessment) by Cairokee 
(es-sekka šmāl, 2014) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to answer the final research question: 
RQ4 How can the findings further our understanding of the language situation in 
Egypt? 
In answering this question, I draw on the literature reviewed in chapters 2 and 3 and 
build on existing theories to situate the findings and incorporate them into our 
current knowledge about the language situation in Egypt. I also bring the discussion 
up to speed with more recent developments in the Egyptian sociolinguistic scene and 
address the findings in light of these. Identity – one of the central themes in my 
findings – is addressed in Section  6.2. The question of power is then revisited in 
Section  6.3, while Section  6.4 discusses an alternative way of conceptualising 
diglossia in Egypt. 
6.2 The Politics of Identity in Revolutionary Egypt 
In November 2009, I travelled to Egypt during the early stages of my research. 
Egyptian flags filled the streets. In those pre-revolution days that could only mean 
one thing: a major football event was about to take place. The Egyptian football team 
were about to face their Algerian counterpart for an important tie-breaking match 
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which would determine which team qualified for the 2010 World Cup. The two 
teams had already faced each other twice and now had an equal number of points.  
In the last match, the Algerian team accused the Egyptian (home) team of 
intimidating their players and fans. The tension between the two sides was so high 
that the tie-breaking match had to take place on neutral ground. The teams met in 
Sudan in a media hyped confrontation which the Egyptian team lost. It was a very 
bitter loss. Backed by the full force of Egyptian media and government, the Egyptian 
team claimed that they were terrorised by masses of Algerian fans and appealed for 
a replay.   
By the time the Egyptian team returned to Egypt, the matter had escalated into a full 
blown diplomatic crisis between the two countries. But it was not only the relations 
between the two countries which suffered: In Egypt, criticism (and indeed, derision) 
of the Algerian team – which became conflated with the Algerian state, and then 
with all Algerians – was often coupled with assertions of Egyptian supremacy, not 
just over Algerians, but over all ‘Arabs’. This was not an ordinary instance of football 
nationalism; Egyptians from outside the sports world (e.g. government officials and 
actors) were engaging in this supremacist rhetoric. A Facebook group named ‘I’m 
Egyptian, not Arab’ was promptly set up in the wake of the match, and less than two 
months later had over 20,000 members. 
The crisis – which has earned its own Wikipedia page77 - certainly deserves in depth 
study by scholars in fields other than linguistics. The reason it is mentioned here is 
because of the Egyptian nationalist sentiments which characterised the discourse 
around it. That is, when I began my research, Pan-Arabism in Egypt, which had 
already receded significantly under Sadat and Mubarak (cf. Section  3.3.2.2), had just 
suffered another major blow. Indeed, the reverberations of this crisis were still felt 
when I returned to Egypt in the summer of 2010 to conduct the interviews, hence 
the reference to it in the interview with the ALCSs (Section  4.5). 




%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1_2009 (Accessed, 01/08/2014) 
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But did these events signify that pan-Arabism in Egypt was dead? If they did, then 
pan-Arabism was reincarnated a year later. When Egypt followed in the steps of 
Tunisia and mass protests calling for the ousting of Mubarak broke out across Egypt 
in January 2011, pan-Arab feelings appeared to surface once more. During the 18 
days of protest in Cairo’s Tahrir Square – culminating with Mubarak stepping down 
on the 11th of February 2011 in what became known as the January 25 Revolution – 
there was no shortage of indexes of pan-Arabism (Aboelezz, 2014). Similarly, pan-
Arab feelings were high in the euphoric mood that followed the revolution: Egypt 
was at the centre and the lead of the ‘Arab’ Spring. On the 18th of February 2011, 
Friday prayers were conducted in Tahrir Square in a massive public celebration of 
Mubarak’s ouster. Following prayers, a chant reverberated across the square: ʿa l-uds 
rayḥīn; šuhadāʾ be-l-malayīn [to Jerusalem we march; martyrs by the million]. It was 
as though the last four decades of Egyptian history were a mere fissure: Egypt was 
once more leader of the Arab World and patron of the Palestinian cause (which has 
historically united the peoples of the Arab World). However, the chant was 
immediately followed by another: erfaʿ rāsak fōʾ; enta maṣrī (raise your head high; 
you’re Egyptian) signalling the national pride spurred by the extensive International 
attention that the revolution received. That is, at that moment, pan-Arabism was 
coupled with a high sense of national pride. 
The role of the Arab spring in reviving pan-Arab sentiments is noted by Phillips (2014: 
141), who observes that prior to 2011, “the orthodox position considered Arabism a 
spent force”, stating that the Arab leaders had “consolidated nation-state identities 
(waṭaniyya), cynically turning old Arab nationalism (qawmiyya) into empty rhetoric”. 
However, “the contagious nature of protests illustrated the domestic relevance of 
Arab identity” or New Arabism (Phillips, 2014: 142). This New Arabism is quite 
different from Gamal Abdel Nasser’s ‘unitary Arab nationalism’. Perhaps a good 
example of how the Arab Spring shaped pan-Arab sentiments is this comment (in 
SA), made by one of the survey participants to explain his choice in the national 
orientation question (cf. Section  5.5.2.5): 
The Arab countries and Egypt do not have a lot in common at present. I suppose if I 
were filling this survey in the time of Abdel Nasser I would have selected “Egypt is an 
232 
 
integral part of the Arab World”, but now, in light of the political orientations of the Gulf 
states (towards the US) and orientations of North African countries (towards Europe), I 
don’t see many commonalities. But, I might find that those who really share 
[something] with us are the Arab Spring countries (Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Palestine, 
Yemen, and maybe Jordan). This conclusion is not based only on the notion of 
governments, but on the notion of peoples as well. I might perceive those who do not 
share my language (Turkey for instance) closer to my identity than the Arab Gulf states. 
Of course this comment must be understood in its political context. At the time that 
the survey was carried out, Egypt was under the rule of Muhammad Morsi, the MB 
president who was elected to power in June 2012. The image of Egypt at the lead of 
the Arab World was one that Morsi was keen to project. However, when the army 
removed the unpopular president following mass protests a year later, the pendulum 
appeared to sway in the other direction again. The euphoria of the Arab Spring was 
already a thing of the past: none of the ‘Arab Spring countries’ seemed to be much 
better off. The situation in Syria had turned particularly sour and Egyptians had to 
contend with this first hand as thousands of displaced Syrian families took refuge in 
Egypt. In particular, the pro-Palestinian actions taken by Morsi (such as opening the 
Rafah crossing) were quickly reversed by the Egyptian army. After Morsi was 
deposed, Egyptian media turned against any source of external criticism in a manner 
reminiscent of Sadat’s post Camp David foreign policy. An emphasis on Egyptian 
identity and Egyptian interests surfaced once more. 
The concern with Egyptian identity was at the forefront of Egyptian politics and social 
life at the time of writing this thesis. This is of little surprise given successive sharp 
changes in how Egyptian identity was constructed at the official level over the last 
four years. Early in 2014, the annual International Cairo Book Fair was launched 
under the slogan ‘Culture and Identity’ (al-ṯaqāfa wa-l-huwiyya) in a declared 
attempt “to revive Egyptian identity” (Ali, 2014). Reportedly, the slogan was changed 
following the toppling of the MB government which was said to have “deprived 
Egypt of many elements of its identity” and “tried to twist the Egyptian cultural 
traditions to serve the pure [presumably Islamist] interests of the Brotherhood”  
(ibid.). In Section ‎6.2.1, I outline how this shift in the construction of Egyptian identity 
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relates to language by looking at Egypt’s last 3 constitutions, and in Section ‎6.2.2, I 
discuss the post-revolution political map and the relevant research findings. 
6.2.1 Language and identity in the Egyptian constitution 
Mapping how Egypt is defined in its three most recent constitutions (1971, 2012 and 
2014) is a useful exercise which highlights the shifting relationship between nation, 
language and identity.  In the Egyptian constitution of 197178 (which did not depart 
substantially from the first constitution of the republic in 1956, and which remained 
functional, albeit with various amendments, until Mubarak was deposed in 2011), 
begins with these two defining articles79: 
ARTICLE (1): The Arab Republic of Egypt is a state with a democratic system based on 
citizenship. The Egyptian people are part of the Arab nation and seek to 
realise its comprehensive unity. 
ARTICLE (2): Islam is the religion of the state, the Arabic language is its official language, 
and the principles of Islamic Sharia are the principal source of legislation. 
The 1971 constitution also included this paragraph in the preamble: 
SECOND: Unity is the aspiration of our Arab nation: stemming from a certainty that Arab 
unity is a call from history, an invitation to the future, and a necessity by destiny .. and 
that it cannot be realised except in the protection of a nation which is able to deter and 
drive out any threat regardless of its source and of the claims which support it. 
Language is only mentioned again in Article (40), which stipulates that citizens shall 
not be subject to discrimination based on “race, origin, language, religion or creed”. 
Following the 2011 revolution, the 1971 constitution was suspended and public 
debates ensued about amending Articles 1 and 2. Due to the amount of controversy 
in these debates, the two articles were retained verbatim in the constitutional 
declaration which was ratified on the 30th of March 2011 (following a referendum 
with 77.27% in favour of ratification). The constitutional declaration did not have an 
                                                             
78 Retrieved 01.08.2014 from: 
http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=73#.U_PLP2PCd0Q 




extended preamble. The 2012 constitution80, which was drafted under the MB 
government and accepted by 63.83% of voters in a referendum at the end of 2012, 
begins with: 
ARTICLE (1): The Arab Republic of Egypt is an independent, sovereign, united, indivisible 
state, with a democratic system.   
The Egyptian people are part of the Arab and Islamic nations, and take 
pride in belonging to the Nile Basin and the African continent and in their 
Asian extension, and actively participate in human civilisation. 
There was no change to Article (2), but the preamble included these two items: 
TENTH: Unity is the aspiration of the Arab nation; a call from history, an invitation to the 
future, and a necessity by destiny, reinforced by complementarity and fraternity with 
the countries of the Nile Basin and the Islamic World, a natural extension borne out of 
the distinctiveness of Egypt’s position and location on the map of the universe. 
ELEVENTH: Egypt’s intellectual and cultural pioneering is an embodiment of its soft 
power, and a model of profusion with the freedom of its innovators, thinkers, 
universities, scientific and language academies, research centres, its press, art, literature 
and media, its national church and the noble Azhar which has been throughout its 
history a mainstay of the nation’s identity, a custodian of the immortal Arabic language 
and the noble Islamic Sharia, and a beacon for moderate enlightened thought. 
The 2012 constitution also introduced an article (Article 4) which granted al-Azhar 
religious authority and assigned it with the responsibility to “spread Islamic daʿwa 
and the disciplines of religion and Arabic language in Egypt and the world”. In 
addition, in Article (11), “religious and patriotic values”, “Arab culture”, and the 
“historical and civilizational heritage of the people” are counted among the morals 
that the State shall foster. Language is also explicitly mentioned in a number of 
articles. Article (12) reads: “The State shall safeguard the cultural and linguistic 
constituents of society, and foster the Arabicisation of education, science and 
knowledge”. Moreover, Article (59) stipulates that “universities, scientific and 
language academies, and scientific research centres are independent and the State 
shall assign a sufficient percentage of the GNP to them”, while Article (60) states that 
                                                             
80 Retrieved 01.08.2014 from: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/255182 
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“the Arabic language is a core subject in various stages of education in all educational 
institutions” and that religious studies and national history are core subjects in all 
types of pre-university education. In addition, Article (215) assigns the National 
Media Council with the responsibility to “establish standards and regulations to 
ensure the commitment of various media to the principles and ethics of the 
profession, safeguarding the Arabic language, and observing the values and 
constructive traditions of society”. 
Hence, the 2012 constitution reinforced Arab affiliation, introduced Islamic identity 
and added a (symbolic) African dimension. The emphasis on Arab and Islamic 
identities translated into a focus on the Arabic language with several provisions for 
the language. When the MB’s Muhammad Morsi was deposed by the army following 
mass protests in July 2013, the 2012 constitution was suspended and within less than 
a year Egypt had yet another constitution. The 2014 constitution81 was accepted by 
98.13% of voters in a referendum early in 2014. The newest constitution begins thus:  
ARTICLE (1): The Arab Republic of Egypt is a sovereign, united, indivisible State, no part 
of which may be given up. It has a democratic republican system that is 
based on citizenship and rule of law.  
The Egyptian people are part of the Arab nation and seek its integration 
and unity. Egypt is part of the Islamic world, belongs to the African 
continent, takes pride in its Asian extension, and contributes in building 
human civilization.   
While the sentence which was added in the 2012 outlining Egypt’s Arab, Islamic and 
African character was retained, in the 2014 constitution Egypt is significantly 
described as part of an Islamic world rather than an Islamic nation (umma). The latter 
is a much more ideologically loaded term (cf. Section  3.3.2.2). Equally significant, the 
paragraph in the preambles of the 1971 and 2012 constitutions stating that unity is 
the aspiration of the Arab nation (with some variation), was removed from the 2014 
constitution. Instead, Article (1) was altered slightly as seen above to include that the 
Egyptian people seek the unity and integration of the Arab nation; a milder version of 
                                                             
81 Retrieved 01.08.2014 from: www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/consttt%202014.pdf 
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Article (1) in the 1971 constitution, and certainly a statement which does not carry 
the symbolic loadings of the paragraph which was removed from the preamble. 
The paragraph referring to al-Azhar was also removed from the preamble, and 
although the preamble “asserts that the principles of Sharia law are the principal 
source of legislation”, it refers – for the first time – to a “secular government” as part 
of a “modern democratic State”. It is worth noting that Article (2) – which states that 
Arabic is the official language - remained intact in the 2014 constitution as well. 
Language is only mentioned in four other locations of the 2014 constitution. The first 
is in Article (7) outlining the role of al-Azhar as a custodian of religion and the Arabic 
language. This is essentially the same as Article (4) in the 2012 constitution, but al-
Azhar is granted more power in interpreting Islamic jurisprudence in the 2014 
constitution. The second location is Article (24) which states that “The Arabic 
language, religious education and national history – which includes all its periods – 
are core subjects in public and private pre-university education”. Hence, instead of 
being a core subject in “all stages of education” (Article 60 of the 2012 constitution), 
Arabic was equated with religious education and national history which are only 
compulsory in pre-university education. A third location is Article (53) which states 
that citizens shall not be discriminated against based on “religion, creed, sex, origin, 
race, colour, language, disability, social class, political or geographic affiliation, or any 
other reason” (which resonates with Article 40 in the 1971 constitution, but there 
was no equivalent article in the 2012 constitution). 
Language is also mentioned in Article (48) which includes “The State shall encourage 
translation from and into Arabic”. This replaces the stipulation that the State shall 
foster Arabicisation of education, sciences and knowledge in Article (12) of the 2012 
constitution. All other mentions of the Arabic language and language academies 
which featured in the 2012 constitution were omitted from the 2014 constitution. 
Similarly, the frequent use of the adjectives ‘Arab’ and ‘Islamic’ in the 2012 
constitution is not mirrored in the 2014 constitution. Instead, there is an emphasis 
on “Egyptian identity”.  
Whereas, in the 2012 constitution, the word huwiyya (identity) is only mentioned in 
the preamble where al-Azhar is described as the “mainstay of the nation’s identity”, 
237 
 
identity is mentioned twice in the body of the 2014 constitution. Article (19) states 
that education is a right for every citizen and that it “aims to build the Egyptian 
character and preserve the national identity”. This identity is defined in Part II, 
Chapter 3 of the 2014 constitution which is devoted to “Cultural Constituents” and 
includes articles 47 to 50. Article (47) includes that “The State shall preserve the 
Egyptian cultural identity with its diverse civilizational components”. In addition, 
Article (50) states: 
ARTICLE (50): Egypt’s civilizational and cultural heritage, moral and material, which 
includes all its major periods – ancient Egyptian, Coptic and Islamic – is a 
national and human wealth. The state shall preserve and maintain this 
wealth in addition to the contemporary cultural inventory of architecture, 
literature and art in their diverse forms. Aggression against any of the 
foregoing is a crime punishable by law. The state shall give special 
attention to preserving the components of cultural pluralism in Egypt. 
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to conduct a full comparison between the 
1971, 2012 and 2014 constitutions (research in this area is certainly needed), 
comparing the items related to language and identity alone points to a significant 
difference in how they are handled. The 1971 constitution which was drafted at a 
time when pan-Arab feelings were high emphasised the ‘Arab’ character of Egypt, 
but the Arabic language itself – except being named official language – does not 
receive further specific mention in the constitution. The 2012 constitution reinforced 
the emphasis on Arab belonging and added numerous stipulations specifically 
addressing the Arabic language (which is arguably an extension of that belonging). As 
well as introducing African belonging (and an Asian extension), the first article of the 
2012 constitution also introduced belonging to an Islamic nation. This Islamic 
dimension was stressed by introducing a number of other items in the constitution 
which lend it prominence. Most of the articles dealing with language and identity 
introduced in the 2012 constitution were either scrapped or significantly altered in 
the 2014 constitution. Instead of the implied Islamic identity in the 2012 constitution 
(achieved by describing the Islamic institution of al-Azhar as custodian of “the 
nation’s identity”), the 2014 constitution refers to “Egyptian identity” which is 
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associated with diversity (tanawwuʿ) and pluralism (taʿadudiyya), and – for the first 
time – incorporates Coptic and ancient Egyptian in this identity. 
6.2.2 The post-revolution political map 
In this section I discuss the broader range of political ideologies illustrated in the 
Egyptian political map in the wake of the 2011 revolution and how I developed the 
political ideology spectrum used in the survey (cf. Section ‎5.5.2.5). The survey was 
conducted during a ‘golden window’ of political interest and engagement (and 
arguably, political freedom) in Egypt between February 2011 and June 2013. 
Following the 2011 revolution, Egypt went from an atmosphere of widespread 
political apathy to prevalent politicisation. In particular, the few months leading up 
to the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections saw unprecedented political activity. 
Literally hundreds of new political parties were formed (although not all of these 
participated or were registered in time for the elections). This newfound interest in 
politics was reflected in the high turnout of voters (for the lower house 
parliamentary elections).  
The elections took place between 28 November 2011 and 22 February 2012 over 
several phases and the electoral system was “extraordinarily complicated” (The 
Carter Centre, 2012: 22). There are two houses of parliament in Egypt: the upper 
house (the Shura council) and the lower house (the People’s Assembly or maglis el-
šaʿb). The question in the survey concerns the latter (cf. Section ‎5.5.2.5). During the 
2011-2012 elections, one third of the seats in the People’s Assembly were allocated 
to two-seat majoritarian constituencies and two thirds allocated to closed-list 
proportional representation system. In the former, voters from each constituency 
would elect two individual candidates who may or may not be affiliated with a 
political party, whereas in the second, voters would select a named list which itself 
represents either a specific political party or an alliance of political parties. Hence, 
the survey participants were asked about their closed-list vote and not their two-seat 
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majoritorian constituency vote since it is easier to associate the former with the 
ideologies of political parties82.  
According to Egypt’s State Information Service, 65.98% of registered voters 
participated in the elections for the lower house of parliament  (SIS, 2011-2012). This 
participation rate was the highest of all the referenda and elections which took place 
post-revolution including the presidential elections of 2012 (Abdel-Jawwad, 2013). 
Indeed, it is telling that in the survey, 76% of all participants indicated the party they 
voted for – this rises to 85% when we disregard those who skipped this question, and 
to 90% if we discount those who indicated that they could not remember who they 
voted for. This is an impressive response rate to this question considering that 
roughly 15% of the overall survey sample would not have been old enough to vote in 
the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections.  
One of the biggest challenges that I faced in designing and analysing this question 
was navigating the sea of new political parties to determine where they stand 
ideologically. A very helpful resource that I relied on was the map of political parties 
and alliances published on the Arabist blog prior to the parliamentary elections (El 
Amrani, 2011). The map provides an overview of where the main political formations 
stand along a four-dimensional grid composed of two intersecting axes: religious 
(Islamic) ÅÆ secular, and right ÅÆ left. So helpful was this guide to anyone 
following the elections at the time that The Guardian adopted an interactive version 
of this map as part of its coverage of the elections (Scruton et al., 2011). However, 
while it is an outstanding effort, the map contains some inaccuracies, which made it 
necessary to revisit the individual manifestos published on the websites of the 
various political parties to ascertain their political ideologies. I also relied on the 
extensive coverage of the parliamentary elections provided by Ahram Online and 
their review of all the participating political parties (Ahram Online, 2011-2012). Their 
coverage has been more recently collated into a published book (Sallam, 2013). 
                                                             
1 I refer the reader to (The Carter Centre, 2012) for a detailed explanation of the technical aspects of 




Useful as this political map was, the four-dimensional grid was not workable for 
statistical analysis. I therefore reduced it to a two-dimensional spectrum to introduce 
ordinality. The right-left axis was effectively nested into the Islamist-secular axis, with 
the underlying aim of having the politically and religiously conservative parties on 
one end of the spectrum, and the politically and religiously liberal parties on the 
opposite end. The symmetry within the spectrum is illustrated in Figure 48.  
 
Figure 48. Symmetry within the two-dimensional political spectrum 
I must point out that while the political orientation spectrum I devised is a useful 
analytical tool for studying the relationship between language and political ideology, 
it is essentially a reduction of a very complex and multi-dimensional political reality. 
A significant feature of this spectrum is the two classifications ‘Islamist 1’ and 
‘Islamist 2’. Given the abundance of Islamist parties, I make a deliberate distinction 
between the most conservative Islamists (such as the Salafist Al-Nour party and the 
parties which joined their alliance in the 2011-2012 elections) and the less 
conservative Islamists such as the MB’s Freedom and Justice (F&J) party. This was 
particularly important when assigning votes in the 2011-2012 to ideology because in 
these elections the F&J led a political alliance which included non-Islamist parties 
(such as the liberal Al-Ghad, and the Nasserist Al-Karama). It would have therefore 
been misleading to group the F&J alliance and Al-Nour alliance in a single category.  
It is also important to delineate what is meant by the political right. This refers to 
politically conservative parties with traditional right-wing ideologies (e.g. hierarchical 
social order, free market economics). Political conservatism here also implies 
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antipathy to political change. In the 2011-2012 elections the right was dominated by 
political parties formed by former members of the (by then defunct) National 
Democratic Party83. The military establishment in Egypt is also considered an 
extension of the political right. It can therefore be said that with Abdel Fattah El-Sisi 
assuming Egyptian presidency in 2014, state governance is once more situated on 
the right of the political map.  
The use of the term ‘secular’ also warrants some explanation. In a society where 
religion plays a central role in every aspect of life, the term ‘secular’ must be 
understood in context. While it is used to refer to political parties with a non-
religious agenda in Egypt (aḥzāb ʿilmāniyya = secular parties), it does not have the 
Western connotations of irreligion. Indeed, a few of these secular parties include 
religious Copts as founding members. For example, Coptic billionaire Naguib Sawiris 
was a founding member of the most prominent secular party, el-Maṣriyyīn el-Aḥrār 
(founded April 2011), and sits on its Board of Trustees (cf. section ‎6.3 and ‎6.4). 
Secular parties are therefore more usefully seen as the antithesis of Islamist parties. 
It is worth noting that the LEP, interviewed in Section ‎4.2, assimilated into a 
liberal/secular party. In the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, this party joined the 
main secular alliance in the elections: The Egyptian Bloc (el-Kutla el-Maṣriyya), which 
was led by el-Maṣriyyīn el-Aḥrār. On the other hand, it is easy to imagine Malamih’s 
El-Sharkawi at home in the liberal, leftist ideology of ‘The Revolution Continues’ 
alliance which attracted revolutionary youths and included a number of communist 
and Marxist parties in addition to parties stemming from opposition movements. The 
alliances of the Egyptian Bloc and The Revolution Continues represent the bottom 
and second to the bottom categories in the spectrum respectively. This is in line with 
the survey findings where pro-ʿāmmiyya attitudes clustered around these two 
categories. 
One might ask: but where does the pan-Arab / Egyptian separatist dimension figure 
into this spectrum? The answer is that it doesn’t. In the lead-up to the 2011-2012 
parliamentary elections, parties with a pan-Arab or Egyptian nationalist ideology 
                                                             
83 The National Democratic Party was the ruling political party – led by Mubarak himself. It was 
dissolved following the 2011 revolution. 
242 
 
were scattered all over the political map, making it impossible to depict them in this 
spectrum. It is worth noting however that while there were a handful of parties with 
explicit pan-Arab ideology (both on the left and the right, but mostly Islamist or 
Islamist-leaning rather than secular), there were no explicitly Egyptian separatist 
parties. Instead, there were parties which touted ‘Egyptian identity’, most of which 
were either secular or secular-leaning, and significantly several were formed by 
former NDP members from the political right. It is therefore not entirely surprising 
that the survey participants with an Islamist political orientation were significantly 
more likely to indicate a pan-Arab stance in terms of Egypt’s relationship to the Arab 
World. Conversely, those at the secular end of the political orientation spectrum 
were more likely to indicate a separatist stance (cf. Figure 37, Section ‎5.5.2.5).  
It is also worth noting that none of the pan-Arab parties which ran in the 2011-2012 
parliamentary elections were considered major political players. Even the most 
prominent of these did not attempt to ‘sell’ pan-Arabism in their parliamentary 
campaigns. A good example is al-Karama party, the most prominent Nasserist and 
pan-Arab party on the political scene. Although not itself an Islamist party, in the 
2011-2012 parliamentary elections, al-Karama was part of the Islamist F&J alliance. 
The founder of the party, Hamdeen Sabahy, joined the presidential race in 2012 and 
finished third in the first round with 20.7% of votes (2012 Presidential Elections 
Official Website, 2012)84. Arguably, what attracted his large voter base was not his 
pan-Arab ideology (which was not a prominent part of his campaign), but his leftist, 
socialist orientation. Indeed, Sabahi was famously supported by the ʿāmmiyya poet 
Abdel Rahman El-Abnoudi; what Sabahi and El-Abnoudi have in common is not pan-
Arabism, but rather their leftist ideology. 
It is also telling that out of the rankings for Egyptian, Arab and Muslim identities in 
the survey, Arab was by far the most likely to be ranked last while Muslim identity 
was most likely to be ranked first (Q42 in Appendix II). Moreover, while the rankings 
of Islamic and Egyptian identities correlate with pro-fuṣḥā and pro-ʿāmmiyya 
language attitudes respectively (Section ‎5.5.2.5), the ranking of Arab identity was not 
                                                             
84 Hamdeen Sabahy also ran in the 2014 presidential elections but withdrew before voting closed. 
243 
 
a significant explanatory variable. This appears to be in agreement with Phillips’ 
(2014: 143-144) observations about nationalism in the Arab World post-2011: 
Islam, whether Sunni or Shi’a, appears the main source of mass identity and secularist 
opposition is framed through national rather than Arab discourses most visibly the post-
2013 surge in secular Egyptian nationalism. Ironically the revolutions that New Arabism 
helped to spread may now create a world where it is no longer relevant. 
In other words, if we are looking for an identity binary, then the prominent binary in 
Egyptian politics at present is not pan-Arabism vs. Egyptian separatism, but rather 
Islamic identity (which has an incidental pan-Arab element) vs. Egyptian identity. This 
sheds new light on Gamal El-Din’s statement that he ‘is neither [concerned with] 
Arab nationalism (qawmiyya ʿarabiyya) nor Egyptian nationalism (qawmiyya 
maṣriyya), but rather [with] Egyptian identity (hawiyya maṣriyya)’ (Section ‎4.2). It is 
significant that, despite his party’s clearly separatist nationalist views, Gamal El-Din 
expresses them in terms of Egyptian identity not Egyptian nationalism. 
Further evidence for the salience of this Islamic/Egyptian binary can also be found in 
the difference between the 2012 and 2014 constitutions: the former implied an 
Islamic identity while the latter refers to ‘Egyptian identity’. This binary was also 
expressed in one of the survey comments (in SA): 
Some of the other Arab countries want to stamp out the distinctive Egyptian identity by 
trying to spread Wahhabi thought, which is known as Salafism, to schemingly and 
spitefully forbid everything which distinguishes Egypt’s identity from other Arab 
countries. They do this with America’s help by deluding people that holding on to 
Egypt’s non-religious identity (from their point of view) would make it an easy target for 
American culture (liberalism). 
The first sentence of the comment resonates closely with the views expressed by 
Malamih’s El-Sharkawi (cf. Section ‎4.3). The idea of an Arab identity which is nested 
within an Islamic identity also calls to mind Suleiman’s (2008) observation that 
Islamic nationalism can easily ‘fade into’ pan-Arab nationalism (cf. Section ‎3.3.2.2); 
except that in contemporary Egyptian politics the reverse appears to be true. On the 
other hand, the reactionary emphasis on Egyptian identity in post-Morsi social and 
political discourse highlights that this identity is more significantly defined, not in 
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terms of what it is, but in terms of what it isn’t. For example, the declared motives 
for changing the slogan of the 2014 Cairo Book Fair would imply that Egyptian 
identity is not a (predominantly) Islamist one. In particular, the current Egyptian 
government which stands on the right of the political map is keen to distance itself 
from the ideology of their Islamist predecessors. Hence, while the political right has 
traditionally been considered a champion of fuṣḥā, by applying the concept of 
alterity (cf. Section ‎3.3.2.3) to distance itself from Islamist ideology and shifting the 
emphasis to Egyptian identity, the current government is potentially signalling a 
significant shift in language ideology as well. That is, as the 2014 constitution 
indicates, it is difficult to reject an ideology without rejecting its symbols, and in the 
case of the Islamist ideology, language is a very important symbol. 
6.3 Revisiting the Question of Power 
So far in this chapter, I have been focussing on the political dimension of the 
language situation in Egypt. I now revisit the related question of power. In Section 
‎3.2.5, I discussed the relationship between standard language and power. The 
section focused on political power, and I concluded by pointing to other forms of 
power which are related to language. I continue this discussion here. I will begin with 
Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power: a kind of ‘soft power’; a “subordinate power” 
(1991: 170); an “invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of 
those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they 
themselves exercise it” (1991: 64). The ramifications of this power can be political, 
social or economic, and a language through which this kind of power can be 
exercised is said to have ‘symbolic capital’. Bourdieu (1991: 170) provides this 
detailed explanation of symbolic power: 
Symbolic power – as a power constituting the given through utterances, of making 
people see and believe, of confirming or transforming the vision of the world and, 
thereby, action on the world and thus the world itself, an almost magical power which 
enables one to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained through force (whether 
physical or economic), by virtue of the specific effect of mobilization – is a power that 
can be exercised only if it is recognised, that is, misrecognised as arbitrary. This means 
that symbolic power does not reside in ‘symbolic systems’ in the form of an 
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‘illocutionary force’ but that it is defined in and through a given relation between 
those who exercise power and those who submit to it, i.e. in the very structure of the 
field in which belief is produced and reproduced. (Emphases in original) 
With this definition in the backdrop, the pertinent question is: can this concept be 
applied to the language situation in Egypt? In Section  3.4, I presented Haeri’s 
criticism of Bourdieu’s model of the linguistic marketplace, which itself relies on the 
notion of symbolic power:  
All symbolic domination presupposes, on the part of those who submit to it, a form of 
complicity which is neither passive submission to external constraint nor a free 
adherence to values. The recognition of the legitimacy of the official language has 
nothing in common with an explicitly professed, deliberate and revocable belief, or with 
an intentional act of accepting a ‘norm’. It is inscribed, in a practical state, in 
dispositions which are impalpably inculcated, through a long and slow process of 
acquisition, by the sanctions of the linguistic market, and which are therefore adjusted, 
without any cynical calculation or consciously experienced constraint, to the chances of 
material and symbolic profit which the laws of price formation characteristic of a given 
market objectively offer to the holders of a given linguistic capital. (Bourdieu, 1991: 50-
51) 
Haeri (1996, 1997) presents a case against the applicability of the model in Egypt 
because foreign languages are accorded a higher value than the official language in 
the Egyptian linguistic marketplace. I argue here that an adaptation of the 
Bourdieuian model can actually provide a valuable way of understanding the power 
dynamics of the language situation in Egypt beyond the fuṣḥā/ʿāmmiyya dimension.  
Wright refers to Phillipson (2000) who demonstrates how “English is associated with 
the reproduction and legitimating of power, both as the language of a dominant 
speech community internationally and as the language of elites in national contexts” 
(Wright, 2004: 169). This is the main premise for Haeri’s critique of Bourdieu’s 
framework of symbolic power: Bourdieu argues that the ‘dominant language’ is the 
language of the ‘dominant classes’, and therefore the language of highest symbolic 
capital. In fact, he equates legitimate language practices to “the practices of those 
who are dominant” (Bourdieu, 1991: 53). However, Haeri (2000: 69) notes that 
246 
 
“although the emergence and imposition of a standard variety always involves forms 
of power configured and exercised in different ways, this fact alone does not render 
them identical”. She argues rather convincingly that it is not fuṣḥā, the legitimate 
language, which holds the highest symbolic capital in Egypt, but European languages 
like English (Haeri, 1996; 1997).  
While Haeri’s critique would appear to invalidate Bourdieu’s model altogether, 
appealing to wider sociological theory allows us to reconcile the theoretical terms 
laid out by Bourdieu with the linguistic reality described by Haeri. To accept that 
access to the labour market in Egypt is not solely controlled by government (cf. 
Section ‎3.4), is to accept that there is another group in society which exercises 
control over this access. In other words, there is more than just one dominant group; 
more than one elite85. Elite can be defined here as a small group of society who have 
a disproportionately large amount of power, material or symbolic. On the one hand, 
there is the ruling ‘political elite’, those in government and those who possess 
political decision-making power. It is usually this group who are accorded with 
‘dominance’ in society. However, there are other, equally important but often 
overlooked non-political elites; privileged groups “who can exercise any influence on 
those that govern and those who obey, either because of the moral authority they 
possess or because of the economic or financial power they possess” (Aron, 1988: 
150, cited in Martin et al., 2006). Note how this definition is consistent with 
Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic power.  
In Egypt, we can identify three “key elites” (cf. Etzioni-Halevy, 1993) who exercise 
substantial power over Egyptian social life: a ‘political elite’ (those who possess 
political power: the government and the state apparatus), an ‘economic elite’ (those 
                                                             
85 The concept of multiple elites or “elite pluralism” (Bealey, 1996) is a well-established sociological 
concept and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a detailed review of it. However, a few 
notes can be made in passing: Multiple elites are seen as the product of the development of modern 
societies where power is no longer restricted to a single dominant group (Keller, 1963). They are 
particularly important in globalised societies (Martin et al., 2006). There is great variation in the 
literature regarding the nature and degree of autonomy of multiple elites (see Bealey, 1996 for a 
review). They are sometimes portrayed as part of the (socio-)political establishment, and other times 
as groups that the political establishment contends with. To add to the confusion, the term ‘elites’, in 
plural form and without a qualifier, is often used to mean multiple political elites. I adopt Bealey’s 




who possess economic power, such as business tycoons and large multinational 
corporations), and a ‘moral elite’ (those who possess moral authority: religious 
scholars and institutions, especially al-Azhar). If we accept that there are multiple loci 
of power in the Egyptian context, then it must also follow that the language varieties 
present in the linguistic marketplace of Cairo can potentially have different kinds of 
symbolic capital.  
At present, political power in Egypt resides with the same political elite who had a 
monopoly on this power when I started my research in 2010. It could be argued that 
the military establishment in Egypt never really lost their far-reaching authority and 
decision-making power in Egyptian politics over the past three years – even when 
they were not ruling the country, they were still part of the political elite. This was 
particularly clear in the military’s management of the transitions of authority in 
February 2011 and June 2013. The presidency in Egypt today – as it was in 2010 – is 
an extension of the influence of this powerful political establishment.  
Before the 2011 revolution, the ruling regime in Egypt was characterised by linguistic 
conservatism, and for good reason. Influential politicians such as the then speaker of 
parliament Fathi Surur used “their expertise in SA to legitimise their political system, 
almost in the same way that priests in ancient Egypt monopolised certain aspects of 
knowledge to empower themselves” (Bassiouney, 2013), (cf. Section ‎3.2.5). In the 
interviews I conducted, it is telling that the pro-ʿāmmiyya agents of change faced 
opposition from the government, while the pro-fuṣḥā ALCSs worked with the 
government. As the legitimate standard language of authority, fuṣḥā was clearly 
endowed with political capital. However, it is difficult to tell how valid and 
sustainable this symbolic capital is under the present government. That is, in seeking 
to distance itself from the previous MB regime the current government appears to 
be distancing itself from the symbols of Islamist ideology, which includes language 
(cf. Section ‎6.2). On the other hand, there is a clear political advantage in maintaining 
the old regime’s policies: by reproducing the symbolic capital of fuṣḥā as the 




Another important group in Egyptian society is the moral elite. These are Islamic 
scholars who are seen as the caretakers of social morality. While Islamic scholars are 
generally aligned with political Islamists in matters of religion, they may not share 
the same political ideology. In fact, the most influential religious authority in Egypt, 
al-Azhar (which receives special mention in the 2012 and 2014 constitutions, cf. 
Section ‎6.2.1), is politically aligned with the state. By tapping into the associations of 
fuṣḥā as the language of Islamic morality, religious scholars endow fuṣḥā with moral 
capital. It is revealing that in the interview with the ALCSs, foreign languages were 
not just seen to undermine fuṣḥā, but social morality as well (Section ‎4.5). 
Finally, there is the economic elite who control access to the highest paid jobs. The 
influence of the economic elite in Egypt has been growing since the introduction of 
Sadat’s open door policy which beckoned an age of privatisation policies and 
capitalism. The power of the economic elite in Egypt has more recently grown as a 
result of globalisation which is itself “definable as an erosion of the sovereignty of 
states and the growth of international organisations” (Wright, 2004: 160). It would 
therefore seem that the balance of powers is tipping in favour of the economic elite 
against the political elite. 
Significantly, while access to the political and moral elites is strictly controlled, access 
to the economic elite is possible if one possesses the right symbolic capital: English 
(cf. Section ‎3.4). In other words, mastering fuṣḥā does not secure access to the 
political and moral elites but mastering English can facilitate access to the economic 
elite. In fact, it is not even necessary for the political and moral elites to use fuṣḥā 
themselves in order to assert its symbolic capital; they merely need to promote its 
ideological superiority. For instance Bassiouney (2013) notes that the same 
politicians who benefit from the legitimising capacity of fuṣḥā do not necessarily 
master it or even believe in its superiority. Similarly, the bigger role that ʿāmmiyya is 
playing in the discourse of Islamic scholars (Soliman, 2008) does not seem to 
contradict their exaltation of fuṣḥā. Given this reality, it is not entirely surprising that 
the same people who look to fuṣḥā with much pride and admiration, in looking out 
for the future of their children “behave rationally and realise that access to 
prosperity and upwards social mobility goes through access to the global market—
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which today presupposes English” (Mejdell, 2006: 20). That access to English is linked 
to access to economic capital in Egypt is supported by the survey findings. The higher 
the participants’ SES, the more likely they were to report greater confidence in using 
English, greater importance of English at work and using English in written 
communication – which one begets the other is a moot point.  
Another concept of relevance to the power structure in Egyptian society is that of the 
counter-elite who challenge the hegemony of the state or other dominant groups 
(Bottomore, 1964). In Egypt, opposition groups on the left of the political map 
represent a counter-elite; they do not recognise the symbolic capital possessed by 
the political elite and therefore, according to Bourdieu, cannot be dominated by it. In 
this light, the use of ʿāmmiyya in Egyptian opposition newspapers (Z. Ibrahim, 2010) 
and in a youth magazine with anti-regime political sympathies (Borg, 2007) on the 
one hand, and the pro-ʿāmmiyya bias of Malamih which is owned by a leftist political 
activist (Section ‎4.3) on the other, becomes more than just a happy coincidence: 
using ʿāmmiyya appears to be an act of linguistic resistance (cf. Section ‎6.4). 
Another important counter-elite in Egypt is those who do not recognise the symbolic 
capital of the Islamic moral elite. This includes seculars and non-Muslims, most 
notably, the Coptic minority in Egypt. Since the moral elite derive their power from 
the legitimacy and authority of Islam, it follows that those who do not recognise the 
validity of Islam cannot be dominated by the symbolic power of the moral elite. In 
the same way that the ideal of fuṣḥā did not regulate the Middle Arabic writings of 
Christians and Jews (Hary, 1992); the religious argument for the superiority of fuṣḥā 
cannot be expected to persuade Egypt’s Copts. Coptic billionaire and media magnate, 
Naguib Sawiris – a proponent of ʿāmmiyya – is a case in point (cf. Section ‎6.4).  
Figure 49 illustrates the relationship between the three key elites and the two 
counter-elites described in this section. The overlap between some of the circles is 
worth noting. In particular, the moral counter-elite overlap with both the economic 
elite (e.g. Sawiris), and with the political counter-elite (e.g. Malamih’s El-Sharkawi). 
Likewise, both the moral and political elites overlap with the economic elites. As 
explained above, for those in the overlapping area, pursuing English for economic 
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gains does not contradict the ideological exaltation of fuṣḥā. I have demonstrated 
how Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power is applicable throughout this framework; 
what is central is whether or not this power is recognised. Moreover, the multiple 
loci of power in Egyptian society are a departure from Bourdieu’s model, but the 
symbolic power that the elites possess is exercised in similar ways: fuṣḥā, English and 
even ʿāmmiyya are associated with different kinds of symbolic capital. It remains to 
be said that this adaptation – and its representation in the diagram below – is an 
attempt to illuminate the relationship between power and language in Egyptian 
society. However, like the political spectrum in Section ‎6.2.2, it is a simplification of a 
rich and complex reality. 
 
Figure 49. The relationship between Egypt's multiple elites 
Nevertheless, this interpretation reveals how language ideologies are embedded in 
power structures. When we take stock of the available positions within these 
structures and the language ideologies associated with them, we come to the 
realisation that “the available positions to which one can stake claim are limited” 
(Walters, 2008: 656). As Walters points out, “it is not simply that we, as members of 
a society, choose to subscribe to particular ideologies, including language ideologies, 
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but rather that, in a real sense, ideologies choose us, based on our position in the 
social order, our life experience, and our value commitments of various sorts” (ibid.). 
In the next section I use the information presented so far in this chapter and the 
findings of the survey and interviews to demonstrate how language choice can also 
retrospectively index ‘our position in the social order, our life experiences, and our 
value commitments’; that is, our identities. 
6.4 Beyond the Diglossic model: functions vs. indices 
The foregoing discussions and the findings of the survey and interviews raise the 
pertinent question: is Ferguson’s diglossic model entirely invalid in contemporary 
Egyptian society? In Chapter 2, I provided a lengthy review of Ferguson’s model, the 
criticisms levelled against it and the conceptual expansions it underwent. I concluded 
by pointing to the fact that even proponents of the diglossic continuum and Arabic 
linguists who study mixed and intermediate varieties assume the existence of two H 
and L poles, and this appears to be reflected in Arabic speakers’ awareness. Indeed, 
this served as an underlying premise in my survey design. The interview findings also 
supported the existence of what are perceived to be, by-and-large, two different 
varieties, each associated with its own set of values, even if the terms used to refer 
to these varieties were not consistent. The interviewees were also aware of mixing 
between the two varieties, and in the interviews with Malamih and the ALCSs a 
distinct intermediate variety was referred to. Even a non-specialist like VE’s El-
Sagheer was aware of the possibility of signalling increased formality/ informality by 
‘calibrating’ the distance from either pole. In the interview with LEP where the 
existence of intermediate varieties was not acknowledged, this appeared to serve 
the party’s ideology: the more different the language spoken by Egyptians, the more 
distinct their identity from Arabs.  
Hence, it is not really the validity of the H and L poles which is being questioned in 
the present section, but the validity of their functional distribution or domains of 
use. To Ferguson’s credit, we cannot assume that the sociolinguistic situation in the 
Arab World has remained constant since he wrote his landmark article on diglossia in 
1959. In fact, in a later article, Ferguson himself dwells on the massive political and 
social changes which took place in the second half of the 20th century: independence 
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movements, increase in population and per capita income, mobility between Arab 
nations, etc. (Ferguson, 1997 [1990]). He argues that in the space of forty years 
(roughly 1950-1990) the Middle East had seen more change than in the preceding 
400 years. One particular change he notes is the surge in literacy. When Ferguson 
wrote his ‘Diglossia’ article in 1959, “the Arab World was then a society like many 
others in Asia, where there had been literacy and works of literature for centuries in 
the society but where the society was overwhelmingly non-literate: there was only a 
thin layer of traditional scholars and people who used literacy in their own language 
in their daily lives” (Ferguson, 1997 [1990]: 263).  
The role of mass literacy and mass media in creating new domains in Arabic has been 
highlighted by several scholars (see for example: Boussofara-Omar, 2008; Brustad, 
2012; Eid, 2007). Although cultural and technological advancements have naturally 
created new domains for both fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya, there is a tendency to view the 
use of ʿāmmiyya in these domains as encroachments on the uses of fuṣḥā (cf. 
Boussofara-Omar, 2008). Brustad (2012) however asserts that “the new discursive 
spaces engendered by new media are giving rise to new speech communities, and 
new patterns of language use” – as well as shifting ideologies. She points to the 
“plethora of articles and television shows over the past 10 years or so on Arabic 
being in danger and under threat from various directions, at a time when standard 
Arabic is used and understood by more people than ever before in its history”, and 
contends that these have less to do with Arabic itself (as a linguistic system) being 
perceived as under threat, and more to do with the standard language ideology of 
Arabic being under threat (cf. Section  3.2.4). Perhaps this aptly frames what has been 
described as an increase in ‘defensive’ activity on the part of ALCSs (cf. Section  4.5). 
While the fact that new domains have introduced new avenues for the use of fuṣḥā 
too is mostly overlooked, the fact that the nature of ‘traditional’ domains has 
changed appears completely so. That is, it is not at all uncommon to read in an article 
(scholarly or non-scholarly) about the use of ʿāmmiyya in ‘domains traditionally 
reserved for fuṣḥā’. These domains are typically ‘written’ domains. What is not 
acknowledged, however, is that what counts as written today is much more diverse 
than ever before. Of course, one can still write a message using a paper and a pen, 
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but increasingly, we are ‘writing’ by typing, dialling, swiping, etc., and the nature of 
the medium in this now diverse written domain has a bearing on our language 
choices, as evidenced by the survey findings (cf. Section  5.5.1.3). 
Returning to the question about the validity of Ferguson’s model then, the answer 
must not be read as an attempt to discredit the model, but an attempt to reinterpret 
it, fifty-five years later, in light of the huge social, cultural, political and economic 
changes in Egypt.  
In a valuable book published recently, Bassiouney (2014) addresses the validity of 
Ferguson’s functional distribution in modern Egypt. She notes that “this function 
orientation relation between code and context is not enough in understanding 
diglossia” (Bassiouney, 2014: 108). Nevertheless, the functions can still be used as a 
general guide about the associations or indexes of fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya. Throughout 
this thesis, I have illustrated through the literature reviewed and the findings made 
and discussed that the three varieties – fuṣḥā, ʿāmmiyya and English – have multiple 
(and sometimes contradictory) associations. In Egypt, the associations of these 
language varieties allows speakers to “take advantage of the social, moral and 
political attributes of each variety” in order to achieve a range of communicative 
effects “from showing solidarity with the pan-Arab nationalist ideology to 
transgressing social and geographical boundaries by tapping into Western 
communicative styles” (Stadlbauer, 2010: 4). In other words: 
… the selective use of language features from different varieties signals as much 
information as the propositional content of the message: choosing features from one 
variety over another is a significant marker indexing the position of the speaker in 
society, their knowledge of political and religious values, or their aspiration for social 
mobility. (Stadlbauer, 2010: 8) 
Bassiouney (2014) uses the concept of language as an index to introduce a 
framework for understanding the role of language in identity construction in Egypt. 
The framework relies on the idea of language as resource, which Bassiouney adopts 
from Heller (2007). The underlying principle is that “whenever individuals use a 
linguistic resource … they do so in order to take a stance, while simultaneously 
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appealing to linguistic ideologies and practices that reflect identity” (Bassiouney, 
2014: 40). She elaborates: 
The clearest evidence of the immanent role of “access to resources” as a marker of 
identity is in the way that Egyptian public discourse utilises language as a classification 
category, as a social variable that categorises a community, similar to ethnicity, locality, 
or historical context. Code-switching and code-choice are used in this case. That is, in 
the projection of public discourse, the code that one chooses reflects directly on how 
one positions her or himself in relation to others: as an insider or an outsider, as an 
Egyptian or as a foreigner, as an Egyptian with no affiliation to Egypt or as a loyal citizen, 
as a typical man in the street or as an Egyptian who does not share the same 
characteristics that unify Egyptians, and so on. (Bassiouney, 2014: 41) 
Indexicality is premised on the notion that “a sign is indexical if it is related to its 
meaning, because it mostly co-occurs with the thing that it is taken to mean” 
(Bassiouney, 2014: 58). Bassiouney adopts the concept of indexical order introduced 
by Silverstein (2003) and elaborated by Johnstone et al. (2006). Central to this 
concept is that linguistic forms serve as non-referential indexes, presupposing and 
entailing social meaning. This social meaning “includes register, which refers to 
situational appropriateness; stance, which includes certainty and authority; and 
social identity, which includes class, ethnicity, and interactional role” (Bassiouney, 
2014: 59). 
Bassiouney applies these ideas to the language situation in Egypt, drawing a 
distinction between first order indexes – which she associates with language 
practices, habits and realities – and second order indexes – which she associates with 
language ideologies and attitudes. She makes a further distinction between direct 
and indirect second order indexes, the first are associated with language ideologies, 
and the second with attitudes. While I seek to build on Bassiouney’s framework, I 
have not retained this latter distinction because in some of the cases I present the 
ideologies and attitudes are too intertwined to make such a distinction. 
At the level of first order indexes, Bassiouney notes that fuṣḥā “is associated with 
formality, abstract, and distant contexts, as well as written rather than spoken 
contexts”, while ʿāmmiyya “is associated with informality, concrete, and intimate 
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contexts and tends to occur more in spoken than written contexts” (Bassiouney, 
2014: 108). This formal/written association of fuṣḥā versus the informal/spoken 
association of ʿāmmiyya is the only similarity between Bassiouney’s indexes and 
Ferguson’s functions. Crucially, the indexes presented by Bassiouney are only 
associations rather than a deterministic distribution of roles. That is, while this thesis 
has already gone to great lengths to demonstrate that the written domain is not 
exclusive to fuṣḥā, it is not to say that the association between fuṣḥā and this domain 
does not hold. This was suggested by the survey findings where participants 
indicated significantly higher confidence and frequency of fuṣḥā use in written form 
compared to spoken form (cf. Section ‎5.5.1.1).  
I retain Bassiouney’s spoken association for ʿāmmiyya, but I should point out that this 
is not as clear cut as fuṣḥā’s written association. Indeed, the survey findings suggest 
that ʿāmmiyya was significantly more likely than fuṣḥā to be selected when writing 
an email, text or even handwritten letter to a friend (cf. Section ‎5.5.1.3). It was only 
in the formal context of communicating with one’s superior at work or 
teacher/lecturer that fuṣḥā was more likely to be selected than ʿāmmiyya. Hence it 
would appear that the formality of the context has more salience than the 
written/spoken associations of fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya. This salience was not only clear 
in the survey results, but also in the interview with VE, where fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya 
were respectively referred to as ‘formal’ and ‘slang’ (Section ‎4.4). It was even 
suggested that ʿāmmiyya (in its most ‘slang’ rendition) could have associations of 
vulgarity. It could be argued that changing VE’s messages to ʿāmmiyya does not 
signal a change in the perceived informality of this variety. On the contrary, it is 
evident that the intent was to make the messages themselves less formal by 
capitalising on the informal association of ʿāmmiyya. One of the survey participants 
commented on this formality/informality binary (in SA):  
No one speaks to others in fuṣḥā all the time; they would be seen as deranged or 
pretending to have meaningless superficial cultivation and they would become a joke to 
everyone, [while] in formal situations fuṣḥā is classier and more beautiful [than 
ʿāmmiyya]. In short, ʿāmmiyya and fuṣḥā are like classic and casual apparel; each has its 
time and use. 
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English on the other hand is not particularly associated with formal/informal 
situations or spoken/written use. However, the survey findings do suggest an 
association between English and writing in electronic mediums (texting and email). 
This is part of a broader ‘script divide’ where there was an apparent preference for 
the Latin script options in the electronic mediums, but a greater likelihood for the 
selection of the Arabic script options in the handwritten medium. This was 
particularly clear in the informal context of communicating with a friend (cf. Section 
‎5.5.1.3).  
Since first order indexes in Bassiouney’s framework also relate to language realities, 
we could add education system to the framework. As discussed in Section ‎3.4, and 
corroborated by the survey findings, in Egypt, the public school system has come to 
be associated with Arabic while the private school system has come to be associated 
with foreign languages, most notably English. Another item which might be added is 
the job market for these languages. While government jobs are the sector where 
competence of fuṣḥā would be valued, higher paying multinational corporations 
value competence in English (Section ‎3.4). An often overlooked sector where 
ʿāmmiyya could be valued is media and advertising, as indicated by the interview 
with VE (Section ‎4.4). Similarly, as suggested in the interview with the ALCSs (Section 
‎4.5), there are distinct types of scholarship associated with Arabic and English. Arabic 
is associated with Islamic and heritage studies while English is associated with 
technological and scientific studies. 
Given that the main concern of this thesis has been language ideology, it can make 
several contributions at the level of second order indexes. In terms of prestige, while 
fuṣḥā enjoys both sacred language and standard language prestige (sections ‎3.3.1.1 
and ‎3.2.4), and English has Global language prestige (cf. Section ‎3.4), (Cairene) 
ʿāmmiyya – particularly spoken – enjoys both local and supra-local prestige (cf. 
sections ‎1.2 and ‎3.2.6). Its local prestige is evident in the interviews: Gamal El-Din 
refers to the ʿāmmiyya of Cairo as a source for a standardised EL and El-Sharkawi 
‘corrects’ writing which is not in Cairene. Its (albeit exaggerated) supra-local prestige 
is also referenced by Gamal El-Din and El-Sharkawi. Even Tag El-Din refers to the 
regional prestige of ʿāmmiyya in the interview with the ALCSs. 
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In terms of age, the survey findings indicate a clear preference for the use of SA in 
written communication among older participants (Section ‎5.5.2.2). On the other 
hand, English has been associated with the tastes and consumer behaviour of young 
Egyptians (Aboelezz, 2012; Peterson, 2011). Youth consumption in Egypt has also 
been associated with LA (Aboelezz, 2012), an association evidenced in the survey 
findings by a clear preference for this variety among younger participants (Section 
‎5.5.2.2). Similarly, ʿāmmiyya has been associated with the speech and writing of 
young Egyptians (Borg, 2007; Dahle, 2012; Rizk, 2007). The ‘generation’ mentioned in 
the slogan which used to appear on the cover of Ihna magazine – ṣōt gīl be-ḥālu (the 
voice of an entire generation) – coincides with the generation that Malamih targeted 
– the under-35s; the ‘Mubarak generation’ – and crucially, both Malamih and Ihna 
had a bias for ʿāmmiyya. It is also the generation that Naguib Sawiris’s “youth 
channel” with ʿāmmiyya news bulletins was intended for (Doss, 2010). 
With regard to religion, it is hardly necessary to put a case for the association 
between fuṣḥā and Islam (but see Section ‎3.3.1.1 for a review). Fuṣḥā is also 
associated with being religious; that is, a religious Muslim. The fact that the notion of 
religiosity in Egyptian society is linked to Islam and excludes Copts ties in with the 
position of Islam as the dominant religion which defines religious morality and 
dominates the country’s religious identity. It is quite revealing for example, that in El 
Amrani’s (2011) political map, the “religious-secular” axis depicts Islamist vs. anti-
Islamist parties at its poles. It was around the ‘secular’ pole that Coptic membership 
and votes coalesced (Marroushi, 2012). This links to the position of Copts in Egypt as 
a moral counter-elite (Section ‎6.3). 
However, to understand the full symbolic loadings of ʿāmmiyya for Egyptian Copts, 
one needs to move from the religious paradigm to the national paradigm. While 
fuṣḥā is associated with pan-Arab and Islamic nationalisms, ʿāmmiyya is associated 
with Egyptian nationalism (Section ‎3.3.2.3). Egyptian nationalism has particular 
appeal to Egyptian Copts for two main reasons: on the one hand it provides an 
alternative means of national self-definition against Islamic and pan-Arab 
nationalisms (which are often conflated as demonstrated in Section ‎6.2), and on the 
other it promotes an Egyptian identity which emphasises continuity from ancient 
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Egyptian and Coptic civilisations, hence privileging Copts as rightful heirs of these 
civilisations. Central to this nationalism is the claim that ʿāmmiyya is a direct 
descendent of Coptic, bestowing symbolic importance on ʿāmmiyya for Copts.  
Seen in this light, it becomes quite logical and understandable that the most 
separatist of Egyptian nationalists were Copts (Section ‎3.3.2.3), that many of the 
‘Masry Wikipedians’ are Copts (Panovi , 2010) and that an important pro-ʿāmmiyya 
agent of change who subscribes to Egyptian nationalist ideology, Naguib Sawiris, is 
also a Copt. Noting the role of Coptic users in Wikipedia Masry, Panovi  (2010: 100) 
states that this should not be underestimated: “Members of the minorities or 
marginalised groups tend to be more active in the field of identity politics, more 
eager to look for alternatives to practices and ideologies which members of the 
dominant group(s) might comfortably and unreflectively adhere to”. 
The case of Naguib Sawiris is another example. It has been argued that Sawiris’s 
investments in several cultural and media (and now political) institutions is part of his 
attempt to counter ‘Egypt’s Islamisation’ and transport a vision of a ‘liberal Egyptian 
identity’ which is removed from Arab identity (Gemeinder, 2009). Sawiris’s pro-
ʿāmmiyya stance was clear in his launch of the satellite channel OTV (now ONTV) in 
2006 (Bassiouney, 2009, 2014; Doss, 2010). The channel, which was aimed at young 
people and carried the slogan qanā maṣriyya miyya fi l-miyya (a 100% Egyptian 
channel), introduced news bulletins in ʿāmmiyya for the first time (a domain 
traditionally associated with fuṣḥā). Very much like in the case of Wikipedia Masry, 
the actual product was not ‘pure’ ʿāmmiyya but ‘elevated ʿāmmiyya’; an 
intermediate level between fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya (Doss, 2010). It is worth noting that 
the association between the channel on the one hand and ʿāmmiyya and a young 
audience on the other is difficult to assert today. In 2009, Yosri Fouda, a former Al-
Jazeera presenter joined ONTV. Fouda had already established an illustrious career 
as a news presenter, and consistent with the language policy of his former 
employers, he continued to use fuṣḥā in his programme on ONTV. Moreover, the 
channel gained wide viewership during and after the January 25 revolution for siding 
with the protestors and providing an alternative to the State media narrative. It 
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could be argued that ONTV today attracts both young and old viewers, albeit with a 
particular political ideology.  
To understand the ideological significance of OTV/ONTV it is useful to dwell on a 
similar earlier project in Lebanon; that of the Lebanese channel, LBCI (Lebanese 
Broadcasting Corporation International). Established in 1991, the channel “is strongly 
connected to the Maronite-dominated Phalange Party, which is committed to 
maintaining a Lebanese identity for Lebanon in which the Maronites play a pivotal 
role” (Suleiman, 2006a: 131-132). Significantly, LBCI’s local news bulletin is broadcast 
mainly in Lebanese colloquial Arabic (Al Batal, 2002). Al Batal (2002: 112) relates this 
to a tension between the ideologies of “[pan-]Arabism” and “Lebanonism” where 
“the former ideology perceives Lebanon as an integral part of the Arab World both 
culturally and linguistically, while the latter stresses the cultural and linguistic 
uniqueness of Lebanon vis-à-vis the rest of the Arab World”. According to Suleiman 
(2006a: 132), while the former perceives Lebanon as “of the Arab Middle East”, the 
latter sees it as merely “in the Arab Middle East”. Clearly, there are many parallels 
between LBCI and OTV/ONTV; what makes them sociolinguistically interesting is 
“their symbiotic association with the centres of political power in the country” 
(Suleiman, 2006a: 131).  
However, this is not to say that ventures such as OTV/ONTV and Wikipedia Masry are 
not met with resistance. Like some of the attacks on Salama Musa and Louis Awad 
which used their Coptic identity to explain their linguistic ideology and accuse them 
of ‘conspiracy’, both OTV/ONTV (Bassiouney, 2009) and Wikipedia Masry (Panovi , 
2010) were the subject of such accusations because of their association with Coptic 
founders. It could be argued that such accusations serve to strengthen the 
ideological association between Copts and ʿāmmiyya in a cyclical manner.  
English is also often associated with ‘conspiracy’. This has partly to do with the 
‘colonial hangover’ (Section ‎3.3.2.1) and the association between English and 
colonialism. This was clearly evidenced in the interview with the ALCSs (Section ‎4.5). 
This association was also expressed by one of the survey participants (in SA): 
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 Here in Egypt we do not use the Arabic language (al-luġa al-ʿarabiyya) in our daily 
conversations. This owes to the cultural invasion from Europe in an attempt to eliminate 
our identity and replace Arabic with English and French, so you find that the Egyptian 
child speaks English and does not know Arabic 
On a different level, English is also indexical of national disloyalty. Bassiouney (2012, 
2014) demonstrates how the identity of protesters in Tahrir Square was questioned 
during the 2011 revolution. Their linguistic practices were used to discredit them and 
claim they were conspiring against Egypt: they were not ‘real’ Egyptians because 
‘they speak English language very well’ (Bassiouney, 2012: 113). 
The national identities indexed by ʿāmmiyya, fuṣḥā and English are each tied to 
specific world orientations. While ʿāmmiyya is associated with a worldview oriented 
towards the Egyptian territories, and fuṣḥā is associated with a view oriented 
towards the Arab and Islamic worlds, English is associated with a Global, 
cosmopolitan worldview (Peterson, 2011). Nationalism aside, ʿāmmiyya and fuṣḥā 
can also index political orientation as outlined in Section ‎6.2. 
In terms of social orientation, the religious associations of fuṣḥā have made it 
indexical of a conservative social outlook, while the worldly associations of English 
have made it associated with a liberal social outlook. On the flip side, fuṣḥā is 
indexical of Islamic and Eastern morality while English is indexical of Western 
(im)morality. This binary was particularly clear in the interview with the ALCSs where 
the use of English was constructed as a moral threat (Section ‎4.5).  
In the same vein, fuṣḥā can be said to be indexical of tradition and of Arabic and 
Islamic heritage. English on the other hand is associated with technology and 
modernity. This was potently expressed by Mustafa where he indicated that 
someone like Salah who is well versed in Arabic language and heritage studies would 
not be deemed educated and modern unless he demonstrated a linguistic command 
of English, highlighting the cultural capital of English (Section ‎4.5). Of course, the 
association of English with technology and modernity also endows it with 
commercial capital. As Stadlbauer (2010: 15) observes, “English in particular conveys 
an international feel, and some ideologies associated with commercial products are 
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as important as the linguistic meaning potentially conveyed”, indeed, more often 
than not “the use of English as a symbol of modernity is more important than 
communicating through it” (Pimentel, 2000: 211, cited in Stadlbauer, 2010). This was 
particularly clear in the interview with VE (Section ‎4.4). The use of English to brand 
some of VE’s products (like ‘mini-call’) did not seem to contradict VE’s concern that a 
large proportion of their customer base came from humble backgrounds and had 
little or no education. That is, the use of English here is not communicative, but a 
strategic choice which capitalises on the positive commercial value of the commodity 
of English which is linked to technology and modernity. 
The association between English and modernity also entails an association with 
technological and scientific innovation. Similarly, ʿāmmiyya indexes freshness and 
linguistic innovation (Bassiouney, 2014; Borg, 2007; Rizk, 2007); it is seen as flexible 
and malleable, while fuṣḥā is seen as inflexible and static, indexing (particularly 
linguistic) rigidity. The binary of the flexibility of ʿāmmiyya and inflexibility of fuṣḥā 
comes up in the interviews. However, while the flexibility of ʿāmmiyya is positively 
valued in the interviews with LEP and Malamih (Sections ‎4.2 and ‎4.3 respectively), it 
is negatively valued in the interview with the ALCSs (Section ‎4.5). 
Bassiouney (2014) also points to the association between ʿāmmiyya and political 
opposition (cf. Section ‎6.2.2). In its capacity as standard and official language, fuṣḥā 
is associated with the hegemony of the state. Hence, the very act of rejecting the 
linguistic hegemony of the state becomes a symbolic act of political resistance. While 
the state uses fuṣḥā to signify authority and legitimacy, those opposed to the state 
use it to signify authenticity and credibility. Fuṣḥā, which has come to be associated 
with government bureaucracy and repression, is countered by ʿāmmiyya which is 
forging an association with resistance and dissent.  
Bassiouney (2014) makes a compelling case for the association between ʿāmmiyya 
and authenticity. She cites evidence from recent Egyptian movies where the 
protagonists are in search of their identity; their language changes as they go 
through various stages of self-discovery (indexing different identities), but it is only 
when they ‘find themselves’ that they speak in ʿāmmiyya alone. This perception of 
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ʿāmmiyya as an index of authenticity also comes up in the interviews, particularly 
with Malamih, where El-Sharkawi constructs ʿāmmiyya as an authentic code which 
has the capacity to unite Egyptians, and which people on the streets can relate to. On 
the other hand, English is inauthentic and has a dividing capacity (Section ‎4.3). 
The ‘inauthenticity’ of English is also addressed by Peterson (2011: 216) who refers 
to the struggle of young Egyptians to be at once ‘Egyptian and traditional’ and 
‘cosmopolitan and modern’: “This balance is difficult to find because the 
communities that define modern and global deem Egypt to be backward, while the 
communities that define local and traditional deem many of the styles adopted by 
cosmopolitans to be inauthentic”. English is associated with adopting foreign 
mannerisms “which smack of artifice” (Peterson, 2011: 104); it is associated with 
pretence; with not being genuine. It is this association, and the identity struggle 
highlighted by Peterson, which are indexed in the song lyrics quoted at the beginning 
of this chapter86.  
The framework of indexes constructed in the course of this section is summarised in 
Table 9. That a single code can simultaneously carry positive and negative indexes is 
a hallmark of the framework. Indeed, the very same index can be perceived 
positively or negatively based on context and stance. For example, the index of 
Egyptian nationalism can be perceived positively by some but negatively by others. 
The value of this framework is that it allows us to appreciate the scope of the 
indexical pool of fuṣḥā, ʿāmmiyya and English in Egypt. In turn, this appreciation 
helps us understand the often reported rift between language perceptions and 
realities, and language ideologies and practices (cf. Section ‎3.1). 
 
  
                                                             
86 The lyrics are from a song by the popular Egyptian youth band Cairokee. The band rose to fame in 
the wake of the 2011 revolution and is known for its political songs. 
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JOB MARKET Media and advertising Government jobs 
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(immorality) 
MODERNITY Fresh (social relevance) Traditional (heritage) Modern (technology) 
















Table 9. The indexes of fuṣḥā, ʿāmmiyya and English in Egypt 
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Drawing on the associations of different codes, language can become a classification 
category (Bassiouney, 2014), and hence be used to produce stereotypes; that is, third 
order indexes (Johnstone et al., 2006). Bassiouney provides many examples of such 
stereotypes in the movies she analyses: such as the Islamist who speaks in fuṣḥā and 
the cosmopolite who code-switches between ʿāmmiyya and English. Such 
stereotypes rely on “a shared ideological model” with the audience (Bassiouney, 
2014: 195). That is not to say however that stereotypes – how certain groups are 
perceived – necessarily reflect reality. The popular depiction of Islamists as persons 
who speak in fuṣḥā in Egyptian cinema and cartoons relies on the ideological 
association of fuṣḥā with Islamism. In reality, anyone who goes about their daily 
business constantly speaking in fuṣḥā would be a true oddity, Islamist or not!  
The short-lived elected parliament of 2012 presents a particularly interesting case 
study. The parliament housed an Islamist majority, and yet one particular MP, Amr 
Hamzawy, stood out for speaking fuṣḥā most consistently and correctly. Hamzawy 
was not an Islamist, but a secular, liberal MP. It could be said that Hamzawy was 
using fuṣḥā to index formality and authority in a formal situation where authority is 
valued.  Conversely, despite promoting fuṣḥā ideologically in the 2012 constitution, 
the MB’s F&J party were using written ʿāmmiyya in their political campaigns 
(Bassiouney, 2014) in what appeared to be an attempt to tap into the indexes of 
authenticity, freshness and young age to attract – especially young – voters. 
The multiple indexes of English also became apparent in Egyptian political life over 
the past few years. While English was used to discredit the protestors who spoke it 
fluently in Tahrir Square (Bassiouney, 2012; 2014), the MB president Muhammad 
Morsi was widely ridiculed in early 2013 when, during a visit to Germany, he made 
“scandalous” attempts to speak in English, demonstrating his less-than-impressive 
command of the language (Al Arabiya, 2013). To understand why both fluency and 
lack of fluency in English were valued negatively, we must look at the range of 
indexes associated with English in Egypt. In the case of the protestors, the indexes of 
inauthenticity and national disloyalty were invoked, while in Morsi’s case, the 




The findings of the survey and interviews also offer examples of discrepancy 
between language ideology and practice. While the participants’ ideologies were 
significant predictors of their language attitudes, the relationship between ideologies 
and language practices was not direct. In informal written communication, political 
conservatism, viewing Egypt as an integral part of the Arab World and having a low 
ranking of Egyptian identity generally correlated with selecting SA. Conversely, 
political liberalism, having a separatist view towards the Arab World and a high 
ranking of Egyptian identity – all variables which correlated with pro-ʿāmmiyya 
attitudes – did not correlate with choosing ʿāmmiyya in written communication. They 
only correlated with not choosing fuṣḥā. Moreover, there was no significant 
relationship between political ideology and language choices in formal written 
communication: here, the first order index of formality appeared to trump second 
order ideological indexes in favour of SA and English. 
A related example is Gamal El-Din’s use of fuṣḥā in the interview despite his pro-
ʿāmmiyya ideological position (Section ‎4.2). Gamal El-Din’s use of fuṣḥā’s evokes 
authority and legitimacy which in turn projects the image of the knowledgeable 
expert. Ironically, in using fuṣḥā while advocating ʿāmmiyya, Gamal El-Din is in fact, 
to borrow Bourdieu’s terms, producing and reproducing “the game and its stakes by 
reproducing … the practical commitment to the value of the game and its stakes 
which defines the recognition of legitimacy” (Bourdieu, 1991: 58). In other words, 
while Gamal El-Din is petitioning for ʿāmmiyya as a legitimate language, his actual 
practice is reinforcing the legitimacy of fuṣḥā. 
6.5 Summary 
This chapter has sought to incorporate the findings of the survey and interviews into 
the existing body of knowledge about the language situation in Egypt while 
simultaneously bringing in new artefacts of knowledge for a more up-to-date picture 
of events. My purpose was not simply to discuss my findings, but to offer meaningful 
ways of viewing these findings in light of other contributions to the field.  
In answering the final research question I have attempted to use my findings to 
further our knowledge of the language situation in Egypt by: (a) outlining the 
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changing political landscape in Egypt and relating my findings to the politicised issue 
of language and identity; (b) using the findings to adapt Bourdieu’s concept of 
symbolic power to the language situation in Egypt by proposing a model which 
incorporates multiple power elites with different types of symbolic capital; (c) 
addressing the relevance of Ferguson’s distribution of diglossic functions in modern 
Egypt and building on Bassiouney’s (2014) orders of indexicality as an alternative, 





S THERE’S BEEN SOMETHING DIFFERENT, SOMETHING VERY SPECIAL, 
ABOUT THE QUALITY OF THE ATTENTION THE EGYPTIAN 
REVOLUTION HAS ATTRACTED: IT’S BEEN – PERSONAL. 
 
T 
Ahdaf Soueif (2012: 183), Cairo: My city, our revolution 
 
I started the thesis by pointing to the special status of Egypt in sociolinguistic studies. 
Not only is EA considered one of the most well-known colloquial Arabic varieties in 
the Arab World, but the language situation in Egypt is one of the most studied cases 
of Arabic diglossia. However, the political upheavals of the past few years have given 
Egypt a fresh relevance and lure, not only to sociolinguists but to scholars from an 
array of disciplines. While Egypt’s moment in the media spotlight may have passed, it 
does not look like research on Egypt will diminish any time soon. Keeping abreast of 
all the new literature which has emerged about Egypt in the past few years was a 
particular challenge, but I have sought to make this thesis as relevant and as up-to-
date as possible at the time of completion. 
The time period during which this project was undertaken presented some serious 
hurdles. When the 2011 revolution took place, I was already more than a year into 
my research; I had already conducted the interviews and piloted the survey (the final 
version of which was originally scheduled to go live at the end of January 2011). A 
year of uncertainty followed. Less than a year after I had conducted the interviews, 
two of my ‘agents of change’ – Malamih and LEP – had become defunct. I saw my 
research in real danger of losing relevance. At the same time, the situation in Egypt 
was still unfolding – it arguably still is. The outcomes were not clear and there was 
the other danger that any data I collected just then would have limited relevance in 
the long run. 
But despite the inevitable delays and among the moments of political and scholarly 
uncertainty, I also recognised that this unfolding situation presented unique research 
opportunities, and I was keen to seize these. The survey – which had to undergo 
major revisions – could now incorporate political orientation. Moreover, the rapid 
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rise in the number of Twitter users following the 2011 revolution made it a valuable 
platform for distributing the survey. My challenge then was to determine a period of 
relative political calm to launch the survey. I decided that the 2012 presidential 
elections would be my cut-off point, and indeed, the final survey went live from the 
25th of October 2012 to the 5th of February 2013. Six months later, I was confronted 
with yet another regime change! 
In the end I accepted this project for what it had become; from a study about 
language change, to a study of change amid change. I decided to shed my concern 
about ‘relevance’. Gradually, this gave way to recognition that both the interviews 
and the survey derive value from their timing. If I were to re-launch the survey today, 
I would likely have to scrap the dimension of political ideology completely. The 
situation now may not be the same as the situation in 2010 six months before the 
2011 revolution, or in 2012 months after Morsi was elected to power, but it is 
precisely because these situations cannot be recreated that this data is now 
important. I ultimately decided to present the interviews as they were, for what they 
were. The timing of this research has inevitably become part of its essence. 
A direct influence of the period in which this research was conducted is the fact that 
ideology came to be a defining component. The unique opportunity to study political 
ideology and relate it to language ideology shaped the central contribution of this 
thesis. Somewhere along the way, my research also caught the ‘identity bug’. That 
the question of identity features so prominently in this thesis is at once a reflection 
of its inextricable link to language ideology as well as its salience in Egyptian public 
and political discourse at the time of writing. I reflect on my own identity as a 
researcher in Section ‎7.2 and identify areas for future work in Section ‎7.3, but first, I 
highlight the main contributions and limitations of this thesis in Section ‎7.1.  
7.1 The Main Contributions 
The main contributions of this thesis fall into three categories: findings, analytical 




In terms of findings, the interviews in Chapter 4 capture the ideological arguments in 
the discourse of pro-ʿāmmiyya agents of change vis-à-vis the arguments of pro-fuṣḥā 
resisters of change. Through discourse analysis, I have demonstrated how the topoi 
of superiority, unity, authenticity, purity, continuity, competition and conspiracy are 
invoked through language myths in the discourse of both agents and resisters of 
change. Significantly, I have shown through the interview with VE that not all pro-
ʿāmmiyya change entails a pro-ʿāmmiyya ideology in the conventional sense. 
Moreover, I have shown that while there is overlap between Malamih and LEP’s pro-
ʿāmmiyya ideologies, there were also significant differences in their arguments. 
One limitation of the interview findings is that they can only account for the motives 
of the interviewed agents of change. Although the interviews appear to capture 
prominent pro-ʿāmmiyya arguments, it is likely – especially in light of the discussions 
in Chapter 6 – that interviewing different agents of change will point to different 
motives. Another limitation in Chapter 3 relates to the very conceptualisation of 
agents and resisters of change. The idea was that pro-ʿāmmiyya agents seek to 
change the linguistic situation by expanding the role of ʿāmmiyya in Egyptian society 
while resisters try to preserve the status quo. However, this can be misleading as it 
implies that only agents of change have agency while resisters of change are passive 
actors. The interview findings show that this is not true: the ALCSs are also actively 
seeking to expand and reinforce the use of fuṣḥā in Egyptian society. This is 
particularly evidenced by their attempts to promote the spoken use of fuṣḥā. 
Perhaps a more apt conceptualisation would be to depict agents and resisters as 
forces of change and counter change. This would capture the ‘defensive’ nature of 
the ALCSs’ activities which was noted in the interview.  
The survey in Chapter 5 provides rich results which illuminate the relationship 
between identity and language attitudes and practices. In terms of language use, the 
most salient identity variables were language of education and SES, which correlated 
significantly with participants’ responses to the paired questions on Arabic and 
English and to the questions on language choice in written communication. Overall, 
foreign language-educated participants and participants with higher SES were more 
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likely to complete the survey in English and to report higher confidence and 
frequency in using English. They were also more likely to report greater importance 
for English at work. Conversely, Arabic-educated participants and participants with 
lower SES were more likely to complete the survey in Arabic. Arabic-educated 
participants reported higher confidence in using Arabic and higher frequency in using 
written Arabic. The findings also showed an interesting ‘script divide’ in the choices 
of participants in written communication based on SES and language of education: 
foreign-language educated participants and participants with higher SES were more 
likely to favour Latin script options (English, LA, English mixed with LA), while Arabic-
educated participants and participants with lower SES were more likely to favour 
Arabic script options (SA, EA, SA+EA). Age was also a significant predictor of SA and 
LA use. Older participants were more likely to choose SA in written communication 
and not to choose LA or English mixed with LA. They were also more likely to have 
negative attitudes towards LA. 
The political ideology variables (except the ranking of Arab identity) were significant 
predictors of language attitudes. Overall, participants at the conservative end of the 
political spectrum, those who had a pan-Arab national orientation, and those who 
had a low rank for Egyptian identity (and in some cases, high rank for Muslim 
identity), were more likely to perceive the recent changes as a threat to the Arabic 
language. Conversely, participants at the liberal end of the political spectrum, those 
with a separatist national orientation, and those who had a high ranking of Egyptian 
identity were more likely to view pro-ʿāmmiyya changes positively. The relationship 
between political ideology and language use however was not straightforward. 
There are a number of limitations to the survey findings which I discuss in detail in 
Section ‎5.6. Some design flaws were only detected during analysis. The self-reporting 
nature of surveys makes it important to highlight that the language practices 
questions are tied to participants’ understanding of what constitutes fuṣḥā and 
ʿāmmiyya. Finally, although the sample was generally diverse and the results were 
highly reliable, the method used limits the generalisability of the findings. 
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7.1.2 Analytical contributions 
This thesis makes two main analytical contributions. The first contribution lies in 
expanding Eisele’s topoi in the dominant regime of practice about Arabic: Eisele 
proposed four topoi (unity, purity, continuity and competition), to which I add 
superiority, authenticity and conspiracy. I used Eisele’s approach in conjunction with 
Kelsey’s discourse mythological approach, a CDA approach with a particular focus on 
the construction of myths. Marrying the two approaches provides a powerful 
analytical framework for the study of language ideologies about Arabic. 
The second analytical contribution was in introducing the two-dimensional political 
orientation spectrum representing the dominant political orientations in 
contemporary Egyptian politics. This spectrum seeks to simplify a complex reality for 
the sake of quantitative analysis. The symmetry and ordinality of the categories 
within the spectrum have made it workable for statistical analysis. 
7.1.3 Theoretical contributions 
In answering the final research question and attempting to incorporate my findings 
into the existing knowledge about the language situation in Egypt, I have made two 
theoretical contributions. The first is offering a fresh perspective on the relationship 
between language and power in Egypt. Here, I integrated Bourdieu’s theory of 
symbolic power with the sociological concepts of multiple elites and counter-elites. I 
argued that there were three key elites in Egyptian society with different symbolic 
capital associated with them: the political elite (who grant fuṣḥā political symbolic 
capital), the moral elite (who grant fuṣḥā moral symbolic capital) and the economic 
elite (who grant English economic symbolic capital). In addition, there are two 
counter-elites – the political counter-elite and the moral counter-elite – both of 
whom use ʿāmmiyya to challenge the political and moral elites respectively. 
The second theoretical contribution was to expand the framework of first and 
second order indexes developed by Bassiouney (2014) for the language situation in 
Egypt. Here I used the literature and my own findings to widen the pool of indexes of 
fuṣḥā, ʿāmmiyya and English. 
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7.2 Looking Back: reflecting on the researcher’s position 
The notion of reflexivity is gaining wider currency in social sciences and there is 
pressure on researchers who study topics such as ideology and identity to address 
the role of their own identities. Indeed, this is not only desirable but necessary if a 
researcher’s claims of objectivity are to be taken seriously.  
Suleiman (2006b) provides an excellent discussion on the importance of reflexivity. 
He notes that “for some scholars – particularly linguists – writing about identity may 
in some sense be driven by personal concerns, even anxieties, about their own 
personal identity. Writing about identity, a scholar may in fact use the occasion, 
knowingly or unknowingly, to grapple with issues of personal identity” (2006b: 51). 
Suleiman provides examples of how “the personal and the scholarly dimensions of a 
person’s identity can interact with each other in discussions of language and 
identity” (2006b: 52). He adds that “constructing or deconstructing linguistic identity 
in scholarly discourses of this kind therefore has great significance because it 
engages and links that which is interior to the self in the realm of personal identity 
with what is exterior to it in the social domain of professional and collective identity” 
(ibid.). He states: “I believe it is important to highlight this link because it raises 
questions about the nature of ‘science as practice’, in particular about the meaning 
and limits of ‘objectivity’ in scientific inquiry” (ibid.). 
Addressing the quest for objectivity in studies of ideology, Kelsey (2014) notes that 
“ideology should not only be referred to negatively in accusation or opposition”;  “if 
one criticises something for its ideological intentions, a neutral approach to ideology 
accepts that one’s own argument might also be ideologically influenced”. This 
acceptance, according to Kelsey, is conducive of objectivity: 
This approach means that the analyst does not need to claim any freedom from 
ideology; there is an open acceptance that our own perceptions, critiques and ideas are 
equally influenced by ideology. But since ideology is not an exclusively negative term, it 
is this neutral approach that exempts the analyst from accusations of hiding their own 
ideologies behind claims of intellectual or analytical superiority or objectivism. 
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Hence, while recognising the ‘limits of objectivity’, the very path to objectivity begins 
by reflecting on my own identity and ensuring a ‘neutral approach to ideology’.  I 
cannot deny the influence of my own personal identity in this research – as an 
Egyptian and a Muslim, and as an Arabic-speaker with a Western education and an 
‘Arab’ upbringing. This identity is arguably what led me to this research topic. Would 
I have chosen to study the language situation in Egypt if I did not have these linguistic 
and national ties to Egypt? Likely not. Eisele (2003: 49) – whose own writings provide 
an excellent model for the reflexive spirit which should characterise research of 
language ideology – refers to the ““Europeanist” view of language, espoused by 
Arabs trained in the West”. It is a description which probably captures my position. 
I consider myself an insider looking from the outside. My position as an ‘insider’ 
allows me to understand some of the intricacies of the language situation in Egypt, 
while looking from the outside gives me enough detachment to see aspects of the 
wider picture that I might have missed were I looking from the inside. In a period 
when it had become virtually impossible for anyone with personal ties to Egypt not 
to develop strong political opinions and ideological alignments; being on the outside 
has made it all a little less ‘personal’.  
Throughout the various stages of my research, I have tried to shelve my own 
ideological baggage: my goal has been not to make ideological judgments but to 
understand the very workings of language ideology. It is for this reason that I do not 
evaluate the accuracy of the language myths in the interviews. This was a particular 
challenge when conducting the actual interviews. On multiple occasions, I had to 
suppress my scholarly intuition to question the accuracy of some of the arguments 
while simultaneously probing for elaboration. I reminded myself that I was not there 
to evaluate the validity of these arguments; the arguments were clearly valid to the 
interview subjects and this is what mattered. This is my personal interpretation of a 
‘neutral approach to ideology’. 
However, I became wary in the course of my research that how I saw myself and how 
others saw me were two different things. In the survey, participants saw an 
information page at the beginning where I presented myself as an Egyptian 
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researcher, and my institutional affiliation indicated that I was studying in the UK. 
The information page also included a link to my university webpage where the 
participant would have been greeted with a picture of a woman in a headscarf which 
does not only immediately identify me as Muslim, but also indexes religious 
conservatism. As I have demonstrated in Chapter 6, such an identity is readily 
associated with a pro-fuṣḥā language ideology. This might explain why many of the 
survey participants thanked me in their comments for ‘looking out for Arabic’. This is 
a sample of such comments: 
 ةيبرعلا ةغللا ءارثاو ءامنا ىف رود كانه نوكي ناو قيفوتلا هل ىنمتاو ةساردلا هذه ىلع ماق نم ركشا نا دوا
ىف اهنا ثيح رمتسم رادحنا 
‘I would like to thank the person who has prepared this study and wish them luck, and that 
they play a role in nurturing and enriching the Arabic language as it is in constant decline’ 
(SA) 
ءوسب برعلل حضتيل كلذو نايبتسلااب ىكارتشلا ةديعس اناا  ةغللا مادختساو اهراقتحاو ةيبرعلا ةغلل مهمادختسا
مهتاراضحو ةيبرعلا مهتغل ريمدت ىف اومهاسيب مهنا زازفتساب ةيزيلجنلأا 
‘I am happy to have participated in the survey so that Arabs may know [that] by abusing and 
scorning the Arabic language and provocatively using the English language they are 
contributing to the destruction of their Arabic language and their civilisations’ (SA + EA) 
لجو زع انبر ملاك انمهف امل اهنقتن مل ول ىتلا نآرقلا ةغلل مامتهلاا اذهل ركشلا لك 
‘All thanks for [giving] this attention to the language of the Quran which if we did not master 
we would not [be able to] understand the words of our almighty Lord’ (SA) 
On the other hand, some participants left ‘defensive’ comments such as the 
following: 
I disagree with calling it Egyptian Arabic, lots of linguists would place our language as a 
language on its own. it has a very big component of coptic vocabulary and its grammer is 
mainly coptic. it should be called the egyptian language. 
 
I would like to point out that I believe that spoken varieties of languages are legitimate 
languages. The use of Egyptian Arabic (EA) in printed matter should be seen as normal, 
rather than a threat to Standard Arabic. Finally, even though I do not use what you call 
Franco Arabic, it seems to be a handy way for young people to communicate in EA using the 
Latin alphabet. 
 
Egyptian Arabic is so natural I no longer think of it being used extensively as a phenomenum 
anymore. It's good. And no worries for it as being a threat to the Standard Arabic. Teach 
Standard Arabic correctly at schools first and then talk about threats! 
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It appeared that participants with a pro-fuṣḥā language ideology assumed that I 
shared the same ideology, while participants with a pro-ʿāmmiyya language ideology 
assumed that I was opposed to their ideology. Needless to say, the codes used to 
write these comments are significant. Comments like this highlight the inseparability 
of the researcher’s scholarly and personal identities. They also point to the power of 
indexicality. In the same way that language use can index identity, identity can index 
language ideology: I did not need to express my language views to be associated with 
a pro-fuṣḥā ideology; I merely needed to be who I was. Walters’ (2008: 656) words 
that “in a real sense, ideologies choose us” resonate strongly indeed (cf. Section ‎6.3). 
7.3 Looking Forward: avenues for future research 
The work presented in this thesis is not meant to be the final stroke; it is an invitation 
for further research into a generally well-studied language situation, but in specific 
areas where research is still wanting. While work like Bassiouney’s (2012; 2013; 
2014) provides some way forward in studying the relationship between language and 
politics in post-2011 Egypt, research in this area is still in its infancy and will likely 
take some years to mature, especially alongside a turbulent political situation. I hope 
that the ways I have proposed to make sense of this situation will inspire other 
researchers to offer their contributions. There are two particular areas in need of 
research which I have flagged in my discussions. The first is the relevance of pan-
Arabism in contemporary Egypt and the Arab World and how this relates to 
language. The second is how the language ideologies of the traditional political right 
are evolving in post-MB Egypt. This includes how ‘Egyptian identity’ is constructed at 
the official level by a government which is keen to distance itself from Islamist 
ideology. More research into the area of identity politics in Egypt is generally 
needed. 
Another area where research is urgently needed relates to how persons with limited 
or no literacy interact with technology in Egypt. In Chapter 5, I presented clear 
evidence that there was a subset of mobile users – and possibly Internet users – with 
little or no literacy in the country. This was supported by the findings of the interview 
with VE (Section ‎4.4). That such persons use technologies which presuppose at least 
a basic ability to read and write challenges our very understanding of literacy. 
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Research is clearly needed to shed light on the ‘literacy’ practices of such technology 
users and how this links to the diglossic nature of their language community. 
There is also a dire need, not for research, but to make the research on the Arabic 
language available in the Arabic language. As noted in Section ‎3.3.1.2, there is no 
shortage of interest in the language question in Egypt, and in the Arab World more 
broadly. However, this interest is not matched by the availability of scholarly work 
which addresses this interest in Arabic. Scholarly works in Arabic on the language 
situation in the Arab World are scant, and even more so scholarly works which are 
pitched at a non-specialist audience. Even where such works exist, they usually 
belong to the ‘dominant regime of practice’ about Arabic (Eisele, 2000, 2002, 2003), 
alienating those who do not subscribe to their ideology. The lack of Arabic linguistics 
research published in Arabic has created an intellectual void which has been filled by 
‘folk linguistics’ (cf. Suleiman, 2013a); the work of non-specialists and language 
aficionados who contribute to the perpetuation of language myths such as those 
expressed in Chapter 4. 
On the other hand, research published in English about Arabic and on the language 
situations in the Arab World is incessantly growing. This is evidenced by the rise in 
the number of conferences, journals and book series dedicated to these topics in the 
West. Much of this research has been fuelled by ‘Arabs trained in the West’; native 
Arabic speakers with insider knowledge of the language situations they research. 
Having identified myself as one of these researchers, I feel that we now have a 
choice: we can continue to talk about Arabic in English amongst ourselves, 
occasionally listening in on the conversations in Arabic and referring to them, or we 
can finally start contributing to these conversations. 
Finally, it is important to point to research which is already underway. During the 
latter stages of my project I joined ‘The Ideology and Sociology of Change in the Arab 
World’ project team. The project is funded by the Norwegian Research Council and 
includes partners from a number of universities across the world. In addition to the 
partners’ research contributions, the project involves carrying out two language 
surveys in Egypt and Morocco. The Egyptian survey was carried out in 2013 on a 
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representative sample from Greater Cairo and investigates language behaviour and 
attitudes (with a focus on written practices and on fuṣḥā and ʿāmmiyya). In 
contributing to the design of this survey with other partners I was able to draw on 
the experience of designing the web-based survey for my own study. I have been 
fortunate to become part of a project with the resources to carry out this large scale 
survey on a population which I was only able to capture a glimpse of in my research. 
The tabulation report which includes the preliminary results from the Cairo survey 
was recently published (Kebede et al., 2013). My research efforts beyond this thesis 
will be concentrated on using this exciting new data to gain a better understanding 
of a language situation which will likely continue to attract research interest for many 





2012 Presidential Elections Official Website. (2012). al-Natāʾij al-Nihāʾiyya li-l-Marḥala al-Ūlā  
Retrieved 01.09.2014, from http://pres2012.elections.eg/index.php/round1-results 
Abd-El-Jawad, H. R. (1981). Lexical and Phonological Variation in Spoken Arabic in Amman. 
PhD, University of Pennsylvania.    
Abd-El-Jawad, H. R. (1987). Cross-dialectal Variation in Arabic: Competing prestigious forms. 
Language in Society, 16(03), 359-367.  
Abdel-Hafez, F. H. M., & Wahba, K. (2004). Assessment of the "Free Internet Access" Project 
on the Internet Market in Egypt: System Dynamics View. Paper presented at the 
22nd International Conference of the System Dynamics Society, July 25-29, 2004, 
Oxford, England. 
Abdel-Jawwad, M. A.-S. (2013). al-Ṣundūq fī ʿāmayn: 41% min al-nāxibīn šārakū fī ḍarbat al-
bidāya… wa-l-barlamān al-munḥal al-aʿlā mušāraka. Al-Masry Al-Youm 23.01.2013. 
Retrieved 1.06.2014, from http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/285859 
Abdel Ghani, K. (2012). al-Lajna al-ʿulyā Tuʿlin al-Natāʾij al-Nihāʾiyya li-Intixābāt Majlis al-Šaʿb 
bi-Marāḥilihā al-Ṯalāṯ. Ahram Gate, (21.01.2012). Retrieved 01.08.2014, from 
http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/162896.aspx 
Aboelezz, M. (2009). Latinised Arabic and Connections to Bilingual Ability. In S. Disney, B. 
Forchtner, W. Ibrahim & N. Millar (Eds.), Papers from the Lancaster University 
Postgraduate Conference in Linguistics and Language Teaching, 2008. (Vol. 3, pp. 1-
23). Lancaster: Department of Linguistics and English Language. 
Aboelezz, M. (2012). ‘We are young. We are trendy. Buy our product!’: The Use of Latinised 
Arabic in Printed Edited Magazines in Egypt. United Academics Journal of Social 
Sciences(September/October 2012), 47-72.  
Aboelezz, M. (2014). The Geosemiotics of Tahrir Square: A study of the relationship between 
discourse and space. In L. Martín-Rojo (Ed.), Occupy: The spatial dynamics of 
discourse in global protest movements, special issue of Journal of Language and 
Politics, 13(4) (pp. 599-622): John Benjamins. 
Ahram Online. (2011-2012). Egypt Elections 2011.  Retrieved 1.06.2014 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/elections2011.aspx 
Al-Sayyid, A. L. (1937). al-Muntaxabāt. Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif. 
Al-Sayyid Marsot, A. L. (2007). A History of Egypt: From the Arab conquest to the present  
(2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Al-Shalh, M. (2010). Masīḥī Maġribī Yusīʾ ilā al-Qurʾān bi-Tarjamatih ilā al-Dārija. HESPRESS 18 
March 2010. Retrieved 31.03.2014, from 
http://www.hespress.com/orbites/19609.html 
Al-Shubashi, S. (2004). Litaḥyā al-Luġa al-ʿarabiyya, Yasqut Sībawayh  (3rd ed.). Cairo: 
Madbūlī al-Ṣaġīr. 
Al-Wafd. (2011). Wafāt Ḥāmī al-Luġa al-ʿarabiyya Ṭāhir Abu Zēd  Retrieved 01.08.2014, from 
http://www.alwafd.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9265: ةافو
ىعاذلإا ريبكلا رهاط وبأ ديز &catid=131: هحفصلا هريخلاا &Itemid=370 
Al Arabiya. (2013). ‘Versus is not against’: Mursi haunted by attempts to speak English 
Thursday, 14 February 2013. Retrieved 01.09.2014, from 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2013/02/14/266228.html 
Al Batal, M. (2002). Identity and Language Tension in Lebanon: The Arabic of local news at 
LBCI. In A. Rouchdy (Ed.), Language Contact and Language Conflict in Arabic: 
Variations on a sociolinguistic theme (pp. 91-115). 
279 
 
Ali, I. (2014). Cairo Book Fair Aims to Revive Egyptian Identity. Almonitor 23.01.2014. 
Retrieved 05.04.2014, from http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/culture/2014/01/cairo-book-fair-egypt-identity.html 
Alrabaa, S. (1986). Diglossia in the Classroom: The Arabic case. Anthropological Linguistics, 
28(1), 73-79.  
Altoma, S. J. (1969). The Problem of Diglossia in Arabic: A comparative study of classical and 
Iraqi Arabic: Harvard University Press. 
Altoma, S. J. (1974). Language Education in Arab Countries and the Role of the Academies. In 
J. A. Fishman (Ed.), Advances in Language Planning (pp. 279-313). The Hague: De 
Gruyter. 
Amer, P. (2011). Twitter Nation. Egypt Today. Retrieved 29.04.2012, from 
http://egypttoday.com/news/display/article/artId:316/twitter-nation/secId:3 
Anis, I. (2003 [1973]). Fī al-Lahajāt al-ʿarabiyya  (3rd ed.). Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop. 
Archer, T. M. (2008). Response Rates to Expect from Web-Based Surveys and What to Do 
About It. Journal of Extension, 46(3).  
Aron, R. (1988). Etudes sociologiques. Paris: PUF. 
Atia, T. (1999). Instant Publishing. Al-Ahram Weekly, 437. Retrieved 24.08.2011, from 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/1999/437/feature.htm 
Awad, L. (1989 [1947]). Plutoland, wa-Qaṣāʾid min Šiʿr al-Xāṣṣa  (2nd ed.). Cairo: Al-Hayʾa al-
Miṣriyya al-ʿāmma lil-Kitāb. 
Awad, L. (2006 [1981]). Muqadimma fī Fiqh al-Luġa al-ʿarabiyya. Cairo: Ruʾya. 
Ayari, S. (1996). Diglossia and Illiteracy in the Arab World. Language, Culture and Curriculum, 
9(3), 243-253.  
Badawi, E. S. M. (1973). Mustawayāt al-ʿarabiyya al-Muʿāṣira fī Miṣr: Baḥṯ fī ʿalāqat al-luġa 
bi-l-ḥaḍāra. Cairo: Dār al-Maʿarif. 
Badry, F. (2011). Approaching English: Languages in Identity Construction in the United Arab 
Emirates In A. Al-Issa & L. S. Dahan (Eds.), Global English and Arabic: issues of 
language, culture, and identity (pp. 81-122). Oxford: Peter Lang. 
Bassiouney, R. (2003). Theories of Code Switching in the Light of Empirical Data from Egypt. 
In D. B. Parkinson & S. Farwaneh (Eds.), Perspectives in Arabic Linguistics XV (pp. 19-
39). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Bassiouney, R. (2006). Functions of Code Switching in Egypt: Evidence from monologues. 
Leiden: Brill. 
Bassiouney, R. (2009). Arabic Sociolinguistics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Bassiouney, R. (2012). Politicizing identity: Code choice and stance-taking during the 
Egyptian revolution. Discourse & Society, 23(2), 107-126.  
Bassiouney, R. (2013). Language and Revolution in Egypt. Telos, 2013(163), 85-110. doi: 
10.3817/0613163085 
Bassiouney, R. (2014). Language and Identity in Modern Egypt. Edinburgh Edinburgh 
University Press. 
Bauer, L., & Trudgill, P. (1998). Introduction. In L. Bauer & P. Trudgill (Eds.), Language Myths 
(pp. xv-xviii). London: Penguin Books. 
Bealey, F. (1996). Democratic Elitism and the Autonomy of Elites. International Political 
Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, 17(3), 319-331.  
Best, S. J., Krueger, B., Hubbard, C., & Smith, A. (2001). An Assessment of the Generalizability 
of Internet Surveys. Social Science Computer Review, 19(2), 131-145.  
Birnbaum, M. H. (2004). Human Research and Data Collection via the Internet. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 55, 803-832.  
Bishai, W. B. (1960). Notes on the Coptic Substratum in Egyptian Arabic. Journal of the 
American Oriental Society, 80(3), 225-229.  
Bishai, W. B. (1961). Nature and Extent of Coptic Phonological Influence on Egyptian Arabic. 
Journal of Semitic Studies, 6, 175-182.  
280 
 
Bishai, W. B. (1962). Coptic Grammatical Influence on Egyptian Arabic. Journal of the 
American Oriental Society, 82(3), 285-289.  
Bishai, W. B. (1964). Coptic Lexical Influence on Egyptian Arabic. Journal of Near Eastern 
Studies, 23(1), 39-47.  
Blanc, H. (1960). Stylistic Variation in Spoken Arabic: A sample of interdialectal educated 
conversation. In C. A. Ferguson (Ed.), Contributions to Arabic Linguistics (pp. 79-156). 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Block, D. (2006). Identity in Applied Linguistics. In T. Omoniyi & G. White (Eds.), The 
Sociolinguistics of Identity (pp. 34-49). London: Continuum. 
Borg, G. (2007). How to be Kool in Arabic Writing: Linguistic observations from the side line. 
In E. Ditters & H. Motzki (Eds.), Approaches to Arabic Linguistics (pp. 527-542). 
Leiden: Brill. 
Bosnjak, M., & Tuten, T. L. (2001). Classifying Response Behaviors in Web-based Surveys. 
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 6(3), 0-0.  
Bottomore, T. (1964). Elites and Society. London: Penguin. 
Bourdieu, P. (1977). The Economics of Linguistic Exchanges. Social Science Information, 16(6), 
645-668.  
Bourdieu, P. (1991). Language and Symbolic Power  (G. Raymond & M. Adamson, Trans.). 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Boussofara-Omar, N. (2003). Revisiting Arabic diglossic switching in light of the MLF model 
and its sub-models: the 4-M model and the Abstract Level model. Bilingualism: 
Language and Cognition, 6(01), 33-46.  
Boussofara-Omar, N. (2006). Neither third language nor middle varieties but diglossic 
switching. Zeitschrift für arabische Linguistik(45), 55-80.  
Boussofara-Omar, N. (2008). Diglossia, lemma in K. Versteegh, M. Eid, A. Elgibali, M. Woidich 
& A. Zaborski (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics (Vol. I, pp. 629-
637). Leiden: Brill. 
Brame, M. (1970). Arabic Phonology. unpublished PhD thesis, MIT.    
Brugman, J. (1984). An Introduction to the History of Modern Arabic Literature in Egypt. 
Leiden: Brill. 
Brustad, K. (2011). Standard Language Ideology and the Construction of Modern Standard 
Arabic. Paper presented at the Workshop on Language, Literacy and the Social 
Construction of Authority, March 3-5, 2011, Stanford University.  
Brustad, K. (2012). A Revolution in Language: Ideology and Practice in Arabic. Paper 
presented at the Oakley Center for the Humanities and Social Sciences, Williams 
College, March 5, 2012.  
Calvert, P. (1990). Revolution and Counter-Revolution: Open University Press. 
CAPMAS. Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics.   
http://www.capmas.gov.eg/?lang=1 
Carter, M. G. (1983). Language Control as People Control in Medieval Islam: The aims of the 
grammarians in their cultural context. In R. Baalbaki (Ed.), Arab Language and 
Culture (pp. 65-84). Beirut: American University of Beirut. 
Carter, M. G. (2004). Sībawayhi: Oxford University Press. 
Chejne, A. (1969). The Arabic Language: Its role in history. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Cooper, R. L. (1989). Language Planning and Social Change. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Couper, M. P., Traugott, M. W., & Lamias, M. J. (2001). Web Survey Design and 
Administration. Public Opinion Quarterly, 65(2), 230-253.  




Dahle, S. B. (2012). Ungdomsmagasinet’Iḥnā: En studie i skriftlig talemål og språkholdninger.  
MA thesis, University of Oslo, Oslo.    
Dallal, A. (1999). Science, Medicine and Technology: The making of a scientific culture. In J. 
Esposito (Ed.), The Oxford History of Islam (pp. 155-213). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Daoudi, A. (2011). Computer-mediated Communication: the emergence of e-Arabic in the 
Arab world. In A. Al-Issa & L. S. Dahan (Eds.), Global English and Arabic: issues of 
language, culture and identity (pp. 285-305). Oxford: Peter Lang. 
Darwish, A. (2007). The Surge in Egyptian Nationalism. Middle East(October), 22-25.  
Dawwa, H. (2011). Ilġāʾ Muḥāfaẓatay Ḥilwān wa-Oktōbar wa-ḍammuhumā li-l-Qāhira wa-l-
Gīza. Masrawy. Retrieved 27.11.2011, from 
http://www.masrawy.com/News/Egypt/Politics/2011/april/14/helawan_octobar.asp
x 
de Jung, M. J.-W. (2008). The Impact of the USA Patriot Act on Social Diversity in Cyberspace. 
In T. Kidd & I. Chen (Eds.), Social Information Technology: connecting society and 
cultural issues (pp. 86-95). London: Information Science Reference. 
De Silva, S. (1982). Some Consequences of Diglossia. In W. Haas (Ed.), Standard Languages, 
Spoken and Written (pp. 94-122). Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Deutskens, E., de Ruyter, K., Wetzels, M., & Oosterveld, P. (2004). Response Rate and 
Response Quality of Internet-Based Surveys: An Experimental Study. Marketing 
Letters, 15(1), 21-36.  
Diem, W. (1974). Hochsprache und Dialekt im Arabischen Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner GMBH. 
Dillman, D. A. (2000). Mail and Internet Surveys: The tailored design method. New York: 
Wiley. 
Dillman, D. A., Tortora, R. D., & Bowker, D. (1998). Principles for Constructing Web Surveys. 
Pullman, WA: Washington State University Social and Economic Sciences Research 
Center. 
Dillman, D. A., Tortora, R. D., Conradt, J., & Bowker, D. (1998). Influence of Plain vs. Fancy 
Design on Response Rates for Web Surveys. Paper presented at the Joint Statistical 
Meetings of the American Statistical Association, Dallas, US.  
Donner, F. M. (1999). Muhammad and the Caliphate: Political history of the Islamic empire 
up to the Mongol conquest. In J. Esposito (Ed.), The Oxford History of Islam (pp. 1-
61). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Doss, M. (2010). Ḥāl Id-dunyā: An Arabic news bulletin in colloquial (ʿāmmiyya). In R. 
Bassiouney (Ed.), Arabic and the Media: Linguistic analyses and applications (pp. 
123-140). Leiden: Brill. 
Duffy, M. E. (2002). Methodological Issues In Web-based Research. Journal of Nursing 
Scholarship, 34(1), 83-88.  
Egypt ICT Indicators.   http://www.egyptictindicators.gov.eg/en/Pages/default33.aspx 
Eid, M. (1982). The Non-randomness of Diglossic Variation in Arabic. Glossa, 16(1), 54-84.  
Eid, M. (1988). Principles for Code-switching Between Standard and Egyptian Arabic. Al-
ʿArabiyya: Journal of the American Association of Teachers of Arabic, 21, 51-80.  
Eid, M. (2007). Arabic on the Media: Hybridity and styles. In E. Ditters & H. Motzki (Eds.), 
Approaches to Arabic Linguistics (pp. 403-434). Leiden: Brill. 
Eisele, J. (2000). Representations of Arabic in Egypt, 1940-1990. The Arab Studies Journal, 
8(2/1), 47-60.  
Eisele, J. (2002). Approaching Diglossia: Authorities, values and representations. In A. 
Rouchdy (Ed.), Language Contact and Language Conflict in Arabic: Variations on a 
sociolinguistic theme (pp. 3-23). London/New York: Routledge. 
Eisele, J. (2003). Myth, Values and Practice in the Representation of Arabic. International 
Journal of the Sociology of Language(163), 43–59.  
282 
 
Ekman, A., Dickman, P., Klint, Å., Weiderpass, E., & Litton, J.-E. (2006). Feasibility of Using 
Web-based Questionnaires in Large Population-based Epidemiological Studies. 
European Journal of Epidemiology, 21(2), 103-111.  
El-Hassan, S. A. (1977). Educated spoken Arabic in Egypt and the Levant: A critical review of 
diglossia and related concepts. Archivum Linguisticum Leeds, 8(2), 112-132.  
El-Hassan, S. A. (1978). Variation in the Demonstrative System of Educated Spoken Arabic. 
Archivum linguisticum, 9, 32-57.  
El Amrani, I. (2011). Mapping Egypt's Political Parties. The Arabist  Retrieved 01.06.2014, 
from http://arabist.net/blog/2011/11/13/mapping-egypts-political-parties.html 
Elgibali, A. (1996). Beginning to Understand Arabic. In A. Elgibali (Ed.), Understanding Arabic: 
Essays in contemporary Arabic linguistics in honor of El-Said Badawi (pp. 1-14). Cairo: 
The American University in Cairo Press. 
Etzioni-Halevy, E. (1993). The Elite Connection: Problems and potential of Western 
democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Eviatar, Z., & Ibrahim, R. (2000). Bilingual is as bilingual does: Metalinguistic abilities of 
Arabic-speaking children. Applied Psycholinguistics, 21(04), 451-471.  
Ezzat, A. (1974). Intelligibility among Arabic dialects. Beirut: Beirut Arab University. 
Fasold, R. (1984). The Sociolinguistics of Society. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Faust, C. M. (2012). Style Shifting in Egyptian and Tunisian Arabic. The University of Utah.    
Feiler, G. (1991). Migration and Recession: Arab Labor Mobility in the Middle East, 1982-89. 
Population and Development Review, 17(1), 134-155.  
Ferguson, C. A. (1959a). The Arabic Koine. Language: Journal of the Linguistic Society of 
America, 35(4 (Oct-Dec)), 616-630.  
Ferguson, C. A. (1959b). Diglossia. Word, 15, 325-340.  
Ferguson, C. A. (1971 [1963]). Problems of Teaching Languages with Diglossia. In C. A. 
Ferguson (Ed.), Language Structure and Language Use (pp. 71-86). Stanford: 
Standford University Press. 
Ferguson, C. A. (1977). Sociolinguistic Settings of Language Planning Language Planning 
Processes (pp. 9-29). 
Ferguson, C. A. (1991). Diglossia Revisited. Southwest Journal of Linguistics, 10(1), 214-234.  
Ferguson, C. A. (1997 [1959]). Myths About Arabic. In K. R. Belnap & N. Haeri (Eds.), 
Structuralist Studies in Arabic Linguistics: Charles A. Ferguson's papers, 1954-1994 
(pp. 250-256). Leiden: Brill. 
Ferguson, C. A. (1997 [1990]). "Come Forth With a Surah Like It": Arabic as a measure of Arab 
society. In K. R. Belnap & N. Haeri (Eds.), Structuralist Studies in Arabic Linguistics: 
Charles A. Ferguson's papers, 1954-1994 (pp. 261-272). Leiden: Brill. 
Fishman, J. A. (1967). Bilingualism With and Without Diglossia; Diglossia With and Without 
Bilingualism. Journal of Social Issues, 23(2), 29-38.  
Fishman, J. A. (1972). The Sociology of Language: An interdisciplinary social science approach 
to language in society: Newbury House. 
Fleming, C. M., & Bowden, M. (2009). Web-based surveys as an alternative to traditional mail 
methods. Journal of Environmental Management, 90(1), 284-292.  
Gamal El-Din, A. A. (2007). al-Masīḥiyya fī Miṣr. Cairo: Dār Axbār al-Yawm. 
Gamal El-Din, A. A. (2011a). Ḥawl Taṭawwurāt Luġatinā al-Miṣriyya al-Muʿāṣira. Cairo: 
Manšūrāt Miṣriyya naḥw Ṯaqāfa Waṭaniyya Dīmuqrāṭiyya. 
Gamal El-Din, A. A. (2011b). Ṯawarāt al-Miṣriyyīn ḥattā ʿaṣr al-Maqrīzī. Cairo: Dār al-Ṯaqāfa 
al-Jadīda. 
Gamal El-Din, A. A. (2013). Ṯawarāt  wa-Tamarrudāt al-Miṣriyyīn munḏ al-Iḥtilāl al-ʿuṯmānī 
ḥattā ʿām 1952. Cairo: Dār al-Ṯaqāfa al-Jadīda. 
Gamal El-Din, A. A. (Ed.). (2006). Tārīx Miṣr min Bidāyāt al-Qarn al-Awwal al-Mīlādī ḥattā 
Nihāyat al-Qarn al-ʿišrīn min xilāl Maxṭūṭat Tarīx al-Baṭāriqa li-Sawīris ibn al-
Muqaffaʿ. Cairo: Madbouli Bookstore. 
283 
 
Gamal El-Din, A. A. (Ed.). (2011c). Tārīx Miṣr wa-l-ʿālam al-Qadīm li-Yūḥanna al-Niqyūsī. 
Cairo: Dār al-Ṯaqāfa al-Jadīda. 
Gamal El-Din, A. A. (Ed.). (2012). ʿajāyib al-Āṯār fī al-Tarājim wa-l-axbār li-ʿabd al-Raḥmān al-
Jabartī (vol I-III) Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-ʿāmma li-Quṣūr al-Ṯaqāfa. 
Gemeinder, S. (2009). "We're not Arabs - We're Egyptians": The Struggle for Identity in Egypt. 
Paper presented at the Ninth Mediterranean Research Meeting, Florence & 
Montecatini Terme, 25 - 28 March 2009.  
Gosling, S. D., Vazire, S., Srivastava, S., & John, O. P. (2004). Should We Trust Web-Based 
Studies? A Comparative Analysis of Six Preconceptions About Internet 
Questionnaires. American Psychologist, 59(2), 93-104.  
Grandgillaume, G. (1983). Arabisation et Politique Linguistique au Maghreb. Paris: 
Maisonneuve & Larose. 
Greenlaw, C., & Brown-Welty, S. (2009). A Comparison of Web-Based and Paper-Based 
Survey Methods. Evaluation Review, 33(5), 464-480.  
Gumperz, J. (1962). Types of Linguistic Communities. Anthropological Linguistics, 4(1), 28-40.  
Gumperz, J. (1964). Linguistic and Social Interaction in Two Communities. American 
Anthropologist, 66(6), 137-153.  
Gumperz, J. (1966). On the Ethnology of Linguistic Change. In W. Bright (Ed.), Sociolinguistics: 
Proceedings of the UCLA Sociolinguistics Conference, 1964 (pp. 27-38). The Hague: 
Mouton. 
Gumperz, J. (1972 [1968]). The Speech Community. In P. P. Giglioli (Ed.), Language and Social 
Context (pp. 219-231). Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
Haeri, N. (1996). The Sociolinguistic Market of Cairo. London: Kegan Paul International. 
Haeri, N. (1997). The Reproduction of Symbolic Capital: Language, state and class in Egypt. 
Current Anthropology, 38(5), 795-816.  
Haeri, N. (2000). Form and Ideology: Arabic sociolinguistics and beyond. Annual Review of 
Anthropology 29, 61-87.  
Haeri, N. (2003). Sacred Language, Ordinary People. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hary, B. (1992). Multiglossia in Judeo-Arabic. With an Edition, Translation and Grammatical 
Study of the Cairene Purim Scroll. Leiden: Brill. 
Hary, B. (1996). The Importance of the Language Continuum in Arabic Multiglossia. In A. 
Elgibali (Ed.), Understanding Arabic: Essays in contemporary Arabic linguistics in 
honor of El-Said Badawi (pp. 69-90). Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. 
Haugen, E. (1966). Dialect, Language, Nation. American Anthropologist, 68(4), 922-935.  
Haugen, E. (1968). Language Planning in Modern Norway. In J. A. Fishman (Ed.), Readings in 
the Sociology of Languages. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Haugen, E. (1972 [1962]). Schizoglossia and the Linguistic Norm. In A. S. Dil (Ed.), The Ecology 
of Language: Essays by Einar Haugen (pp. 148-158). Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
Heller, M. (2007). Bilingualism as ideology and practice. In M. Heller (Ed.), Bilingualism: A 
social approach (pp. 1-22). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Holes, C. (1983). Patterns of Communal Language Variation in Bahrain. Language in Society, 
12(4), 433-457.  
Holes, C. (1986). The social motivation for phonological convergence in three Arabic dialects. 
International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 61(1), 33-52.  
Holes, C. (2004). Modern Arabic: structures, functions and varieties  (2nd ed.). Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
Husayn, T. (1996 [1937]). Mustaqbal al-Ṯaqāfa fī Miṣr. Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif. 
Hussein, M. (1984). al-Ittijāhāt al-Waṭaniyya fī al-Adab al-Muʿāṣir  (7th ed.). Beirut: 
Muʾasasat al-Risāla. 
Ibn Khaldun. (1967 [1377]). The Muqaddimah: An introduction to history N. J. Dawood (Ed.), 
(F. Rosenthal, Trans.). Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
284 
 
Ibrahim, M. H. (1983). Linguistic Distance and Literacy in Arabic. Journal of Pragmatics, 7(5), 
507-515.  
Ibrahim, M. H. (1986). Standard and Prestige Language: A problem in Arabic sociolinguistics. 
Anthropological Linguistics, 28(1), 115-126.  
Ibrahim, R., & Aharon-Peretz, J. (2005). Is Literary Arabic a Second Language for Native Arab 
Speakers?: Evidence from Semantic Priming Study. Journal of Psycholinguistic 
Research, 34(1), 51-70.  
Ibrahim, Z. (2000). Myths about Arabic revisited. Al-Arabiyya, 33, 13-28.  
Ibrahim, Z. (2010). Cases of Written Code-switching in Egyptian Opposition Newspapers. In R. 
Bassiouney (Ed.), Arabic and the Media: Linguistic analyses and applications (pp. 23-
46). Leiden: Brill. 
IFES. (2011). Elections in Egypt: Analysis of the 2011 Parliamentary Electoral System. 
International Foundation for Electoral Sytems (IFES), Middle East and North Africa 
November 2011. Retrieved 1.06.2014, from 
http://www.ifes.org/~/media/Files/Publications/White%20PaperReport/2011/Analy
sis_of_Egypts_2011_Parliamentary_Electoral_System.pdf 
Irvine, J. T. (1989). When Talk Isn't Cheap: Language and Political Economy. American 
Ethnologist, 16(2), 248-267.  
ITU. (2011). Measuring the Information Society 2011. Retrieved 16.09.2011, from 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/publications/idi/2011/index.html 
Johnstone, B., Andrus, J., & Danielson, A. E. (2006). Mobility, Indexicality, and the 
Enregisterment of “Pittsburghese”. Journal of English Linguistics, 34(2), 77-104.  
Kaye, A. S. (1970). Modern Standard Arabic and the Colloquials. Lingua, 24(0), 374-391.  
Kaye, A. S. (1972). Remarks on Diglossia in Arabic: Well-defined vs. ill-defined. Linguistics, 
10(81), 32-48.  
Kaye, A. S. (2001). Diglossia: the state of the art. International Journal of the Sociology of 
Language(152), 117-129.  
Kebede, T. A., Kindt, K. T., & Høigilt, J. (2013). Language Change in Egypt: Social and Cultural 
Indicators Survey. Oslo: Fafo. 
Keller, S. (1963). Beyond the Ruling Class: Elites in modern society. New York: Random 
House. 
Kelsey, D. (2012a). Pound for Pound Champions: The myth of the Blitz spirit in British 
newspaper discourses of the city and economy after the 7 July bombings. Critical 
Discourse Studies, 9(3), 285-299.  
Kelsey, D. (2012b). Remembering to Forget: Supporting and opposing the War on Terror 
through the myth of the Blitz spirit after the July 7th bombings. Critical Approaches 
to Discourse Analysis Across Disciplines, 6(1), 23-37.  
Kelsey, D. (2014). The Myth of the City Trickster: Storytelling, bankers and ideology in the 
Mail Online. Journal of Political Ideologies, 19(3), 307-330.  
Khamis-Dakwar, R., & Froud, K. (2007). Lexical Processing in Two Language Varieties: An 
event-related brain potential study of Arabic native speakers. In M. Mughazy (Ed.), 
Perspectives on Arabic Linguistics XX (pp. 153-166). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Khidr, M. (2000). Min Fajawāt al-ʻadāla fī al-Taʻlīm. Cairo: al-Dār al-Miṣrīyah al-Lubnānīyah. 
Knapp, F., & Heidingsfelder, M. (1999). Drop-Out Analysis: Effects of Research Design. 
Current Internet Science: trends, techniques, results.  
Kojak, W. (1982-1983). A Case Study of a Group of Educated Syrian Speakers of Arabic. M.A. 
dissertation, Lancaster University, Lancaster.    
Krumbacher, K. (1902). Das Problem der Neugriechischen Schriftsprache: K. B. Akademie in 
kommission des G. Franz'schen verlags. 
Labov, W. (1982). Building on Empirical Foundations. In W. P. Lehmann & Y. Malkiel (Eds.), 
Perspectives on Historical Linguistics: Current issues in linguistic theory (Vol. 24, pp. 
17-92): John Benjamins. 
285 
 
Lambert, W. E. (1967). A Social Psychology of Language. Journal of Social Issues, 23(2), 91-
109.  
Lapidus, I. M. (1999). Sultanates and Gunpowder Empires: the Middle East. In J. Esposito 
(Ed.), The Oxford History of Islam (pp. 347-393). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Lippi-Green, R. (1994). Accent, Standard Language Ideology, and Discriminatory Pretext in 
the Courts. Language in Society, 23(02), 163-198.  
Maamouri, M. (1998). Language Education and Human Development: Arabic diglossia and its 
impact on the quality of education in the Arab region. Paper presented at the 
Mediterranean Development Forum of the World Bank (Marrakech, Morocco 3-6 
September 1998), Philadelphia.  
Mahmoud, Y. (1979). The Arabic Writing System and the Sociolinguistics of Orthography 
Reform.  PhD thesis, Georgetown University.    
Mahmoud, Y. (1986). Arabic After Diglossia. In J. A. Fishman, A. Tabouret-Keller, M. Clyne, B. 
Krishnamurti & M. Abdulaziz (Eds.), The Fergusonian Impact: In honor of Charles 
Ferguson on the occasion of his 65th birthday (pp. 239–251). Berlin: Mouton de 
Gruyter. 
Manfreda, K. L., Bosnjak, M., Berzelak, J., Haas, I., & Vehovar, V. (2008). Web surveys versus 
other survey modes. [Article]. International Journal of Market Research, 50(1), 79-
104.  
Marçais, W. (1930). La Diglossie Arabe. L'Enseignement Public, 97, 401-409.  
Marroushi, N. (2012). Egypt's Copts Voice Fear and Optimism. The Daily Star Lebanon, 
(January 06, 2012). Retrieved 01.09.2014, from 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2012/Jan-06/159029-egypts-copts-
voice-fear-and-optimism.ashx#axzz3DI4MTOFL 
Martell, L. (2010). The Sociology of Globalization Cambridge: Polity. 
Martin, D., Metzger, J.-L., & Pierre, P. (2006). The Sociology of Globalization. International 
Sociology, 21(4), 499-521.  
McCarus, E., N. (2008). Modern Standard Arabic, lemma in K. Versteegh, M. Eid, A. Elgibali, 
M. Woidich & A. Zaborski (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics 
(Vol. III, pp. 238-262). Leiden: Brill. 
McCormick, B., & Wahba, J. (2003). Return International Migration and Geographical 
Inequality: The case of Egypt. Journal of African Economies, 12(4), 500-532.  
MCIT. (2010). Taṭawwur Istixdām al-Internet fī Miṣr Taqārīr Maʿlūmātiyya (Vol. 1(2)). Egypt: 
Ministry of Communication and Information Technology. 
MCIT. (2011). The Future of the Internet Economy in Egypt: A statistical profile. Egypt: 
Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. 
Medlin, C., Roy, S., & Ham Chai, T. (1999). World Wide Web versus Mail Surveys: A 
comparison and report. Paper presented at the ANZMAC99 Conference: Marketing in 
the Third Millennium. November 28 - December 1 Sydney, Australia. 
Mehrez, S. (2012). Translating Revolution: An open text. In S. Mehrez (Ed.), Translating 
Egypt's Revolution: the language of Tahrir (pp. 1-23). Cairo: The American University 
in Cairo Press. 
Meiseles, G. (1980). Educated Spoken Arabic and the Arabic Language Continuum. Archivum 
linguisticum, 11(2), 117-148.  
Mejdell, G. (1996). Some Sociolinguistic Concepts of Style and Stylistic Variation in Spoken 
Arabic - with reference to Nagīb Maḥfūẓ talking about his life. In J. R. Smart (Ed.), 
Tradition and Modernity in Arabic Language and Literature (pp. 316-326): Curzon 
Press. 
Mejdell, G. (1999). Switching, Mixing - Code Interaction in Spoken Arabic. In B. Brendemoen, 




Mejdell, G. (2006). Mixed Styles in Spoken Arabic in Egypt: Somewhere between order and 
chaos  (Vol. XLVIII). Leiden: Brill. 
Mejdell, G. (2008). What is Happening to Lughatunā l-Gamīla? Recent media representations 
and social practice in Egypt. Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies, 8, 108-124.  
Milroy, J. (2001). Language Ideologies and the Consequences of Standardization. Journal of 
Sociolinguistics, 5(4), 530-555.  
Milroy, J., & Milroy, L. (1985). Authority in Language: Investigating language prescription and 
standardisation. London: Routledge. 
Mitchell, T. F. (1975). Some preliminary observations on the Arabic Koine. British Society for 
Middle Eastern Studies, 2(2), 70-86.  
Mitchell, T. F. (1978). Educated Spoken Arabic in Egypt and the Levant, with special reference 
to participle and tense. Journal of Linguistics, 14(2), 227-258.  
Mitchell, T. F. (1982). More Than a Matter of 'Writing With the Learned, Pronouncing With 
the Vulgar': Some preliminary observations on the Arabic koine. In W. Haas (Ed.), 
Standard Languages, Spoken and Written (pp. 123-155). Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Mitchell, T. F. (1986). What is Educated Spoken Arabic? International Journal of the Sociology 
of Language, 61(1), 7-32.  
Mitchell, T. F., & El-Hassan, S. A. (1994). Modality, Mood and Aspect in Spoken Arabic with 
Special Reference to Egypt and the Levant. London: Kegan Paul International. 
Mubarak, A. (2011). Two Million Egyptians Joined Facebook Since the Revolution. Egypt 
Independent. Retrieved 29.04.2012, from 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/two-million-egyptians-joined-facebook-
revolution 
Murad, M. R. (2011). Ziyāda Kabīra fī ʿadad Mustaxdimī al-Internet fī Miṣr baʿd Ṯawrat 
Yānāyir. Reuters (Arabic). Retrieved 23.08.2011, from 
http://ara.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idARACAE72G1PN20110318?pageNum
ber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true 
Musa, S. (2012 [1912]). Nušūʾ Fikrat al-Lāh. Cairo: Kalimāt ʿarabiyya li-l-Tarjama wa-l-Našr. 
Musa, S. (2012 [1945]). al-Balāġa al-ʿaṣriyya wa-l-Luġa al-ʿarabiyya. Cairo: Kalimāt ʿarabiyya 
li-l-Tarjama wa-l-Našr. 
Musa, S. (2013 [1956]). al-Adab li-l-Šaʿb. Cairo: Hindawi Foundation for Education and 
Culture. 
Nader, L. (1962). A Note on Attitudes and the Use of Language. Anthropological Linguistics, 
4(6), 24-29.  
Nasr, S. V. R. (1999). European Colonialism and the Emergence of Modern Muslim States. In 
J. Esposito (Ed.), The Oxford History of Islam (pp. 549-599). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Neustupný, J. V. (1968). Some General Aspects of "Language" Problems and "Language" 
Policy in Developing Societies. In J. A. Fishman, C. A. Ferguson & J. Das Gupta (Eds.), 
Language Problems of Developing Nations (pp. 285-294). London: John Wiley & Sons. 
Newbert, M. (2011). Digital Insights from Egypt's Revolution. Edelman Digital. Retrieved 
14.09.2011, from http://www.edelmandigital.com/2011/02/04/digital-insights-from-
egypts-revolution/ 
Nielsen, H. L. (1996). How to Teach Arabic Communicatively: Toward a theoretical 
framework for TAFL. In A. Elgibali (Ed.), Understanding Arabic: Essays in 
contemporary Arabic linguistics in honor of El-Said Badawi (pp. 211-239). Cairo: The 
American University in Cairo Press. 
Omoniyi, T. (2006). Hierarchy of Identities. In T. Omoniyi & G. White (Eds.), The 
Sociolinguistics of Identity (pp. 11-33). London: Continuum. 
287 
 
Palfreyman, D., & Al Khalil, M. (2003). "A Funky Language for Teenzz to Use": Representing 
Gulf Arabic in Instant Messaging. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 
9(1).  
Panovi , I. (2010). The Beginnings of Wikipedia Masry. Al-Logha: Series of Papers in 
Linguistics, 2010(8), 93-127.  
Parkinson, D. B. (1990). Orthographic Variation in Modern Standard Arabic: The case of the 
hamza. In M. Eid & J. McCarthy (Eds.), Perspectives on Arabic Linguistics II (Vol. 72, 
pp. 269-295). Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing. 
Parkinson, D. B. (1991). Searching for Modern Fuṣḥa: Real-life formal Arabic. Al-ʿArabiyya, 24, 
31-64.  
Parkinson, D. B. (1993). Knowing Standard Arabic: Testing Egyptians' MSA abilities. In M. Eid 
& C. Holes (Eds.), Perspectives on Arabic Linguistics V (pp. 47-73). Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins. 
Parkinson, D. B. (1994). Speaking Fuṣḥā in Cairo: The role of ending vowels. In Y. Suleiman 
(Ed.), Arabic Sociolinguistics: Issues and perspectives (pp. 179-211). Richmond, 
Surrey: Curzon. 
Parkinson, D. B. (1996). Variability in Standard Arabic Grammar Skills. In A. Elgibali (Ed.), 
Understanding Arabic: Essays in contemporary Arabic linguistics in honor of El-Said 
Badawi (pp. 91-101). Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. 
Parkinson, D. B. (2003). Verbal Features in Oral Fuṣḥā Performances in Cairo. International 
Journal of the Sociology of Language, 163, 27-41.  
Peterson, M. A. (2011). Connected in Cairo: Growing up cosmopolitan in the modern Middle 
East. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
Phillips, C. (2014). The Arabism Debate and the Arab Uprisings. Mediterranean Politics, 19(1), 
141-144.  
Phillipson, R. (2000). English in the New World Order: Variations on a theme of linguistic 
imperialism and World English. In T. Ricento (Ed.), Ideology, Politics and Language 
Policies: Focus on English (pp. 87-106). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Pimentel, J. J. (2000). Sociolinguistic Reflections of Privatization and Globalization: the Arabic 
of Egyptian newspaper advertisements. PhD, University of Michigan.    
Riguet, M. (1981-1982a). Variation dans l'opinion selon la langue en milieu tunisien, I. Institut 
des Belles Lettres Arabes(148), 229-252.  
Riguet, M. (1981-1982b). Variation dans l'opinion selon la langue en milieu tunisien, II. 
Institut des Belles Lettres Arabes(149), 57-86.  
Rizk, S. (2007). The Language of Cairo's Young University Students. In C. Miller, E. Al Wer, D. 
Caubet & J. Watson (Eds.), Arabic in the City: Issues in dialect contact and language 
variation (pp. 291-308). Oxon: Routledge. 
Ryding, K. C. (1991). Proficiency Despite Diglossia: A New Approach for Arabic. The Modern 
Language Journal, 75(2), 212-218.  
Ryding, K. C. (2005). A Reference Grammar of Modern Standard Arabic. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Sabry, S. (2009). Poverty lines in Greater Cairo: Underestimating and misrepresenting 
poverty Human Settlements Working Paper Series: Poverty Reduction in Urban 
Areas-21. London: International Institute for Environment and Development. 
Said, F. F. S. (2011). "Ahyaanan I text in English 'ashaan it's ashal": Language Crisis or 
Linguistic Development? The Case of How Gulf Arabs Perceive the Future of their 
Language, Culture, and Identity. In A. Al-Issa & L. S. Dahan (Eds.), Global English and 
Arabic: issues of language, culture, and identity (pp. 179-212). Oxford: Peter Lang. 
Sallam, H. (Ed.). (2013). Egypt's Parliamentary Elections, 2011-2012: A critical guide to a 
changing political arena: Tadween Publishing. 
Sax, L. J., Gilmartin, S. K., & Bryant, A. N. (2003). Assessing Response Rates and Nonresponse 
Bias in Web and Paper Surveys. Research in Higher Education, 44(4), 409-432.  
288 
 
Schaefer, D. R., & Dillman, D. A. (1998). Development of a Standard E-Mail Methodology: 
Results of an Experiment. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 62(3), 378-397.  
Schaub, M. (2000). English in the Arab Republic of Egypt. World Englishes, 19(2), 225-238.  
Schiffman, H. F. (1992). ‘Resisting arrest’ in status planning: Structural and covert 
impediments to status change. Language & Communication, 12(1), 1-15.  
Schiffman, H. F. (1993). The Balance of Power in Multiglossic Languages: Implications for 
language shift. International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 103(1), 115–148.  
Schiffman, H. F. (1996). Linguistic Culture and Language Policy. London: Routledge. 
Schmidt, R. W. (1974). Sociolinguistic Variation in Spoken Arabic in Egypt: A re-examination 
of the concept of diglossia. PhD thesis, Brown University, Rhode Island.    
Schmidt, R. W. (1986). Applied Sociolinguistics: The case of Arabic as a second language. 
Anthropological Linguistics, 28(1), 55-72.  
Schonlau, M., Fricker Jr., R. D., & Elliott, M. N. (2002). Conducting Research Surveys via E-mail 
and the Web: Rand. 
Scruton, P., Oliver, C., & Shenker, J. (2011). Egyptian Elections: The parties and where they 
stand. The Guardian, 22 November 2011. Retrieved 1.06.2014, from 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2011/nov/22/egypt-election-
political-parties-interactive 
Shaaban, K. (2008). Language Policies and Language Planning, lemma in K. Versteegh, M. Eid, 
A. Elgibali, M. Woidich & A. Zaborski (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and 
Linguistics (Vol. III, pp. 694-707). Leiden: Brill. 
Shaker, M. M. (1972). Abātīl wa-Asimār. Cairo: Maktabat al-Xānjī. 
Sheehan, K. B., & McMillan, S. J. (1999). Response Variation in E-mail Surveys: An 
exploration. Journal of Advertising Research, 39(4), 45-54.  
Silverstein, M. (2003). Indexical Order and the Dialectics of Sociolinguistic Life. Language & 
Communication, 23(3–4), 193-229.  
SIS. (2011-2012). Egyptian Parliamentary Elections 2011-2012.  Retrieved 1.06.2014, from 
State Information Service 
http://www.sis.gov.eg/newVR/election2011/html/2306.htm 
Smith, J. I. (1999). Islam and Christendom: historical, cultural and religious interaction from 
the seventh to the fifteenth centuries. In J. Esposito (Ed.), The Oxford History of Islam 
(pp. 305-345). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Soliman, A. (2008). The Changing Role of Arabic in Religious Discourse: A sociolinguistic study 
of Egyptian Arabic.  PhD, Indiana University of Pennsylvania.    
Solomon, D. J. (2001). Conducting Web-based Surveys. Practical Assessment, Research and 
Evaluation, 7(19).  
Sotiropoulos, D. (1977). Diglossia and the National Language Question in Modern Greece. 
Linguistics, 197, 5-31.  
Soueif, A. (2012). Cairo: My City, Our Revolution. London: Bloomsbury. 
Spolsky, B. (2004). Language Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Stadlbauer, S. (2010). Language Ideologies in the Arabic Diglossia of Egypt. Colorado 
Research in Linguistics, 22(1).  
Suleiman, Y. (1996). Language and Identity in Egyptian Nationalism. In Y. Suleiman (Ed.), 
Language and Identity in the Middle East and North Africa (pp. 25-38). Surrey: 
Curzon Press. 
Suleiman, Y. (2003). The Arabic Language and National Identity: a study in ideology. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Suleiman, Y. (2004). A War of Words: Language and conflict in the Middle East  (Vol. 19): 
Cambridge University Press. 
Suleiman, Y. (2006a). Charting the Nation: Arabic and the Politics of Identity. Annual Review 
of Applied Linguistics, 26, 125-148.  
289 
 
Suleiman, Y. (2006b). Constructing Languages, Constructing National Identities. In T. Omoniyi 
& G. White (Eds.), The Sociolinguistics of Identity (pp. 50-71). London: Continuum. 
Suleiman, Y. (2008). Egypt: From Egyptian to pan-Arab nationalism. In A. Simpson (Ed.), 
Language and National Identity in Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Suleiman, Y. (2011). Arabic, Self and Identity: A study in conflict and displacement. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Suleiman, Y. (2012). Ideology, Grammar-Making and the Standardization of Arabic. In B. 
Orfali (Ed.), In the Shadow of Arabic: The centrality of language to Arabic culture (pp. 
3-30). Leiden: Brill. 
Suleiman, Y. (2013a). Arabic Folk Linguistics: Between mother tongue and native language. In 
J. Owens (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Arabic Linguistics (pp. 264-280). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Suleiman, Y. (2013b). Arabic in the Fray: Language Ideology and Cultural Politics: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
The Carter Centre. (2012). Final Report of the Carter Centre Mission to Witness the 2011-




Trouteaud, A. R. (2004). How you ask counts: a test of internet-related components of 
response rates to a web-based survey. Social Science Computer Review, 22(3), 385-
392.  
Tuten, T. L., Bosnjak, M., & Bandilla, W. (2000). Banner-advertised web surveys. Marketing 
Research, 11(4), 17-21.  
Umbach, P. D. (2004). Web surveys: Best practices. New Directions for Institutional Research, 
2004(121), 23-38.  
UN. (2011). ICT Policy Review: Egypt (Vol. United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD)). Switzerland: United Nations. 
UNESCO. (1951). Definition, Classification and Tabulation of Illiteracy Statistics: report of the 
expert committee on standardization of educational statistics, UNESCO House, Paris, 
5-9 November 1951. 
Van Selm, M., & Jankowski, N. W. (2006). Conducting Online Surveys. Quality & Quantity, 
40(3), 435-456.  
Versteegh, K. (1996). Linguistic Attitudes and the Origin of Speech in the Arab World. In A. 
Elgibali (Ed.), Understanding Arabic: Essays in contemporary Arabic linguistics in 
honor of El-Said Badawi (pp. 15-31). Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. 
Versteegh, K. (1997). Landmarks in Linguistic Thought III: the Arabic linguistic tradition. 
London: Routledge. 
Versteegh, K. (2001). The Arabic Language. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Walters, K. (2003). Fergie’s Prescience: The changing nature of diglossia in Tunisia. 
International Journal of the Sociology of Language(163), 77-109.  
Walters, K. (2008). Language Attitudes, lemma in K. Versteegh, M. Eid, A. Elgibali, M. Woidich 
& A. Zaborski (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Arabic Language and Linguistics (Vol. II, pp. 650-
664). Leiden: Brill. 
Warschauer, M., El Said, G. R., & Zohry, A. (2002). Language choice online: Globalization and 
identity in Egypt. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 7(4).  
Watt, J. (1997). Using the Internet for Quantitative Survey Research. Quirk's Marketing 
Research Review(July 1997).  
Wexler, P. (1971). Diglossia, Language Standardization and Purism: Parameters for a typology 
of literary languages. Lingua, 27(0), 330-354.  
Woolard, K. A., & Schieffelin, B. B. (1994). Language ideology. Annual Review of 
Anthropology, 23, 55-82.  
290 
 
World Bank. (2002). Poverty Reduction in Egypt: Diagnosis and strategy: World Bank. 
Wright, S. (2004). Language Policy and Language Planning: From nationalism to 
globalisation: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Zack, L. (2009). Egyptian Arabic in the Seventeenth Century: A study and edition of Yūsuf al-
Maġribī's Dafʿ al-iṣr ʿan kalām ahl Miṣr. Utrecht: LOT. 
Zakariyya, N. (1964). Tārīx al-Daʿwa ilā al-ʿāmmiyya wa-Āṯāruhā fī Miṣr. Alexandria: Dār Našr 
al-Ṯaqāfa. 
Zughoul, M. R. (1980). Diglossia in Arabic: Investigating solutions. Anthropological Linguistics, 






Appendix I: Interview Transcripts 
SEG1.  
… mawḍūʿ el-ʿāmmiyya l-maṣriyya daxal fī muškilit muṣṭalaḥ. anā baḥiss enn huwwa baʿḍ el-
… muddaʿī ʿilm el-luġa biyastasmirūh li-l-ḥaṭṭ min mustawā el-luġa el-maṣriyya. bi-maʿnā enn 
tibʾā fī ʿāmmiyya maṣriyya wa-fuṣḥā ʿarabiyya, baynamā ʿilmiyyan da šēʾ miš mutawwafir 
yaʿnī. al-mutawwafir anna hunaka luġa maṣriyya tataṭawwar ʿabr al-tārīx taʾxuz min kul el-
luġāt ellī daxalit-lahā min awwel el-fārisiyya ilā l-turkiyya ilā l-ʿarabiyya ilā l-inglīziyya ilā l-
almāniyya ilā l-firinsiyya ilā l-īṭāliyya ilā l-yūnāniyya… ilā en-nūbiyya wa-l-ifrīqiyya wa-l-
amāzīġiyya. kul da daxal fī el-luġa l-miṣriyya. wa-kullin min hāzihi l-muʾassirāt lā tušakkil 
ġālibeyyit al-luġa l-maṣriyya biḥēs niʾdar nisammīhā bi-ʾinnaha luġa yūnāniyya aw luġa 
firinsiyya aw luġa inglīziyya aw luġa ʿarabiyya ḥattā, aw turkiyya. laʾ niʾdar nisammīhā luġa 
miṣriyya mutaʾassira bi-kull da, w-dī qīmet el-luġa l-miṣriyya; ennahā istaṭāʿat an tastawʿib, 
min ḍimn ma-stawʿabet kull el-ḥaḍārāt ellī daxalithā, tistawʿib el-mufradāt ellī gat-laha min 
hāzihi el-luġāt. wa-lākin ẓallat, munzu al-qidam wa ḥattā al-yōm, taskun fī bēt al-qawāʿid 
wa-l-grammar al-xāṣ bīhā. w-da wāḍiḥ giddan fī el-dirāsāt al-luġawiyya el-ḥadīsa ellī 
bituʾakkid en al-luġa al-maṣriyya el-ḥadīsa aw el-muʿāṣira hiya luġa ibnat al-luġāt el-ʾadīma fi 
šaklahā n-nihāʾī el-mawgūd al-muʿāṣir el-ʾān, w-ellī ha-yitṭawwar ṭabʿan ilā aškāl uxrā 
biẓuhūr aškāl uxrā. 
SEG2.  
… amma ann el-fuṣḥā titsammā hiyya l-ʿarabiyya fa-anā yaʿnī ma-ʾaẓonneš enn fī, fi waʾt min 
el-awʾāt kān fī luġa ʿarabiyya fuṣḥā mawgūda fī ay fatra tārīxiyya waḍḥa yaʿnī. kān fī luġa 
ʿarabiyya, hiyya gimāʿ li-šitāt al-ʿadīd min al-luġāt ellī kāt mawgūda fi l-gazīra el-ʿarabiyya w-
ellī kānet bitaxtalif fī-mā baynahā fī asmāʾ al-ašyāʾ: fī asmāʾ el-naxīl wa asmāʾ el-assad wa 
asmāʾ el-sēf […] wa-huwa min aṭ-ṭabīʿī enn el-luġa ellī bitanšaʾ fī mugtammaʿ faqīr ṣaḥrāwī 
takūn aqqal taṭawwuran wa-ingāzan men luġa našaʾat fī mugtammaʿ zirāʿī zay maṣr. el-
mugtammaʿ el-zirāʿī fī maṣr ʾaddem ḥaḍāra qadīma zāta mustawayāt ʿadīda fil-saqāfa wa-fi 
l-fann wa-fi l-ʿilm wa-fi l-luġa wa-fi l-adab, lā yumkin an tatawwafar fī mā yusammā bi-l-
alsina, w-anā baʾuṣṣir ʿalā enn anā asammīha alsina laʾennahā kānet tunṭaq wa-lā tuktab fi l-
ġālib […] wa-lam tuktab illā mutaʾaxirran, wa-ʿindamā kutibat kāna fī awqāt lissa hāzihi al-
luġa lam tastaqirr […] ḥattā anna kul el-manṭiʾa ʿindamā arādat fil-ʿaṣr al-ḥadīs wa-l-muʿāṣir 
an tataʿallam al-luġa al-ʿarabiyya kanat talgaʾ ilā al-mudarris al-maṣri. humma fi l-ḥaʾīʾa 
beysammūhā el-maṣrī beyʿallemhum ʿarabī; miš mumkin el-maṣrī yeʿallemhum ʿarabī, ha-
yʿallemhum maṣrī […] kul el-manṭiʾa izā kānu ʿarab fa-humma miš fī ḥāga ilā mudarris maṣrī 
yeʿallemhum ʿarabī, wa-lākin lamma itʿallimū itʿallimū maṣrī. 
SEG3.  
el-kull beyitkallim luġa taʾrīban wāḥda, el-furūʾ bēnhā furū’ basīṭa, w-mumkin tekūn fī baʿḍ el-





ṭabʿan wāḥid ʿurūbī ha-yʾullik “ēh el-xarāb da!” we “ēh el-bawaẓān da!” we “fēn el-luġa el-
ʿarabiyya?”, “ḍāʿit luġet ed-dīn w-el-qurʾān w-kaza!” we “kul da ḥarām!” w-yoʾaf ḍid da. ṭab 
lēh? ṭab xalāṣ en-nās istaxdimethā. uʾʿud intā baʾā w-ūl ellī intā ʿāyiz tuʾūlū w-en-nās šaġġāla 
ʿādī. […] w-el-kalimāt dī lil-asaf ma-bitxuššeš el-qamūs, w-el-qawāmīs nafsaha qawāmīs 
ʿāgiza; yaʿnī lā tuʿabbir ḥaqīqatan ʿan el-luġa el-qāʾima. wa kamā anna l-qawāmīs fī maʿnāhā 
al-ʿilmī yagib an tuʾxaz min taḥt, mina n-nās, ilā al-tasgīl fi l-qāmūs, iḥnā ellī biyiḥṣal ʿandinā 
el-ʿaks. el-qāmūs benergaʿ li-l-kalām bitāʿ lisān el-ʿarab w-el-ḥagāt el-ʾadīma, baynamā dī 
ḥagāt intahit. […] kull el-qawāmīs fi l-dinyā betitʿimel, betittāxid min luġat en-nās w-titʿimel 
qawāmīs, iḥnā be-l-ʿaks biniʿlebhā; bengīb mufradāt w-nḥāwil nimaššīhā ġaṣb ʿan en-nās. zay 
mā beyīgī magmaʿ el-luġa l-ʿarabiyya yistaxdimlī kilmet el-muxašlab badal el-izāz; el-zugāg 
aw izāz. mahu l-zugāg tibʾā faṣīḥā w-el-izāz tibʾā ʿāmmiyya. innamā el-etnēn miš ʿarabī, laʾinn 
el-ʿarabī bitaʿhā muxašlab. fa-anā balāʾī nafsī fi l-nihāya mitḥāṣir, wa-lākin hāzā l-ḥiṣār 
ġaṣbin ʿannu biyanfakk wa yazūb kamā zāba ġayruhu min qabl wa intahā mina l-tārīx. laʾenn 
sunnit al-ḥayā al-taṭawwur wa-al-taqaddum. el-muškila enn ellī beyḥawlū yefreḍū ʿalā en-
nās tinṭaʾ izzāy w-titkallim izzāy miš mudrikīn enn dī muhemma mustaḥīla. 
SEG5.  
ma-hu da nafs el-muʿādil le-fikret en nās teʾullik […] ʿalā l-luġa btāʿitnā yeʾullik el-ʿarabiyya el-
maṣriyya. mā huwwa ma-yinfaʿš; ma-yinfaʿš abʾā el-inglīziyya el-firinsiyya, aw el-inglīziyya el-
maṣriyya, aw el-ʿarabiyya el-maṣriyya. yaʿnī intī bitḥuṭṭī ḥagāt… ma-timšīš yaʿnī. ma-yinfaʿš 
abʾā ʿarabī w-maṣrī. izzāy tīgī? fa-yʾollak laʾ, mā l-ʿarabiyya dī l-qawmiyya w-el-maṣriyya dī l-
waṭaniyya. laʾ, anā lā qawmiyya maṣriyya wa-lā qawmiyya ʿarabiyya, anā hawwiya 
maṣriyya. 
SEG6.  
fī ḥudūd. fi l-āxir anā yasārī; miš ha-ʾdar anšur ḥāga betitkallim ʿan el-raʾsimāliyya, masalan; 
miš ha-ʾdar anšur ḥāga maʿa l-niẓām. fī buʿd siyāsī fi l-mawḍūʿ. 
SEG7.  
… iḥnā min awwel yōm ulnā enn iḥnā ʿandinā tawagguh xāṣ bi-daʿm el-luġa l-ʿāmmiyya l-
maṣriyya. iḥnā balad lenā xuṣūṣiyya, šiʾnā am abēnā ʿalā fikra […] yasqut sībāwēh tabʿan! 
tabʿan! ma-fīš ḥāga ismahā sībāwēh! sībāwēh! anā mālī be-sībāwēh? sībāwēh da rāgil kān 
ʿāyiš hināk; fī nagd w-el-ḥigāz. anā mālī? 
SEG8.  
el-luġa el-ʿāmmiyya betiddīnī barāḥ aktar fi t-taʿbīr, bimā innī maṣri, w-betewṣal li-nās ketīr 
awī, ʿaks el-fuṣḥā. el-fuṣḥā miš kul en-nās bitatazawwaqhā, w-ṭūl el-waʾt hiyya ṣaʿba laʾinn.. 
el-luġa el-ʿarabiyya, luġet eḍ-ḍād yaʿnī, qawiyya w-ṣaʿba giddan. ḥattā hiyya muṣannafa min 
el-luġāt el-ṣaʿba fi l-ʿālam, zay… zay el-almāniyya, laʾinn el-almāniyya luġa aṣīla w-el-




el-ʿāmmiyya bitiddī raḥāba šwayya enn anā atkallim fī mawāḍīʿ aktar urayyiba li-n-nās. laʾinn 
en-nās hiyya dī el-luġa ellī betikkallim bīhā. zay mā ultellik, el-fuṣḥā baʾā … kidda. ṭūl ew-waʾt 
šiʿr el-ʿāmmiyya aʾrab li-n-nās min el-fuṣḥā. [...] el-luġa el-fuṣḥā bitxallīnī saʿāt atʿaddā el-
ʿāmmiyya; el-ʿāmmiyya bitxallīnī saʿāt ašraḥ. bas dī bitbān udret el-ḥakawātī. miš iḥnā 
ʿandinā ḥāga ismahā el-ḥakawātī ‘storyteller’? huwwa da. law anā ma-ʿandīš baʾā el-labāqa 
eš-šedīda giddan w-udritī ʿalā el-ḥuḍūr ṭūl el-waʾt - laʾinn barġī; el-ʿāmmiyya bitxallīnī arġī; 
miš kilma w-rad ġaṭāhā; el-ʿarabī kilma w-rad ġaṭāhā. […] w-barḍu el-ʿāmmiyya ġaniyya 
bimufradāthā, bas laʾinn barḍu daxal ʿalēhā kalimāt daxīla keteer w-laʾinnahā luġa miš aṣīla, 
yaʿnī el-ʿāmmiyya miš aṣīla. el-ʿāmmiyya fil-āxir ibṭī ʿalā yūnānī ʿalā hīrūġlīfī ʿalā ʿarabī. dī miš 
luġetnā; yaʿnī el-ʿarabiyya miš luġet maṣriyyīn. […] ʿašān kida iḥnā ixtaraʿnā el-ʿāmmiyya. el-
ʿāmmiyya el-maṣriyya lēh hiyya el-waḥīda ellī betitfihhem fī kul ḥitta fi l-ʿālam, el-ʿarabī? 
mustaḥīl el-ʿāmmiyya el-filisṭīniyya titfihhem fi l-ʿālam el-ʿarabī kullu – ʿand el-šawām; 
mustaḥīl el-gazāʾiriyya – miš el-amāzīg, el-ʿarabiyya, ellī betitʾāl ‘el-dārga’ fi l-gazāʾir – 
titfihhem. 
SEG10.  
laʾann hiyya lahā xuṣūṣiyya, w-laʾinn... hiyya mittaxda min kaza ḥaga, w-sahla, w-baʾdar 
ašraḥ bīhā ḥagāt kitīr, mushiba, yaʿnī fīhā ishāb, w-ḥilwa waqʿahā ʿa- l-wedn. el-gazāʾirī laʾʾa, 
el-ʿirāʾī laʾʾa. […] iḥnā aʾrab li-l-luġa el-ʿarabiyya min el-luġāt\ el-lahagāt et-tanya bas fī nafs 
el-waʾt hiyya betiddīnī barāḥ, laʾinn hiyya miš aṣīla. 
SEG11.  
šiʿr be-l-fuṣḥā, bas be-l-fuṣḥā btāʿitnā, miš bifuṣḥet el-badw betūʿ šibh el-gezīra… I’m sorry, 
bas anā ḍidd\ humma miš\ humma… el-wahhābiyyīn bawwaẓū ḥayāt el-maṣriyyīn ʿumūman 
– ḥattā fi l-islām yaʿnī ʿanduhum tafsīrāthum – bas kamān betūʿ šibh el-gezīra bawwaẓū l-
luġa, yaʿnī bitāʿitnā iḥnā. iḥnā fi l-āxir dī miš luġetnā, bas intī taktašifī enn iḥnā līnā xuṣūṣiyya. 
el-ʿāmmiyya līhā xuṣūṣiyya w-līhā qawāʿid nuṭʾ w-ktāba rahība, bas ṭabʿan ma-ḥaddiš beyibʾā 
maʿnī bīhā. 
SEG12.  
Malāmiḥ bitṣaddar el-aʿmāl bitāʿithā ellī btiṭlaʿ be-l-ʿāmmiyya innahā be-l-ʿāmmiyya; dūr el-
našr el-tanya ma-btiʿmelš kida, laʾinnahā bitxāf. […] law saʾalti dār našr betunšur kitabēn, 
talāta be-l-ʿāmmiyya “huwwa da tawagguh ʿandak?”, yeʾullak “lā, laʾ, ʿādī yaʿnī el-kātib 
huwwa ellī kattab”. [...] bas anā ka-dār našr mayinfaʿš aktib el-kilma dī – bitastafizzinī giddan 
– ellī hiyya “al-ārāʾ al-wārida fī hāzā l-kitāb tuʿabbir ʿan raʾy al-muʾallif be-l-ḍarūra”. laʾ xāliṣ 
ʿalā fikra. law anā miš muqtaniʿ el-mafrūḍ ma-nšurš, laʾʾin da beyʿabbar ʿannī w-beyʿabbar 






ṭūl el-waʾt kān garāyid w-ṭūl el-waʾt kān… kuttāb kubār, ṭūl el-waʾt kān musaqqafīn fī ʾaʿadāt 
w-yebdaʾū yʾūlu “laʾʾa yā mḥammad ma-yinfaʿš teʿmil kida” aw “mḥammad lāzim miš ʿārfa 
teʿmelū ēh”. fa-baʾullu awya ma-hu da lāzim fa-l-lāzim da ha-niʿmilu fī dār našr tanyā, bas 
bimā inn malāmiḥ ʿamalnāhā ʿašān niksar bīhā l-lāzim fa-iḥnā beniʿmil kul el-ḥagāt ellī hiyya 
miš lāzim. 
SEG14.  
iḥnā ʿayzīn ellī yegammaʿ ma-yfarraʾš. el-luġa el-ingilīziyya bitfarraʾ ma-bitgammaʿš; el-
riwāya fil-āxir kām waḥid ha-yiʾrāhā ingilīzī? bas iḥnā baʾīna baṣṣīn-lahā bi-šakl tānī: enn iḥnā 
fī gumhūr miš adrīn nurūḥlu. fa-xalāṣ iḥnā binṭallaʿ ḥāgāt bitrūḥ li-l-gumhūr ellī iḥnā ʿayzīn 
nurūḥlu, w-fī gumhūr tānī mawgūd hināk kidda mumkin nurūḥlu; da fi l-taḥrīr yaʿnī; fi l-
gamʿāt el-xāṣṣa ellī entī ʾultī ʿalēhā – el-AUC yaʿnī baʾṣud – fa-xallīnā nrūḥ. 
SEG15.  
kān min tesʿa w-tesʿīn w-eḥnā l-IVRs kullahā btāʿet Vodafone… formal. formal bemaʿnā ēh? 
enn anā baddī el-commands kullahā aw el-orders le-l-customers formally. w-el-indicational 
ḥattā IVR ellī beykallemūhā bardū kānit kullahā formal. zay mā ultelik: geh el-taġyīr menēn? 
enn huwwa\ laʿinn el-… customers kulluhom maḥaddiš beyismaʿ ay ḥāga xāliṣ min el-IVR w-
beyḥawlū yewṣalū le-agents betūʿ el-call centres ʿašān yefhamū menhum aktar. ʿamalnā 
research zay mā ultelik, w-kān el-majority betʾūl enn humma miš fahmīn ḥāga, w-ennu 
humma bey-prefer enn huwwa yekkallim maʿ ḥad yifham mennu aktar; yisʾalu, yerud ʿalēh… 
baʿd mā ʿamalnā el-research da fa-qarrarnā enn iḥnā kul el-IVRs bitāʿit Vodafone ha-
titġayyar min el-formal le-l-slang. ḥattā kamān el-messijjāt ellī benebʿathā lel-customers 
baʾet slang. ma-fhāš\ ma-fīš ṣīġet el-order, ellī huwwa ‘inta lāzim teʿmil kaza’, laʾ, baʾet be-
ṭarīʾa friendly… w-tewṣal le-l-customers be-surʿa giddan, w-yefhamūhā… ʿāwiz aʾullek yaʿnī 
men sāʿit mā ʿamalnā kida baʾā fī self-help tool kebīra giddan. self-help yaʿnī ēh? yaʿnī el-
customer yaʿtamid ʿalā nafsu; miš miḥtāg enn anā addīluh musaʿda. anā mumkin axallīh yaʿnī 
min A to Z, min awwel mā yešterī el-xaṭ liġāyit mā yašterik fi l-Internet, fi l-ADSL, kul ḥāga 
min ġēr mā yetkallim maʿ ay ḥad; kul ḥāga huwwa yiʿmilhā bi-nafsu. 
SEG16.  
fi l-awwel tabʿan kān ṣaʿb awī. yaʿnī fī kalām keda kān ṣaʿb awī enn anā aġayyaru men formal 
le-slang. zay ʿayiz aʾūl masalan ‘abl kida’; ‘min qabl’, yaʿnī abl kida kunnā benʾulhā. fī kalām 
kida kān beyibʾā ṣaʿb awī. bas fi l-awwel bṣarāḥa kunnā metʿāmlīn maʿ vendor, advertising 
agency, hiyya ellī kanet beteʿmellenā el-script da […] li-ġāyit lammā\ yaʿnī men urayyib barḍu 
xalāṣ baʾā el-mawḍūʿ maʿānā iḥnā ellī bneʿmel el-script bas xadnā el-experience menhum, el-







… btibʾā beṭarīʾa yaʿnī mubassaṭa giddan, slang giddan, w-f nafs el-waʾt fī kalām barḍu ma-
ʾdarš aʾūlu, fa-lāzim beyitʾelib formal šwayya. fa-hiyya\ huwwa mā bēn el-etnēn, bas miš 
formal awī wa-lā slang awī. yaʿnī ma-ʾdarš aʾullo “inta law daxalt fi l-yōm ellī baʿd kida miš 
ʿārif hatiʾdar teʿmel..” yaʿnī, fa-fī ḥagāt kida betbʾā\ bendaxxal fīhā formal šwayya laʾinn anā 
ma-yinfaʿš aʾūlhā slang xāliṣ. fa-iḥnā yaʿnī wa-lā slang awī, ellī huwwa baʾā bakkallim ka-
ʾenni bakkallim fi l-šāriʿ, wa-lā formal. fa-hiyya mā bēn el-etnēn, dī ellī ṣaʿba awī. 
SEG18.  
wa-llāhī iḥnā mešēnā maʿ el-yaʿnī\ “cope with the change”. yaʿnī huwwa\ laʾinn el-nās hiyya 
ellī ʿāwza kida. w-eḥnā el-mafrūd enn iḥnā širka bitʾaddim services […] fa-anā lāzim aʿraf el-
customer needs w-aʿmelhā. fa-huwwa el-mawḍūʿ kān badaʾ yantašir, yantašir – enn huwwa 
xalāṣ mawḍūʿ el-slang da – w-ḥatta ʿal-facebook, ʿala el-mobile el messijjāt: kul da slang. fa-
kān lāzim ne-cope; ma-yinfaʿš enn anā abʾā māšī fī ḥitta w-el-nās fī ḥitta tanya xāliṣ. fa-
mumkin nekūn yaʿnī sāhimnā yaʿnī ka-part men el-taġyīr, bas already el-taġyīr kān mawgūd. 
SEG19.  
al-ʿāmmiyya hiya lahga wa-laysat luġa, liʾanna l-luġata lahā qawāʿid maktūba wa-maʿrūfa. 
wa-laysat al-ʿāmmiyya al-miṣriyya faqat bal anna kulla luġata fi l-ʿālam lahā lahga. al-lahga 
al-ʿāmmiyya hiya ašhar al-ʿāmmiyāt al-ʿarabiyya, wa-laʿalla l-sabab fī hāzā huwwa al-fann al-
miṣrī allazī daxala hāḏihi al-bilād fī fatra qadīma wa anna muʿẓam hāʾulāʾ al-fannānīn gāʾū ilā 
miṣr wa-lamaʿū fi l-qāhira, fa-ntašarat al-ʿāmmiyya min hāzā al-munṭalaq. al-ʿāmmiyya 
tuʿtabar iḥdā mukawwināt luġat al-ṣaḥāfa liʾanna […] luġat aṣ-ṣaḥāfa al-muʿāṣira hiya l-luġa 
as-sālisa. hiya arqā min al-ʿāmmiyya wa-aqal min al-fuṣḥā; hiya wasaṭ mā baynahum. 
SEG20.  
el-ʿāmmiyya el-miṣriyya, anā raʾyī innahā mustawā min mustawayāt el-luġa wa-hiya ibna 
šarʿiyya lil-luġa al-ʿarabiyya al-fuṣḥā. […] el-lahga al-ʿāmmiyya taʿrīfī līhā ennahā tustaxdam 
fī el-ḥayā l-ʿamma fī al-mustawā eš-šaʿbī baʿīdan ʿan el-mustawā er-rasmī aw el-mukātabāt 
er-rasmiyya. 
SEG21.  
el-ʿāmmiyya be-n-nisbālī hiyya ṭarīʾ lil-hurūb min el-iškāliyyāt ellī mumkin yaqaʿ fīhā eš-šaxṣ 
ellī betastadʿīhā el-fuṣḥā min nawāḥī el-iltezām be-qawāʿid el-luġa, be-mustuwā muʿayyan 
men el-balāġa, be-usus nuṭq muʿayyana. fa-l-ʿāmmiyya ilā ḥaddin mā betumassil el-mahrab 
min kul hāḏihī el-quyūd, izā gāza tasmiyyethā bel-quyūd. wa-hiya fiʿlan hiyya qawāʿid wa 
lakkinahā aṣbaḥat qawāʿid muqayyida beyibʾā men eṣ-ṣaʿb el-taʿāmul bīhā ʿalā mustawayāt 
igtimāʿiyya mutafawta. fa-aṣbaḥit hiya l-ʿāmmiyya ben-nisba le-l-gamīʿ ḥal wasaṭ […] ka-nōʿ 
men anwāʿ el-tawāṣul mumkin en huwwa yerbuṭ bēn fiʾāt wa-šarāʾiḥ igtimāʿiyya muxtalifet 




w-miš el-lahga el-ʿāmmiyya el-rāqiya aw ʿāmmiyyet el-musaqqafīn kamā yuqāl ʿanhā, wa-
lākin […] ʿāmmiyya aqal kaṯīran min al-mustawā al-margū wa-l-maṭlūb 
SEG23.  
wāḥid zay ḥalātī […] xāyif enn huwwa yeddī saqaṭāt luġawiyya fa-tuḥsab ʿalēh fa-yuhān fī 
waḍʿu el-akādīmī. […] aṣbaḥet el-fuṣḥā qāṣira ʿalā el-nuxba, fa-aṣbaḥet šēʾ mustahgan […] 
wa-aṣbaḥet beyeʿtebrūhā fī baʿḍ el-aḥyān nōʿ men anwāʿ el-esteʿlāʾ. 
SEG24.  
maḥaṭṭāt al-metro, munz sanawāt kāna yanṭiq be-ʿāmmiyya wa-bi-ṣawt yusabbib inziʿāg li-r-
rākib, fa-badallan min an yabtaʿid ʿan er-raṣīf yaqtarib. ammā ḥīnamā uṣġī ilā muzīʿa zāta 
ṣawt gamīl wa-šagiyy ilā āxiruhu, tataḥaddas bi-fuṣḥā munaġġama gamīla... anā wāḥid min 
an-nās ḥaqīqatan azhab ilā maḥaṭṭāt al-metro, lā le-rukūb el-metro, wa-lākin li-samāʿ ṣawt\ 
ḥattā ẓanantu fi l-awwel annahā imraʾa taglis wa ṭalabt an aškurahā, fa-izā bihi annahu 
tasgīl yaʿnī ṣawṭī wa-hāzā kāna mumtiʿ. 
SEG25.  
ṯumma anna mā yagmaʿ al-ʿarab gamīʿan… yaʿnī rubammā law galasa al-ʿarab fī ḥugra 
muġlaqa miṯl hāzihi, wa-taḥaddas kullun minhum bi-luġatih, nisbet el-fahm sa-takūn ṯalāṯīn 
aw arbiʿīn fi l-miʾa […] lākin ḥīnamā yataḥaddaṯ aḥad bi-l-ʿarabiyya al-fuṣḥā, sa-yafham al-
gamīʿ. 
SEG26.  
el-luġa el-ʿāmmiyya hiya luġet tawāṣul; šafra min šafarāt et-tawāṣul, lākin mayinfaʿš ʿalā l-
iṭlāq enn anā agʿal minhā miqyās aw miʿyār aw luġat tawwaḥud. […] el-ʿāmmiyya be-n-
nesbālī luġet igtihād; nōʿ men anwāʿ el-ʿalāmāt el-muttafaq ʿalēhā; ʿalāmāt ṣawtiyya darugat 
bayna fiʾa, tawasaʾet, intaqalet min fard le-magmūʿa, wa-hākazā, wa-hākazā. 
SEG27.  
el-ʿāmmiyya dī […] anā baʿtaberhā men el-maxāṭer eš-šadīda ellī bethaddid el-luġa. laʾenn 
enta hatīgī fi yōm men el-ayyām miš āder temayyiz mīn el-faṣīḥ w-mīn ellī miš faṣīḥ, w-ēh 
miʿyār el-faṣāḥa. hal huwwa šuyūʿ el-istixdām? hal-huwwa l-qudra ed-dalāliyya? hal huwwa 
l-aṣl? hal huwwa t-taṣrīf? 
SEG28.  
dantū l-faraʿna! buṣṣū l-timsāl; šabah-kū. buṣṣū samār el-nīl; šabah-kū. entū lī-kū luġa. el-bīḍ 
ellī entū šāyfinhum mawgūdīn fī maṣr dōl […] ʿamr ibn el-ʿāṣ gābhum warāh ʿalā ḍhūr el-




ma-yinfaʿš fī yōm men el-ayyām enn entī kuntī tšūfī – w-akīd entī ʿreftī – ennek tesmaʿī ayyām 
gamāl ʿabd en-nāṣir – el-fatra dī, ṭabʿan miš ʿašān gamāl ʿabd en-nāṣir kān huwwa en-nabī l-
qawmiyya, lākin fi l-fatra dī kānet ēh en-našīd? ‘el-arḍ btetkallim ʿarabī’ – ma-kānš fī magāl 
enn maṣr tetxāniʾ maʿ al-gazāyer ʿašān šwayyit kōra. kwayyis? lākin ēh ellī ḥaṣal baʿd xināʾet 
el-kōra? ‘intū balad el miš ʿārif kām w-kām…’ ṭabʿan ma-bāʾetš ‘šahīd’, baʾet ay lafẓ āxar. 
‘intū? Intū mīn? da-ntū ʿamaylā w-ṣahāyna wlād lazīna …’ da ʿal-maṣriyyīn. fa-badaʾit el-
huwwa tattasiʿ. dilwaʾtī eš-šuġl baʾā miš laʾyīn ḥāga; mā-hu anā kida kida law ḥattenī gamb 
wāḥid gazāʾirī w-ma-tkallemnāš iḥnā l-etnēn hatʾūlī ʿalēnā exwāt. kwayyis? nafs eš-šakl, nafs 
eṭ-ṭūl, nafs eš-šaʿr w-nafs el-lōn. w-mumkin el-adān yeʾaddin telāʾīnā iḥnā l-etnēn benʾūm 
neṣallī. kwayyis? tefṣilīnā b-ēh baʾā? bel-luġa. be-l-lahga. kwayyis? law el-gazāʾirī itkallem 
ʿalā šwayyit el-faransāwī bitāʿu ‘šūf, miš da ellī betʾūl ʿalēh axūya fi l-ʿurūba? ahu talat-tirbaʿ 
kalāmu faransāwī ya ʿam!’ […] humma delwaʾtī byelʿabū ʿalā guzʾeyyit el-ṯawra el-
burtuqāliyya fī aswaʾ ṣuwarhā, iʿtimādan ʿalā ēh? ʿal-ʿunṣuriyya. 
SEG30.  
anā ha-stabʿid el-muʾamra; hiyya l-muʾamra en-nōbādī baʾā min ed-dāxil miš min el-xārig. 
yaʿnī el-muʾamra mawgūda lākin el-maṣdar ixtalaf [...] naḥnu mūlaʿūna bi-taqlīd el-ġarb 
ḥattā baʿd an raḥala l-ġarb. 
SEG31.  
el-xōf barḍu ennu izā l-ʿammiyyāt intaṣarit wa-aṣbaḥit luġa muqaʿʿada aw luġa maktūba, 
asʾal suʾāl; māzā sa-nafʿal be-l-qurʾān? […] taḥwīl hāzihi al-ʿammiyyāt ilā luġāt – yibʾā ʿandinā 
l-luġa l-miṣriyya wa-l-luġa t-tūnisiyya, wa, wa… ilā āxirihi; ʿišrīn aw etnēn w-ʿišrīn luġa – hinā 
kārisa. lēh? laʾinnu al-qurʾān al-karīm al-wāḥid sa-yantahī! 
SEG32.  
el-ʿāmmiyya miš luġet targama. qad, qad takūn luġat tafsīr, luġat šarḥ, luġat tabsīṭ. lākin ka-
targama, laʾ. anā lammā bāgī atargim el-qurʾān el-karīm le-l-luġa el-inglīziyya ma-babaṣaṭūš. 
lēh? et-tafsīr aw et-tabsīṭ mustawā muʿaqqad min el-luġa, ba-agību be-mustawā aqal bi-
stixdām mufradāt wa-murādifāt. […] da et-tafsīr. lākin enn anā atargim, enn anā bašūf el-lafẓ 
el-mukāfiʾ – bi-ḏāt el-maʿnā wa-ḏāt ed-dalāla, wa-ḏāt el-qīma l-īḥāʾiyya, kwayyis – w-abdaʾ 
aštaġal ʿalēh. 
SEG33.  
anā lastu ḍid el-fuṣḥā wa-lastu ḍid el-ʿāmmiyya. anā amīl ilā l-fuṣḥā akṯar mina l-ʿāmmiyya, 
wa-lākin likul maqām maqāl. el-luġa l-fuṣḥā lahā mustawā, wa-l-luġa al-ʿāmmiyya lahā 
mustawā fi t-twāṣul wa-lākin bišurūṭ […] anā ḍid an takūn al-luġa\ al-lahga l-ʿāmmiyya luġet 
kitāba, lākin attafiq ayḍan ennahā takūn luġat ibdāʿ. yaʿnī, al-ibdāʿ bel-luġa\ bel-lahga l-
ʿāmmiyya maṭlūb laʾenn barḍu lahu ḥuqūlu d-dalāliyya wa-lahu ṭāqātu l-īḥāʾiyya wa-l-
ibdāʿiyya el-maṭlūba. wa-ayḍan al-ibdāʿ bi-l-fuṣḥā barḍu lahu nafs hāzā l-amr. wa-le-kul nōʿ 
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adabī, aw kul mustawā luġawwī fi l-ibdāʿ el-adabī, lahu gumhūru wa-lahu l-mutaḏawwiq aw 
el-mutallaqī l-xāṣ bih. 
SEG34.  
… tarakit niẓām taʿlīm, tarakit rawāsib ṯaqāfiyya, tarakit nuẓum igtimāʿiyya, tarakit mabādiʾ 
aqnaʿit eš-šaʿb el-maṣrī be-ʾinn […] ʿašān tibʾā mutaṭawwir, mafhūm el-ḥadāsa baʾā muqtarin 
be-mafhūm el-iġtirāb, enn anā aqtabis men el-ġarb. 
SEG35.  
aṣbaḥ raṣīdī ṣifr, fa-aṣbaḥt mustawrid; aṣbaḥt anā mufarraġ ʿaqliyyan wa-fikriyyan, w-badaʾt 
astawrid; astawrid el-afkār […] le-daragit enn anā waṣal biyyā al-xuwāʾ le-daragit enn anā 
astawrid el-luġa. 
SEG36.  
aṣbaḥ delwaʾtī el-murādif liṯ-ṯaqāfa, el-murādif enn el-banī ādam da mutaʿallim, huwwa 
ixṭilāṭu be-s-saqāfa l-ġarbiyya. yaʿni lammā yuʿʿud gamb mennī wāḥid zay axūya ed-doctōr 
mḥammad gamāl – rāgil besmi-llāhī māšāʾ-allāh, ḍalīʿ fī qawāʿid el-luġa l-ʿarabiyya, ḥāfiẓ 
kunūz et-turāṯ wa-ummahāt al-kutub wa-hākazā, wa-hākazā – lā yumkin enn anā aʾūl ʿalēh 
en huwwa ēh, rāgil musaqqaf, aw mutamaddin aw, aw, aw. awṣifu be-innu huwwa ēh, rāgil 
mistašyax, kwayyis; rāgil antīka; rāgil meʿattaʾ. lākin law huwwa rāḥ gay mitkallim maʿāya 
talat-arbaʿ kalemāt agnabiyya, kwayyis, “allāh! da er-rāgil dawwat mulāṣiq li-l-fikr el-ġarbī 
el-ḥadīs”. fa-aṣbaḥ anā ʿandī henā fī maṣr taḥdīdan enn el-exṭelāṭ bel-ġarb aw mugārāt el-
ġarb, aw muḥākāt el-ġarb huwwa nōʿ min anwāʿ, el-ēh, el-ḥadāsa. 
SEG37.  
… la’enn iḥnā axadnā enn kul šēʾ ḥelw lā-bud yekūn madmūġ be-damġa agnabeyya […] 
ṭabʿan ellī byeddīnī barra da ma-byeddīnīš ʿašān yebnīlī šaxṣiyyetī ellī anā ʿāyezhā teṭlaʿ, laʾ, 
huwwa ʿāyiz yebnī šaxṣiyyetī zay mā huwwa ʿāyez-hā. […] in ma-kunteš šabīh līh, laʾ fa-ʿal-
aqal abʾā muwāʾim aw maʿāh fi nafs el-etegāh. 
SEG38.  
el-ʿawlama dī walledit amr axar. ēh huwwa? xōf w-roʿb badaʾ yiẓhar ʿalā asāsu nōʿ min anwāʿ 
raddit el-feʿl el-ʿaksiyya. fi ēh? fi enn anā baʾēt min kutr xōfī badaʾt aʿmel ellī anā el-mafrūḍ 
aʿmelu men zaman. badaʾt enn anā delwaʾtī anādī be-l-taʿrīb, badaʾt delwaʾtī enn anā anādī 
be-l-ḥifāẓ ʿalā l-luġa l-ʿarabiyya. kwayyis? laʾenn muḥtawā l-ʿawlama be-n-nesbālī anā gaylī 
ka-ġūl, fa-ḥnā xufnā ennu yuʿād istiʿmarnā marra uxrā. yaʿni, ma-tiftekrīš en kull ellī beyeḥṣal 
delwaʾtī men ḥirṣ ʿa t-taʿrīb w-men ḥirṣ ʿalā ḥmāyet el-luġa l-ʿarabiyya w-da kullu, ḥirṣan ʿalā 
l-luġa. lā mā-ḥnā ḥarīṣīn ʿalā l-luġa min ayyām… hanʾūl men ayyām el-qurʾān el-karīm. lākin 
lēh tazāyad? laʾinn anā aṣbaḥ uddāmī ġūl anā miš ʿārif huwwa ʿāyiz yeblaʿ mennī ēh. fa-




… in lam yaʿmal ʿalā iʿādet el-luġa l-ʿarabiyya ilā mā kanat ʿalēh fī mawḍiʿ er-riyāda, fa-huwa 
ʿal-aqal ha-yeḥmīhā min at-taraddī w-yʾakkid sabāt-hā. 
SEG40.  
anā miš ha-ngaḥ ṭabʿan […] lākin anā baḥarrak el-miyāh ar-rākida. yaʿnī le-awwel marra 




Appendix II: Survey Report 
Q1 Referring tag87: 
 
 
Q2 Survey language: 230 (59.3%) Arabic; 158 (40.7%) English 
Q3 Age: 
 
Q4 Gender: 154 (39.7%) male; 234 (60.3%) female 
 
                                                             





Q6 Employment: 244 (62.9%) employed; 144 (37.1%) not employed 
Q7 Highest academic qualification: 
 




Q9 Main language of education: 
 
Q10 Are you a student now? Yes: 170 (43.8%); No: 218 (56.2%) 
Q11 Do you have a mobile phone? Yes: 387 (99.7%); No: 1 (.3%) 
Q12 Is it a smart phone? (N = 387) 
 




Q14 How available is computer access in your immediate surroundings? 
 
Q15 How do you access the Internet? 
 




Q17 How often do you use SA in your daily life? 
 
Q18 In your work, how important is competence in SA? (N = 244) 
 
Q19 In your opinion, how important is it that SA should be part of (a) compulsory school 




Q20 How confident are you in using English? 
 
Q21 How often do you use English in your daily life? 
 




Q23 In your opinion, how important is it that English should be part of (a) compulsory 
school education, (b) higher education (university)? 
 
Q24 In your opinion, which of the following statements is the most accurate definition of EA? 
 




Q26 Attitudes towards VE’s new recorded message in EA: 
 
Q27 Familiarity with Wikipedia Masry: 
 




Q29 Familiarity with LA: 
 
Q30 Attitudes towards LA in movie billboards: 
 




Q32 Language choice when writing an email to a close Egyptian friend88: 
 
Q33 Language choice when writing an email to superior at work (N = 244)89: 
 
Q34 Language choice when writing an email to teacher/lecturer (N = 158)90: 
 
                                                             
88 ‘SA+EA’ category imposed retrospectively based on recurring answers in the ‘other’ option. 
89 ‘SA or English’ category imposed retrospectively based on recurring answers in the ‘other’ option. 
90 ‘SA or English’ category imposed retrospectively based on recurring answers in the ‘other’ option. 
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Q35 Language choice when writing a text message to a close Egyptian friend (N = 387)91: 
 
Q36 Language choice when writing a text message to parent (N = 352)92: 
 
Q37 Language choice when writing a handwritten letter to a close Egyptian friend (N = 384)93: 
 
                                                             
91 ‘SA+EA’ category imposed retrospectively based on recurring answers in the ‘other’ option. 
92 ‘SA+EA’ category imposed retrospectively based on recurring answers in the ‘other’ option. 
93 ‘SA+EA’ category imposed retrospectively based on recurring answers in the ‘other’ option. 
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Q38 Language choice when writing a handwritten memo to superior at work (N = 228): 
 
Q39 Language choice when writing a handwritten letter to principal/dean (N = 170): 
 





Q41 Which of the following statements most accurately describes your feeling about Egypt 
in relation to the Arab World? 
 
Q42 Which party did you vote for in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections [qawa'im 






Appendix III: Survey Printout 
A printout of the English version of the survey is attached on the next pages (pp. 314-
326), followed by the Arabic version (pp. 327-338). 
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